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ABSTRACT
Exploring Preschoolers’ Personal Epistemologies 
Using Focus Groups
by
Denise Lynne Winsor
Dr. Lisa D. Bendixen, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f Edueational Psyehology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
This is a qualitative study designed to use focus groups as a means o f identifying the 
personal epistemologies o f preschool children in an authentic learning environment. 
Personal epistemology is generally defined as the theory about the nature o f knowledge 
and the process o f knowing. Investigations o f young children are scarce in this field, and 
little  is known about the early onset o f epistemological development. However, recent 
research suggests a possible eonneetion between epistemie development and theory o f 
mind.
This study explores very young children and how their cognitive ability and 
interactions with peers may reveal information regarding epistemological development. 
The aim o f this study is two-fold: (1) to investigate three- to four-year-olds’ 
demonstration o f personal epistemology, and (2) to integrate developmental levels and 
dimensions o f knowledge into an epistemie matrix as a way to identify epistemological 
patterns.
Ill
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Focus groups are rarely utilized with children; however, they provide a platform to 
capture the essence o f the children’s knowledge in their own words. For this study the 
focus groups were based on the weekly classroom theme, and the whole class instruction 
was used as a catalyst to formulate epistemological questioning. The six ehild- 
participants were divided into two groups o f three and involved in a total o f eight focus 
groups over a four week period. Each week the children participated in a pre- 
instructional and a post-instructional focus group to distinguish their prior knowledge and 
past experiences from their understanding o f new information pertaining to the theme.
Constant comparative analysis was used during data collection in order to allow for 
follow-up questioning as a way to understand the children’s epistemological thinking in 
more depth. Data was coded inductively and deductively using ATLAS-T l software.
The twelve levels o f analysis ultimately resulted in three sets o f themes: individual 
epistemie profiles, group epistemie profiles, and overall preschooler’s epistemie profiles.
These themes suggest that preschoolers can and do demonstrate epistemological 
development and that focus groups provide a unique and abundant source o f 
epistemological insights. This study stands to promote theoretical, methodological, and 
edueational advancements in the field o f personal epistemology and with the research o f 
young children.
IV
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Epistemology has been the focus o f philosophy for centuries and addresses questions 
regarding an individual’s beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and the nature and 
process o f knowing (Holer &  Pintrich, 1997). What arc an individual’ s beliefs about the 
nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing? How do we know what we know? 
When we are in the process o f constructing our knowledge, how do we make decisions 
about what we believe and whom we believe? These are just a few o f the questions 
asked in personal epistemology research, which is deeply rooted in Piaget’s “ genetic 
epistemology.”  Piaget (1950) had an interest in developing a theory o f knowledge, that 
is, how individuals come to know the world, and he approached it by researching 
children’s cognitive development. Vygotsky (1978) introduced a socio-cultural 
perspective to cognitive development. Both theories have important aspects in common 
and have been influential in personal epistemology theory and research.
Contemporary personal epistemology research was rejuvenated by Perry in the 
1970’s. Since then it has been heavily researched in college students and more recently 
has focused on development in adolescents. Young children’s personal epistemology 
research continues to be absent; however, that may be shifting with the recent connection
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
between young children’s personal epistemology and theory o f mind development (Burr 
&  Hofer, 2002).
Most researchers in the field agree on a general trajectory o f epistemological 
development that begins as a type o f dualism, progressing into multiplism, and then 
finally into evaluativism. Chandler (2002) states that this is the same stage progression 
that appears in most research in personal epistemological development, regardless o f who 
is studied and no matter what the conditions or measure. Over the past 35 years, personal 
epistemology has been conceptualized in a variety o f frameworks. The current study w ill 
review various models that view personal epistemology in terms o f development, belief 
systems, theories, cognitive resources, and integrative process.
Despite that personal epistemology research has neglected investigating children, 
many have hypothesized about the onset o f personal epistemological development in 
young children. Other areas o f cognitive development have flourished in their 
investigation o f young children. Theory o f mind refers to a developmental milestone in 
which children begin to recognize that other’s perspectives d iffer from their own. This is 
an area that has dominated children’s cognitive developmental research. Researching 
young children’s personal epistemology may uncover important information about the 
current trajectory o f personal epistemology development.
The puipose o f this study is to investigate preschooler’s developing epistemologies 
by exploring relationships among their peers in a classroom environment. Additionally, 
this study aims to develop an innovative methodology that is new to the research in 
personal epistemology and very young children. This study uses foeus groups as one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
component of the methodology as a means o f identifying interactions among peers that 
could contribute to their developing epistemologies.
It is the goal o f the study to contribute to personal epistemology research by meeting 
the future needs o f the field, enhancing educational perspectives for young children, and 
impacting the larger spectrum of personal epistemology with insights about early 
childhood epistemological development.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction
The range and variety o f literature that exists in personal epistemology research is 
becoming increasingly tnore innovative and diverse at a variety o f levels, ineluding age, 
gender, culture, subject domains, and measurement instruments, just to scratch the 
surface. Even with the considerable amount o f theoretical and empirical literature, there 
is little  consideration given to researching children’ s personal epistemology. Only until 
very recently have researchers been active in their investigations with children. The 
foeus o f this study involves young children’s personal epistemology in a preschool 
environment. It w ill also attempt to provide a more diverse lens for interpreting the 
trajectory o f individuals’ personal epistemology. W ithin this perspective, using a 
dynamic systems view from Bronfenbrenner (1975) and Minuchin (1974), a framework 
w ill be developed to identify children’s emerging personal epistemology. The dynamic 
systems framework that is proposed focuses on the child and his personal epistemology. 
Other internal factors related to the child w ill be investigated including his theory o f 
mind, affect, and language. In addition, the framework w ill include external factors in 
the ch ild ’ s environment including the child’s parents, preschool teacher, and classroom 
peers. This framework w ill guide the entire study including the literature review, 
research questions, and design.
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In itia lly  in this chapter there w ill be a broad and historical introduction to the study o f 
epistemology. The study o f epistemology is derived and deeply rooted in the disciplines 
o f philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. In order to integrate the complex framework 
■that w ill be proposed, it is essential to understand the foundation o f the diverse 
components o f epistemology. Following the historical overview o f the study o f 
epistemology, a much more narrow focus on personal epistemology literature and how it 
has been interpreted and integrated into the field o f edueational psychology w ill begin. 
The theoretical frameworks o f Piaget and Vygotsky are central factors to the field o f 
educational psychology and personal epistemology. These two theoretical frameworks 
w ill be discussed in terms o f how cognitive and social development are generally viewed 
w ithin the field. The next section w ill review the various models o f personal 
epistemology that are predominantly recognized in the field o f educational psychology 
and w ill be discussed according to their relevance for interpreting childhood 
epistemology. The models generally represent what is known about an individual’s 
beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and knowing (Hofer &  Pintrich, 2002). The 
models w ill be reviewed according to their definitional differences, terminology, traits 
and characteristics, empirical support, strengths, and limitations. Narrowing the focus 
more closely to this study, the next section w ill involve young children’s personal 
epistemology. In this section the importance o f investigating young children w ill be 
discussed, including developmental issues, research in children’s personal epistemology, 
methodological issues, theory o f mind, and children’ s personal epistemology and theoiy 
o f mind.
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Children’s theoiy o f mind has been researched eonsiderably over the past thirty years, 
and this chapter w ill review the theory o f mind literature that is relevant for the purposes 
o f the study. Once the overview o f children’s theory o f mind is presented, the discussion 
w ill turn to the integral eomponents related to the proposed study and w ill begin with the 
connection between children’s personal epistemology and theory o f mind.
Theoretical Frameworks 
Epistemology: The H istorical Perspective 
Epistemology is a branch o f philosophy that focuses on knowledge and is important 
to this study because it relates to a debate about subjective and objective truths. This 
debate has gone unresolved and continues to haunt educational psychology. Researching 
children may provide infomiation regarding subjective and objective knowledge. For 
centuries this has been a controversial issue, but in spite o f the confusion about many 
seemingly contradictory positions, a clear trend has emerged. Early trends in philosophy 
stressed knowledge as absolute and permanent (empiricism). Later theories placed more 
emphasis on the relativity o f knowledge and suggested a dependence on experience or 
context (rationalism). These more recent theories o f epistemology focus on the 
continuous development o f knowledge and active inferences about one’s world in a 
subjective and objective manner. What is noticeable in the trend is that it has shifted 
from a passive and static view o f knowledge towards a progressively more active and 
adaptive perspective o f how we think o f knowledge.
Early Greek philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, viewed knowledge 
as simply absolute. Knowledge ineorporated ideas that existed independent o f
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
individual’ s understanding o f the ideas themselves. It was Aristotle who contributed to 
plaeing more emphasis on logical and empirical methods o f obtaining knowledge but 
continued to support the position o f universal principles (Reed &  Johnson, 2000).
Looking back, it was Plato’s Republic that focused on the impact o f one’s emotional 
perspective. The study o f personal epistemology embraces this perspective but 
repetitively falls short. Although Socrates had moral and political ambitions toward the 
nature o f justice, it was Plato’ s interpretation o f Socratic conversations that extended to 
virtues o f justice, wisdom, courage, and moderation as they exist w ithin the individual 
and in society collectively. Plato spoke o f this unity by utilizing emotions, primarily love 
in the Phaedriis. For Plato, education was a matter o f leading the student from 
knowledge as a mere belief to knowledge as truth. Plato used the “ Allegory o f the Cave”  
to represent how uneducated individuals are restrained by their lack o f knowledge and 
hold the mistaken belief that the shadows on the walls are real. When individuals 
become knowledgeable, they then can escape from the cave into the light. Plato claimed 
that it was this type o f individual who would discover justice, knowledge, and objectivity.
Aristotle valued the idea o f truth and had an appreciation for the value and 
contributions o f observation and opinion in the pursuit o f knowledge as truth. Aristotle’s 
contributions to philosophy are too numerable to comment on here, but some say 
Aristotle has been labeled “ The Philosopher”  because he was vastly pro lific in his writing 
(Audi, 2001). One o f Aristotle’s significant works that made a large impact on the study 
o f epistemology is the Nicomachean Ethics, in which he contemplated the natural desire 
to achieve happiness, described functions o f human volition, expanded Plato’s ideas o f 
morals and virtue in a more neutral sense, diseusscd friendship, and stressed the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
importance o f knowledge. Aristotle suggests that because humans are rational, an 
educated individual unites morality and reason through wholesome actions. For 
Aristotle, the ultimate goal o f education is to assist individuals in understanding the world 
and their role in it (Reed &  Johnson, 2000). By doing this the individual acquires 
happiness, becomes a good and just representative for the community, and is able to 
function w ithin the community as a rational member. The aspect o f A ristotle ’s 
philosophy that has been particularly important in the elaboration o f epistemology is the 
idea o f not only choosing and doing good and just actions but identifying that humans 
need to execute the actions in a good and just manner. This supports humans as 
possessing the ability to be intentional beings. That is, Aristotle believed that individuals 
do things or possess knowledge that they believe to be good and just. These perceptions 
which take place in the mind o f the individual as images and are produced by the 
individual are linked to the social context and how we experience external objects.
Descartes is the most influential figure o f the intellectual revolution which challenged 
and overthrew the theories o f Aristotle. Fie was perplexed by the philosophieal 
skepticisms, and therel'ore used his knowledge o f mathematieal applications to develop 
the scientific method which helped gain certainty about human knowledge. In the 
Discourse o f  Methods, Descartes realized that it is human nature for humans to be 
deceived and mistaken. He thought i f  such mistaken beliefs did not undergo inquiiy and 
became foundational, then all knowledge built from the mistruth would be faulty. He 
proposed a program that all beliefs should be examined until a belief was arrived at that 
could not be doubted. He termed this “ systematic doubt”  (Reed &  Johnson, 2000). 
Deseartes concluded that an individual needs to reject all beliefs that can be doubted and
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the core o f an individual’ s foundational knowledge begins when they reach the belie f that 
cannot be doubted. Descartes’ theory is elassieally represented as, “ ./e pense, donc Je 
s u is f  as it was first published in French but is more commonly identifiable in Latin as 
“ cogito sum ergo”  which means “ 1 think; therefore, 1 am.”  Once individuals achieve this 
understanding, they ean go forward to develop a secure system o f knowledge. This is the 
core o f all scientific method we use in research today.
Descartes established other significant components that researchers continue to 
grapple with. Meditations was unique fo r the time; it explored the discoveiy o f doubt and 
the journey to certainty o f one’s own existence. It also further elaborated on the turmoil 
associated with establishing the existence o f God, incorporation o f the external world, 
and the relationship between the mind and the body. Much later in his writings Descartes 
incorporated questions o f psychology and ethics as they might relate to one’s 
epistemology in The Passions o f  the Soul (Audi, 2001).
In contemporary thinking we frequently refer to Descartes’ philosophy as the 
Cartesian System. Generally, there are three main points: (a) The essential unity o f 
knowledge, in which all sciences are linked together; (b) knowledge that is achieved 
should be useful in the life o f the individual; and (c) knowledge is constructed from the 
roots, and no knowledge should be considered absolute until it is compatible w ith one’s 
core beliefs. Descartes acknowledges that knowledge and humans are fallib le; therefore, 
it must be common practice at least “ once in a lifetim e”  to “ demolish everything and start 
again, right from the foundations”  (Meditations, 1641, cited in Kleiman &  Lewis, 1990, 
p.29). Descartes stresses the human’s fallible nature by pointing out that our senses can 
be deceiving; therefore, an individual needs to be cautious to place judgment during such
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doubtful times and defer to the reliable intellect o f the mind that was God’s g ift to man 
(Audi, 2001).
This idea that God is perfect and would not be deceitful by giving humans the ability 
to believe that many o f our ideas come from external objects must be sound, and 
therefore the external world exists (Kleiman &  Lewis, 1992). This is the facet o f the 
theory that perpetuates indifferences towards the Cartesian system, known as the 
Cartesian circle. It is a rhetorical stance that Descartes establishes. I f  the answer is that 
we can prove God’s existence from the premise that we have the capacity o f perception, 
then how is it that we can assume our perceptions are reliable? This is noteworthy in 
terms o f the present study o f epistemology because it relates to beliefs about the 
justification o f knowledge and personal epistemological development in general.
Descartes believed that everything in the external world was quantifiable. He saw 
material things as possessing indefinite variations o f shapes, sizes, and motions o f simple, 
single, and homogenous matter (Foucault, 1994). The unconscious experience was the 
single phenomenon that Deseartes could not explain mathematically; therefore, he 
proposed a dualistic theoiy. The theory suggests that there is a material substance and a 
thinking substance that are independent o f one another. The mind is related to an 
individual’ s soul and exists even i f  the body fails to exist. This is a controversial but 
noteworthy aspect o f the Cartesian system because it has never been satisfactorily sorted 
out, and it is eonnected to a substantially significant portion o f his attempt to construct a 
system o f knowledge (Kleiman &  Lewis, 1992). Descartes’ system o f knowledge starts 
with the subjective awareness o f the conscious self.
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Spinoza’s philosophy built upon the works o f Descartes w ith added reflection on his 
personal and social importance o f epistemology. He veered away from the Christian and 
Jewish biblical interpretations; his thinking was detached from the anthropomorphic 
conceptions o f god and he viewed these as both logical and theoretically unsound. 
Spinoza proposed a modern historical-critical method that was politically tolerant o f all 
religions. He believed that all individuals could live peacefully together provided that 
they look beyond the theological and cultural controversies that divided them (Popper, 
1992y
Spinoza proposed that individual truth comes from the knowledge that we have about 
ourselves and what facilitates our actions. This information we derive from within can 
then be connected with our unbiased attachment to reason. Spinoza realized the 
complexity o f this type o f thought and concluded “ all noble things are as d ifficu lt as they 
arc rare”  (Ethics, 1677, cited in Pojman, 2003 p. 570). This continues to demonstrate the 
struggle researchers have had w ith subjective and objective truths and how beliefs about 
knowledge have evaded intellectuals for centuries.
John Locke’s philosophies are presented m An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding {\69Q, cited in Kleiman &  Lewis, 1990, p. 193). According to Locke, 
what we know is always properly understood as the relationship between ideas. He 
viewed ideas as simple or complex and were ultimately derived from experience. His 
thinking was empirical, and he thought that human knowledge was based solely on what 
was within realistic reach o f the individual and certainty. Further, he believed that our 
knowledge is comprised o f many pieces and uniquely exists in the manner that we 
represent them; therefore, our knowledge is individually constructed and can be traced to
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the way that we access our mind through our innate abilities. Locke argued that 
knowledge alone was not adequate. He said that life requires the formation o f beliefs on 
matters where knowledge is not available. Our beliefs, Locke believed, need to be 
supervised by an authority for the purposes o f getting accurate information; it is a 
individuals’ moral obligation to do their best to get things right. He advocated for two 
types o f knowledge: (a) Knowledge that could be empirically verified, and (b) knowledge 
related to religion and ethics that is culturally embedded. Locke adapted the scientific 
method to be utilized when knowledge, perception, insight, and awareness were not 
possible. This would include collecting evidence for and against the proposition in 
question, analyzing the evidence to determine the probability o f the proposition, and 
weighing the evidence to determine one’s belief. This has a direct link to more advanced 
epistemological development.
It was a century later that David Hume maintained that moral obligation was a facet 
o f affect rather than reason. O f philosophy, Hume said it, “ cannot go beyond experience 
and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities o f human 
nature, ought to be at first rejected as presumptuous and chimerical’ ’ (Hume 1740, cited 
in Pojman, 2003, p. 726). This view was Hume’s starting point, and at the time it 
narrowed the scope o f human understanding by disconnecting the external world. He 
focused primarily on perceptions, and his work paralleled Locke but directly opposed 
Descartes’ attempts to prove the existence o f the external. Hume distinguishes between 
two types o f perceptions: impressions and ideas. He suggested that impressions come in 
two forms, sensations and reflections, and are stronger than ideas because they more 
frequently lead to beliefs. In this way, ideas are causally dependent on impressions.
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Hume thought morality to be an entirely human affair founded on human nature and the 
circumstance o f human life whieh we experience due to affective and social dispositions 
(Foucault, 1994). This can be linked closely to the sociocultural perspective o f this study 
because it is aligned with many o f Vygotsky’s theories o f development.
Immanuel Kant was among the ranks o f the Idealism movement, otherwise known as 
Kantian Synthesis in his work The Criticjne o f  Pure Reason (1781, cited in Pojman, 2003, 
p. 819). In it he criticizes theories and makes claims beyond the realm o f experience; he 
refutes Hume’s attempts to dismiss physics as a possible science. He argued for a p r io r i 
knowledge but lim ited principles in that everything is open for individual inteipretation 
and therefore can be criticized. This test is that human reason must face the responsibility 
o f determining the source, extent, and bounds o f its own principles. This restricted 
theoretical knowledge in such a way as to make it possible for practical knowledge to 
reveal how pure rational faith has an absolute claim on an individual’s knowledge. 
Practical reason is defined as determining rules for dispositions such as desire and w ill, as 
opposed to thoughts and feelings. What this means is that by the time an individual 
experiences something it is already determined by a p r io r i categories o f intuition that he 
called space and time. This way o f thinking was in direct opposition w ith traditional laws 
o f metaphysics that were in place since Plato. Kant believed that understanding needs 
sensations to be applied to and sensations need to be categorized. According to Kant, 
there could not be “ transcendence o f sensible reality”  (Kant 1781, cited in Pojman, 2003, 
p. 909). This would explain all o f the problems with metaphysics that allow for human 
thinking to overstep boundaries. His justification for this belief was that metaphysics 
could not be possible as a science, but it was possible as a natural disposition due to the
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systematic nature o f reason itself. Ultimately, for Kant the question was, “ how are 
synthetic a /?/7or/judgments possible?” He concluded that the human mind structures 
reality by applying universal categories; therefore, synthetic a p r io r i knowledge is true 
for everyone since everyone has the same categories in mind. The subjective nature o f 
Kant’s philosophy has influenced post-modernism and the way we view language and 
mind (Audi, 2001). Constructivism is deeply rooted in Kantian philosophy and had a 
large impact on one o f the more contemporaiy philosophers o f our time, .lohn Dewey.
John Dewey was a modern philosopher in the twentieth century; he placed experience 
at the heart o f education. For Dewey obtaining knowledge was all about providing 
students w ith new and innovative experiences and offering environments they could draw 
meaning from. Dewey’ s resistance was toward the “ teacher-expert”  in which important 
information as they interpreted it was relayed to the “ child-student,”  then the student task 
was to record the information and deliver it back on an exam (Dewey, 1991).
John Dewey was influenced by the idealism o f Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who 
extended the work o f Kant in terms o f transcendental idealism and searched for 
categories necessary for experience to be discriminated and evaluated. He also tried to 
develop a theory o f the subject that could be responsible for Kant’s categories in a non- 
empirical manner (Audi, 2001). The problem for Hegel (Pragmaticism) was the 
completeness, interrelation, and ontological status o f such a structure. Dewey direeted 
his foeus toward Hegel’s dilemma in his grand work Experience and Nature (1925, cited 
in Dewey, 1991) and based his philosophy on its observations. Primarily an empiricist, 
Dewey was concerned with separating his idea o f experience from idealism and 
empiricism. Idealists focus on the cognitive aspects o f experience whereas Dewey
14
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highlighted the non-cognitive dimensions o f one’s cognition. Dewey thought that the 
Idealists’ perspective was too subjective and alienating to the external world. The 
foundation o f Dewey’s theory viewed experience as basic and used human action and 
emotion to demonstrate the irreducibility o f experience. With this thinking as his 
backdrop, Dewey believed that an individual’ s cognitive experienced derived from and 
was conditioned by our more basic experiences. In this way cognitive experience 
resulted from inquiiy. Inquiry was then the mechanism that emotively develops within 
the individual and prompts concern or doubt. This construeted an initial experience, 
provoked conceptual elaboration toward possible scenarios o f truth, and finally resulted 
in a reconstruction o f our experience. This process o f transforming experience for 
Dewey was a collaborative experience (McDermott, 1981 ).
Dewey argued against Plato and others in the modern period o f philosophy, saying 
that their view o f knowledge was a spectator theory, meaning that it was a passive 
collection o f facts in the external world and derived from a connection with an 
individual’s beliefs. First, Dewey believed that knowing developed from doing; it is the 
activity that is constructed and conceptualized. It shapes and adapts past, present, and 
future interactions w ith our environment. Second, Dewey believed that the criterion for 
knowledge is “ wamanted assertability,”  (McDermott, 1981, p. 129) which was a concept 
he used as a tool to destabilize truth because o f  its ambiguous connotations and the 
relationship to the metaphysical world. By doing this, individual cognition could be 
viewed as a dynamic process in which a present situation allows for an individual to 
contemplate a situation and conclude with a consummation. Dewey was inspired by the 
pragmatic thinking o f his contemporaries, C. S. Peirce and W illiam  James.
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Dewey’s idea o f experience was tightly connected to the idea o f nature but not as 
“ the-world-as-it-would-be-independent-of-human-experiencc”  (McDermott, 1981). 
Dewey believed that nature is a system o f natural transactions that consisted o f three 
parts. Human experience was one o f these parts and was not reducible to any smaller 
form. Consequently, this notion opposed the more strict scientific representations o f 
nature. Although Dewey embraced the scientific method o f investigation as a way o f 
thinking, he thought that the existing dualism between mind and body, fact and value, 
and individual and social, was inaccurate because it made it d ifficu lt to apply reason to 
human actions. Dewey proposed that a way to overcome dualistic thinking was to focus 
on what we want as an individual and what we ought to pursue. In this format using ‘we’ 
grounds our experience in our development and our social history. Extending the 
scientific method to accommodate practical judgments is sim ilar to the process o f 
collecting facts (Merriam, 2002). This is the fundamental thinking that led Dewey to the 
issues o f Democracy and Education (1916). It was in the 20"’ century that Jean Piaget 
and John Dewey developed theories o f childhood development and education that led to 
the evolution o f constructivism and continue to heavily influence personal epistemology 
too.
The modem consideration o f constructivism is rooted in classical philosophy. It was 
Socrates who asked his students questions that prompted them to realize the weaknesses 
o f their knowledge. This Socratic dialogue continues to be an important tool in the way 
constructivism views student learning and understanding o f knowledge and uses the 
environment to create new experiences for understanding knowledge. In constructivism 
the external world is not rejected; it is merely limited to reinforcing individuals’
16
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availability for representing their experiences by reinforcing a scheme or rejecting it. 
There are two basic principles: (a) Knowledge is not passively received through the 
senses or by communication but is actively constructed by the thought and social 
interactions o f the individual with the environment, and (b) the function o f the 
individual’ s cognitive processes is adaptive to the individuals’ experiences, not the 
objective ontological reality (Carpendale &  Muller, 2004, p. 113). Constructivism 
declines to directly validate knowledge by comparing individual truths with the external 
environment; the primary issue is how an individuals experience their world, organize 
their thoughts, and determine their experience. It is important to distinguish 
constructivism and social constructivism, also known as constructionism.
Social constructivism views knowledge solely as the product o f social processes o f 
communication and mediation and is drawn from Kant’s idealism. Kant believed that our 
interpretive categories used to construct the world were developed a p rio ri, and 
constructivists believe that these concepts and practices are different among groups and 
historical periods. Because there is no standard for evaluating conceptual schemes, the 
constructivist view seems relativistic and is present in Thomas Kuhn’s, The Structure o f  
Scientific Revolutions (1962). Kuhn argues that observations and methods in science are 
deeply theory-dependent and that different paradigms function in different realms. His 
position is centered between scientific realism and empiricism. More recently, Neimeyer, 
Brooks, &  Baker ( 1996) stated that “ as long as there were people asking each other 
questions, there has been construction o f knowing. Further, constructivism is the study o f 
learning and knowing and is how we all make sense o f our world; and that really hasn’t 
changed”  (p. 102).
17
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Hofer &  Pintrich ( 1997) point out the eonnection between constructivism and 
personal epistemology research in the influences o f Descartes, Piaget, and Dewey who 
were all concerned with the nature and justification o f human knowledge. This is more 
specifically identified as how individuals come to know, the theories and beliefs they 
hold about knowing, and the manner in which such epistemological premises are a part o f 
and an influence on the cognitive processes o f thinking and reasoning (Hofer &  Pintrich, 
1997). In addition, we see the epistemic questions o f justification o f knowledge (King &  
Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970), doubt (Bendixen, 2002; Chandler, 2002), and epistemic 
change (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004) in our work in epistemological research.
Piaget's Theoretical Framework 
In the United States within the last ha lf century, psychology as a discipline has made 
a major impact on the work o f personal epistemology as we have experienced a paradigm 
shift from behaviorism to a cognitive perspective. In light o f this paradigm shift, much o f 
the focus in educational psychology has centered on Piaget's theory o f development and 
constructivist instructional methods. Piaget has been one o f the most influential 
researchers in the area o f developmental psychology. He was primarily interested in the 
biological influences o f how it is that we “ come to know,”  or what he referred to as 
“ genetic epistemology”  (Piaget &  Inhelder, 1969, p. 81). Piaget separated humans from 
other liv ing creatures because o f our ability to do “ abstract symbolic reasoning”  (Smith, 
1993, p. 8). Piaget (1971) focused on four developmental factors related to an 
individual's cognitive functions: (a) biological factors, (b) equilibration factors, (c) social 
factors, and (d) education and cultural factors.
18
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According to Piaget (1971), the process o f development is carried out in a series o f 
stages, each o f which has a cognitive and logical form. He viewed developmental stages 
as being in a particular order because o f the equilibration process (Kitchener, 1986). 
Piaget applied his stage theory and introduced four basic stages o f cognitive 
development: (a) sensory motor, (b) pre-operational, (c) concrete operational, and (d) 
formal operational.
According to Piaget (1969), during the sensory motor stage, birth to age 2, 
intelligence takes the form o f motor actions. Infants and toddlers use their senses to input 
infonnation observed in the external world but are limited to motor reflexes to 
communicate and understand. However, as they build up their reflexes as a means o f 
developing more sophisticated procedures, they learn to generalize their activities to a 
wider range o f situations and coordinate them into a repertoire o f behaviors.
In the pre-operational stage, between the ages o f 3 and 7 according to Piaget, 
intelligence is seen as intuitive in nature. This is the stage o f development in which 
children begin to acquire representational skills, and their thinking is more conceptual. 
This is also a time when language begins to develop rapidly. Piaget used the term 
egocentric to describe the self-oriented nature o f their thought processes. He thought that 
children were limited to using their representational and language skills to view the 
external world only from their own perspective.
In the concrete operational stage, between the ages 8 and 11, cognitive structures are 
logical but depend on simple, unidimensional, concrete ideas. At this phase, children 
have the capability to consider another person’s point o f view and consider more than one 
perspective simultaneously. In doing so their thought process becomes more logical.
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flexible, and organized. Piaget argued that children at this stage have the capacity to 
understand concrete problems, but they are incapable o f considering or solving abstract 
problems and have not become cognizant o f the diverse consequences that exist as a 
result o f their behavior. Children during this phase o f development acquire the ability to 
understand principles o f conservation, classification, sequencing, and spatial reasoning.
According to Piaget, the final stage, formal operations, takes place from the ages o f 
12 and 15. Thinking in this stage involves integrating complex, abstract, and 
multidimensional eharacteristics (Piaget &  Inhelder, 1969). Children in this phase o f 
development have the capability to think logically and reason deductively with regard to 
evidence and decision making. Piaget thought that this was the ultimate level o f 
cognitive development. He believed that individuals would come to a crossroads as they 
moved into and through adulthood, in which they would have to revise knowledge their 
knowledge base; however, he supported his position that thinking at a formal operational 
stage is really the peak o f cognitive processing and maintained that thinking does not get 
anymore powerful (Piaget, 1970).
While thinking in terms o f the development o f how children understand knowledge 
and the process o f knowing, it is beneficial to distinguish the criteria that Piaget 
conceptualized as a stage. There are five criteria that reflect a stage according to Piaget 
(1971):
1. Sequential order o f succession must be constant, although the age at which an 
individual reaches a particular stage may vary. It is not necessary to reach the 
highest stage, but no stage can be skipped, switched, or regressed. The last detail 
is not clear because Piaget has indicated that regression can occur in unusual
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circumstances. There is some debate about clarity o f the regression, specifically 
i f  it is a regression o f a performance or competence nature (Kitchener, 1986).
2. Concepts at a lower level are necessary for building and advancing to the next 
stage. Even though the concept w ill be present in the advanced stage, it w ill be 
present in a different form.
3. Each stage is compartmentalized to represent one piece o f the whole structure, 
and once a compartment is achieved, an individual can perform all functions 
outlined for that stage. Piaget sets this stage criterion to pertain solely to his 
cognitive theory o f intelligence (Kitchener, 1986).
4. The view o f preparation and completion at each stage is represented by Piaget 
through some disequilibrium:
a.) Each stage begins with preparation o f the goal and ends w ith completion 
o f the goal at that stage (Piaget, 1967).
b.) Stages overlap; each stage is the completion o f the previous stage and the 
preparation for the next stage (Piaget, 1971).
5. Every stage produces some degree o f equilibrium; however, individuals’ 
cognitive structures become balanced at each stage, again, substantiating the 
progressive nature o f each piece as it contributes to the whole sequence (Piaget, 
1971).
Piaget’s theoretical framework w ill be revisited in more detail as it pertains to each model 
o f epistemological development. Many o f the models are grounded in some form o f 
Piaget’s conceptualizations o f cognitive development.
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Piaget outlined several principles for building cognitive structures throughout his 
stages o f cognitive development. Based on a child ’s experience and genetics, i f  an 
experience is familiar, they derive information and assimilate, whereby the information 
fits neatly into their existing cognitive map. However, i f  the information or the 
experience is unfamiliar or contradictory the child must accommodate their cognitive 
map, therefore adjusting their cognitive map to make the information correspond. The 
process o f accommodation occurs, Piaget believed, because the cognitive structures lost 
equilibrium and required an equilibration process. For Piaget, this equilibration process 
is a constant attempt to adapt to the environment and construct stronger cognitive 
structures.
The goal o f Piaget’s genetic epistemology was to expand the theories o f knowledge 
about cognitive development in children. He thought that children’ s logic and modes o f 
thinking start out extremely different from adult cognitive processes. He viewed 
knowledge as a progressive construction, beginning w ith lower and less capable 
structures that develop into much stronger mechanisms as individuals progress through 
life (Flavell, 1999). Piaget assumed that there was a bond that existed between a child ’s 
biology and their environment; he called this function interactionism (Piaget, 1969).
The problem that arises in Piaget’ s stage theory is that children’s development is 
driven precisely by the stage that they presently in. This means, i f  a child is in one stage, 
he cannot successfully master tasks in another stage. There have been substantial 
criticisms o f Piaget’ s stage theory. There are questions that are raised about whether 
children really develop adhering to these criteria and also the argument that not all 
children reach fomial operations (Driscoll, 1994). His work has been criticized for
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underestimating the ability o f very young children and being overly optimistic about the 
capabilities o f older children (Slavin, 2006).
Regardless, Piaget has been incredibly influential in the search to tap into children’s 
cognitive understanding. In the 1960’s, researchers focused on Piaget’s ideas that 
children begin development with an egocentric subjectivity, meaning that they are 
incapable o f understanding conceptual, perceptual, or affective perspectives (Flavell, 
1999). In the 1970’s, researchers focused on many o f children’s metacognitive abilities 
such as strategies, problem solving, and critical thinking (Flavell, 1999). It was in the 
1980’s that researching children was dominated by the investigations regarding a ch ild ’s 
theory o f mind. This thread o f investigation remains strong in the research o f children 
today. Theory o f mind development investigates children’s knowledge about an 
individual’ s most basic mental states, desires, perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, thoughts, 
intentions, and feelings (Flavell, 1999). The foundation o f this research is based on 
Piaget’s cognitive developmental stages. Piaget explored the implications o f his theory 
primarily in the areas o f cognition, intelligence, and moral development. His theory has 
been applied to classroom teaching methods and curriculum design, primarily in 
elementaiy education. It has influenced and is similar to constructivist theories such as 
Vygotsky and Bruner.
Vygotsk}’ 's Theoretical Framework
Vygotsky’s (1978) framework has been widely overlooked in terms o f young 
children’s personal epistemology w ithin a classroom context. Researchers in the area o f 
personal epistemology are beginning to notice the importance o f social interaction. For 
example, Bendixen (2002) reported that as college students reflected about their
23
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epistemic doubt and belie f change they emphasized the role o f social interactions in their 
perseverance over epistemic doubt. Bendixen &  Rule (2004) elaborate on resolution 
strategies as a final component in their mechanism o f epistemic change process and stress 
the importance o f social interaction in overcoming epistemic doubt. Perhaps there is 
much to be gleaned from investigating what might be understood from young children’s 
social interactions and how this may impact their personal epistemologies.
It is often thought that Piaget and Vygotsky were in direct disagreement in terms o f 
individuals’ cognitive development and how they construct knowledge (Smith, Dockrell, 
&  Tomlinson, 2000). Between the two theories, many significant similarities are present 
with regard to intellectual development: (a) It occurs as a sequence o f hierarchical levels 
or stages; (b) there is a significant social component involved; and (c) biological 
contributions play an important role (Smith et ah, 2000).
The major theme o f Vygotsky’s theoretical framework is that social interaction is 
fundamental in the development o f cognitive development. Vygotsky (1978, p. 57) 
states; “ Every function in a ch ild ’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the social 
level, and later, on the individual level.”  Therefore, he suggests that interactions among 
individuals and with their environment first occur extemally, as interpsychological 
experience, and then second, w ithin the individual, which he referred to as 
intrapsychological. Vygotsky argued that all higher-order functions are actually 
internally manifested in itia lly  through external relationships between individuals. This is 
in direct contrast to the beliefs o f Piaget’s philosophy o f egocentrism and socialization.
Another primary difference between the Vygotskian and Piagetian theories is the role 
o f language (W ink &  Putney, 2002). Vygotsky considered language and nonlinguistic
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behavior as the process that begins at birth with external exposure to the words and 
actions o f others, which are then subsequently internalized by the child. It is only after 
repeated experiences and a gradual mapping o f the language and actions o f the outside 
world that a child gains the capacity to become egocentric or autonomous. Vygotsky 
(1978) viewed language with a cultural, historical, and social lens and believed that 
development is first facilitated by interaction and the use o f language among individuals. 
Conceptually it is this process that allows learning to occur and precipitates the 
restructuring o f an individual’s thought process, and, in a reciprocal fashion, the new 
thinking thereby impacts language (W ink &  Putney, 2002). Vygotsky believed that 
initial developmental stages are derived externally through interactions w ith others and 
the higher levels o f development are those in which the individual becomes more 
independent (Vygotsky, 1978).
One o f the most important differences in terms o f educational implications noted 
between Piaget and Vygotsky is that Piaget thought development comes first and learning 
follows, and Vygotsky saw this in reverse, that learning precedes development (W ink &  
Putney, 2002). A second aspect o f contention between the two theories is that o f 
perspective in a broad sense. Piaget viewed his work as epistemological, whereas _ 
Vygotsky chose the perspective o f pedagogy, the study o f the process o f teaching and 
learning (Wertsch, 1985). He focused on components o f human learning and 
development such as: (a) Learning with assistance is paramount to cognitive 
development; and (b) w ith the support and assistance o f others, an individual’ s seemingly 
limited capacity for learning or problem-solving can be expanded.
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This pedagogical perspective allowed Vygotsky to look closely at certain assumptions 
o f intellectual development including; (a) Intellectual development is driven from within 
an individual; and (b) the capacity for understanding is based on cognitive ability. 
Vygotsky, like Piaget, thought that children differed in their innate ability but viewed 
each child as having the potential to achieve higher cognitive understanding based on the 
circumstances o f their learning and by the contributions o f their environment. He 
focused on the child ’s learning not solely as a reflection o f inherent ability but also as a 
dimension o f the effectiveness and communication o f the teacher and the learner.
Another assumption is that children learn best i f  they experience tasks that are w ithin 
their cognitive level o f development, so that tasks which are developmentally appropriate 
can be achieved independently or w ith m ild to moderate assistance. Piaget’s argument is 
that wlien children are given tasks that require interventions or assistance from someone, 
they are prevented from constructing their own knowledge or self-discovery which then 
lim its an individual’ s understanding. Vygotsky’s view is quite different. He believed that 
children should be exposed to tasks that were developmentally advanced in order to 
strengthen intellectual capacity. Vygotsky (1978, p.53) stated that “ Instruction is only 
good when it proceeds ahead o f development.”  A potential drawback to the Piagetian 
way o f thinking is that when children are given free rein to construct knowledge 
independently, there is a greater chance o f increasing the amount o f misconceptions that 
they formulate which, in turn, increases their opposition to changing their misconceptions 
(Vygotsky, 1978).
It is Vygotsky’s theory that leaves more allowances for the influences o f parents, 
teachers, and peers in terms o f cognitive and epistemological development o f children
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which are important aspects o f the current study. It focuses on the construction o f 
knowledge as a mutual reciprocation o f learning through thought and language.
Although it was Vygotsky who introduced the influences o f language, he failed to 
elaborate about how language was actually used in the process o f teaching and learning.
It was Jerome Bruner (1978) who followed Vygotsky’s vision and studied the language 
o f teaching and learning, primarily through observing young children interacting with 
their mothers, using Vygotsky’s ideas about the Zone o f Proximal Development. 
Language is in itia lly  used as a means o f communication with a very small and 
deliberately chosen circle o f individuals; but, once mastered, language becomes 
internalized and makes internal speech possible. Vygotsky’s work has been influential in 
Bandura’s theory o f social learning and as a key component in Lave’s situated learning 
theory.
A second important aspect o f Vygotsky’s theory is the concept o f the Zone o f 
Proximal Development (ZPD) in which higher levels o f development are attained when 
children are engaged in social behaviors (Bruner, 1978). W ithin the ZPD, it is believed 
that a child can reach the highest level o f understanding and skill w ithin a range o f 
development utilizing either adult guidance or peer collaboration, and this would far 
exceed what the child could attain independently. In this way Vygotsky’s approach is a 
demonstration o f how intentionality and conscious awareness is produced by using 
socialization as a catalyst for the development o f knowledge.
Piaget and Vygotsky are important in developing a framework for children’s personal 
epistemology because o f their theoretical contributions to early childhood cognitive 
development, their support o f constructivist instruction, and their profound influences on
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adult personal epistemological research. Piaget’s equilibration process and Vygotsky’s 
zone o f proximal development stray from the idea that knowledge is fixed and 
independent o f  the individual. Instead, they have opened the door to view knowledge as 
constructed by the individual based on beliefs and experience. Piaget has contributed to 
personal epistemology through his emphasis on individual cognitive development and 
meaningful construction (Moore, 2002). Vygotsky has contributed to our understanding 
o f knowledge as being socially constructed, which involves merging experiences and 
interactions w ithin one’s cultural environment (Bendixen, 2002).
Theory and Research on Personal Epistemology
Epistemology is the study o f the nature o f knowledge and justification; more 
specifically it is the study o f (a) the defining features o f knowledge, (b) the substantive 
conditions or sources o f knowledge, and (c) the lim its o f knowledge and justification 
(Audi, 2001). Views o f epistemology do not come without controversy. From as far 
back as Socrates, rationalism, empiricism, and skepticism have debated about the nature 
o f knowledge. Descartes’ dualistic view o f epistemology undoubtedly has raised more 
problems that it solved but remains deeply influential (Kuhn, 1962). The cluster o f 
profound problems that he raised about the nature o f the human mind and its relationship 
to the material world are still very far from being adequately resolved.
Educational and developmental psychology have produced a great deal o f research 
pertaining to epistemological development in the past forty years, beginning with 
W illiam  Peiry. This has resulted in a variety o f perspectives about knowledge from 
definitional differences to the way knowledge is constructed and evaluated. The focus o f
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epistemological investigations in the field have revolved around students’ thinking and 
beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and knowing (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). There w ill 
be three sections that follow : (a) discussion and critique o f the current models o f 
personal epistemology development including: five developmental models, 
epistemological beliefs, personal epistemological theories, epistemological resources, and 
the integrated model o f  personal epistemology; (b) young children’s personal 
epistemology including: developmental issues, researching personal epistemology in 
young children, methodological issues, theory o f mind, and connections between theory 
o f mind and personal epistemology; and (c) a seetion that links all o f the components 
together, introducing the purpose o f the study and the research questions.
Review o f Developmental Models 
In the follow ing section, five models o f personal epistemology development w ill be 
reviewed including; (a) PeiTy’s Scheme o f Intellectual and Ethical Development (Perry, 
1970), (b) Women’s Ways o f Knowing (Belensky, Clinchy, Goldberger, &  Tarule,
1986), (c) the Model o f Epistemological Reflection (Baxter Magolda, 1992), (d) the 
Reflective Judgment Model (King &  Kitchener, 1994), and (e) the Model o f 
Epistemological Thinking (Kuhn, 1991). Each section includes a b rie f introduction that 
links contributions to personal epistemology that relate to this study. Sections on each 
model have a discussion o f the model, empirical support, and a summary and critique 
section.
Peny's Scheme o f Intellectual and Ethical Development
In the 1950’s and I960’s W illiam  Perry Jr., an educational psychologist, conducted 
two longitudinal studies. He began collecting information about his students’
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interpretations o f their learning experience using open-ended interview questions. Perry 
was not interested in the student’s academic achievements, but rather the open-ended 
questioning was a strategy used to capture the perceptions o f the individual’ s overall 
development.
Discussion o f  the model Perry’s subjects were Harvard University undergraduates, 
predominantly white males from a high socioeconomic class. The students completed a 
survey, which Perry developed and called Checklist o f Educational Values (CLEV). This 
came from research in the areas o f personality and beliefs (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). The 
CLEV was administered to a large sample, and using results from the CLEV, Perry 
would select a significantly smaller sample to participate in annual interviews at the end 
o f each academic year. Contrary to Perry’s hypothesis, the patterns o f development 
resulting from the interviev/s did not reflect changes in personality traits so much as the 
confmnation o f many logically, coherent, cognitive developmental processes (Perry, 
1999).
Perry and his colleagues compiled the interviews and worked out a Scheme o f  
Intellectual and Ethical Development (Perry, 1970). The scheme was comprised o f 
intellectual and ethical development and described a nine-position model and introduced 
terminology to explain how an individual progresses from one position to another. The 
scheme reflects mechanisms o f change closely resembling Piaget’s model o f cognitive 
development (Piaget, 1950). The team quickly set out to validate these initial findings, 
which they did successfully. Although continuing to collect more non-homogenous data, 
the second study had even less female representation, but Perry (1970) stated that 
women’s experiences would fo llow  the same developmental scheme.
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Perry’s scheme includes four main categories: (a) Simple Dualism, (b) Complex 
Dualism, (c) Relativism, and (d) Commitment in Relativism. The nine positions fall 
under these main headings.
Position 1: Basic Duality. This position represents the simplest set o f assumptions 
about the nature o f knowledge and values. The assumption o f the dualistic structure in 
the world is taken for granted and unexamined. This position holds the belief o f right 
versus wrong, good versus bad, and we versus other. Perry ( 1970, p.87) phrases the 
division as such: “ the familiar world o f Authority-right-we, as against the alien world o f 
illegitimate-wrong-others.”  It is authority that rules, and the scope o f thought is that 
w illpower and work w ill yield corresponding actions and rewards. M u ltip lic ity  is not 
viewed, and the position is self-defined by ability to fo llow  in the right or desirable 
fashion o f the tradition. The operational concept o f knowledge is objective, definite, and 
organized as a body o f facts that constitute the truth about a subject, to be distinguished 
from opinion, which is subjective and cannot be proven as true.
Position 2: M ultip lic ity Pre-Legitimate. In this position M ultip lic ity  (M ) is 
perceived but only as unreal or alien; both perspectives are represented as (M) because 
they are perceived but not as a signal o f legitimate epistemological uncertainty. As 
unreal, (M ) serves a vague appearance; opposition acknowledges authority not as wrong 
but rather failing to convey their position w ith adequate warrants. As alien, (M ) 
assimilates easily to error and otherness. Perry (1999) uses this example; “ others are 
wrong and confused (M ).”  Assimilated to authority, it leads to opposition: “ 1 am right”  
translating the authority as being confused. Teachers are the seen as the source o f Truth 
rather than resources. The operational concept o f knowledge consists o f facts, principles.
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axioms, and other items that can be proven although it may be d ifficu lt to derive proof. 
Overcoming this d ifficu lty  is a challenge best left to the experts, and individuals hold the 
idea that there are levels or degrees o f expertness.
Position 3: M ultip lic ity Subordinate. In this position. M u ltip lic ity  is perceived but 
with some limitations because authority may not have all o f the answers. In the ideal 
perspective, authority is not threatened and is perceived to evaluate the individual on skill 
presentation. Students may fear that they are being judged inappropriately. The world 
view o f Position 2 begins to break down in a number o f different ways, perhaps most 
frequently through confrontation with several Authorities who are already established as 
good authorities and who just happen to disagree. This position is the first display o f 
uncertainty in the world. There continues to be a right-box and a wrong-box, but in 
Position 3 a box is added for items that are unknown (Moore, .larrold, Russell, Lumb. 
Sapp, &  MacCallum, 1995). So, in other words, i f  two good authorities are disagreeing, 
it is probably because they are dealing with an area where all o f the answers have not 
been found.
Position 4: M ultip lic ity Correlate o r Relativism Subordinate. W ithin this position, 
there is considerable overlap. In the beginning level o f the position, duality is 
restructured in more complex terms, such as right-wrong versus (M ) absolutes that may 
be doubted or seen as unattainable w ithin a reasonable amount o f  time. Therefore in (M ) 
individuals have liberty to their own opinion, and there are no better interpretations; one 
is just as good as another.
Relativism Subordinate is a more advanced perspective that is attained just prior to 
advancing to the next position. Clearly there are more progressive interpretations on the
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part o f  the individual happening, but there is still a sense that information or ways o f 
thinking remain in the control o f the authority. There is more realization that hard work 
is not sufficient in and o f itself, and the individual achieves a stance that there is not an 
autocratic governing basis for determining what is right. Evaluation is frequently a 
fragile component as the individual begins to understand the idea o f quality versus 
quantity and the application o f information.
Position 5: Relativism Correlate, Competing or Diffused. In this position.
Relativism is viewed as a way o f perceiving, analyzing, and evaluating. Different 
authorities exist, such as authorities that hold the Truth in math and physics as opposed to 
authority for which relativism must be used, for instance, an English paper. The 
operational concept o f knowledge lends itse lf to an ind iv idual’s awareness that thought 
and knowledge can be more intrinsic, that knowledge is always changing or has the 
potential to change. Knowledge can be shared but not measured, predicted, or counted 
on to remain the same.
It seems that the latter part o f Position 4 and then Position 5 describe the individual’ s 
most significant movement because it represents a transformation in one’s view o f the 
world from essentially dualistic to essentially relativistic and context-bound. Along with 
this transition, individuals’ attitudes about their role as a student and the way they 
interpret knowledge and learning shift. The self becomes a viable source o f knowledge 
alongside previous sources. The biggest distinction between the relativism o f Position 4 
versus 5 is the introduction o f being self-consciously aware o f the self as an active 
meaning maker (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). An individual’ s goal is fina lly understood 
here, that is to develop intellectually and ethically in order to make sense o f and evaluate
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knowledge as a means o f generating judgments in a diverse and relativistic world 
(Moore, 2002).
Position 6: Coininitinent Foreseen. In this position, relativism is accepted for all 
moral or nonreligious purposes, including systematic judgments and actions.
Commitment may be perceived as a logical necessity for action in a relativistic world. 
Interestingly, Perry (1970) includes emotions as a separate entity and emphasizes they 
can appear with or without any external observable validation o f logic. The realization 
may provoke a variety o f responses including: eagerness, ambivalence, dismay, 
sturdiness, turmoil, or simple acceptance (Perry, 1999). The concept o f knowledge is that 
it is not something that is any longer external and definite, rather something that each 
individual constructs according to his/her own experience and background.
Position 7: In itia l Coininitinent. This position is on the heels o f Position 6 where the 
individual becomes aware o f a need for commitment. This position includes the 
individual’s first commitment. Knowledge is perceived as what individuals have 
constructed themselves from learning and experience, along with the ethical implications 
o f this view, synthesized into a consistent philosophy.
Position 8: Orientation in Implications o f  Commitment. In this position, individuals 
may encounter the realization o f some o f the implications o f their commitments. They 
may experience tension between feelings o f tentativeness and finality, expansion and 
narrowing, freedom and constraint, and action and reflection. This intellectual freedom 
makes for a dynamic interaction between the self and the environment, requiring stability 
and flexib ility . There is more reflection and elaboration o f identity commitments because 
the individual is coping with and synthesizing solutions for the consequences o f their
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commitments. The naïve assumption that making a commitment w ill take care o f 
everything dissolves, and individuals discover the need for multiple commitments. They 
begin to realize that these multiple commitments, such as career, partner, friends, and 
lifestyle, are often conflicting.
Position 9: Developing Commitments. In this position, individuals assume new 
priorities and begin to reassess their commitments. Commitments can be either 
augmented or reconstructed, and balance is welcomed as the individual experiences less 
tension and more ease w ith knowledge and commitments. It remains a tentative level in 
that individuals come to terms with the complexity o f the world and their position. They 
are now able to acknowledge a willingness to struggle through the proeess in a search for 
answers.
Perry’s scheme has been instrumental in the development o f four other developmental 
models and continues to be the integral component o f current investigations into the 
study o f personal epistemology. He has designed a trajectory o f development that 
progresses in a natural forward direction and assumes patterns in the reorganization o f 
meaning that incur, both a structure and systematic momentum.
Em pirical support. Kurflss ( 1977) focused on validating three developmental 
constructs from Perry’s seheme: (a) sequentially, (b) hierarchical development, and (c) 
structural unity. She studied college students from two psychology classes who 
participated in three interviews. The first session was a two-hour interview in which the 
students used a Likert scale to verbally rate 40 short statements representing the concepts 
from eight o f Perry’s positions. In the second session the students addressed the same 40 
statements as in their first session, except this time they did so in writing. The third
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session was identical to the second session. Because o f the writing, it was necessary to 
add another hour so the students could get through all 40 statements. There were eight 
questions in each o f five categories that related to Perry’s positions: (a) making moral 
decisions, (b) role o f advisor, (c) how essays should be graded, (d) responsibilities o f 
teacher, and (e) the nature o f academic knowledge.
In terms o f sequences, Kurfiss (1977) concluded that Perry’s individual positions are 
sequential and are ordered by increasing cognitive complexities. The hierarchieal 
development did support Perry, but it was not strong support, which was anticipated. The 
structural unity construct demonstrated that cognitive development proceeds unevenly 
across different areas, and, not surprisingly, the area where the individual is actively 
involved was found to advance first.
Clinchy, Lief, &  Young (1977) used the Perry scheme to validate its generalizability 
to adolescent girls. Their major purpose was to examine the relationship between type o f 
schooling and students’ ways o f reasoning about moral and epistemological issues.
Using Kohlberg’s (1969) scale o f moral development and Perry’s scheme o f 
epistemological development, they compared the performance o f girls from a traditional 
and a progressive public high school. Clinchy et al. (1977) detennined that previous 
methods o f identifying positions on Perry’s scale (Kurfiss, 1975; Meyer, 1975; W idick, 
Knefelkamp, &  Parker, 1975; Stephenson &  Hunt, 1975; Slepitza &  Knefelkamp, 1975) 
had yielded inconclusive results. They chose to adopt an interview fonnat (Clinchy &  
Zimmerman, unpublished) because interviews seem to consistently provide data that was 
easy to score and allowed for the highest interrater reliability. They found that the 
traditional (teacher-eentered) and the progressive (student-centered) school students
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transitioned through identical positions (but at different rates) o f epistemological 
development which confirmed Perry’s scheme. They also, like Perry, failed to identify 
the actual characteristics o f the scale’s extremities.
Interestingly, where Perry found little relativistic thinking in college freshmen, 
Clinchy et al. (1977) found that over 40% o f the progressive high school seniors 
exhibited relativistic reasoning, moving from position 3 to position 5. Considering their 
findings, the argument was that perhaps progressive schools facilitate development by 
providing more opportunities for cognitive conflict, perspective taking, and more active 
participation with one’s environment. One o f the most significant limitations o f this 
study was the small sample that was used to draw the comparison to Perry. It was also 
argued by the authors that i f  the sample had been larger the differences between the 
schools may have been different. The important point is that using the interview method 
was a time consuming process and reduced the number o f students- they were able to 
evaluate.
Moore (1991) concluded that while interviews may provide a rich and valuable 
resource for evaluation o f epistemological beliefs, they are inefficient to use in academic 
settings. He suggested two alternative approaches to unstructured interviews: (a) the 
Measurement o f Intellectual Development (M ID ), a production-task measurement; and 
(b) the Learning Environment Preferences, a recognition-task measure. He suggested 
both measures were better than interviews because they eliminated individual’s high 
degree o f subjectivity in the individual’ s responses. Moore (2002) continues to 
acknowledge the value o f in-depth qualitative methods; however, he continues to 
recommend that efforts be placed toward developing and refining assessments geared
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toward individual’ s perfonnances set in real-world contexts, and he believes self- 
assessment data is especially insightful and should not be overlooked.
Mentkowski &  Strait (1983) used the M ID  to validate Perry’s positions with high 
school students, using a cross-sectional analysis, and found that seniors scored 
significantly higher on two o f the three essays than did the freshman. However, when 
compared to a longitudinal study looking at the same two essay questions, students had a 
significant increase over the four year span on the first question while the other question 
showed a small decrease. K ing &  Kitchener (1990) point out the importance o f the 
Mentkowski &  Strait (1983) findings claiming that among college students such a gain 
typically reflects a qualitative shift from a style o f reasoning based largely on personal 
beliefs to one that explicitly uses evidence in making judgments.
Using his M ID  and the Defining Issues Test (D IT) (Rest, 1979), Moore (1989) 
developed an alternative to the intepidew protoeol for measuring epistemological beliefs, 
called the Learning Environment Preferences (LEP). His findings focused on the design 
and construct valid ity o f the LEP, but they also offered evidence o f Perry’s scheme o f 
intellectual development. The LEP focuses primarily on the stages that Perry found to be 
most salient in college education (Knefelkamp &  Comfeld, 1978). This narrowed the 
focus to positions 2 thru 5, which is legitimate because Perry’s upper levels seemed to be 
most properly assessed by in-depth interviews, and the lowest level had been 
hypothesized from the onset and never truly measured. Ultimately, the LEP was 
comprised o f five specific domains related to epistemology and approaches to learning:
(a) view o f knowledge and course content, (b) role o f the instructor, (c) role o f the student 
and peers in the elassroom, (d) the classroom atmosphere, and (e) the role o f evaluation.
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Moore (1989) recruited students enrolled in a mixture o f universities, state, 
community, and private colleges ranging from small to large with curriculums that varied 
among selective, comprehensive, and honors. Gender was equally split between males 
and females, and students were evenly distributed according to the year o f attendanee 
from freshman through senior years. Construct validity was measured on each item by 
(a) internal consistency o f the position-keyed items across the live domains and 
according to Peiry’s four positions, and (b) an item factor analysis to determine whether 
and to what extent the LEP measures the underlying factor constructs corresponding to 
positions 2 thru 5 and to explore any empirical relationship that could link the items 
theoretically to the instrument scoring protocol (Moore, 1989).
It was reported that some items were poor because they did not obtain the empirical 
performance they had anticipated. Some o f the items could be discarded without any 
threat to the internal consistency o f the scale while others needed to be revised. There is 
such little distinction between Perry’s position 4 and 5, which Moore refers to as 
“ hybrid”  (p. 511), that for clarification between the positions it would be beneficial to 
rework or replace some o f the items in order to make it easier to draw distinctions 
between the two positions. Moore (1989) indicated that it was helpful for interpreting the 
LEP to have the scoring system reflect Peny’s positions, but admittedly it may not be the 
most effective empirical reflection for identifying underlying cognitive processes. To get 
at such cognitive processes, the LEP’s scoring system may need to relate more closely to 
its factor structure.
Zhang (1999) suggested that student’s cultural background and experience as it 
relates to the learning environment may influence students’ cognitive development. This
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was a cross-cultural investigation for generalizability, comparing one group o f students 
from the United States and two groups from the People’s Republic o f China. The Zhang 
Cognitive Development Inventory (ZCDI) was constructed based on Perry’s intellectual 
development and was found to be valid and reliable. Her findings were problematic for 
incorporating Perry’s scheme to the Chinese culture. However, using the ZCDI the U.S. 
students matched Perrys’s progression.
Zhang (1999) reported an interesting pattern in the Chinese college students. She 
found the patterns o f  cognitive development were not hierarchically consistent with 
Perry. One o f the Chinese groups showed that the college freshman groups scored the 
highest in relativism and commitment in relativism but lowest in dualism. The dualism 
scores showed steadily more strength in the sophomores and still stronger in the juniors. 
The juniors actually had the lowest relativism scores, followed by the sophomores with 
the lowest. The seniors from the People’s Republic o f China were m inim ally less 
dualistic and had slightly more relativism and commitment in relativism. The other 
Chinese group did show some cognitive development changes very similar to Perry’s 
scheme. One o f the problems was that the two Chinese groups were investigated over 
two years apart. Although this study may imply that Perry’s model is not generalizable to 
diverse cultures in general and the Chinese culture specifically, it did show a systematic 
progression but in reverse. This finding could have significance in the proposed study or 
even provide support for varying theories with trajectories that d iffer from the traditional 
developmental models o f personal epistemology.
Some researchers suggest that students’ understanding o f knowledge is related to the 
types o f epistemological assumptions they are exposed to, for example, the
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epistemological assumptions o f teachers (Hofer, 2004a; Schraw &  Olafson, 2006). Based 
on Perry’s model o f evolving epistemological development, Hofer (2004a) concluded 
that teachers can influence student’s understanding and epistemological development in 
multiple ways. Her study used elassroom observation and interviews with the college 
students in two different courses. The observations aimed toward investigating how 
beliefs about knowledge and knowing are communicated in a college course and how 
they are situated w ithin classroom interactions. This methodology veered slightly from 
Perry’s CLEV and interview process in that it incorporated classroom observations. One 
o f the significant conclusions from the study came from the interviews: students’ 
evolving understanding o f knowledge might also alter their sense o f self. This is 
important in researching young children’s epistemological onset because it suggests that 
the impact o f  entering a classroom environment can influence beliefs and knowledge but 
might affect a children’s sense o f identity and their relationship w ith others, for example, 
parents and peers.
Siimmaiy and critique. Perry’s work is ground-breaking and paved the way for 
nearly 35 years o f  investigation o f epistemological understanding. However, Perry 
himself attributed several limitations to his research. First, his research sample was 
comprised largely o f young, white, upper-class, male subjects who attended Harvard 
University in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Second, the subjects were strictly volunteers, and 
many o f the members o f the research team served a dual role, in that they were subjects 
and helped analyzed the data. This matter places the validation o f the study in question. 
Third, the first and ninth positions were not actually identified in Perry’s study but rather 
extrapolated based on the other seven positions. Fourth, the beginning positions seem to
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be more explicitly epistemological than the latter positions; therefore the scheme’s 
description is less noticeably “ spatial-cognitive restructuring”  and more toward 
“ emotional and aesthetic assessments”  (King &  Kitchener, 1994; Perry, 1970, p. 205).
Perry and his colleagues appear to have loosely adopted the Piagetian framework for 
two reasons: (a) They had expected to link their findings with personality characteristics, 
but when they began seeing patterns o f epistemological understanding between 
individuals and over time they had to search for desirable alternatives; and (b) very 
simply it was the best framework available that would portray a cohesiveness throughout 
the progression and could withstand the coherence o f the individual’ s interpretations in 
sueh a way that would allow them to implant position 1 and 9 based on inferenee. 
Ultimately, Perry’s nine positions were reduced to four categories (Hofer, 2001 ; Moore, 
2002): dualism, m ultip licity, contextual relativism, and commitment to relativism.
Researchers in the field (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997; King &  Kitehener; 1994) have 
criticized Perry’s work because o f concerns about whether the responses capture a true 
structural, developmental trajectory or are more just artifacts o f the socialization process 
in values o f a liberal arts education at that place and time. It is not clearly explained in 
the Scheme about what occurs prior to and including Position 1 or is it hypothesized what 
might happen to knowledge after Position 9. The progression from dualism to relativism 
is not all that well-defined in terms o f how knowledge is interpreted beyond the positions, 
especially in the later positions where intellectual and ethical development, issues o f 
epistemology, and identity intersect during the affirmation o f commitment (Perry, 1981).
The methods used by Perry (1970) are not particularly efficient at measuring change 
and are functionally time-consuming. There is a question o f valid ity in that the
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developmental process o f the individuals and their value systems could be easily 
misconstrued. Many researchers have taken on the task o f modifying the Scheme with 
interviews and various written assessments (Baxter Magolda, 1992; King &  Kitchener, 
1994; Knefelkamp &  Slepitza, 1978; Schraw, Bendixen, &  Dunkle, 2002). Even with 
these theoretical and methodological contributions, epistemological development 
continues to have many unresolved issues, considerable virgin soil, and much speculation 
especially w ith younger children.
Perry’s work precipitated the movement o f investigating college-age students’ 
epistemological beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 1992; Belenky Clinchy, Goldberger, &  Tarule, 
1986). However, many researchers who have followed a similar framework to Perry’s 
positions have gone on to suggest that this phenomenon can be detected at varying ages 
such as middle childhood (Carpendale &  Chandler, 1996; Kuhn, Chaney, &  Weinstock, 
2000; Lalonde, 1996) and teenage years (Boyes, &  Ball, 1990; Reich, Oser, &  Valentin, 
1994; Rosenberg, Hammer, &  Phelan 2006).
Perry’s Scheme o f Intellectual and Ethical Development has activated a wealth o f 
research in the area o f personal epistemology, primarily in college students. The 
pendulum appears to be shifting, and researchers are beginning to investigate how Perry’s 
scheme might apply to children and even very young ehildren (Burr &  Hofer, 2002). 
Women's Ways o f  Knowing
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, &  Tarule (1986) joined forces to investigate v/omen’s 
issues concerning knowledge and learning. They adopted Perry’s Scheme and developed 
Women's Ways o f  Knowing, a developmental model w ith five perspectives “ from which 
women view reality and draw conclusions about truth, knowledge, and authority”
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(Belenky, 1986, p. 3). Perry (1970) utilized an im plic it visual metaphor, but, in contrast, 
the Belenky et al. (1986) model uses voice as their metaphor. They conducted their 
research with only women in the same fashion as Gilligan (1982) and, in direct 
opposition to Perry’s sample; they chose women from all walks o f life, from college 
institutions to the Department o f  Public Wel fare. Their goal was to explore whether there 
were certain conceptions o f knowing that could be detected in the “ voices o f women”  
(Belenky, Bond, &  Weinstock, 1997, p. 55). Hayes &  Flannery (2000) explain that in 
women specifically but m inority groups in general, voice can imply communication or 
connectedness with other people. Voice can be viewed in the same way in researching 
young children. Voice becomes a more sophisticated way for children to communicate, 
and while language may be an obstacle in learning what children know and understand, 
voice is always present (Dowling. 2005).
Discussion o f  the Model. Woman’s Ways o f  Knowing differs from Perry’s scheme 
structurally. Perry describes his stages in a systematic format much in the same way 
Piaget introduced his cognitive stages o f development. Belenky et al. (1986) do not view 
their findings as developmental in nature but rather as traditions that can be contextual 
and non-linear (Belenky et al., 1997). It should be pointed out that the different ways o f 
knowing are not intended to be fixed or universal stages o f epistemological development, 
and that culture and social context would undoubtedly unfold as a significant factor; 
therefore, in most cases ways o f knowing should not be expected to be generalizable.
Belenky et al. (1986) conducted 135 in-depth interviews, ranging from two to five 
hours. The approach was phenomenological, so it allowed the women to convey their 
own meaning making experience through the semi-structured interviews. The protocol
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involved gender, relationships, education, and ways o f knowing. They did not include 
culture, economic, or affective dispositions, but they did segregate the ways o f knowing 
section from the educated women and the less educated women. The educated 
participants were asked to respond to one or more statements about the conception o f 
knowledge and were then probed further about issues o f expertise and truth. They were 
then quizzed on topics o f intellectual judgment and justification. The less educated 
participants had a much less involved interview; they were asked five shorter questions 
involving the expertise o f their own learning.
Table 1 : Summary O f Women’s Ways o f Knowing 
Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, And Tarule (1986)
PERSPECTIVES METAPHOR DEFINITION
1
SILENCE
Deaf &  Dumb Voiceless, relies on external sources o f 
knowledge
2
RECEIVED
KNOW ING
Listening to voices 
o f others
Use o f listening as a key to knowledge
3
SUBJECTIVE
KNOW ING
The inner voice &  
the quest for self
Beginning trust o f own knowledge
4
PROCEDURAL
KNOW ING
The voice o f 
Reason
Separate and connected ways o f knowing 
become systematic at finding solutions
5
CONSTRUCTED
KNOW ING
Integrating the 
voices
Knowledge is reliable &  comes from self 
&  others
The inteiwiew questions Belenky et al. used were a collage from the theories o f Perry 
(1970), Gilligan (1982), and Kohlberg (1969). For data analysis the questions were
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separated by theorist and evaluated, and an attempt was made to f it  the information into 
Pen-y’ s Scheme. When the Women's Ways o f  Knowing Model did not coincide with 
Perry’s scheme, they introduced five new classifications for epistemological perspectives 
that are represented by the metaphor o f “ voice and silence”  (Belenky et al. 1986, p. 17) 
(See Table 1).
Silence. This was not a highly represented position in their sample but is a significant 
example o f the extreme denial o f self and the extreme dependence on external authority 
for direction. The women representing this level were among the most economically, 
socially, and educationally deprived. Other characteristies include the following: (a) a 
poor sense o f self, w ith no internal voice; (b) thought processes linked to the immediate 
present and eoncrete experiences; (c) a short attention span; (d) a complete polarization 
o f authority; (e) obedience to authority because o f fear o f punishment; and (f) d ifficu lty 
forming bonds with others.
Interestingly, while considering the cultural implications o f Women's Ways o f  
Knowing, Belenky &  Stanton (2000) modified the Silence perspective to Silenced, a 
small but mighty shift when considering the different connotations o f each term 
separately. Their intention was to help distinguish that perspective from contrasting 
observations made in non-Westem cultures. Hurtado (1996), for example, found that 
African-American women use silence as an information-seeking strategy. An interesting 
question could be as follows: is there any relationship between the way in which minority 
women use their voice, and how young children develop their voice? The proposed study 
may be able to shed light on this question.
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Received Knowing. In this stage, epistemological perspective is either/or thinking; all 
information and ideas are viewed as good or bad, and there can only be one right answer. 
The origin o f knowledge is external, and the self has nothing to do w ith knowing; 
however, individuals are able to verbalize the external source o f knowledge where the 
silenced women are paralyzed. The women who oceupied this position do not view 
themselves as aligned with any authority. Although this position corresponds to Perry’s 
dualism, the male counterparts in his research do view themselves as aligned with 
authority (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997).
In this position, individuals are open to what others say but do not speak with their 
own voice and do not view themselves as on an equal level. Some other outstanding 
characteristics are the following: (a) faith that others can provide valuable information 
and direction, (b) confidence in their ability to store information but a reluctance to do 
anything with the information, (c) dualistic thinking, (d) intolerance for any ambiguity,
(e) dependence on authority, (f) desire for ways to adapt and conform (g) a tendency to 
leave challenging environments where they cannot adjust, (h) concern for others but not 
themselves, and (i) extreme d ifficu lty w ith communication (Belenky et al. 1986).
Subjective Knowing. Women in this position continue to think somewhat 
dualistically but realize that the source o f knowledge is within the self; therefore, it seems 
interchangeable with Perry’s early m ultip licity position. Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) point 
out gender differences in the meaning making w ith the men in Perry’s (1970) results.
Men expressed the right to have their own opinions, whereas the women viewed truth as 
coming from personal experiences in an intuitive manner. The sense o f self overcomes 
reliance on outside authority and replaces it w ith intuition. This type o f knower w ill
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often deflect influences o f others and refer all decisions to a gut feeling. This 
epistemological perspective can be characterized by: (a) an understanding that individual 
inteiprctations are more valid than authority, (b) placing value on feelings over ideas and 
on intuition over reason, (c) skepticism toward rational thought and procedural 
approaches, (d) vast attention to personal experience, and (e) utilization o f self-talk as a 
means of developing a voice.
Procedural Knowledge. This perspective is divided into two parts: separate and 
connected ways of knowing. Separate knowing is the abandonment o f subjective 
knowing to assume a skeptical frame of reference, using procedures as a means for 
evaluating any situation or making decisions. Gaining use of procedures empowers the 
individual (now viewed as a learner) to go beyond subjectivism. This is aligned with 
Perry’s relativism. It is a type o f critical thinking but more detached. Subjective thinking 
perceives it as possible for everyone to be correct, but separate knowing perceives that it 
is possible for others and themselves to be incorrect. Separate knowers can be identified 
by their: (a) preference for argument and emphasis on doubt; (b) need to be prepared and 
confident before speaking; (c) strategic approach to dealing with people and tasks; (d) 
acceptance of established standards; (e) emphasis on procedure, methodology, and 
objectivity; and (f) problem solving ability.
The second part o f procedural knowing, connected knowing, maintains the subjective 
aspect o f knowing but at the same time develops procedures for gaining access to others’ 
knowledge and interpretations. The impersonal knowledge becomes personal, and the 
learner transitions to a more empathetic and caring perspective as a means of 
understanding rather than judgment. The individual who experiences connecting
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knowledge demonstrates eharacteristics such as: (a) putting forth effort to emphasize 
trust, (b) being able to adhere to multiple perspectives without necessarily being swayed 
to alternative points o f view, (c) displaying a preference for being non-competitive and 
non-judgmental, and (d) showing no hesitation to accept assistance from others to 
negotiate and develop ideas.
Conslmcted Knowing. This perspective integrates received subjective and procedural 
ways o f knowing in order to construct knowledge. This individual w ill use the following: 
(a) reflection to articulate understanding in an exploratory way; (b) self-awareness to 
complement sensitivity to others; (c) tolerance as a strategy for conflict, ambiguity, 
stress, and internal contradictions; (d) eontextualization when needed for solving 
problems with little structure; and (e) environments that value diverse perspectives and 
ideas. The individual definitely views herself as a participant in the construction o f 
knowledge, as one who can construct and reconstruct different frames o f reference.
One conceptual difference that exists between Perr>'’ s Scheme and Women’s Ways o f  
Knowing is that Periy^s positions are descriptive about the nature o f knowledge and truth, 
whereas Belenky et al. (1986) focus more toward the source o f knowledge and truth. 
Their scope o f questioning relied heavily on reflection o f se lf in relation to knowledge. 
They reported that once the idea o f self generalizes it strongly affects how women think 
about knowledge, truth, and expertise. They compare this process to Piaget’s horizontal 
decalage, which refers to the repetition that takes place w ithin a single period o f 
development as opposed to vertical decalage, v/hich is repetition that occurs at different 
levels o f functioning. In other words, the individual experiences changes about 
knowledge w ithin themselves or self-knowledge prior to their understanding o f self in
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relation to knowledge and truth. Women's Ways o f  Knowing uses a soeioeultural 
perspective (Vygotsky, 1978) in its use o f diversity in culture and age. The combined 
Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986) theories can demonstrate structural differences 
that are developed from different gender voices.
Empirical support. Measurement o f personal epistemology has historically been an 
obstacle for researchers, including the tremendous time factor involved with interviews 
and the imposition it requires in educational settings. Buezynski (1993) attempted a 
paper-and-peneil questionnaire designed to measure the perspectives developed by 
Belenky et al. (1986); the measure is called the Ways o f  Knowing Instrument (W OKI). 
The sample investigated was comprised o f 348 female undergraduates. The analysis 
supported a 5-factor model o f intellectual development for women and appeared to 
support the five dimensions o f Belenky et al. (1986); however, the instrument was not 
vastly adopted by the research community although it was found to be a reliable and valid 
measure.
Tennant &  Poquson (1995) used Women 's PVays o f  Knowing and found no differences 
in perspective between traditional and non-traditional students. This seems 
counterintuitive and in direct opposition to the findings o f Belenky et al. (1986). This is 
an important finding because one o f the emerging issues in personal epistemology is the 
possibility that there is a recursive nature to beliefs about knowledge. In addition, it 
contributes to the idea that personal epislemologies may be more context-dependent or 
eontext-specifie. We have yet to scratch the surface o f either issue, and the present study 
provides an opportunity to investigate both possibilities.
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Luttrell (1989) studied working-class women and their ways o f knowing and how it 
was affected by gender, race, and class. This study looked at two groups o f women: (a) 
African-American working-class women who attended a basic education program serving 
maintenance and housekeeping employees at a Southeastern university, and (b)
Caucasian working-class women who attended an urban northeastern community-based 
program. She intentionally targeted women in learning environments and women who 
were also working. Vast demographic information was collected on the women. 
Additionally they were observed in their respective classrooms, notes were taken, and 
grade equivalency testing was conducted. Fifteen women from each group were chosen 
to participate in in-depth interviews, and the final interview for each woman took place at 
their home and ranged from 2 hours to 4 hours in length. W ithin each group o f women, 
there were identifiable similarities, which were expected, but there were minimal 
similarities between the groups o f women. Surprisingly, the one area that both groups o f 
women had in common was that they all had ehildren and that was the biggest factor for 
all o f them dropping out o f school. Luttrell (1989) concluded her findings were similar to 
Belenky et al. (1986) when compared to Perry (1970) because o f the underlying themes 
geared toward unconscious psyehodynamie factors, cognitive development, and gender- 
role socialization. These women had developed inclinations toward their self and 
knowing that were less linear, separate, and hierarchieal as compared to men in the Perry 
(1970) study. The findings also suggested a similar trajectory in that the women showed 
more o f a continuous and connected sense o f self-knowledge which was embedded in 
their social relationships and was related to their background knowledge and experiences. 
Through qualitative analysis it was summarized that although it was still d ifficu lt to
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pinpoint precisely how the women internalized rationality and knowledge, it was clear 
that the outcome continues to falsely dichotomize emotion and thought; subjectivity and 
objectivity; and mind and body (Luttrell, 1998).
Brown and Gilligan (1992) did a study that directly links Women's Ways o f  Knowing 
to the current study because it investigates personal epistemological development in 
young g ir l’ s over time. Brown &  Gilligan (1992) is a ten-year longitudinal study with 
young girls entering adolescence and through their teens. What they found over the 
course o f their discussions was that younger girls have strong voices and are unafraid o f 
speaking the truth about their feelings, thoughts, and experiences. However, once on 
their way to becoming young women, these same girls who seemed at first open and 
uninhibited had experienced a significantly diminished voice and appeared to be 
disconnected from themselves. They concluded that the transition they had witnessed 
was that “ developmental progress goes hand-in-hand with evidence o f a loss o f voice”  (p. 
6). They observed a struggle to authorize or take seriously their own experience, to listen 
to their voices in conversation, and to respond to their feelings and thoughts, increased 
confusion, and sometimes defensiveness.
In another study using the Women's Ways o f Knowing framework, Llorens (1994) 
claimed that the voice that is missing in educational research is the voice o f the teachers. 
Her goal was to find out why more teachers did not conduct more action research in their 
classrooms and what it might take to encourage teachers to find their voice. The study 
looks in-depth at 38 teachers from a variety o f perspectives; educational background, 
teaching experience, instructional approach, goals, and classroom assessment. Data was 
collected from the experimental group over four months and included semi-structured
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interviews, group brainstorming, a weekly reading meeting, and individual journal 
entries. The control group had a pre-interview and a post-interview discussing the same 
topics as the experimental group without the intervention. The findings were compatible 
w ith Women’s Ways o f  Knowing. The teachers involved in the experimental group began 
to realize that the silencing they were experiencing was related to the female role models 
in their lives. Upon reflecting on their female students, the teachers were able to see 
patterns o f what they had been exposed to and how they themselves might be impacting 
silence w ithin their female students. Personal commitment and passion were also 
missing in the teachers in previous action research projects. This precipitated a 
disconnection from their work in the classroom. This is pivotal for successful action 
research because personal connection with the content and the students is the only way 
for a teacher to regain their voice (Zeichner, 1993). In Llorens (1994) it is the personal 
disconnect and lack o f commitment that is consistent with Belenky et al. (1986).
Summary and critique. Like Perry ( 1970), Belenky et al. ( 1986) opened themselves 
up for criticism by intentionally investigating all women. They also generalized that their 
findings could be found in the male population but provided no means to assess the 
gender-related nature o f their findings (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). Their decision to 
expand the investigation to include less educated women had good possibilities to really 
see differences, but the decision to utilize two different protocols immediately infuses 
questions about the conclusions regarding the differences in the epistemological 
perspectives o f the women. Perry’s scheme included a position o f Basic Dualism in 
which ideas are either right or wrong, but there is no inference o f a power imbalance 
between the authority and the knower. Belenky et al. (1986) failed to include a
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perspective representative o f this type o f thinking or knowing. They give validation to 
the Subjective Knower’s voice, provided the voice can be interpreted as the only 
authority. Subjectivity does not prevail in Women’s Ways o f Knowing, however, except 
when knowledge is subjective to the knower.
Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) raise the question about the order o f the question sets: that 
there is a possibility that by asking the “ relationship”  set prior to the set on “ ways o f 
knowing”  the women may have been primed. They raise the question because o f the 
findings that women have a relational, connected approach to knowing. The division o f 
procedural knowledge into separate and connected knowledge has had an impact on 
epistemological development as they appear to be gender related. Feminists have taken 
on work in this field, including the authors, and assert that power issues may drive many 
o f the differences (Erwin, 1983). Belenky et al., (1986) lean toward empathy as another 
possible explanation. Baxter Magolda (1989) asserts that differences in ways o f knowing 
may be related to feelings o f confidence. These hypotheses eventually relate to affective 
dispositions and how they can affect an individual’ s perspectives about the nature o f 
knowledge and the process o f knowing. This is pertinent to the proposed study because 
affect w ill be investigated in terms o f how personal epistemologies may be eonstrueted in 
young children.
Belenky et al. (1986) broach the issue o f cultural diversity (which is a lim itation o f 
Perry’s scheme) and its importance to the ways women know, and they never claim 
universality. This resonates w ith personal epistemology research and how it tends to 
overlook sociocultural issues and their contributions to shaping individuals’ beliefs about 
knowledge. Goldberger (1996) calls for more research that uses a more diverse
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sociocultural perspective, and the Zhang (1999) study with the Chinese students supports 
this request. Further, Zhang (1999) proposes that the different cultural and educational 
systems between China and the U. S. may create different patterns o f cognitive 
development. She suggests that cultural background has a supreme impact on critical 
factors related to cognitive development such as decision making, instructional 
approaches, and personality formation..
Belenky et al.’s (1986) model does not use the concept o f stages but rather 
perspectives. However, while there may be no explicit hierarchical claim, their work is 
fu ll o f  developmental references. For example, when Belenky et al. (1986) discuss 
subjectivism, they state that “ developmentalists in the past have noted that this kind o f 
shift in orientation toward authority-from external source, which binds and directs our 
lives, to an adherence to authority within us-is one o f the central tasks o f adolescence”
(p. 139). Belenky &  Stanton (2000) refer to constructed knowing as the endpoint o f 
development with regard to discussion about Women’s Ways o f Knowing. Weinstock 
(1989) has accepted the transitional and developmental nature o f the model, breaking 
them down even further into specific developmental phases.
Exploring women’s conceptions o f knowing through their own voice is an important 
goal in the proposed study because in developing a framework for children’s 
epistemology it w ill be critical to hear the voices o f the child and the significant 
participants that scaffold the knowledge and understanding that the child finds 
meaningful. Women’s Ways o f  Knowing is also particularly useful in the proposed study 
because o f its focus on the influence o f parents and teacher. The study calls for the
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parents and the teacher to be very reflective o f their own experiences and their 
observations o f the ehild.
Epistemological Reflection Model
The Epistemological Reflection Moc/c/(Baxter Magolda, 1992) has been influential in 
the study o f personal epistemology. The model builds on the work o f Peny (1970) and 
Belenky et al. (1986) in a way that addresses one o f the primary limitations o f the 
previous works by targeting the potential gender-related differences in epistemological 
development. Baxter Magolda began her contributions somewhat differently. First there 
was the development and validation o f  a written instrument, the Measure o f  
Epistemological Reflection (MER), as a way to quantify ways o f thinking (Baxter 
Magolda, 1987). In contrast to Perry (1970) and Belenky et al. (1986), the MER is a 
short-essay production task that poses questions about the role o f the learner, instructor, 
and peers; an evaluation o f learning; the nature o f knowledge; and educational decision­
making. These domains were central to Periy’s theory and relied on Loevinger &  
Wessler’s (1970) data analysis and Gibb &  Widaman’s (1982) domain coding procedure 
(Baxter Magolda, 2004). In itia lly, Baxter Magolda (1992) analyzed the data using the 
first five positions from Perry (1970) and the five perspectives from Belenky et al.
(1986), also allowing for room to insert additional categories i f  needed. Later, she 
reanalyzed the data in a more qualitative form which resulted in the Epistemological 
Reflection Model (Baxter Magolda, 1992). Further studies to validate the MER resulted 
in a coding manual based on more than 1,000 MER responses (Baxter Magolda &  
Portfield, 1988).
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Table 2: Summary o f Epistemological Reflection Model 
Baxter Magolda ( 1992)
WAYS OF KNOW ING
ABSOLUTE TRANSITIO NAL INDEPENDENT CONTEXTUAL
FEMALE Receiving
Private
listening
Recording
Interpersonal 
Discussion 
Resolve uncertainty 
by personal judgment
Inter-individual Inter-individiicil
M ALE Mastery
Public
demonstration
Challenging
Impersonal
Debate
Resolve uncertainty 
by logic
Individual Individual
Nature
o f
Knowledge
Knowledge is 
certain or 
absolute.
Knowledge is 
certain and 
partially uncertain.
Knowledge is 
uncertain, and 
evei-yone has his 
own beliefs.
Knowledge is 
eontextual &  
judged on the 
basis o f 
evidence w ithin 
the context.
Role
o f
Learner
To obtain
knowledge
from
the instruetor. 
They believe 
that authorities 
have all o f  the 
answers.
To achieve knowledge 
from the instructor 
and make meaning o f 
that
knowledge.
Discovery
that authorities are not 
all-knowing and begin 
to aecept the 
uncertainty o f 
knowledge.
To think for 
themselves &  
share their views 
w ith  others. They 
are able to question 
authority as the only 
source &  w ill begin 
to develop their 
own perspective &  
hold their opinions 
as
equally valid.
To have the ability 
to
exchange &
compare
perspectives.
They are capable o f 
constructing an 
individual 
perspective by 
judging evidence in 
context.
Role
o f
Instructor
To
eommunicate 
knowledge 
appropriately, 
they should 
ensure the 
student
understands the 
knowledge.
To use methods that 
aim toward student 
understanding and to 
use methods that help 
apply the knowledge.
To be w illin g  and 
able to promote 
independent 
thinking &  promote 
the open exehange 
o f  ideas.
To promote the 
application o f 
knowledge in 
context &  promote 
evaluative 
diseussions on 
perspectives.
Role
o f
Peers
To share 
materials.
To get involved in 
active engagements.
To openly exchange 
ideas &  serve as a 
source o f 
knowledge.
To be able to 
enhance learning 
through quality 
contributions.
Evaluation
o f
Learning
Evaluation is a 
vehicle to show 
the instruetor 
what the 
student has 
learned.
Evaluation is a means 
to measure students’ 
understanding o f the 
material.
Evaluation rewards
independent
thinking.
Ultim ately all 
students are 
responsible for their 
own judgments and 
constructed 
perspectives.
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Discussion o f the model. The Epistemological Reflection Model (Baxter Magolda, 
1992) consists o f four ways o f knowing; (a) absolute, (b) transitional, (c) independent, 
and (d) contextual (See Table 2). It is important to note that three o f the four categories 
contain a gender-related distinction; contextual ways o f knowing is not based on evidence 
but rather hypothesized (See Table 2). Each category leads to a “ particular expectation o f 
the learner, peers, and instructor in learning settings, as well as to an understanding o f 
how learning should be evaluated and how educational decisions are made”  (Baxter 
Magolda, 1992, p. 29). There is less focus on knowledge alone, but rather the emphasis 
is on the nature o f learning in the context o f a college classroom. Baxter Magolda was 
particularly interested in gender-related issues o f epistemological understanding, and her 
motivation to shift the conceptual frame slightly was due to the troublesome attempts to 
match student responses to Perry’s scheme and the apparent discrepaneies between the 
men in Perry’s study compared to the women in Belenky et a l.’s (1986) work.
Empirical .support. Baxter Magolda’ s ( 1992) framework is the result o f a five-year 
longitudinal study o f epistemological development and how epistemological assumptions 
affect individuals’ interpretation o f their educational experiences. However, this was 
limited because the terms in which she defined epistemology for the study largely 
consisted o f students’ perceptions o f their learning experiences and involved only 
students at M iami University. The model is a representation o f 70 graduate and 
undergraduate college students who completed annual open-ended interviews, and at 
each interview the students were given a MER to complete and return later. Year-one 
inteiwiews addressed the original six issues involved in the development o f 
epistemological understanding but was modified later to incorporate questions about the
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nature o f knowledge, out-of-class learning, and individual changes as a result o f students’ 
experienees with learning.
The Epistemological Reflection Model impacted the research in personal 
epistemology because it investigated gender-related patterns o f epistemologieal 
development by researching both men and women. The conclusion was that there are in 
fact patterns in gender-related differences o f knowing, which Belenky et al. (1986) 
speculated; however the patterns can be detected in both genders, so they are not gender- 
specific. The model encapsulated more middle-class socioeconomic groups o f students, 
however, and sociocultural diversity was limited since the population was restricted to a 
Midwestern university whose enrollment was 97% Caucasian.
In a later study, Baxter Magolda (2003) illustrates how four practice samples using 
her constructivist approach to analyzing qualitative inquiry mimic findings o f Baxter 
Magolda (1992) during a broader study investigating identity and learning. Her 
microgenetic study looks at four students and focuses on making identity central in 
learning to promote learning and self-authorship. There are four frameworks: 
multicultural education, community development, academic advising, and student affairs’ 
role in leading educational transformation. This brie f study resonated with many o f the 
findings from her longitudinal work, including how students encountered significant 
challenges during college. When challenged, students were most often offered external 
formulas for how to handle them instead o f being engaged in real struggles to determine 
how these challenges shaped their beliefs about themselves in relation to their 
environment. She concludes that her proposed framework for promoting self-authorship 
could alleviate some o f the difficulties students encounter in academic settings by making
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the experience more real, allocating responsibility, exposure to tough issues, engaging in 
decision-making and active argumentation and negotiation. These would be helpful 
because they most closely relate to what happens in the world outside o f academia. She 
places the burden of authority-dependence on teachers and calls for higher education to 
be more malleable for students to make the shift to higher levels o f epistemological 
development. Despite the repetition of finding the gradual progression, Baxter Magolda 
(2003) reported that higher levels o f sophistication seem to develop closer to age 30 
rather than age 18, which in some cases has been marked as the beginning o f more 
complex epistemological thinking (Baxter Magolda, 2001; King & Kitchener, 1994).
More recent work from Baxter Magolda (2004) uses a constructivist lens discussed in 
Cuba &  Lincoln (2000). The constructivist lens allows inquiry to view reality as 
contextualized so that the knower mutually constructs knowledge through the interaction 
between what is known and the knower or self. Her original work was aimed toward the 
nature, limits, and certainty of knowledge and how epistemological assumptions evolve 
during young adulthood. Her bottom line is that epistemological transformation is a 
movement toward more sophisticated epistemological thinking and not the development 
o f specific learning strategies or skills.
Baxter Magolda (2004) portrays personal epistemology as socially constructed and 
context bound. This paints a picture o f individuals actively making meaning of their 
experiences using short-essays to convey their reflections. Their interpretations are based 
on what occurs internally and externally to them during the experience; they evaluate the 
experience and derive a conclusion based on their cunent level o f understanding. The 
result or the meaning they construct depends on their present knowledge and
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understanding that they hold regarding themselves and the world, the particular context 
o f the experience, and conflicting assumptions or misconceptions they confront.
Baxter Magolda (2004) did not simply wake-up w ith this epiphany. Rather she 
explains that her own experience as a researcher has allowed her to construct her current 
views on epistemology. She explains that through attempting to make meaning and 
understand her experiences, it was the combination o f her current interpretation o f 
knowledge, the interaction with her participants’ interpretation o f knowledge, and what 
the possibilities o f the two interpretations meant. This process helped guide her ability to 
ask fru itfu l questions, probe specific areas, or otherwise conduct a productive 
investigation o f the students’ personal epistemologies. This has been an insightful 
finding and is one that is particularly beneficial in qualitative analysis. Denzin &  Lincoln 
(2000) encourage this type o f researcher introspection and recommend the researcher 
detail their personal remarks in an epoche. An epochc is a technique that assists data 
analysis from incorporating subjective interpretations onto the inteq^retation o f the 
participants. This approach w ill be used in the current study and w ill be discussed at 
more length in chapter three.
One o f the more interesting aspects o f Baxter Magolda’s (2004) self-reflection study 
is her arrival at a new level o f understanding in her thinking about personal epistemology, 
Phase Three. Phase Three includes exploring systems for managing uncertainty. In itia lly 
perplexed about how many seniors constructed the world from a transitional perspective, 
she found it more disturbing that others had shifted to an independent or contextual 
perspective but still used external formulas to approach life after college. This meant that 
the post-college environments had prompted movement toward independent and
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contextual knowing faster than the college environment. The question here: how could 
that be the case? Baxter Magolda found an answer during the interview process; the 
students stressed the message that learning was not a meaningful framework for their 
post-college experiences and they preferred to talk about their experiences in more 
general terms (Baxter Magolda, 2004). This finding opened the door for the possibility 
that there were additional developmental dimensions such as identity and relationships 
that regulated the students’ intellectual development. Baxter Magolda found Kegan 
(1994) helpful in identifying other systems that can contribute to epistemological 
development; for example, challenges and supports the individuals experienced at their 
job, advanced education, and social contexts; and the differences in the way the 
individuals reacted to the challenges and supports. Although the immediate frame for 
defining personal epistemology was not altered, the lens certainly broadened for 
identifying factors that contribute as an operating system associated w ith personal 
epistemology.
Summary and critique. Baxter Magolda’s refreshing constructive-developmental 
perspective and her methodological approach o f inquiry and qualitatively analyzing data 
may invite research in more diverse populations with respect to age, gender, and race. 
Among the most significant contributions that Baxter Magolda has brought to the study 
o f personal epistemology include the following: the perspective o f multiple realities, 
contextualizing the individual’s experience, and socially constructed interactions. These 
components w ill be central to proposed study for developing a framework for researching 
children’s personal epistemology.
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Baxter Magolda’s (1992) model is particularly useful beyond the gender-related 
issues because it approaches epistemological thought as it relates to the educational 
environment. It aims to grasp the students’ dispositional perspective about a host o f 
educational factors that marks the beginning o f interpreting the system that is related to 
the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. Viewing personal epistemology 
from a broader system such as the individual’ s environment and the connection to the 
development o f personal epistemologies is o f particular importance because the proposed 
study combines a personal epistemological framework w ith a systems framework to 
identify young children’s personal epistemologies w ithin the context o f the classroom 
environment.
Reflective Judgment Mode!
King and Kitchener (1994) developed the Reflective Judgment Model that is the result 
o f fifteen years o f studies and interviews with countless participants ranging in age from 
high school students to middle aged adults. The Reflective Judgment Model is derived 
from several theoretical bases including Dewey, Piaget, Kohlberg, and Perry (Kitchener, 
1983). John Dewey first used the term reflective judgment in 1933 to discuss the process 
o f thinking that must occur when no clear-cut solution can be identified (Dewey, 1933).
According to King &  Kitchener (1994) reflective judgment can be thought o f as 
“ beginning with an awareness o f uncertainty”  ( p. xvi). The Reflective Judgment Model 
(RJM) is based on reflective thinking which can be identifiable on its own because 
neither an individual’ s current understanding nor logic w ill assist with finding the 
answer. The model focuses on epistemic cognition, which they define as “ the ways that
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people understand the process o f knowing and the corresponding ways they jus tify  their 
beliefs about ill-structured problems”  (King &  Kitchener, 1994, p. 13).
Discussion o f  the nwdel. The most outstanding features o f the RJM are the 
sophisticated quality o f the theory and the gender-balancing as compared to the models 
reviewed thus far (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). They also have succeeded in covering the 
largest age range (adolescence to late adulthood). King &  Kitchener (1994) have linked 
their work closely to Kohlberg’s ( 1984) model o f moral judgment. Some o f King & 
Kitchener’s studies have indicated that the ReJJective Judgment Interview  (RJI) and 
Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test (the D IT is a pencil-and-paper assessment for moral 
judgment) correlate moderately; however, correlations are less when age and education 
are controlled (King &  Kitchener, 1994). King &  Kitchener (1994) have also connected 
their model o f reflective judgment to Erikson’s psychosocial development for the stage o f 
identity versus role confusion. Another moderate correlation was indicated to exist 
between an increase in reflective judgment and Marcia’s (1964) identity statuses: identity 
diffused, foreclosed identity, moratorium, and identity achieved (King &  Kitchener,
1994).
Perry’s scheme o f intellectual development has influenced most all o f the research in 
epistemological beliefs over the past 35 years, but his contribution has been directly 
influential in the case o f RJM (King &  Kitchener, 1994). Perry was the first to observe 
that underlying assumptions about knowledge and learning can make a difference in 
reflective judgment (Knefelkamp, 1999). According to King &  Kitchener (1994), the 
later stages o f Perry’s model did not satisfactorily account for or articulate the nature o f 
an individual’ s reflective judgment. The RJM has pioneered most o f the reflective
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judgment research over the past twenty years (King &  Kitchener, 2002). The Reflective 
Judgment Model elaborates on the structural and epistemological aspects o f Perry’ s 
higher positions. King &  Kitchener (1994) identify the RJM as a developmental model 
because it is consistent w ith what Flavell (1971) lists as criteria for a stage model: (a) 
underlying organization, (b) units are qualitatively different, and (c) the whole forms a 
loosely or consistent sequence. Mechanisms o f developmental change come from 
Piaget’s theoretical framework; that is, assumptions about knowledge develop through 
assimilation and accommodation o f  existing cognitive structures as individuals interact 
w ith their environment (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). There is no assumption that an 
individual’ s reasoning can be summed up by one stage at any one point in time.
King &  Kitchener (1994) do, however, interpret their findings to indicate that 
individuals possess both an optimal and a functional level; this area between the two 
levels is considered the developmental range. This concept corresponds to Vygotsky’s 
(1962) zone o f proximal development. According to Vygotsky, stage change may be 
marked by rapid bursts o f growth, then a plateau that promotes generalizations across 
domains (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). The idea o f developmental range is in contrast to 
Piaget’s thinking; he thought development progressed abruptly and was discontinuous.
The RJM was developed after more than 1,700 individual interviews had been 
analyzed, and the participants ranged in age from 14 to 65. In the sample there were 150 
high school students, 1,100 college undergraduates, 200 graduate students, and 150 non­
students. These individuals were questioned about their epistemological assumptions and 
the ways in which they justified their beliefs when they were confronted with uncertainty. 
The individuals were presented with four ill-structured problems and asked to state and
65
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
jus tify  their perspective. The ill-structured problems had to do w ith things like the 
objectivity o f news reporting or issues o f evolution. In addition they had to respond to 
six probing follow-up questions designed to capture the essence o f their assumptions 
about knowledge and how they perceive gaining knowledge.
Based on these interviews the Reflective Judgment Model was developed. It has three 
general levels and seven specific stages. Level (I); Pre-Reflective, (stages 1, 2, &  3), 
individuals are not like ly to perceive that problems exist that have no correct or absolute 
answer; Level (II): Quasi-Reflective, (stages 4 &  5), reflection characterizes thinking; 
Level (111): Reflective, (stages 6 &  7), knowledge is actively constructed and must be 
understood w ithin a context and judgments are susceptible to réévaluation. (See Table 3).
Each stage has a focus on both the individual’ s conception o f the nature o f knowledge 
and the process o f justification for the knowledge. Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) point out 
some consistent parallels between the RJM and Perry’s scheme (fo r a detailed chart 
comparing all the developmental models see Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997): (a) the Pre- 
Reflective thinking Stage 2 corresponds with Perry’s dualism, (b) Quasi-Reflective 
thinking. Stage 4, represents Perry’s M u ltip lic ity  position; and (c) Quasi-Reflective Stage 
5 parallels Perry’s relativism. In addition, like Perry, King &  Kitchener make no claims 
that an individual’s reasoning must be compatible w ith only one stage at a particular 
time.
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Table 3: Summary o f The Reflective Judgment Model 
K ing and Kitchener ( 1994)
PRE-REFLECTIVE
TH IN K IN G
QUASI-REFLECTIVE
THINKING
REFLECTIVE
THINKING
Stage 1
Knowledge is assumed to be 
simple, concrete, absolute and 
exist exclusively. Beliefs 
need no justifica tion because 
no alternatives are thought to 
exist.
There is a direct connection 
between what is observed and 
truth. What an individual 
believes to know is the 
complete information and 
exists prim arily  in young 
children. Not identified______
Stage 4
Knowledge &  the justification o f  
knowledge are perceived as 
abstractions but are poorly 
differentiated. Individuals 
believe differences o f opinions 
exist b/c knowledge is uncertain. 
They believe that no one can 
know w ith absolute certainty, &  
some knowledge w ill remain 
uncertain. A ll people are entitled 
to their opinion.
Stage 6
Knowledge is uncertain &  
contextual. Conclusions are 
based on context. Able to link 
knowing &  justification. 
Answers can be more correct 
than others b/c o f plausibility 
o f arguments. Evidence may 
be tentative &  critica lly 
evaluated on the basis o f 
justification.
Stage 2
Knowledge is absolute and 
lim ited to authority. Not 
everyone knows the truth. 
Individuals w / authority 
know the truth &  all others 
who disagree must be wrong. 
Individuals function as filters. 
They are not able to explain 
information but know it to be 
right because o f the source. 
They believe that knowledge 
is certain &  not everyone has 
access to it.
When individuals are 
uncertain about the truth, they 
jus tify  their beliefs by 
accepting the views o f 
authority. D ifficu lty  
recognizing that there are 
legitimate dif. in opinion.
Stage 5
Knowledge is contextual &  
relative &  filtered through the 
perceptions o f the individual 
evaluating the evidence. What is 
ultimately known is limited to 
the individual's perceptions. It is 
possible to relate evidence &  
arguments to knowledge, but 
reasoning is not possible because 
evidence is evaluated 
qualitatively &  some evidence is 
stronger than other evidence. 
Knowledge is no longer certain, 
and interpretation is inherent in 
all understanding. Individuals 
can recognize that choosing one 
alternative does not deny the 
legitimacy o f others but cannot 
explain the relationships 
between the alternative 
perspectives.__________________
Stage 7
Knowledge is constructed by 
using skills o f  critical inquiry 
and by combining evidence 
and opinion into cohesive and 
coherent explanations for 
beliefs about problems. 
Solutions are probabilistic and 
are reevaluated when relevant 
new evidence, perspectives, or 
tools o f  inquiry become 
available.
Stage 3
Knowledge is s till considered 
to be absolute but only in 
some areas. Uncertainty is 
temporary.
Authorities may not currently 
have the truth, but it is 
assumed that in the future the 
absolute correct ansvrer w ill 
be known.
Beliefs are jus tified  by 
authorities. Opinions &  
beliefs are viewed the same as 
factual evidence.
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King &  Kitchener (1994) found that an individual’s assumptions toward what and 
how something can be known provide a particular lens that dictates how they tend to 
view a problem and how they jus tify  their beliefs about the problem in the face o f 
ambivalence. The foundation o f the RJM stresses that reflective judgment is an ultimate 
outcome and developmental endpoint o f reasoning and the ability to evaluate knowledge 
claims. This developmental transition presumably occurs w ithin the context o f an 
individual’ s background, prior educational experience, and present life situation.
Empirical support. K ing &  Kitchener (1994) indicate that over time higher-stage 
reasoning is more evident than lower-stage reasoning, and that educational achievement 
is strongly related to higher stages o f reflective judgment. In general, comparing o f the 
findings with the college students in terms o f educational achievement, periods o f 
development conesponded to the individual’s college attendance and a relationship exists 
between the individual’s age and stage. Interestingly, none o f the college graduates are 
reported to be functioning any higher than low stage quasi-reflective thinking, and the 
traditional and non-traditional age participants were identical. Amazingly, there is only 
approximately a ha lf a stage difference between the college freshmen and college seniors. 
The most significant gain in reflective thinking is among those individuals in the early 
portion o f graduate training who are between stage 4 &  5. Stage 6 reasoning has 
appeared only in advanced doctoral students. Out o f four testing episodes, the first two 
did not yield any gender-related differences in the ways o f knowing; however, the last 
two studies showed results with gender-related differences. They found men to score at 
the higher stages and speculated that it might be due to educational achievement, mainly
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because more o f the men in the study had furthered their education beyond a 
baccalaureate program.
The task o f validating the RJM consisted o f a ten-year longitudinal study that is 
condensed nicely in King &  Kitchener (2002). It consists o f the collaborative efforts o f 
King &  Kitchener (1981), King, Kitchener, Davison, Parker, &  Wood (1983), King, 
Kitchener, Wood, &  Davison (1989), King &  Kitchener (1990), and King &  Kitchener
(1994). Over the ten years, data on reflective judgment was collected in the years 1977,
1979, 1983, and 1987. King &  Kitchener (2002) refer to two ways a proper validation 
study is conducted: (a) Cross-seetional data can identify developmental sequences that 
emerge over time, and (b) longitudinal data are needed to assess change in the 
individual’s reasoning over time. The initia l sample consisted o f 40 21-year-old college 
juniors, 20 16-year-old high school students, and 20 third-year doctoral students whose 
average age was 28. Gender and academic achievement was matched between the two 
younger groups and the doctoral students. The results were reported after retest 
participation in 1979 (74%), 1983 (69%), and 1987 (66%) and was noted that most o f the 
participants were still primarily active in their educational endeavors (King &  Kitchener, 
1981).
King, Kitchener, &  Wood (1994) followed by reporting individual mean and modal 
scores for each participant at each o f the testing times above. They reported a 
progressively upward pattern o f change with 92% o f the students demonstrating an 
increase in their RJI score from 1977 to 1987. They went on further to report that these 
changes corresponded to the general stage progression o f the RJM but include movement
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between stages, and they identified waves o f variability w ithin each stage; however, the 
waves had different forms across the stages.
Brabeck &  Wood (1990) was veiy/ similar to King et al. (1994) in participant 
confirmation but investigated well-struetured versus ill-structured problems in a 
longitudinal and cross-sectional study. Wood (1995) is a secondary analysis o f  studies 
involving reflective judgment interviews. The most significant longitudinal research is a 
10-year study w ith 80 students; 38 o f these students were involved in four rounds o f 
assessments using the RJI. The results indicated that the RJI increased with age and 
education; however, both variables were confounded, but that seems to be the case with 
reflective judgment research (King &  Kitchener, 1996).
There have been studies that look at educational-level differences as a way to confirm 
whether epistemic cognition develops over time when measured by reflective judgment. 
Most o f this work has been completed by King, Kitchener, &  Wood (1994), but Dale
(1995) assessed reflective judgment levels in 45 male students (freshmen through 
seniors), and 18 faculty at a conservative seminary. The results confirm the gradual 
progression o f reflective judgment; the faculty scored highest, and the more advanced 
students scored higher on the RJI than did the younger students. The interesting finding 
in Dale (1995) was that the stronger the student’s belie f in God, the lower their score on 
the RJI. Freshmen and sophomores tended to fall into stages 4 and 5 whereas the juniors 
and seniors leaned more toward stages 5 and 6. King and Kitchener (2002) add that 
many o f their findings show that the highest RJI scores for early level graduate students 
are consistent w ith Dale (1995), falling in stages 4 and 5 and more advanced level
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graduate students clustering around stages 5 and 6. They add that stage 6 has only been 
indicated in doctoral equivalent education and faculty o f advanced education.
Summary and critique. Reflective judgment research has used multiple methods for 
assessment, most o f which have been developed by King &  Kitchener themselves; the 
most w idely utilized is the Reflective Judgment Interview  (RJI).
The Reflective Judgment Interview is limited to trained raters, placing it largely out 
o f reach. The research using the instrument has been primarily white middle-class college 
students and needs to be used to evaluate other diverse populations. Although there is 
evidence o f gender-related differences in knowing, the results from King &  Kitchener 
(1994) and Baxter Magolda (1992) seem to be the tip o f the iceberg and remain 
inconclusive. Classroom studies are needed view reflective judgment development in a 
broader scope, especially because the results have shown that there is very little  refleetive 
judgment development occurring in the first few years o f college and that age may be 
linked to stage.
King &  Kitehener view the Reflective Judgment Model to be within the broader realm 
o f intellectual development and have been critieized for conceptually resembling eritical 
thinking constructs (Hofer, 2001 ). King and Kitchener ( 1994) argue that the reflective 
judgment model is separate from critieal thinking which may occur as a result o f 
induetive or deduetive logic. It is this type o f reflective thinking that seems important in 
order for students to move from knowledge to applied practice o f coneeptions and to 
transfer those eoneeptions to similar situations. Dewey (1933) differentiated critical 
thinking and reflective thinking in this way; critical thinking is used to solve problems 
that have an absolute answer or well-structured problems but as for problems that exist in
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the real-world, Dewey claimed these have no single absolute answer and are ill-structured 
problems. It is w ith ill-structured problems that reflective thinking can be most useful.
The problem is theoretical King &  Kitchener (1994) say; epistemological assumptions 
are missing w ithin the critical thinking research, and critical thinking is driven by solving 
well-defined problems.
The Reflective Judgment Model has made invaluable contributions to epistemological 
development in several areas: (a) their thoroughness o f the developmental sequence; (b) 
the elaboration o f Perry’s higher positions; and (c) that through reasoning there is a better 
understanding o f knowledge itself, which King &  Kitchener refer to as epistemic 
cognition. However, little can be detemiined regarding the process which occurs during 
personal epistemological development. King and Kitchener have sheltered their 
methodology; therefore, much o f the empirical support conies from them and places the 
reliability o f the measurement in question. They have, however, been proactive in the 
research o f adolescence and recommend research in this area be extended to younger 
children (King &  Kitchener, 2002).
A rgumentative Reasoning
Kuhn, Cheney, &  Weinstock’s (2000) model is an attempt to manage and resolve the 
difficulties o f epistemological understanding by simplifying it in the hopes that it might 
attain more consistent theoretical and empirical analysis. Despite that all o f the 
developmental models have varying numbers o f stages with slightly different overlapping 
distinctions, they do, however, maintain similar developmental trajectories that are 
represented by a sequence from dualistic objective beliefs about knowledge, to subjective 
views which are more relativistic, and then finally advancement toward a contextual way
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o f knowing that is constructed by the individual. It is suggested by Kuhn &  colleagues 
that there is a coordination o f the subjective and objective dimensions o f knowing that 
create the foundation for knowing, and this is the end goal o f epistemological 
development.
The model is supported by research ranging from childhood to adulthood and is 
motivated by the question: “ What is the developmental task to be achieved or the 
developmental goal toward which changes in epistemological understanding are 
directed?”  (Kuhn &  Weinstock, 2002, p. 123) It is claimed that the integration o f 
subjective and objective knowing is where and how epistemological understanding is 
manifested. The result o f this type o f integration, according to Kuhn &  Weinstock 
(2002), is a sequence o f qualitatively distinct understandings o f what it means to make a 
claim. The essence o f epistemological development is defined in this model as the 
progression from claims as copies to claims as facts and opinions, then finally claims as 
judgments. Kuhn &  Weinstock’s (2002) study includes children, which supports the 
proposed study, and this type o f investigation with children is currently quite sparse.
Discussion o f  the model. Kuhn’s model o f epistemological development is similar to 
Perry ( 1970) and includes three categories: (a) Absolutism, (b) Multiplism , and (c) 
Evaluativism. Absolutist individuals believe knowledge is certain and absolute; they 
emphasize expertise and facts as the foundation for knowing. These individuals convey 
their beliefs with a high degree o f certainty. M ultip lis t individuals have a high degree o f 
hesitation regarding expertise and do not accept the belie f that there is expert certainty or 
that experts w ill ever reach certainty. They observe that experts are imperfect. Experts do 
not agree and are regularly inconsistent; therefore, they are plagued with “ radical
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subjectivity” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Due to a lack o f tolerance for expert certainty, 
this type o f individual is driven by emotions. The emotional way o f interpreting 
knowledge makes the individual’s belief personal in nature and is surmised to be 
legitimate, as well as equal to, an expert’s view. Finally, in the Evaluativistic 
perspective, individuals view knowledge with varying degrees of uncertainty. They have 
respect for expertise and view the expert to have less uncertainty while they have more 
uncertainty. They possess the ability to evaluate differing points-of-view before making 
a judgment. They realize the productivity o f logic and argumentation and are accepting 
that knowledge can change.
Kuhn’s model is the first to relate epistemological understanding to argumentative 
reasoning, which requires cognitive skills such as reflection, evaluation, and judgment of 
other perspectives and evidence. Kuhn (1991) links these processes to individuals' 
metacognitive ability to review their own thinking. There are claims that this 
metacognitive ability is not likely in young children (Inhelder &  Piaget, 1958; Kuhn 
Amsel & O’Laughlin, 1988). Kuhn &  Weinstock (2002) discuss what they perceive to be 
an important goal o f understanding the development o f personal epistemology and that is 
getting to the bottom of what is being measured in the most precise and meaningful way. 
They further add that this is done through similar subjective and objective dimensions of 
knowing and is present in children. The subjective dimensions of knowing are 
represented by knowledge that is constructed internally in the individual, and the 
objective dimensions o f knowing are represented by knowledge that is constaicted 
externally by the individual. This view is consistent with Vygotsky’s (1978) theory that 
objective (external) knowledge develops first and is a stronger influence that is needed
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prior the development o f subjective (internal) nature o f knowing. Ultimate achievement 
is accomplished, according to Kuhn &  Weinstock (2002), when there is a balance 
between the subjective and objective ways o f knowing and is represented through a 
developmental progression from realist to absolutist, absolutist to relativist, and relativist 
to evaluativist.
Em pirical support. Kuhn et al. (2000) tap into informal reasoning through the use o f 
ill-structured problems as a way to identify the impact o f epistemological thinking as a 
process. This is similar to Baxter Magolda’s (1992) research; however, Kuhn’s ill-  
structured problems were placed w ithin authentic world contexts.
One o f Kuhn’s (1991) early studies was comprised o f 160 participants broken into 
four groups o f 40 individuals (teens, 20’s, 40’s, &  60’s), and each group was equally 
distributed according to gender and education. Two one-hour inteiwiews were conducted 
with each participant. The interview protocol consisted o f the participants generating 
causal explanations for three current urban social problems; (a) What causes prisoners to 
return to crime after they are released; (b) what causes children to fail in school; and (c) 
what causes unemployment. This line o f questioning was expected to generate three 
areas o f interest: (a) an explanation o f how individuals came to have their point-of-view 
and justification with supporting evidence, (b) the individual’s perception o f an opposing 
point-of-view including a rebuttal, and (c) epistemological reflection about their 
reasoning when asked explicitly. Embedded in the interview protocol were prompts for 
epistemological reasoning including proof, expertise, multiple viewpoints, origins o f 
theory, and certainty. Even though they based their questions solely on expertise, they 
still identified multiple dimensions o f personal epistemology.
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The most surprising aspect o f Kuhn’s (1991) study is the miniscule number o f 
individuals who met evaluativist criteria, especially considering the educational diversity 
and age range o f the participants. This is contrary to what is expected, considering ha lf 
o f the sample attended college, although ha lf o f the sample was over 40 years old. This 
raises the question about epistemological thinking in terms o f education versus life 
experience and is consistent with King &  Kitchener (1986) who found very small change 
w ithin and between individuals after four years o f college.
Kuhn, Katz, &  Dean (2004) found that participants differed substantially as a function 
o f education level. In the study 150 ninth graders in a college-bound, upper 
socioeconomic private school had higher levels o f epistemological beliefs than ninth 
graders in a non-college-bound inner city parochial school. Kuhn (1991) asserted that the 
differences indicated represent the impact o f home environment and background and that 
type o f school does make a difference in epistemological thinking. F ifty percent o f the 
students she interviewed were absolutist who viewed their knowledge with profound 
levels o f certainty and viewed experts or authority figures as their primary source o f 
knowledge. For example, to the question, “ Do experts know what causes school failure?”  
one student responded, “ 1 would have to say yes, because they have proven to me”  (p. 
171). In my old school we had guidance counselors and they know what was wrong with 
me”  (p. 174). Multiplists acknowledged their view of knowledge from a combination o f 
ideas and emotions but in a subjective manner and with subjective evidence. For 
example, one participant stated that “ anyone can prove 1 am wrong, but 1 have my view 
and 1 am set in my view on the basis o f  my experience and information”  (p. 182).
Finally, evaluativists claimed that knowledge is open to argument and examined
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alternative theories o f their understanding o f knowledge. For example, regarding the role 
o f experts again, one student’s comment was, “ I ’ m arguing from just a personal kind o f 
perspective, but by the same token I would be reluctant to change my position unless a 
substantially varied, lucid, and documented argument was presented to me”  (p. 191).
Kuhn, Cheney, &  Weinstock (2000) pursued argumentative reasoning and described a 
systematic progression across several judgment domains: personal taste, aesthetics, 
values, and truth. In this study they used seven groups total; three groups were o f fifth, 
eighth, and twelfth graders; a group o f undergraduate students: a group o f vocational 
students; and two groups o f adults targeted for either high level o f professional 
achievement or high degrees o f life experience. A ll groups were mixed aeeording to 
context, gender, achievement, ethnic background, and age. They used a 15-item 
questionnaire which they designed to tease apart the influences o f age, intellectual ability, 
and life experience for epistemological understanding. The instrument contains 
contrasting statements regarding two individuals and the response varied from, “ only one 
can be right”  to “ both could have some rightness.”  Kuhn et al. (2000) concluded that all 
o f the adult groups were capable o f transitioning from absolutist thinking to multiplist 
ways o f thinking. However, only one half o f the adults from any background made the 
transition from multiplist to evaluativist where the discrimination between judgment and 
commitment to a particular position is critical. Experts and undergraduates showed the 
highest level in evaluativist thinking and understanding. This finding indicates that 
educational experience is a contributor to the development o f epistemological 
understanding. This means that the data does not support age and educational level as 
sufficient variables that can promote the transition to evaluativist types o f thinking. This
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relates to the basis o f their argument that it is a lack of reasoning while formulating an 
argument that maintains the objectivity in ways o f knowing and epistemological 
understanding.
The work o f Kuhn &  Pearsall (2000) is significant to the proposed study because it is 
among the few in the area o f personal epistemology that supports the investigation of 
young children and one of two works that investigates the possible link between personal 
epistemology and theoiy o f mind. In young children, Kuhn & Pearsall (2000) state the 
ability to distinguish ways o f thinking (scientifically) is defined as the consciously 
controlled coordination of theory and evidence. Although, their theory has not been 
empirically validated the research used to construct the theory is valid and recognized by 
researchers in the field (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Shaw. & Felton, 1997). It is difficult to 
locate research that investigates young children’s personal epistemology, however, this 
theory provides a warrant for the purpose o f the current study. Scientific thinking may be 
central to many forms o f lower and higher levels o f thinking and cannot be ruled out in 
children prior to being investigated (Kuhn, 1996; Olson &  Astington, 1993). While 
investigating how individuals know, and what they know it may be beneficial to consider 
epistemological categories such as; fact, opinion, theory, and evidence.
Kuhn &  Pearsall (2000) argue that children as young as ages four to six exhibit an 
“ epistemological category mistake”  regarding source of knowledge. This should catch 
the eye of epistemological belief researchers because this implies that very young 
children begin to think episteinologically, a concept that is not investigated with the 
tenacity in which this study is proposing. Kuhn & Pearsall (2000) present a theory of the 
development o f scientific thinking in young children based on previous experimental
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results in which Kuhn &  Pearsall (1998) investigated 35 four-to-six-year-olds. They 
were shown a sequence o f pictures in which, for example, two runners are competing in 
race and asked to tell why one w ill win. One runner has fancier running shoes or one has 
bigger legs so they w ill be stronger and faster. The final picture in the sequence shows 
the outcome o f the race and the child is asked to state what the outcome is and tell why or 
justify  how they know. The youngest children merged the two questions— How do you 
know and why is it so? This means that they could not always identify evidence about 
how they knew the runner had won (because he was holding the trophy) but rather w ith a 
theory o f why it makes sense (because he has faster sneakers). This indicates important 
characteristics o f preschool-aged thinking and some o f the findings indicated that the 
four-year-olds were able to successfully answer questions about source and justification 
o f knowledge separately.
Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) combined research from personal epistemology and theory 
o f mind to make a case for how young children confuse a theory, making it plausible that 
an event occurred along w ith evidence that indicates the event. For the child, the source 
o f their knowing is evidence that the event actually occurred; a construct that develops 
rapidly during this young age (Flavell, M ille r, &  M iller, 2002). The argument is that 
when children begin to make the distinction between themselves and others as a source o f 
knowledge is the point in which a foundational platform for the development o f scientific 
thinking occurs. Support for this type o f hypothesis in older participants showing 
engagement in thinking about a topic enhances the quality o f reasoning about that topic, 
and higher levels o f reasoning using evidence-based arguments is an indicator for higher 
levels o f epistemological understanding.
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Summary and critique. Kuhn’s work and the complementary efforts o f her colleagues 
have been used in the context o f the real-world; this is in contrast w ith Baxter Magolda’s 
ill-structured problems. This allows for a much wider scope o f educational implications 
(Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). However the model is significantly trimmed down from 
Perry’s original work which takes away from the true developmental progression and 
complexity o f his developmental theory. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) criticize the three 
stage model, as compared to other models such as Perry’s scheme or Women’s Ways o f 
Knowing (Belenky et al., 1986), because they provide much more detail in their 
developmental models. The criticism is that Kuhn (1991) does not allow for sufficient 
precision in the criteria at each level and does not offer adequate sublevels to identify a 
pattern o f developmental progression in epistemological thinking.
Kuhn’s oversimplification o f  the epistemological phenomenon is perceived as 
problematic because it doesn’t provide the diversity or flex ib ility  to reveal complex 
epistemological issues that an individual constructs. This could be viewed as a criticism 
because ill-structured problems require background knowledge and personal experience; 
therefore, they exclude the potential to validate the personal epistemology o f the 
individual more. They are unable to adequately apply objectively situated arguments 
whereas other less emphatic topics may demonstrate the individual’ s balance o f objective 
and subjective balance. It is noticeable at this point that all o f the developmental models 
reviewed use some derivative o f an interview format to determine levels o f 
epistemological understanding; however, all o f the theories do not believe that the 
justification o f knowledge claims is important for epistemological sophistication to 
develop. For King &  Kitchener (1994) and Kuhn (1991) source and justification o f
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knowledge claims are central, but they recognize that the standards o f rationality are 
fallible.
Kuhn’ s model o f argumentative reasoning and scientific thinking has contributed 
support for research in personal epistemology to extend to investigating young children. 
Kuhn has provided support about the importance o f scientific thinking and how it relates 
to both personal epistemology and theoiy o f mind. Perhaps the progression o f personal 
epistemology w ill make identifying evidence in young children theoretically and 
methodologically more approachable.
Summaiy o f Developmental Models
The previous sections o f this chapter have been a review o f the developmental models 
that have been most commonly recognized by personal epistemology researchers in the 
fie ld o f educational psychology and developmental psychology. A ll o f these models 
have empirical research that supports them, and all o f these models discuss the same 
basic concept, which is, they describe how individuals’ beliefs about the nature o f 
knowledge and the process o f knowing (King &  Kitchener, 1994) develop and change 
over time. It is no coincidence that all o f the models are derived from Piaget’s theory o f 
cognitive development; however, each model consists o f slightly modified dimensions, 
and they can be contrasted by the number o f sequences and the defining characteristics o f 
each level o f development. It follows that despite the differences among the personal 
epistemological models there are also distinctive commonalities, such as, the same 
general trajectory from dualism-relativism-evaluativism (absolutist-multiplist- 
evaluativist). The purpose o f this section is to discuss these similarities and differences.
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Baxter Magolda ( 1992), Perry ( 1970), and Belenky et al. ( 1986) all suggest the 
existence o f different levels and types o f epistemological development and are 
qualitatively diverse (Buehl &  Alexander, 2001). The developmental models convey the 
multiple dimensions o f personal epistemology and are represented through a variety o f 
perspectives. For example, Perrry (1970) studied the nature o f knowledge, but Kuhn 
(1991) and King &  Kitchener (1994) studied the nature o f knov/ing. These are two 
different dimensions o f personal epistemology; therefore, each model contributes its own 
unique set o f stage-like or less-stage-like progressions o f development and its own 
definitional elements that range from what exactly is being studied to precisely how it is 
investigated. Describing the distinctions among each o f the five models becomes more 
coherent when it is taken into account which dimension the model is investigating. This 
is not to indicate that each model actually measures what it claims to measure because 
this continues to be a controversial issue w ithin the field o f personal epistemology.
An additional issue is the definition o f personal epistemology that has been adopted 
by eaeh model, and this definition varies primarily w ith the way in which they identify 
the significance that learning has in the scope o f personal epistemology. In addition, 
there are a range o f lim itations that exist in each model. The limitations attributed to 
each model pose two primary problems; they take away from the analytic ability o f each 
model and diminish the strength o f the educational implications.
It is clear in reviewing the developmental models that the obvious difference is their 
seemingly different titles. Recall the developmental models: Perry’s Scheme o f 
Intelleetual and Ethical Development (Perry, 1970), Women’s Ways o f Knowing 
(Belenky et al. 1986), Epistemological Reflection Model (Baxter Magolda, 1992), The
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Reflective Judgment Model (King &  Kitchener, 1994), and Kuhn’s Skills o f 
Argumentative Reasoning (and often referred to as Epistemological Understanding) 
(Kuhn, 1991). The point so far is that despite the obvious and underlying differences, the 
field o f personal epistemology accepts that these models share a common goal o f 
addressing beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and knowing (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). 
This typically includes four dimensions: (a) the certainty o f knowledge, (b) the simplicity 
o f knowledge, (c) the source o f knowledge, and (d) the justification o f knowing (Hofer &  
Pintrich, 1997).
Conceptually, the developmental models also have common interactionist and 
constmctivist perspectives, and they fo llow  the same basic developmental trajectories 
(Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997). The general trend o f personal epistemological development 
can be captured in three separate phases, all o f which are represented in each o f the 
developmental models. The first phase begins with the individual believing in an 
external objective (dualist) view o f knov/ledge, in which knowledge is certain and 
typically known with authority. The second phase begins to embrace some amount o f 
uncertainty about knowledge, and the individual takes on an overriding notion o f 
subjectivity which represents a transition to a multiplistic perspective o f knowledge. In 
the third phase o f development, there is an integration o f the objective and subjective 
views o f knowledge; wherein the individual has the capacity to weigh evidence and apply 
the evidence to differing knowledge claims. Individuals construct their own knowledge, 
knowledge is perceived to be evolving and malleable, and the individuals balance the 
process o f knowing with justification for knowing.
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This pattern o f development is captured in each o f these models regardless o f the 
number o f stages, levels, or positions. The varying number o f levels between the models 
has to do with how they are defined, which in turn has to do with what they are defining. 
Some models do it in three (King &  Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991) levels and others take 
four (Baxter Magolda, 1992), five (Belenky et al., 1986), or nine levels (Perry, 1970) to 
get from dualism to evaluativism. Even though the general stage progression is similar, 
the levels themselves differ among the models. Interestingly, when the five models are 
overlapped, the degree to which certain levels map onto one another is euriously 
different. For example, the Reflective Judgment model splits Perry’s multiplism position 
and incorporates dualism and part o f multiplism into their initial stage, Pre-Refleetive 
judgment, and in the same sense splits the relativism position and accounts for multiplism 
and evaluativism in their second level, Quasi-Reflective thinking.
Similarly, Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) state, “ A review o f the existing developmental 
models suggests that each o f the primary models posit developmental trajectories that 
parallel one another. Regardless o f the number o f stages, positions, or perspectives, the 
sequence invariably suggests movement from a dualist, objective view o f knowledge to a 
more subjective relativistic stance and ultimately to a contextual constructivist 
perspective o f knowing”  (p. 7). In reference to reviewing the RJM, Knefelkamp (2002) 
states that “ Even after thirty years o f extensive and varied scholarship, the Perry scheme 
continues to reflect the most critical dimensions to educators’ understanding o f learning 
and students’ approaches to learning”  (p. 238).
Another commonality in the area o f personal epistemological development is that 
none o f the models have successfully identified the earliest naïve stages o f dualism. In
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fact the first to even attempt it was Burr &  Hofer (2002), but a single study is not 
empirically valid or reliable on its own. Conversely, the models in general are seldom 
consistently provided with detail o f a profile for individual functioning at the highest 
epistemological level. Although the level has been identified, it is limited. No knowledge 
o f what may come later is ever affirmed in the research. The developmental models are 
proficient when it eomes to describing a sound trajectoiy for personal epistemological 
development and are considerably in-line w ith one another about the calibration o f each 
level. However, they falter when it comes to adequately explaining what occurs on each 
end o f the trajectory and how an individual transitions from one level to the next.
These five developmental models represent the foundation from whieh current work 
in personal epistemology is building and integrating new ideas. Many o f the researchers 
who have developed these models continue to extend their work and expand their 
knowledge and contributions within personal epistemology and in other domains.
Personal epistemology research in young children struggles to describe dimensions and 
trajectory o f children’ s understanding o f knowledge, in part to be adaptable to Piaget’ s 
stage theory o f cognitive development and because it appears to be juxtaposed with 
Perry’s scheme, which is not developmentally compatible nor does it account for 
experiences or memories o f early childhood development (Mansfield &  Clinehy, 2002). 
This presents dissonance for researchers o f children’s theory o f mind and researchers o f 
epistemology primarily because o f conflicting views o f to classify what children know 
and how they understand what they know. There are a variety o f views about the role o f 
environment, as far as im plicit versus explicit influences on the development o f cognitive 
structures and independent versus social dimensions. Chandler (2002) points out that
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despite the age that is investigated, all o f the sequences that unravel appear to be similar 
to Perry’s Scheme. Although Perry hypothesized about position 1, researchers o f children 
have still concluded some corresponding notion o f the individual’ s personal 
epistemology. Moore ( 1994) suggests that Perry’s stages are not developmental in nature 
but rather products o f the socialization process set in the values o f the individual’s 
environment. Hallet, Chandler, &  Krettenauer, (2002) counter that the age that children 
demonstrate some construction regarding the nature o f knowledge differs depending on 
objects o f knowledge or domains o f understanding. Therefore, it is a possibility that 
epistemological beliefs are not a developmental trajectory, and some researchers argue 
for a general sense o f recursion (Hallet, Chandler, &  Krettenauer, 2002; Moore, 1994). 
Contrary to Perry’s developmental model there is a theory that epistemological 
progression is actually a recycling o f earlier epistemic positions in different domains 
(Kitchener, 2002).
Kitchener (2002) addresses many o f the discrepant claims o f personal epistemology 
researchers, such as how to make sense o f them and the data that supports the claims. In 
an attempt to explain conflicting notions o f epistemological progression, according to 
Kitchener there are two levels: (a) the lower functional level, which refers to the 
cognitive processes that exist without contextual support or practice; and (b) the upper 
optimal level, that represents the high-order processes o f an individual’s cognitive 
activity.
Age is a factor which remains controversial while investigating personal 
epistemology. According to their research, the National Center for Education Statistics in 
2001 reported that the number o f college students who are non-traditional college-age has
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risen dramatically and, surprisingly, not much is known about the development o f these 
older re-entiy students.
Other Theories o f  Epistemological Beliefs 
Personal Epistemologies as Independent Dimensions
Developmental models are one way o f conceiving o f personal epistemologies, but 
there arc alternatives to these developmental models such as the work o f Schommer 
(1990; 1993; Schommer, Crouse, &  Rhodes, 1992) and colleagues. This view suggests 
that epistemological beliefs influence comprehension and academic perfonnance. In this 
perspective, epistemological beliefs or dimensions are seen as “ systems o f more-or-less 
independent beliefs”  (Duell &  Schommer-Aikins, 2001, p. 440). According to 
Schommer, this perspective comes on the heels o f previous research on developmental 
theory that conceptualizes personal epistemology as more unidimensional and focused on 
single dimensions o f epistemology, for example, certainty o f beliefs (Perry, 1970; 
Chandler, Boyes, &  Ball, 1990) or the justification o f knowledge (K ing &  Kitchener, 
1990). Schommer (1990) proposed measuring individual’s beliefs about knowledge and 
beliefs about learning which challenges more linear developmental models o f personal 
epistemology.
Schommer's Epistemological Beliefs Model
Schommer’s system o f more-or-less independent dimensions refers to a 
conceptualization that beliefs are multidimensional and may not necessarily develop at 
the same rate. Therefore, Duell &  Schommer-Aikins (2001) claimed it should not be 
assumed that an individual’s epistemological beliefs are more-or-less synchronized, and
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this is particularly important during periods o f development in which an individual has 
changing beliefs, much like the belief systems o f young children.
Schommer (1990) constructed her model from the previous work o f King &  
Kitchener (1981), who proposed the Reflective Judgment Model\ Dweck &  Bemechat 
(1983) who inquired about children’s beliefs about their ability to learn; and Schoenfeld 
(1983; 1985) who studied in the domain o f math beliefs for omniscient authority and 
speed o f learning. Interestingly, the integration o f these works highlights the effects o f 
the learner’s beliefs. Learners’ beliefs about learning in general and their beliefs about 
their abilities to learn have different impact on actual learning outcomes. For example, a 
student who has a lower ability could outperfonn a student with more superior ability 
because the lower ability student believes that intelligence can increase while the higher 
ability student holds the belief that intelligence is fixed (Schommer, 1992).
Table 4: Epistemological Beliefs As Independent Dimensions
Schommer ( 1990)
LEVELS NATURE OF 
KNOWLEDGE
DEFINITION OF 
KNOWLEDGE
1 Structure o f 
Knowledge
Isolated bits o f information to more integrated 
concepts.
2 Stability o f 
Knowledge
Unchanging to continuously changing.
3 Source o f 
Knowledge
Known by authority to derived from empirical 
evidence.
4 Speed o f 
Learning
Quick all-or-none to gradual.
5 A b ility  to 
Learn
Fixed at birth to improvable over time &  experience.
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Identifying distinct beliefs Schommer-Aikins (2004) says, “ was a way to tease apart 
aspects o f previous thick descriptions and allow for a more analytical inspection o f 
individual’ s personal epistemologies”  (p. 21). More advanced or sophisticated thinking 
implies that the system is supported by higher-order thinking. According to Schommer 
(1994), to believe that knowledge is complex is a more sophisticated way o f thinking 
compared to believing that knowledge is unchanging (more naïve). This idea o f differing 
dimensions o f personal epistemologies can still apply to a developmental stage 
progression i f  one considers that the two can develop at different rates, which could 
imply that the periods o f inconsistencies represent periods o f transition, growth, or 
change. It is also thought that the most naïve conceptions o f knowledge and learning are 
the beliefs that knowledge is simple and certain, and learning is believed to be quick and 
fixed from birth.
Discussion o f  the model. Schommer’s model has been used to research middle 
school-aged children into adulthood. In addition, over the past fifteen years it has been 
well represented in the literature for making outstanding contributions in theoretical and 
methodological significance in researching epistemological beliefs (Hofer &  Pintrich, 
1997).
There are five dimensions comprising the model which are designed to be viewed on 
a continuum beginning w ith naïve perspectives on one end and more sophisticated beliefs 
on the other end. (See Table 4). For example, Schommer ( 1990) argues that it is possible 
for a high school student to believe that knowledge is intertwined, meaning that at one 
instance he can hold the naïve belief that knowledge is absolute or certain while at the
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same time believe that the structure o f knowledge is complex, showing his sophisticated 
concept o f knowledge.
During the early period o f Schommer’s research on personal epistemology as more- 
or-less independent structures, she worked on developing an instrument to measure her 
proposed dimensions (Schommer, 1990, 1991, 1993; Schommer, Crouse, &  Rhodes, 
1992). The Epistemological Questionnaire is a paper-and-pencil assessment used to 
measure general epistemological beliefs which pose positively and negatively stated 
questions about knowledge and learning. It is a 63-item, five-point self-report Likert 
scale. The measure ranges from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree. It was 
subsequently subdivided into 12 sets to measure Schommer’s (1990) five dimensions o f 
personal epistemology listed in Table 4. Four factors from both exploratory and 
confimiatory factor analyses have been generated (Schommer, 1990, 1993; Schommer et 
ah, 1992). Each o f the four factors is represented on a continuum, beginning with naïve 
views on one end to more sophisticated perspectives on the other. The dimensions 
include the follow ing: Beliefs in Fixed A b ility  (fixed versus incremental). Beliefs in 
Simple Knowledge (isolated and ambiguous pieces o f knowledge versus highly 
interrelated concepts). Beliefs in Certain Knowledge (knowledge is absolute versus 
knowledge is tentative), and Beliefs in Quick Learning (learning is quick or not at all 
versus learning is gradual) (Schommer &  Walker, 1995). The Source o f Knov/ledge has 
not been empirically validated through Schommer’ s efforts (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997).
Beliefs about learning came from Schoenfeld (1983, 1985) which qualitatively 
accounted for students solving geometry problems aloud. Three conclusions are 
transferred to the Embedded Systemic Model (Schommer-Aikins, 2004): (a) Only gifted
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authority figures can truly understand math is a precursor for ability to learn; (b) solving 
math problems happens quickly or not at all is a precursor for speed o f learning; and (c) 
omniscient authority bequeaths math proofs to less knowledgeable, which signifies the 
precursor for source o f knowledge.
A more recent contribution made by Schommer-Aikins (2004) describes a basic 
paradigm o f the epistemological belief system, and she proposes some new ideas for 
thinking about and studying personal epistemology through the lens o f an embedded 
systemic model with coordinating team approaches to research. Schommer-Aikins 
(2004) claims her Embedded Systemic Model is notably different from previous models 
in the fo llow ing ways: (a) It adds beliefs about learning; (b) it identifies distinct beliefs;
(c) it acknowledges asynchronous progression; (d) it recognizes a need fo r balance; (e) it 
introduces the designation o f beliefs; and (f) it utilizes quantitative methodology. She 
defines this Embedded Systemic Approach as multiple beliefs that are connected within 
an individual’s personal epistemology, and by being more-or-less independent the related 
beliefs could be or could not be developing along different continuums.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) used the term nomenclature to refer to how beliefs are 
designated and has varied in the history o f personal epistemology research. Perry (1970) 
used epistemic positions. King &  Kitchener (1994) referred to epistemic cognitions, 
Baxter Magolda (1998) claimed epistemological reflections, Hofer (2001) chose 
epistemological theories, and Kuhn &  Weinstock (2002) adopted epistemological 
thinking. Schommer ( 1990) built upon Pajares ( 1992) which found that the construct o f 
belief extends alongside constructs o f knowledge and was later supported by Alexander 
&  Dochy (1994). Schommer-Aikins (2004) supports personal epistemologies as beliefs
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because beliefs can be linked to affect, have a close relationship to logic, challenges in 
terms o f change, and have strong importance on thinking.
Recently, Schommer-Aikins (2004) introduced the epistemological belie f system 
which suggests that future research needs to move a direction which incorporates 
multiple interactions o f an individual’ s epistemological beliefs. This innovative method 
is unique to the study o f  personal epistemology but not necessarily to research in other 
areas such as clinical psychology (Minuchin, 1974) or human behavior (Bronfenbrenner, 
1975).
Empirical support. Schommer’s ( 1990) factor structure (four factors) was replicated 
with other college students in Schommer et al. (1992); high school students in Schommer 
(1993); and non-academic adults in Schommer (1998). The Epistemological 
Questionnaire has been adapted for high school students (Schommer, 1993) and middle 
school students (Schommer-Aikins, Man, Brookhart, &  Hutter, 2000). The 
Epistemological Questionnaire has undoubtedly received substantial interest among 
personal epistemological researchers because it is a more quantitative approach, and it 
takes a more analytic approach to the dimensions o f beliefs (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997).
According to Schommer (1995) moderate domain-independence was reported using 
the correlations between epistemological factors across domains and suggests that 
students may have beliefs about knowledge, in general, that are later adjusted depending 
on the domain and context. The general findings are that different epistemological 
beliefs exist in different domains and in different contexts because in specific contexts 
students may reflect considerably different.
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Research has supported some o f the more developmental claims. Schommer, Crouse, 
&  Rhodes (1992) investigated 424 students (157 men and 267 women) who were 
enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The students ranged in academic level; 
freshmen (67.7%), sophomores (21.5%), and the remaining 21% were evenly divided 
between undergraduate juniors and seniors and master-level students. The age range was 
17 to 65, with the mean age being 22, and all were native English-speaking Americans. 
The purpose o f the study was to replicate Schommer (1990) findings; therefore, the 
procedure and analysis were similar. In the first experiment all o f the participants were 
given the EQ. In experiment 2, the purpose was to determine i f  simple knowledge 
predicts statistical text comprehension and metacomprehension, to test i f  task demands 
influence epistemological effects, and to investigate whether epistemological effects on 
learning are mediated by study strategies. Therefore, out o f the original 424 students 
from experiment 1, 138 (39 men and 99 women) returned. Age ranged from 17 to 65 
with the mean age being 25, still the majority was freshmen (66.6%), sophomores 
(18.8%), and the remaining 15% were juniors, seniors, and master-level students. In this 
study, the students were given two sets o f instructions: one asked students to reflect on 
their understanding o f the text, and the other asked students to prepare to teach the 
information in the text. Schommer, Crouse, &  Rhodes (1992) concluded the following: 
belief in simple knowledge is negatively associated w ith comprehension and 
metacomprehension; the influences o f simple knowledge on comprehension may be 
manipulated by study strategies; and the Epistemological Questionnaire provided the 
groundwork for the development o f epistemological assessment.
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Schommer (1993) studied secondary school students: 405 freshmen (180 boys and 
225 girls), 312 sophomores (145 boys and 167 girls), 274 juniors (127 boys and 147 
girls), and 191 seniors (89 boys and 102 girls). The sample was mainly Caucasian 
Americans (68%), with African Americans (21.5%), Asian Americans (5.5%), Hispanic 
Americans (3.4%) and Native Americans (1.5%). In itia lly  the EQ was developed for 
college-level students and when piloted on 100 high school seniors, questions found 
confusing were altered to be age appropriate for high school students. For example, the 
word “ theory”  was changed to “ idea”  and “ unambiguous”  was changed to “ clear-cut”  
(Schommer, 1993). Once the test was adapted for high school students, it was 
administered to all o f  the participants. The factor analysis yielded four factors: simple 
knowledge, certain knowledge, innate ability, and quick learning. These scores were 
correlated with Schommer (1992) which had a similar sample from a different state. 
Test-retest reliability was .74. The results indicated that there was some epistemological 
development occurring at the high school level. Simple knowledge, certain knowledge, 
and quick learning had the most significant incline from the freshmen to the seniors. 
However, one o f the limitations was the cross-sectional design. It could be hypothesized 
that students with beliefs consistent w ith the freshmen drop out o f school, particularly 
because there were considerably less seniors in the study than freshmen. The most 
interesting finding o f this study is the relationship between quick learning and 
performance, even when general intelligence was controlled. Schommer (1993) 
concluded that belief in quick learning predicts performance based on the student GPA. 
There were also some similarities between jun io r college students and the high school 
student in this study in terms o f their metacognitive abilities.
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Schommer (1994, 1996) also included high school students and indicate the 
importance o f balance in order to gain more sophisticated personal epistemological 
thinking and reasoning. Schommer (1993, 1994, 1996) compare high school students’ 
epistemological beliefs w ith their academic success. Schommer (1994) compared the 
epistemological beliefs o f high school students using the EQ with identified gifted and 
non-gifted students in an urban high school. She found that gifted students’ beliefs for 
simplicity o f knowledge decreased more than non-gifted students from freshman to 
senior year. However, the beliefs o f certain knowledge between gifted and non-gifted 
showed no change during their high school years. The students in Schommer (1994) 
believed in the unchanging nature o f knowledge. Therefore it was concluded that 
students in high school may not be exposed to content that reveals the evolving nature o f 
knowledge.
In order to label balance as a significant proponent in personal epistemology 
Schommer-Aikins (2004) claims that epistemological beliefs need to be portrayed as 
frequency distributions rather than as continuums. Schommer-Aikins (2002) also 
supports how critieal balance can be for epistemologieal sophistication. For example, 
Schommer-Aikins (2004) claims her findings, in terms o f balanee, are consistent with 
Perry’s (1970) idea that as students mature, their highest fonn o f thinking is relativistic, 
but he found that dualistic thinkers were the exception, in a subsequent study Schommer 
and Dunnell (1997), 69 gifted students completed the EQ and answered two Dear Abby 
letters.
Conversely, the students who did not demonstrate beliefs in certain knowledge on the 
EQ, offered more frequent consolation for the students’ lack o f success, offered ways to
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change their academic outcome, and provided strategies to help the student succeed in 
school. They saw that younger students tended to blame others such as teachers and 
parents for the lack o f academic success. Interestingly, they found no correlation 
between personal epistemological factors and the prison question.
Measuring personal epistemologies quantitatively was initiated by Schommer (1990) 
and has been widely recognized; however, many researchers have chosen to attempt 
slight modifications. Schraw, Bendixen, &  Dunkle (2002) created the Epistemological 
Belie f Inventory (EB l) as a way to resolve a debate regarding the valid ity o f Schommer’s 
(1990) epistemological dimensions, specifically the dimensions that pertain to omniscient 
authority and innate ability (Schraw, Bendixen, &  Dunkle, 2002). Further, Schraw et al. 
(2002) speculate additional d ifficu lty with the omniscient authority because it did not 
factor load but yet Schommer (1990) proposes a relationship between epistemological 
beliefs and omniscient authority.
The EBl (Schraw et ah, 2002) is a 28-item paper-and-pencil questionnaire linked to a 
five-point L ikert scale. The goal was to construct an instrument that was significantly 
condensed by creating more homogeneous items that could prove to be more reliable than 
other instruments but still measured Schommer’ s five dimensions. In a comparison study 
Schraw et al. (2002) use a sample similar to Schommer (1990), 160 undergraduates 
(n=I04 female &  n=56 males), ages 18-46 from an edueational psychology course in a 
Midwestern university. The participants were given the EBl and the EQ plus a reading 
comprehension test, and 120 o f the same participants completed the retest packet one 
month later. A fter two principal factor analyses, one was a oblique rotation, which 
means the factors were correlated, and the other was a varimax rotation, meaning that the
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factors were uncorrelated; five different factors emerged as follows: (a) innate ability, (b) 
certain knowledge 1, (e) incremental learning, (d) certain knowledge 2, and (e) integrated 
thinking. Ineremental learning and integrated thinking were in contrast to Schommer’s 
(1990) analysis o f quick learning and simple knowledge. Schraw et al. (2002) concluded 
that: (a) The number o f factor loadings differed between the two instruments and the way 
in which they match theoretical predictions vary; (b) the proportion o f sample variance 
that is explained by each instrument was different; (c) when correlated w ith the reading 
comprehension test, the EBl had better predictive validity; and (d) the EBl had better 
test-retest reliability. The final dimensions that corresponded with Schommer (1990) and 
were empirically supported were these five: (a) innate ability, (b) certain knowledge, (c) 
quick learning, (d) simple knowledge, and (e) omniscient authority. The Epistemological 
Belie f Inventory has been pertinent in developing further insightfulness in the area o f 
personal epistemology and epistemic beliefs and how they play a role in ill-structured 
problem solving (Schraw, Dunkle, &  Bendixen, 1998), how they contribute to moral 
reasoning (Bendixen, Schraw, &  Dunkle, 1998), and how they predict the disconnection 
in argumentation (Nussbaum &  Bendixen, 2003).
Jehng, Johnson, &  Anderson (1993) reduced the Epistemological Questionnaire into 
34 items and proposed a belief about the orderly proeess o f  learning to take the place o f 
the structure o f knowledge and reported epistemological beliefs on five dimensions: (a) 
certainty o f knowledge, (b) omniscient authority, (c) orderly process, (d) innate ability, 
and (e) quick learning. They studied 398 undergraduate and graduate students as a 
function o f their educational level and field o f study. They found that students in solfier 
(psychology, sociology, education, and others related to liberal arts) classes had a
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stronger tendency to believe that knowledge was uncertain and relied more heavily on 
their independent reasoning ability. They also had a stronger feeling that learning was not 
an orderly process. That was compared to more hard (liberal science courses, such as 
math, biology, physics, or chemistiy) classes in which students believed that learning was 
more controlled and orderly. The epistemological beliefs o f the graduate students 
differed from those o f the undergraduate students; therefore, they concluded that 
epistemological beliefs are a product o f the activity, the culture, and the context in which 
the individual’ s beliefs were nurtured.
Kardash &  Wood (2000) then combined Jehng et al. (1993) and the EQ and 
developed the Epistemological Beliefs Survey, an 80-item self-report, Likert-type 
instrument. Kardash &  Wood (2002) analyzed individual items and concluded five 
factors: (a) speed o f knowledge acquisition, (b) structure o f knowledge, (c) knowledge 
construction and modification, (d) characteristics o f successful students, and (e) 
attainability o f truth. Kardash and Wood (2002) tested 793 undergraduate and graduate 
students. Some o f the results were confusing because many o f the factors that were 
hypothesized to be consistent with certainty o f knowledge, actually were reported loading 
on the dimensions o f speed o f knowledge acquisition and attainability o f truth. They also 
had items associated with quick learning load on dimensions in addition to speed o f 
knowledge. Kardash &  Wood (2002) does support Schommer’s (1990) claim that 
epistemological beliefs are multidimensional; however, there did not appear to an overlap 
w ith the dimensions reported by Schommer (1990) or Jehng et al. (1993). Kardash &  
Wood’s (2002) findings do support Schommer’s (1993) results that epistemological
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beliefs are related to grade point average, and differences in the beliefs were identified 
based on sex, age, and educational level, sim ilar to the findings o f Sehommer (1992).
Schommer-Aikins (2000) found that age predicted growth in beliefs about learning. 
This finding indicates that the less formal education an individual is exposed to, the more 
limited their beliefs about knowledge become. Schommer-Aikins (2000) reported that 
middle school students differ from high school students primarily on the nature o f 
epistemological beliefs. Beliefs about learning appeared to be better developed on each 
factor. She speculated that this may have occurred because the nature o f learning is less 
abstract than the nature o f knowledge. Another reason could be that the early appearance 
o f beliefs about learning closely reflects the developmental reality o f the middle school 
children. Learning is more the focus o f school, where children are intentionally focused 
on learning and teachers place more emphasis on getting children to talk and think about 
learning. This is not so much the case with knowledge.
Schommer-Aikins (2004) admittedly perceives the reliability scores on many o f the 
instruments (.54 to .76) as moderate but acceptable considering the complexities involved 
in measuring a eonstruct such as personal epistemology. In relationship to the perplexing 
hurdle o f quantifying personal epistemology Schommer &  Walker (1995) propose that 
re liability scores may improve i f  researchers narrow the focus o f their assessment to 
domain-specific epistemological beliefs or epistemological beliefs w ithin the context o f a 
specific classroom.
Summœy and critique. In the process o f developing the Epistemological 
Questionnaire, Schommer has been instrumental in demonstrating how epistemological
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beliefs affect academic work, specifically in building relationships between the beliefs 
about knowledge, use o f strategies, and performance (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997).
Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) argue that the coneept o f epistemological beliefs should be 
restricted to beliefs about knowledge. Their point-of-view is that beliefs about learning 
are slightly removed from the core o f epistemological beliefs. It seems that both beliefs 
about learning and beliefs about knowledge impact learning. Knowing more about how 
epistemological beliefs develop w ill certainly have implications for education, hence 
impacting learning. Schommer-Aikins (1990) hypothesized that beliefs about learning 
may come before beliefs about knowledge.
It is important to point out that although many researchers may utilize the EQ as a 
means o f quantifying their participants’ epistemological beliefs, mueh o f the research that 
consistently supports the instrument has been done by Schommer-Aikins and her 
colleagues. This observation definitely speaks to her dedication to improving both the 
instrument and the model she proposes. However, it absolutely raises questions about the 
source o f the discrepancies in the factor loading o f the instrument. It remains open for 
debate whether personal epistemologies should include dimensions o f personal 
epistemology. Some researchers o f personal epistemology have gone forward to include 
personal epistemology in larger frameworks such as social interactions (Baxter Magolda, 
2004; Bendixen &  Rule, 2004). Lastly, the age o f the participants presented in all o f the 
studies discussed represent a small group o f some o f the youngest populations (age 12) 
assessed in the area o f personal epistemology and remains an area that should be 
investigated from an earlier age (Haerle 2005, Hofer, 2002).
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Included in the Embedded Systemic Approach (2004) is another important 
contribution: the suggestion that researchers consider the interactions o f peers and other 
influences on epistemological beliefs. The proposed study draws on many aspects from 
the work o f Schommer-Aikins in the follow ing ways: (a) the investigation o f young 
children, (b) the idea o f utilizing a systems perspective, (c) the role o f peers; and (d) 
contcxtLializing the research methodology.
Personal Epistemologies as Theories
Viewing individuals’ epistemological beliefs as epistemological theories was 
introduced by Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) and is based on a review o f existing models and 
empirical work in the area o f personal epistemology. Hofer and Pintrieh (1997) propose 
two general areas that represent the core o f an individual’ s personal epistemologies: (a) 
the nature o f knowledge and (b) the nature o f knowing. In each general area there are 
two dimensions for a total o f four dimensions o f epistemological theories: the nature o f 
knowledge is characterized by (a) certainty o f knowledge and (b) simplicity o f 
knowledge, and the nature o f knowing is characterized by (c) source o f knowledge, and
(d) justification for knowing. This definition comes in part from the way in which 
personal epistemology has been developed in the past th irty years but is also deeply 
rooted in the philosophical nature o f the study o f epistemology (Hofer, 2001). This view 
w ill also be used as the current study’s definition o f personal epistemology
According to Hofer (2001) the personal theories view is aligned w ith theory o f mind 
research (Wellman, 1990) and conceptual change literature (Vosniadou &  Brewer, 1994; 
Wellamn &  Gelman, 1992) which suggest that knowledge o f a specific domain is 
structured in much the same way that scientific theories are structured. This combination
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may be the ideal compromise as a way o f avoiding the overgeneralization o f stages that 
do not account for enough variation w ithin individuals in the structure o f their beliefs and 
models that represent beliefs and thinking as multidimensional that lack cohesiveness 
between the structures.
The personal theories model follows the description o f a theory described by 
Wellman (1990) that includes three elements: (a) a continuum o f in itia lly  loosely 
connected ideas or concepts that are discrete in their connectedness but gradually mature 
into sophisticated inteiTelated parts in a domain; (b) a mechanism that categorizes the 
domain by making ontological distinctions between its parts; and (c) a causal-explanatory 
framework for the events w ithin the domain. In reviewing the personal epistemological 
literature, Hofer &  Pintrieh (1997) concluded that: (a) Different aspects o f beliefs about 
the nature o f knowledge and the process o f thinking are interrelated in ways that could be 
theory-like; (b) all o f the models o f epistemology make some distinetion between the 
nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing; and (c) it is premature to say that 
personal epistemologies include a causal-explanatory framework but that aspects o f the 
nature o f knowledge can serve as constraints on the process o f knowing.
Since the introduction o f this model, many researchers in the field o f personal 
epistemology have adopted the application. The model has prompted research in younger 
populations (e.g.. Burr &  Hofer, 2002; Haerle, 2004) and is particularly significant to this 
proposed study because it is the model which is most closely related w ith the design o f 
the study.
Discussion o f  the model. Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) propose a multidimensional view 
o f epistemological development from naïve to sophisticated epistemological beliefs taken
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prim arily from the combined works o f Perry (1970) and Schommer (1990). Hofer (2001) 
points out that using this model o f epistemological theories is consistent with 
Schommer’s (1990) epistemological beliefs but is more open in terms o f the integration 
o f epistemological dimensions or structures. The model does not function in a rigid 
structural manner; it is more representative o f loosely interrelated structures that become 
integrated as an individual’ s epistemological beliefs become more advanced and 
complex. This is similar to the neo-Piagetian view o f cognitive development that has 
turned away from the more rigid view o f stage development (Bidell &  Fischer, 1992). It 
is conceptualized that identifying these ideas as theories may clarify epistemological 
thinking related to belief acquisition and change.
The view o f epistemological theories subsumes most o f the epistemic dimensions 
according to developmental (e.g. King &  Kitchner, 1994) and independent belief (e.g. 
Schommer, 1990) theory, with the exception o f Schommer’s beliefs about learning. 
Although Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) admit there is a close connection between beliefs 
about knowledge and beliefs about learning, they are persistent in their notion that beliefs 
about learning should be represented as a peripheral psychological construct that can 
contribute to an individual’s beliefs about knowledge but is separate. Further, Hofer 
(2001), in support o f delineating beliefs about learning, argues that personal 
epistemology models need to stay tucked in tightly w ith the philosophical meaning no 
matter how they get designated. Therefore, beliefs about learning and education are 
viewed as supplemental means o f acquiring information about an individual’ s beliefs 
about knowledge, rather than being included as a dimension o f their belief about the 
nature o f knowledge and knowing.
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Empirical support. Hofer (2000) provides empirical support for the Epistemological 
Theories Model by investigating the dimensionality o f personal epistemology and the 
nature o f disciplinaiy differences. This study involved 326 first-year college students 
(53% female, 47% male) who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The 
participants completed an abbreviated version o f the Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) 
(Schommer, 1990) and two newly developed epistemological belief instruments which 
were identical except that one was labeled for “ Psychology”  and the other was labeled for 
“ Scienee.”  They used académie achievement and academic performance scores in the 
analysis to measure achievement in either psychology or science and used GPA to track 
overall academic performance. The factor analysis supported the existence o f multiple 
epistemic dimensions, but certainty o f knowledge and simplicity o f knowledge did not 
emerge as separate factors. Perhaps certainty o f knowledge and simplicity o f knowledge 
are not distinctive enough factors (Hofer, 2000).
In another study Hofer (2004a) used case study methodology to investigate 25 college 
students during their first semester. The study focuses on experiences, perceptions, and 
meaning making o f students in sciences and social science courses. She triangulated data 
from classroom observations, individual semi-structured interviews, and instructional 
documentation (syllabi, exams, and handouts from each class). The goal was to uncover 
how the students expressed personal epistemologies in their own words w ithin the 
educational context. The data was reviewed multiple times for evidence o f 
dimensionality o f beliefs, representations o f a continuum o f beliefs, and connections 
between beliefs and instructional practices.
104
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
There were four dimensions that emerged from the data: (a) Simplicity o f knowledge 
was perceived by the students as a continuum spanning from perceiving knowledge as an 
accumulation o f discrete, concrete, knowable facts to interrelated networks o f concepts 
that are relative, contingent, and contextual; (b) certainty o f  knowledge was found all 
along the continuum ranging from the idea that knowledge can be known w ith some 
certainty, to knowledge as less certain, evolving, and always changing;, (c) source o f 
knowledge was found to be primarily external, coming from lectures or textbooks, and 
only a small amount o f students claimed that knowledge was internally constructed, and 
(d) justification o f knowledge was predominantly uncovered on a naïve level; students 
were m inimally eognizant o f criteria and procedures that would verify scientific 
knowledge. Hofer (2004a) points out that although there were four dimensions o f 
personal epistemology accounted for, the evidence that represents the student’s source o f 
knowledge could also have been aecounted for by the criteria used to label the 
dimensions o f certainty and justification o f knowledge. In other words, when students 
responded that the source o f knowledge is derived externally from lectures and textbooks, 
it could be overlapped with certainty or justification o f knowledge.
Summary and critique. Hofer &  Pintrich’s (1997) Epistemological Theories Model 
has contributed largely to the literature. It is consistent w ith many o f the recognized and 
empirically validated models o f personal epistemology. It incorporates a developmental, 
as well as, an independent dimensional perspective. It can be applied to quantitative, 
qualitative, and mixed methodologies with ease. It offers acknowledgement o f beliefs 
about learning in the periphery rather than encapsulating them within the realm o f 
personal epistemology per se. In her efforts to validate her model, Hofer has tapped into
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possibilities to acquire further information to support the model using domain-specific 
areas, classroom context, and fine-grained elements.
Viewing personal epistemologies as theories is paving the way for a better 
understanding o f domain-specific beliefs as well which is consistent with other research 
in cognitive developmental areas. This is a progressive and innovative notion in personal 
epistemology. Hofer (2000) found that individuals appear to have differing 
epistemological assumptions regarding different disciplines; in this case the students’ 
epistemological beliefs about psychology differed from their beliefs about science.
Conceptualizing personal epistemologies as theories is an emerging perspective and 
requires much more research. The framework it provides may lead to a better 
understanding about the teaching and learning process. It lends support to important 
issues pertaining to students’ and teachers’ beliefs about knowledge and the way that they 
think about knowledge; however, it does need to accumulate much more empirical 
support.
Personal Epistemologies as Resources
Hammer &  Elby (2002, 2003) and Loucas, Hammer, Elby, &  Kagey (2004) have 
introduced a new category o f designating epistemological beliefs as resources. For 
Hammer &  Elby (2002, 2003), conceptualizing personal epistemologies is troublesome 
because o f ontology issues. They have a more condensed and domain-specific 
perspective o f personal epistemology; they approach the topic through students’ beliefs 
about science and science learning. Despite the fact that they are studying primarily 
introductory physics beliefs, they claim that their perspective can be applied to other 
disciplines and concur that epistemology refers to the nature o f knowledge and knowing.
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This model challenges the existing theory, research, and methodology o f the personal 
epistemology literature. For example, the model accounts for consistency w ithin a 
specific domain or context, but it does not support the notion o f consistent beliefs across 
domains or multiple contexts. According to what is generally accepted in the research on 
personal epistemology, this model suggests that personal epistemology is less stable and 
consistent and does not ontologically represent a trait-like or stage-like trajectory 
(Hofer& Pintrich, 1997).
Hammer &  Elby (2002) set themselves apart from the unidimensional stage-like 
theories set forth by Perry (1970), Belenky et al. (1986), and King &  Kitchener (1994) 
and connect themselves more closely w ith those who have argued that personal 
epistemologies need to be viewed in multiple dimensions such as Schommer (1990) and 
Hofer &  Pintrich (1997). Hammer &  Elby (2002) also agree that personal epistemologies 
need to be viewed as theories or traits but cannot be generalized
Discussion o f the model. Personal epistemologies as resources is defined by Hammer 
&  Elby (2002) as fine-grained components o f cognition that are highly sensitive to and 
dependent upon the instructional context o f an individual. They categorize 
epistemological resources in four ways: (a) the nature and sources o f knowledge, 
(propaganda, free creativity, and fabrication); (b) as epistemological activities such as 
accumulation, formation, and checking; (c) as epistemological forms, like stories, games, 
rules, and facts; and (d) epistemological stances, for instance, acceptance, understanding, 
and puzzlement.
Hammer &  Elby (2002) argue that it is not a question o f unitary consistency or 
inconsistency but rather a question o f i f  the context (classroom or measure) is presented
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in a manner that enables the student to enter a specific epistemological space to tap into 
their epistemological resources. They believe that to achieve higher levels o f 
epistemological beliefs depends on two related processes: (a) the form o f the students’ 
personal epistemologies, and (b) the teachers’ perceptions o f  their students’ form o f 
personal epistemologies. Louca, Hammer, &  Elby (2004) define form o f personal 
epistemology as grain sized, stable, and context-dependent according to the cognitive 
domain. In this view, children are not seen as possessing epistemological beliefs. Rather 
they have a belief o f certain knowledge based on external information and internal 
information which are finer grained resources that the child does not integrate or has not 
yet compiled. Epistemological beliefs are reserved fo r experts and some thoughtful 
novices because they are capable o f conscious beliefs (a theory) about the constructivist 
nature o f scientific knowledge, and these beliefs do not vary by context. These 
conscious, stable beliefs are considered to be compiled into a rich network o f finer- 
grained cognitive resources.
In this resource framework. Hammer &  Elby (2002) point out some mild rigidity in 
terms o f identifying epistemological beliefs research; they warn that this rigidity has 
some methodological consequences because they do not support labeling a belief based 
on an individuals’ response to a single statement(s) in one context. They point to the use 
o f multiple contexts to more accurately derive an individual’ s epistemological beliefs. 
They argue that different contexts can trigger different resources. Their goal is to model 
personal epistemologies as context-dependent activations (choices) o f resources.
Empirical support. Hammer &  Elby (2004) present a theory about how teachers can 
foster more advanced levels o f epistemological beliefs in physics. This research is based
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on two assumptions: (a) Students with higher levels o f epistemological beliefs are more 
active in learning, and (b) classroom interventions that are directed toward addressing 
students’ epistemological beliefs improve learning. In this way, the instructional 
strategies are the key to having students achieve their highest attainable epistemological 
belief. Rather than trying to confront and change students’ beliefs or trying to offer 
mounds of contextual evidence to support a specific concept to move students to reach 
their developmental milestone, a teacher should attend to helping students find and apply 
productive resources that they know and understand from other contexts that they would 
fail to transfer in the present context (Hammer & Elby, 2003). Louca, Hammer, & Elby 
(2004) examined a case study of a third-grade teacher’s science instruction. The science 
lesson was on the topic o f autumn leaves and took place in a public elementary school. 
The data is divided into four segments: (a) the teaching diagnosis and initial intervention, 
(b) discussion of the “ how”  question, (c) Miss Kagey’s new intervention, and (d) the 
post-cookie discussion. Each segment is broken down further into teacher and student 
perspectives.
In Segment 1, the goal o f the instruction was to prepare the students to have more 
causal explanations of the processes o f why leaves change color and what is happening 
inside of the leaves in order for them to change colors. Some students were unable to 
distinguish between the two questions and ultimately wrote the same response for both 
questions. The teacher followed-up with an explicit description o f the differences in the 
two questions by comparing the first question to why you are hungry and the second 
question to what happens in your stomach when you are hungry. She then returned to the 
questions and proceeded through the discussion. The analysis, according to the resources
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framework, predicted the fine-grained context dependence in the students’ initial 
confusion. They did not intuitively link why leaves change to why they are hungry. The 
connection made has more to do with the teacher’s ability to link what she believes the 
students can associate to the leaves, in this case hunger; therefore, the idea is that the 
strategy used w ill advance the students’ understanding about the leaves. The teacher 
attempted to tap into the students’ epistemological resources for understanding the causal, 
mechanistic knowledge forms o f the lesson and how they differed from the students' 
more general descriptive understanding.
In Segment 2, most students did not adequately settle the confusion regarding the two 
questions and, despite repeated prompts, the students continued to develop general 
descriptions significantly removed from the mechanistic goal. There were hints, 
however, o f mechanistic understanding beginning to formulate. It is theorized in this 
segment that the difficulties may stem from inadequate conceptual knowledge about 
leaves; that the students simply did not have epistemological knowledge about the 
mechanistic nature o f scientific explanations.
In Segment 3, the teacher made a new attempt to show the students the difference 
between the general description question and the mechanistic question. She created a 
scenario about baking cookies because her birthday is coming soon. Immediately 
following the descriptive cookie-making process, she asked, “ how are the leaves 
changing colors?”  in addition to several prompting questions following. The analysis 
goes accordingly; using a fam iliar scenario that the students readily are able to 
distinguish the purpose from the mechanism triggered the students’ mechanism/causal 
resourees, which enabled them to understand the leaf questions.
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In Segment 4, the students began to ask the teacher questions about how they now 
thought about what was happening inside the leaves that make them change and, 
interestingly, many o f the students’ understandings were more causal in nature. The 
take-home assignment was to now re-write their new understanding. In their conclusion, 
Louca et al. (2004) states this study is an illustration o f an everyday life example that 
really helps students understand the difference between a “ how”  and “ why”  question.
Rosenberg, Hammer, &  Phelan (2006) applied the same resource framework to an 
eighth-grade science class about rock cycles. The study followed the same case study 
format. The lesson was 15 minutes long and occurred toward the end o f a multi-week 
unit on rocks and minerals. The lesson began w ith the teacher showing the class a video 
o f themselves discussing the question, “ How are rocks formed?” , that had been recorded 
at the beginning o f the unit. There were 22 students in the class, and the teacher’s role 
was similar. They concluded that their results were consistent with Louca et al. (2004). 
The students had treated knowledge as comprised o f isolated, simple pieces o f 
information expressed with specific vocabulary and provided by authority. The students 
drew on what they knew to construct a sensible, causal account, looking to their own 
reasoning ability to f i l l in gaps and make sense o f inconsistencies in their knowledge 
strueture.
More work is needed in order to more clearly conceptualize and empirically solid ify 
this framework; however, it introduces important issues to the field o f personal 
epistemology such as, researching in the classroom, qualitative case studies, and places 
an emphasis o f teacher’s beliefs and their impact instruction and learning (Hofer &  
Pintrich, 1997).
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Summœy and critique. Hammer &  Elby have not dug deep into the archives o f 
personal epistemology literature, but they have utilized literature that is not the norm in 
developing a conceptualization o f personal epistemology (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Lakoff &  
Johnson, 1980; M insky, 1986). Hammer &  E lby’s (2002) resources view appears to be 
in an infancy stage o f development. There are incomplete and vague representations o f 
their proposed resources, and there is very limited empirical support (Louca, Hammer, 
Elby, &  Kagey, 2004; Rosenberg, Hammer, &  Phelan; 2006) o f their model.
Hammer and colleagues currently have shown that they are able to analyze a case 
study applying their framework, but it appears that it may be a perplexing challenge for 
other researchers to replicate their research with any type o f re liability or valid ity to 
support their interpretations. Although the context-specific component is embraced 
positively in personal epistemology research, this approach could quite possibly be too 
specific in nature. In fact, the approach could be edging on the verge o f being more 
identified as a methodology than a true theory o f personal epistemology. It is also useful 
for the field that they include young children in their attempt to identify epistemological 
resources as this is a trend that needs far more attention than is received in personal 
epistemology research. Another positive aspect o f this research that is valuable in 
personal epistemology is the role o f the classroom teacher and the modification o f 
instructional techniques as a means o f tapping into students’ epistemological beliefs.
This may lead to their research making a greater impact on curriculum and instruction 
than previous models o f personal epistemology because their educational implications 
can be directly identifiable in terms o f suggestions for teachers.
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Integrative Personal Epistenwlog\’ Model
Bendixen &  Rule (2004) point out several o f the more important issues in personal 
epistemology that plague researchers and need attention in future epistemological 
research; they compare and contrast the current models o f personal epistemology and 
propose the Integrative Personal Epistemology Model. This model was introduced 
because there is no existing integrated model o f personal epistemology that emphasizes 
the “ relationship between personal epistemology and how epistemological beliefs change 
and develop”  (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004, p. 69; Schraw, 2001). Most researchers in the 
field o f personal epistemology would probably agree (Baxter Magolda, 2004; Haerle 
2006; Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997; King &  Kitchener; 2004; Schommer-Aikins, 2004) that 
this is currently the most significant issue that needs to be addressed in the field.
Bendixen &  Rule (2004) pose the question. What would we gain from a more integrated 
model o f personal epistemology? They believe that mainstreaming the focus o f personal 
epistemology can inform and guide future research and educational practices. They 
provide an extensive list o f general issues in the field o f personal epistemology, but for 
the purpose o f keeping this section closely tied to the proposed study, the list is slightly 
condensed and adapted. Some o f the general issues and recommendations that they 
discuss include the following: (a) engaging in research that closely parallels cognitive 
development (Hofer, 2001), (b) embedding research methodologies w ithin a real-world 
context (Louca, Elby, Hammer &  Kagey, 2004), (c) engaging in research that w ill yield 
in-depth explanations rather than general descriptions o f personal epistemological 
development (Burr &  Hofer, 2002), (d) identifying the relationship between personal 
epistemology and how beliefs develop and change (Schraw, 2001), (e) adopting a process
13
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that leads to change (Bendixen, 2002), (f) including affect as a factor in identifying 
personal epistemologies (Schoenfeld, 1985), and (g) working toward consensual 
definitions with more inclusive frameworks (Hofer, 2002). Bendixen &  Rule (2004) 
propose the Integrative Personal Epistemology Model to address the issues they believe 
to be prevalent in the field o f personal epistemology and do not assume that their model 
subsumes all o f the issues or models in personal epistemology.
Discussion o f  the model. The Integrative Personal Epistemolog}’ Model (Bendixen &  
Rule, 2004) is centralized around a mechanism o f epistemological belief change and is 
the only model in the research literature that examines, in a more small scale, the change 
process. There are three components w ithin the mechanism o f change: (a) epistemic 
doubt, (b) epistemic volition, and (c) resolution strategies.
The model is intended to be both linear and hierarchical because its components can 
progress incrementally but one is dependent on the next. This does not mean, however, 
that the mechanism o f change occurs in a stage-like manner, but the model views the 
development o f personal epistemology as a dynamic process that includes effects such as 
context, affect, and environment. Three components are interrelated, and it is 
conceptualized in the model that all three components must be in sync for epistemic 
change to occur. For example, i f  an individual experiences only epistemic doubt without 
the epistemic volition component, then the meehanism o f change w ill not be effective. 
Therefore, a reversion back to an existing epistemological belief at any point during the 
process o f change is conceivable (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004).
The model uses aspects o f Piaget’s cognitive development theory to explain how 
epistemic doubt paves the way for the mechanism o f change process. As was discussed
14
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previously, for Piaget, cognitive development is based on the equilibration process. 
Individuals strive to obtain equilibrium between themselves and their environment. When 
balance is not achieved, the individual enters a state o f disequilibrium. This 
disequilibrium is alleviated when the individual either assimilates or accommodates the 
information.
Epistemic doubt in the Integrative Personal Epistemology A4odel is thought to be 
quite broad and extending from dualism to evaluativism. This line o f thinking accounts 
for individuals at all levels o f epistemological development and that they could engage in 
some degree o f doubting their beliefs at one time or another (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004). 
Due to the interrelatedness o f the components that make up the mechanism o f change, 
epistemic doubt is one driving force for change to occur, but it quite possibly requires the 
accompaniment o f epistemic volition as well.
Epistemic volition incorporates many assumptions related to both Piagetian and 
Vygotskian theory and conceptual change. Epistemic volition refers to the purposeful 
actions o f the individual and, as Bendixen &  Rule (2004) point out in their model, change 
may occur when epistemic doubt is joined with epistemic volition. Even i f  epistemic 
volition is achieved, it remains a possibility that an individual can return to an existing 
belief and change does not take place. Epistemic volition is perhaps indirectly somewhat 
present in the personal epistemology literature; it places emphasis on metacognitive 
awareness as discussed Hofer (2004b) and stresses the accountability o f the individual to 
take ownership for their epistemological beliefs (Baxter Magolda, 2004).
Resolution strategies are the final component o f the mechanism o f change process. 
This component relies heavily on the individual’s previous experiences o f epistemic
15
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doubt and epistemic volition. This is a time for the individual to be reflective about past 
experiences; thinking is geared toward weighing the implications o f one’s beliefs in 
connection with goals and finally resulting in an outcome that is reasonable and 
acceptable. Reflection and social interactions are central factors during this process for 
achieving epistemic change (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004). Although individuals reach the 
resolution strategies component, it is believed that they can still return to their existing 
beliefs or revisit the epistemic doubt and/or epistemic volition component. Reflection 
strategies are also discussed in the personal epistemology literature. Baxter Magolda 
(2004) discusses making educated decisions, and King &  Kitchener (2004) discuss a 
more detailed account o f reflection during later stages o f development. Also Dewey 
(1925) believed that reflection o f one’s own experiences was the catalyst for 
development.
The Integrative Personal Epistemology Model maintains the four dimensions o f 
Hofer &  Pintrich (1997): the nature o f knowledge (certainty and structure o f knowledge) 
and the nature o f knowing (source and justification for knowing). The dimensions are 
ultimately affected by the process o f the mechanism o f change.
There are two conditions for change described in the Integrative Personal 
Epistemology Model: dissonance and personal relevance. These conditions are believed 
to be the precursors for personal epistemology change. Dissonance is separate from 
epistemic doubt and does not ensure commitment to change; dissonance is a vague 
emotion where individuals may encounter dissatisfaction that impacts them on the 
surface but does not trouble them deeply (i.e. epistemologically). Personal relevance 
involves emotional engagement on the part o f the individual that relates to personal
16
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issues or a high level o f efficacy. It is then conceptualized that these two conditions o f 
change are similar to conceptual change theory and may influence change in personal 
epistemologies (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004).
Affect also contributes to the Integrative Personal Epistemology Model and is similar 
to the term “ hot conceptual change”  (Bendixen, 2002; Dole &  Sinatra, 1998, p. 208). 
A ffect is a critical element in the Integrative Personal Epistemology’ Model and is present 
in every component o f the mechanism o f change. Bendixen &  Rule (2004) believe that 
this element is at least im plic it in most o f the personal epistemological frameworks. For 
example, Bendixen (2002) found that college students choose to be evasive regarding 
their emotions provoked by epistemic doubt for one o f two reasons; (a) They were so 
strongly attached to their belief, or (b) they were overwhelmed with their emotion and did 
not have adequate coping skills. Either way the individuals did not experience epistemic 
change. More positively, emotions were shown to trigger the individual to take action 
which prompted them to implement resolution strategies. More work needs to be done in 
this area, but regardless o f the uncertainties, affect may contribute to the research in 
personal epistemology development, and this remains a strong area for future 
investigation.
Two other factors in the Integrative Personal Epistemology Model are important to 
the current study: the role o f peers and cognitive ability. Peers are significant due to 
their level o f social equivalency. The role o f peer influence on cognitive development is 
handed down from Vygotsky’s theory o f cognitive development (Vygotsky, 1978). 
Cognitive ability in this model stems from both Piaget’s cognitive development theory 
and Vygotsky’ s sociocultural approach because they both viewed development as the
17
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interaction between the individual and the environment. For example, for an individual 
to have a high level o f personal epistemology it requires the coordination o f interactions 
from the individual’ s cognitive ability while juggling the influences o f environmental 
demands.
Empirical support. The Integrative Personal Epistemology Model is derived from 
earlier work by Bendixen (2002). The Process Model o f Epistemic Belief Change was 
derived from a phenomenological study that investigated 12 undergraduate students and 
their views o f epistemic change. She found that epistemic doubt was critical in fostering 
the changes w ithin the student’s epistemological beliefs. In addition, Bendixen (2002) 
found that peers were instrumental facilitators o f epistemic doubt and dissonance and 
were more often the eatalyst for resolving epistemic doubt. Similarly, peers were found 
to be more sought after to assist with ill-structured problems than were individuals in 
roles o f authority (Mansfield &  Clinchy, 2002), and Schommer-Aikins (2004) found that 
peers can play a large role in restincturing individual’s personal epistemologies.
Summary and critkpie. The Integrative Personal Epistemology’ Model (Bendixen &  
Rule, 2004) attempts to compile the most potent factors relevant in the personal 
epistemology research to date while incorporating the most sound definitional foundation 
o f the construct that exists in the literature. The goal o f this model is to clarify and guide 
personal epistemology research.
The model not only ineorporates the personal epistemology frameworks but links the 
theories o f cognitive development o f Piaget and Vygotsky. The emphasis on the 
importance o f social interactions, context, affect, and environment are correlated and 
form the fundamental operational system o f the individual’s personal epistemology, and
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this is central to the proposed study. Although Bendixen &  Rule (2004) do not call their 
model a system, it definitely represents the ideas o f systems theory as it relates to the 
development o f personal epistemology.
Young Children’s Persona! Epistemology
Research on epistemological development has focused primarily on adolescents and 
adults and has neglected very young children. Most o f the research in personal 
epistemology is conducted with college students ranging from young to middle 
adulthood. There is more interest as o f late in researching adolescent personal 
epistemology, but the field in general is strongly criticized for neglecting young children 
(Kuhn &  Weinstock, 2002). Originally it was thought that epistemological development 
began in late adolescence, triggered by the intellectual demands o f college (Burr &
Hofer, 2002). It is also speculated that researching young children was simply 
inadvertently overlooked because early researchers in the fie ld had their interests in 
higher education and not developmental psychology and, therefore, studied the age group 
o f most interest to them (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997).
For the purpose o f the cun ent study, “ young children”  refers to children whose age 
ranges from 2- to 8-years-old, and the present study is specifically targeting 3-and-4- 
year-olds (i.e. preschool age). The fo llow ing section on young children’s personal 
epistemology includes six parts: (a) the importance o f children’s personal epistemology, 
(b) developmental issues, (c) research on children’s personal epistemology, (d) 
methodological issues, (e) children’s theory o f mind, and (f) children’s personal 
epistemology and theory o f mind.
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The Importance o f Children's Personal Epistemology’
Researching young children addresses the broader issue o f engaging in research that 
closely parallels cognitive development (Hofer, 2001). Development is historically a 
prominent issue in the personal epistemology o f college students, but researching young 
children can be instrumental in identifying periods o f epistemic development that have 
only been hypothesized but never identified. Hofer (2001) proposes that researching 
young children would contribute toward a “ Life-Span”  view o f personal epistemology (p. 
365). Kuhn (2000) states that the development o f epistemological theories is advancing 
but consistently remains distant from other cognitive developmental research. Research 
that investigates young children is severely underrepresented in the personal 
epistemology literature. Currently, there is a single study o f young children’s personal 
epistemology by Burr &  Hofer (2002) that w ill be described in a later section. 
Developmental Issues in Children's Personal Epistemology’
It has been pointed out in reviewing the personal epistemology literature that 
individuals generally organize and reorganize their beliefs about knowledge and knowing 
in an orderly continuous flow  resulting in a developmental pattern. Although much o f 
the research in personal epistemological development has focused on adults and some 
adolescents, there still needs to be substantial investigation into young children’s personal 
epistemological development (Bum &  Hofer, 2002).
Piaget's theory’. In most accounts, early childhood refers to an individual from age 
two until seven years old, and, according to Piaget (1964), this period o f time is called the 
preoperational stage o f cognitive development. This stage o f development is 
characterized by children’s ability to use symbols to mentally represent objects that exist
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in the world, and their thinking is egocentric and centrally focused. This is a period o f 
time when children begin to acquire language skill at lightning speed and build 
knowledge o f concepts at an equally fast pace. Piaget believed that much o f the way that 
children think at this stage o f development is prim itive; however, there is some literature 
that would argue that Piaget underestimated young children and believe that children’s 
ways o f thinking are more sophisticated and complex than in itia lly  theorized (Flavell &  
M iller, 1998; Wellman, Cross, &  Watson, 2001).
Children in the preoperational phase o f development generally lack understanding o f 
the principle o f conservation, which demonstrates their inability to focus on more than 
one event or concept at one time. For example, i f  a sandwich were cut in four small 
pieces, preoperational children would have the tendency to think that the four smaller 
pieces indicate a larger amount o f sandwich than an uncut sandwich because they can 
only focus on the greater number o f pieces. This ability to focus on only one aspect o f the 
situation is called centration. Gelman (2000) and Siegler (1998) have found that children 
in the early preoperational stage o f development are capable o f succeeding on simpler 
forms o f these tasks that require the same skill. Boden (1980) had similar findings and 
discovered that the pass rate on many o f the tasks depended on the variation o f the 
instructions given to the child. Likewise, Nagy &  G riffith  (1982) found that when the 
directions were more complex, the children did more poorly on the tasks than when the 
directions were introduced more simplistically.
Irreversibility is another characteristic o f a preoperational child. This Piagetian term 
means that the child cannot manipulate a change o f direction in their mind. For example, 
just because a child knows how to walk to the store does not mean that it can be assumed
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the child could figure out how to walk home in early preoperations. A t this stage it is 
assumed by Piaget that the child has mastered object permanence; they now know that an 
object continues to exist even though i f  may not be directly visible to them at the 
moment. For example, i f  mom puts candy behind her back, the candy is still present.
Egocentricity is another main characteristic associated with the preoperational child. 
Egocentricity refers to children’s belief that everyone views things in the same way that 
they do. Supposedly, children have the inability to view situations and objects from the 
perspective o f another individual. Piaget &  Inhelder (1956) in a renowned study placed a 
child facing in one direction and a doll in the opposite direction, then asked the child to 
describe the view in the scene (that the doll could not see) from the d o ll’ s perspective. 
Children below age six were more likely to describe the do ll’s view similar to what they 
could see while it would be apparent to an adult that the child and the doll do not have the 
same view.
In many areas o f cognitive development, Piaget’s work is viewed as foundational 
because o f his many insights and contributions; however, there is research that 
demonstrates some weaknesses about his theory. Baillargeon, Graber, DeVos, &  Black 
(1990) found that when practical knowledge is assessed, young children are more 
competent than Piaget originally thought. It could be that we do not consistently capture 
the sophistication and complexity o f preschooler’ s cognitive abilities because they are 
more fragile than those o f older children and are therefore only present under certain 
more fam iliar conditions than they are generally assessed (Gelman, 1979). The heart and 
soul o f Piaget’s stage development is more recently being doubted; some researchers
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question that the broad stages o f cognitive development represent the true course o f 
human development.
Personal Epistemology. The lack o f research w ith young children has made way for 
researchers to speculate conceptually regarding the beginnings o f personal 
epistemological development. Chandler, Hallet, &  Sokol (2002) point out that regardless 
o f the age, the participants studied thus far demonstrate similar patterns o f thinking and 
seem to have similar starting points. There are five arguments for this phenomenon, and 
Chandler, Hallet, &  Sokol, (2002) propose three o f the five: (a) Early onset suggests that 
young children have more sophisticated epistemologies than can be predicted based on 
studies o f college students; (b) recursion is conceptualized as a spiral-like development in 
which epistemological stages continue to occur and reoccur in a cyclic process, rather 
than in a linear motion; and (c) suppression which suggests that prior to entering school 
and during school, children’s advancing beliefs are discouraged which prompts them to 
suppress their epistemological development until adulthood.
Two other arguments can be identified in the literature: (d) late onset supports the 
idea that true epistemological development does not begin until students reach higher 
academic environments and researchers have been overestimating the ability o f young 
children (Perry, 1970; K ing &  Kitchener, 1994), and (e) domain dependence suggests 
that early epistemic thinking is dependent on the domain in question. For example, 
young children may demonstrate multiplistic epistemological perspectives about 
subjective knowledge (i.e., personal judgments or procedural knowledge) and, on the 
other hand, not demonstrate sim ilarly multiplistic epistemological perspectives about 
objective-type-knowledge (i.e., declarative knowledge) until much later (Kuhn &
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Weinstock, 2002; Mansfield &  Clinchy, unpublished). One o f these alternatives may be 
more valid than another, but it is much too premature to make this judgment.
Preschool. Addressing developmental issues with young children may require that 
personal epistemology researchers adopt a more situated perspective and examine more 
microgcnetic levels o f change (Hofer, 2001). This w ill be particularly useful at the 
preschool level because most preschool curricula do not have designated standards; 
therefore, once researchers begin to study preschool classrooms there w ill be a vast array 
o f instructional philosophies and strategies that may be informative about how children 
come to know and understand the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing.
It is also important to point out the National Center for Education Statistics and the 
Institute o f Educational Sciences at the Department o f Education in 2000 indicated that 
there was a 15% increase in preschool enrollment from 1990 to 2000. Over those same 
years they indicated that 40% o f all 3-year-olds attended preschool, followed by 60% o f 
4-year-olds, and 92% o f 5-year-olds. This increasing trend is consistent across 
Caucasian, African-American, and Hispanic populations and showed no correlation 
between household income and the parents’ highest level o f education (National 
Household Education Survey, NHES, 2000). This is an indication that there is an 
educational need to gather information about young children in the preschool classroom 
environment. It is important to investigate young children in a structured learning 
environment in order to identify patterns during their interactions with others and to 
understand their epistemic development. Students are entering school younger, demands 
on teachers are becoming greater, and many states do not require preschool teachers to 
have specific educational backgrounds. Considering the increase in preschool
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attendance, developmental factors o f personal epistemology could prove to be beneficial 
for learning and instruction by stimulating the classroom environment (Bendixen & Rule, 
2004; Hofer, 2001) or linking personal epistemology with a construct such as situational 
learning (Schraw & Lehman, 2001).
Research on C h ild re n ’s Persona! Epistemolog}’
There is some research in personal epistemology that investigates older children 
Haerle (2006) examined fourth-grade children, teacher epistemology, and classroom 
climate and found that the student’s epistemologies were representative o f personal 
theories about knowledge and knowing. He proposed that the findings were identifiable 
and interrelated according to four dimensions: (a) certainty o f knowledge, (b) structure of 
knowledge, (c) justification o f knowledge, and (d) source of knowledge. This is 
consistent with Hofer & Pintrich (1997). Further, the students were categorized 
according to their developmental patterns: absolutism, multiplism, and evaluativism 
(Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). Haerle (2006) developed a model that ineorporates the 
findings o f the fourth-graders’ personal epistemologies with the teacher and the 
classroom climate called The E ducationa l M odel f o r  Personal Epistemology’ 
Enhancement (EMPEE). He argues that the students’ epistemologies are an essential 
component in the model and the primary focus of educational enhancement. Haerle 
(2006) represents another important study that supports the importance o f researching 
children’s personal epistemologies for the implications that it presents for education.
This study w ill focus slightly on the instructional technique o f the teacher primarily 
because it is situated within the classroom context, but the main concern is with
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identifying the ways in which children develop personal epistemological systems in 
relationship to influences and the processes w ithin their learning environment. 
Methodological Issues
Measuring young children’s epistemological awareness w ill be challenging i f  
researchers do not make accommodations for their cognitive abilities. This may well 
explain the discrepancies in the theory o f mind literature that illustrates how changing the 
false-belief task changes the age that children can successfully complete the task 
(Chandler, 2002; Gopnik &  Graf, 1988; O ’Neill, Astington, &  Flavell, 1992; Perner, 
1991). I f  researchers have expectations that children need to perform at a higher level 
than they are developmentally capable, identifying children’s personal epistemologies 
may prove to be emotionally taxing for the child and ineffective for the researcher; 
however, young children should not be underestimated in their ability to perform 
sophisticated cognitive tasks. King and Kitchener (1994) argue that the research 
instruments designed to study personal epistemology are geared more toward college 
students and may be too cognitively challenging for young children.
Ultimately, w ith virtually no research in children’s personal epistemologieal 
development, identifying clear methodologieal issues remains unknown. It could be 
anticipated that there w ill be some measurement issues related to those seen in the 
research in adult personal epistemological development or present in other areas o f 
cognitive development w ith young children.
Personal epistemologies are complex even in adult investigations; therefore, it is 
reasonable to believe they may be equally as elusive in young children. King &  
Kitchener (1994) and Kuhn (1991) emphasize measuring personal epistemologies as
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components o f reasoning. The concern with this type of method is that they can vary 
depending on the nature of the participant, the investigator, and the setting o f the 
investigation. The field o f personal epistemology has been critical o f measures and 
frameworks that are too subjective insofar as they can lead the participants to the desired 
results by focusing on a specific dimension or using a guiding or prompting question. 
Hofer &  Pintrich (1997) conclude that it may be more beneficial to develop more precise 
measures and innovative ways to measure personal epistemologies that can investigate 
specific dimensions o f knowledge or address specific developmental issues (Baxter 
Magolda, 1992; King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991). The biggest problem with 
phenomenological or open-ended types o f questions is the low degree o f replicability 
(Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997).
Interviews and more qualitative methodologies have led to a deeper understanding of 
individual’s beliefs about knowledge; however, the problem with this type of approach is 
that it tends to be an issue of time during data collection on the part o f the participants 
and the researcher. This may prove to be a measurement issue in researching young 
children in general because of their shorter attention span, but specifically, for this study, 
because it is conducted in the classroom setting. While conducting research within a 
classroom context, the researcher needs to be conscientious of multiple factors that 
cannot be controlled, in addition to being respectful to the teacher and students. An 
alternative to structured and unstructured interviews with adults is a paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire, but this can be problematic with younger children because of their 
developmental restraints. Not only are they limited in their reading ability, but i f  the
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questions were to be read to them, the understanding o f the Likert scale may be too 
complex for a young child to understand.
Language development in young children is a gradual proeess and is found to be a 
limitation in other areas o f eognitive development, such as theory of mind (Wellman & 
Cross, 2001) and will need to be strongly considered prior to the examination o f any 
cognitive constructs. The language and activities need to be tailored specific to the age 
group being studied (Poole & Lamb, 1998). In this case, a pilot study was conducted to 
address language issues. Piloting research with young children is recommended (Greig 
& Taylor, 1999). Although piloting research can produce crucial information, it 
contributes to the time factor.
Besides concerns o f measurement, there may be some conceptual issues that exist in 
researching young children’s personal epistemology. Piaget’s theory of cognitive 
development has been criticized for underestimating young children’s ability (Burr & 
Hofer, 2002). In addition, Hofer & Pintrich (1997) point out that current shifts in 
educational thinking continue to impact the way personal epistemology is conceptualized 
and approached, and this can impact the way in which individuals believe what they 
know. Although the field is making strides toward achieving a unified consensus, it 
remains negotiable. Considering findings from Burr & Hofer (2002), researching young 
children may slightly impact current conceptions regarding the trajectory o f personal 
epistemology. Regardless, there is insufficient research, and these thoughts are only 
speculation based on the existing research. Researching young children’s personal 
epistemology needs to be pursued more aggressively.
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Theo)y o f  M ind
Theory o f mind development is an area o f cognitive development research that 
investigates the nature o f and development toward understanding o f the mental world.
The individual’s inner world consists of: beliefs, desires, emotions, thoughts, 
perceptions, intentions, and other states (Flavell, 2004). In contemporary research the 
term theoiy o f mind surfaced from Piagetian literature and with the work o f Premack &  
W oodruff who investigated chimpanzees and their cognitive ability. W oodruff &  
Premaek (1978) defined theory o f mind as a system o f inferences that can be used to 
predict behavior by attributing mental states to individuals.
Piaget framed two separable entities o f an understanding o f mind: an understanding 
o f the nature o f mental states, such as, thoughts and dreams; and the use o f psychological 
reasoning to explain human actions, such as how intentions and desires cause and explain 
human action (Wellman &  Phillips, 2001). Piaget underestimated the capabilities o f 
young children, specifically preschoolers. He thought that they reasoned incorrectly by 
contemplating physical objects by psychological reasoning and applied physical 
reasoning to human actions.
Although Piaget has been an enormous contributor, his theories have been criticized 
and challenged on the basis o f these two assumptions: with the examination o f children’s 
mental states (Shatz, Wellman, &  Sibler, 1983) and examination o f psychological 
reasoning regarding mistaken actions resulting from false-beliefs (Wimmer &  Perner, 
1983). One thing that has been determined as a result o f the resurgence o f this research is 
that young children, in fact, do understand the fundamental differences between mental 
versus the physical world (Flavell, Green, &  Flavell, 1995). Hams, Johnson, Hutton,
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Andrews, &  Cooke (1989) demonstrated that when a child is told about a person who has 
a dog versus a person who is thinking about a dog and then, subsequently asked which 
dog is able to be seen or petted, even three-year-old children were able to judge correctly. 
Estes, Wellman, &  Woolley (1989) told three-year olds a story about a “ raisin in the 
head”  (i.e. a thought about a raisin) versus a “ raisin in the stomach”  (i.e. a swallowed 
raisin), and they correctly acknowledged that neither raisin could be seen or touched, and 
that one was imagined and one was physically real. Further, young children are able to 
distinguish between thinking and doing. Wellman, Hollander, &  Schultz (1996) found 
that even three-year-olds viewed thinking as internal, private, and just mental, as opposed 
to external, public, and just physical phenomena.
In terms o f theory o f mind, another frequently researched topic is children’s 
understanding o f beliefs and, in particular, false beliefs. Understanding false beliefs 
demonstrates a ch ild ’s knowledge or awareness that differences exist between contents o f 
the mind and content o f the world. Wimmer &  Perner, ( 1983) initiated the false-belief 
task in which one subject (A) puts an object in a certain location (a), but then while 
subject (A) is away and cannot see what happens, subject (B) moves the location o f the 
object to location (b). Subject (A) returns, and the child is asked where subject (A) w ill 
look for the object; location (a) or (b)? Children who pass the false-belief task are able to 
predict that subject (A) w ill look for the object in location (a) because that is where 
subject (A) put it and has no knowledge that subject (B) moved it. This infers that the 
child can adequately distinguish between what they themselves know and what subject 
(A) knows. Conversely, children who fail the false-belief-task w ill report that subject (A) 
w ill look for the object in location (b), assuming that subject (A) knows that subject (B)
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has moved the object to location (b). This incorrect prediction on the part o f the child 
indicates an inability to differentiate between what they think/know and what others 
think/know.
Many researchers have conducted similar false-belief task research; however, they 
have altered the original task in various ways, such that the variety o f interpretations are 
too numerous to elaborate (Astington &  Jenkins, 1999; Bartsch &  Wellman, 1995; 
Chandler, Fritz, &  Hala, 1989; Call &  Tomasello, 1999). The vast findings raise 
questionable doubt about children’ s thinking. It may reflect general language or social 
development rather than truly reflect their understanding o f the mind. In general, most 
accounts conclude that this developmental criterion is absent in three-year olds and 
supposedly emerges closer to age four, and is in place by age five. This is not altogether 
absolutely agreed upon and in some cases noted as inaccurate (Chandler et. al., 1989). 
Chandler et al. (1989) showed that, at least in some situations on some task variations, 
three-year olds can also demonstrate correct responses on the false-belief task when they 
are more actively engaged in deceiving the target person. Lewis &  M itchell (1994) found 
that three-year olds could pass the false-belief task when the questions are phrased in a 
certain manner. In a meta-analysis o f theory o f mind development, Wellman, Cross, &  
Watson (2001) looked at over 500 false-belief conditions with a variety o f ages and 
procedural conditions and concluded children from two-and-a-half to five years old 
proceed from consistently making false-belief errors to successful completion.
Preschool children acquire an understanding o f representational mental states such as 
thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge over several years, but at the start o f preschool display 
evidence o f a subjective, psychological understanding o f others’ desires and emotions.
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Bradinetz &  Schneider (2004) used a simplified judgment task with two-year olds to 
show that they know that others may have different emotions from their own. Wellman 
&  Woolley (1990) took the same age group and showed children’s ability to understand 
that others may hold different emotions and desires for the identical objects or events. 
Despite the child ’s understanding o f desires and emotions, they consistently fail the false- 
belie f task. Why? Perhaps it is because the false-belief task utilizes an ineorrect 
application o f a young child ’s language ability or misrepresents the role o f language in 
child development. This eontrast in a child ’s ability needs to be investigated from a 
much closer look at the role o f language in the development o f theory o f mind.
Children use words like happy, sad, want, and like by their second birthday to refer to 
others’ internal mental states separate from the individual’ s external behaviors, physical 
features, and facial expressions (Bartsch, 2002; Bartsch &  Wellman, 1995). As the child 
continues to develop and conversational skills advance, there is an apparent shift in 
children’s mental states o f early understanding o f desire and emotion to later 
understanding o f beliefs, thoughts, and knowledge. It is not until around three-years old 
when children begin to use words like think and know to refer to thoughts and beliefs. 
Why the difference between children’ s connection with emotion and their delayed 
connection to beliefs? Perhaps emotions are routinely viewed as external based on 
personal experience (but in reality we cannot feel someone else’s pain) whereas beliefs 
are inherently internal and are not easily monitored.
There is an interesting proposition to deviate from the current theory o f mind 
literature and adopt a “ community o f mind”  (Nelson, 2003, p. 311). The assumption is as 
follows: in early childhood dcveloppient, an individual is exposed to a large community
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and attempts to gain membership to this community. This community is synonymous 
with a person’s surrounding and social context, sometimes referred to as social cultural 
environment. The emphasis is on the minds that interact with and also d iffer from one 
another as well as having certain similarities o f structure and content. In the end 
understanding differences among minds requires understanding the source o f the 
differences among people, their backgrounds, personalities, relationships, and 
experiences.
Nelson’s perspective corresponds to a Vygotskian view which is more compatible in 
terms o f incorporating affect and language as components o f an individual’ s 
environment. In terms o f external associations, a child ’s receptive language skills, such 
as listening to stories, are largely related to developing representational functions o f 
language. In order to develop these types o f skills, children are dependent on their 
environment to provide these experiences, and their community is fundamentally pivotal.
This idea o f “ community o f minds”  (Nelson, 2003, p. 311) has significant 
possibilities for assisting research to move forward with attempts to link theory o f mind 
and personal epistemology in young children. Although it emphasizes the role o f the 
external as the innovator o f self, the individual remains in an egocentric subjective phase 
and potentially developing pre-dualistie epistemologies (Burr &  Hofer, 2002) which may 
be more specifically identified in relationship to the children’s environment and 
experiences as members o f their community.
There is very little known about the origins o f epistemological awareness or how 
epistemological beliefs can be connected to other aspects o f children’s cognitive 
development (Burr &  Hofer, 2002). Interestingly, the inkling o f research that has been
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conducted on the personal epistemology o f young children seems to indicate similar 
stages to those found in college students. Chandler, Hallett, &  Sokol (2002) bring up an 
important observation; they have noticed that, despite the age o f the participants, dualism 
is consistently the initial stage identified. They identify several explanations for the 
parallel; early onset, late onset, recursion, or suppression. Kuhn &  Weinstock (2002) 
pointed out evidence o f a domain dependence perspective for the similarities between age 
groups. Wellman (2001) concludes that the theory o f mind accomplishments o f young 
preschoolers is consistent with the theoretical accounts that suggest young children have 
an understanding o f beliefs and a related understanding o f mind.
Theory o f  mind researchers have been asking questions such as “ How, when, and in 
what manner does an everyday theory o f mind arise”  (Wellman, 2001, p. 352). 
Researchers in the last decades have made notable progress. The field o f personal 
epistemology is at a similar point. We need to ask, how, when, and in what manner does 
personal epistemology arise. One area worth investigating is the relationship that 
personal epistemology may have with theory o f mind development in young children; 
this is a link which is proposed in this study.
Personal Epistemology and Theoiy o f  M ind
Theory o f mind (TOM) involves the awareness that others have different perspectives 
about what is known, and this awareness bares significance on the concept o f 
epistemological thought (Hofer and Pintrich, 2002). This is important for understanding 
personal epistemology because it focuses on the nature o f  human knowledge and how 
individuals come to know the world (Burr &  Hofer, 2002), and how individuals justify, 
interpret, and construct knowledge and knowing (Sehommer, 1990). In a special issue o f
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New Ideas in Psychology (2002), researchers from personal epistemology and theory of 
mind collaborated regarding a possible connection between the two constructs. Recently, 
uniting these two strands o f research required some new vocabulary; folk epistemology 
was produced to identify the child’s TOM and adolescent epistemological development 
(Bartsch, 2002). It is conclusive among researchers in this field that there needs to be a 
better understanding o f how folk epistemology develops from childhood to adulthood. 
Although this section discusses how the two constructs may be linked, there is very little 
empirical evidence that exists in the current literature.
The research proposed here w ill direct attention toward three- to four-year-old 
children. Mansfield and Clinchy (1985) reported identifying epistemological beliefs in 
three- to five year olds. Although children have been reported to demonstrate successful 
false-belief achievement as low as age three and four (Flavell, Miller, &  Miller, 1993; 
Leslie, 1987; Lillard, 1998), TOM is far more commonly studied and reported at ages 
five and six. It has been suggested by some in the field that personal epistemologies may 
be developing and even in place prior to TOM. I f  this is true, there may be a pre-dualistie 
stage o f epistemologieal development that has not been investigated because a child 
could not hold a belief about knowledge without acknowledging that there are alternative 
perspectives (Burr &  Hofer, 2002).
By successfully completing a false-belief task, understanding that others can/do have 
different beliefs based on knowledge of their experiences is equivalent to achieving a 
dualistic epistemological point of view, acknowledging that there can be competing 
notions o f reality, and understanding that there is no absolute right or wrong 
interpretation (Kuhn, 2000). According to the literature, TOM research in children has
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much more depth and breadth than childhood epistemology; however, Piaget (1952) 
labeled his investigations o f children’s cognitive development as ’’genetic epistemology” 
(p. 778) w ith a focus on how individuals come to know the world and reflective o f his 
interest in formulating a theory o f knowledge (Burr &  Hofer, 2002). Individuals do not 
simply acquire a fu ll capacity for TOM or personal epistemology all at one time; it is a 
gradual and continually evolving developmental process. In Piaget’s theory o f 
knowledge, he focused on how individuals “ progressively reconstruct the relationship 
between the knower and the known”  (Piaget, 1952). The research in this area is in its 
infancy stage, and developmental researehers have raised some questions regarding the 
order in which these two constructs (TOM and personal epistemologies) occur in 
development (e.g., Chandler, 2002). First, a supposed pre-dualistie phase is characterized 
by “ unwavering egocentric subjectivity,’' and evokes TOM (Burr &  Hofer, 2002, p. 204). 
Second and in contrast, Astington, Pelletier, and Homer (2002) suggest from their 
findings that false-belief understanding is fundamental to children’s epistcmological 
development because it underlies their understanding o f the epistemic concepts o f 
evidence, inference, and truth.
Studies linking TOM and epistemology need to move toward a deeper, richer level o f 
understanding about what the child is contributing when he provides a response to a 
false-belief task or answers an epistcmological question, and these studies need to look at 
specific infomiation about the ch ild ’s background knowledge, prior experiences, and 
personal goals.
In a pre-dualistic stage o f epistcmological development, there would be no proposal 
for uncertain knowledge or acknowledgment that an unsolvable problem could exist.
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King &  Kitchener (1994) found evidence o f this type o f thinking in their sample o f teens 
and hypothesized it would most likely be present in much younger children because they 
do not have the capability to respond to ill-struetured problems. Burr &  Hofer (2002) 
propose a connection that overlaps theory o f mind development, placing a “ realist”  stage 
prior to the absolutist stage, with both positions defining knowledge as certain and 
objective. The core difference is that realist thinking would simply be copies o f the 
external world needing no justification, and absolutist thinking views facts as being right 
or wrong. Another possible theory o f epistemology in young children was presented by 
Chandler et al. (2002) as a stage that represents knowledge is objective and is present 
prior to awareness o f competing knowledge claims using the term, “ naïve realism”  
(Chandler et al., 2002, p. 338).
One problem that consistently surfaces is that o f subjective and objective knowledge 
and knowing (Burr &  Hofer, 2002). This is a reoccurring problem in the theory o f mind 
literature as well. Perhaps it is not a development o f either/or in terms o f one over the 
other but that both are at a level o f incongruence because o f changing contexts or 
environment. The structure that supports epistcmological development places absolutists 
as objective knowers, multiplists as subjectively aware, and evaluativists as the judge 
between the objective and subjective.
Burr &  Hofer (2002) make a similar claim: “ realist or pre-dualist stage needs further 
attention, particularly in regard to the individual’ s comprehension o f ‘objectivity’ ”  (p. 
209). It is necessary to distinguish between pre-dualistic and dualistic thinkers by 
looking more closely at the significance o f the source o f knowledge and the justification 
for knowledge used by younger children.
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Burr &  Hofer (2002) propose a pre-dualistic stage of epistemological development as 
preceding theory of mind development and conceptualize the transition from pre-dualistic 
thinking to dualistic thinking in conjunction with the successful completion of the false- 
belief task. They tested their theory with 25 children ranging in age from 3.1 to 5.4 years 
using two false-belief tasks and four epistcmological vignettes. They found a period in 
which children could not yet pass the false belief tasks and were completely unable to 
address issues o f justification for knowledge. Following this level, there appears to be a 
transitional level at which point children are able to conceptualize the idea of justification 
but continue to demonstrate the inability to successfully pass the false-belief tasks. The 
last transition accounts for the child to provide acceptable justifications for their 
knowledge and are able to successfully complete the false-belief task. Burr & Hofer 
concluded that there is an important relationship between theory of mind and personal 
epistemology. A child’s developing personal epistemologies appear to be foundational in 
theoi-y of mind which involves the awareness that others have different perspectives 
about knowledge.
The prospect of drawing a cognitive link between personal epistemology and theory 
o f mind is an intriguing proposition and could address many o f the issues that are 
emerging in the field of personal epistemology. In order to do develop this theoiy it w ill 
be necessary to shift the ordinary theoretical lens. Many o f the questions that are in the 
broader scope of this study are consistent in suggestions for future research from those 
who are beginning to investigate children (Bartsch, 2002; Burr & Hofer, 2002). There is 
much that can be learned about personal epistemology in general, and children in
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particular, by investigating possible links between personal epistemology and theory o f 
mind development in young children.
Another contribution that has not been mentioned in the b rie f review o f the literature 
is the impact that TOM and personal epistemology development have on areas such as 
social skills (Harris and Kavanaugh, 1993), moral reasoning (Bendixen, Schraw, and 
Dunklc, 1998), memory (Carlson, Moses, and Breton, 2002), and se lf efficacy and 
motivation (Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2003). Exploring the interrelatedness o f TOM and 
personal epistemology development can contribute to the research in several other areas. 
As a future study maintaining similar methodology it would be interesting to look at 
gender and social cultural differences; this is an area which remains completely bare in 
terms o f research on TOM and epistemic understanding in preschool child development.
A P ilot Study on Preschool Children’s Personal Epistemology 
A  pilot study was conducted to ascertain information about designing each facet o f 
the current study. The purpose o f the pilot was to fine-tune epistemological questioning 
and procedures for the current study. The pilot was integral to studying children’s 
personal epistemology; it provided information in regard to identifying protocol ideas for 
specific research tasks, as well as scheduling, time limitations, cognitive abilities, and 
other important procedural factors.
The pilot lasted 12 weeks during which the classroom was observed three times per 
week from 8AM until 1PM. Observation included various aspects o f the preschool 
environment including whole class instruction and small group activities (centers). There 
was a theme o f the week which would drive the focus for all o f the activities that the 
children engaged in throughout the week. Along w ith the observations, there were peer
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focus group activities that were implemented during times that did not conflict w ith the 
classroom instruction.
Focus groups emerged from sociological theories regarding data collection and group 
interaction to study values, attitudes, and the impact o f products and services (Walker, 
1993). Bogdan &  Biklen (2003) recommend that focus groups be used for hard to reach 
groups and sensitive issues because they provide a mechanism that identifies what 
individuals think/believe and promote questioning that potentially links to how or why 
they hold a certain position. The focus groups help to gain an understanding o f the nature 
o f knowledge (i.e., simple, certain) and the process o f knowing (i.e., source and 
justification) in terms that the child-participants can identify. Focus groups provide the 
child-participants with a platform for the investigator to capture the essence o f their 
knowledge in their own words.
Participants
The pilot study took place in the Cricket classroom at a local public preschool and 
involved 25 students (14 girls and 11 boys) from culturally diverse backgrounds. The 
teacher was an 18-year veteran o f elementary and preschool teaching.
Child-Participants’ Personal Epistemology
The questions in the focus groups probed personal epistemological reasoning and 
beliefs (Kuhn, Cheney, &  Weinstock, 2000). The script for the interview and focus 
groups was strictly based on the classroom instruction that was taking place in the 
classroom at the time o f the pilot. Some o f the questions were probing for elaboration o f 
cognitive processes and the participants’ own real-life experiences. Specifically, the 
questions were related to the four dimensions o f epistemology (i.e., simplicity and
140
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
certainty refers to the nature o f knowledge; and source and justification refer to the 
process o f knowing) (Hofer, 2001).
Observation o f  Classroom Instruction. There were two weeks o f consecutively 
observed lessons that lasted 20 to 40 minutes. The observation o f the lessons were used 
as the context/catalyst for the child-participant interviews and the focus group, as a way 
lap into the child-participants’ understanding o f the current lesson’ s theme and beliefs 
about knowledge and knowing related to that theme.
Cbild-Participant Interviews. There were two weeks o f semi-structured individual 
interviews w ith each child-participant, and the interviews did not exceed 15 minutes per 
child at any one time. Each child-participant was interviewed at least two times per 
week, but some children were interviewed up to five times per week.
Child-Participant Focus Groups. Each child-participant was active in six focus 
groups during the study (introduction, two pre-instruction, two post-instruction, and a 
conclusion). Each o f the focus groups consisted o f six child-participants and the 
researcher and lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Results
The pilot study used focus groups with preschool children as a means o f identifying 
dimensions o f beliefs about knowledge. Themes and patterns were identified among 
individuals and within and between groups. The follow ing section provides some insight 
about the coding categories and describes the five general themes that emerged from the 
analyses;
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1. Epistemological beliefs are multidimensional. In general, preschool children in the 
pilot study do indeed have epistemological beliefs at different levels and can be 
categorized along the various dimensions.
2. Influences on multiplist and absolutist beliefs. Child-participants with high 
numbers o f multiplistic statements in terms o f simple and source o f knowledge 
demonstrated consistently high scores in affective and social categories. These 
individuals tended to be more confident, animated, and spontaneous. They also seemed 
to have a better concept o f the rules o f the focus group and tended to take more o f the 
lead in the discussions. They demonstrated less egocentric perspectives which is in 
contrast to developmental theories about the social-cognitive capabilities o f this age 
groups that say that egocentrism is quite prevalent in preschool-aged children (e.g., 
Flavell, 1999).
Conversely, child-participants with the highest absolutist ratings had the lowest 
number o f overall contributions across all o f  the focus groups. They were consistently 
unable to give their views o f knowledge unless the conversation was initiated by their 
peers. This finding suggests that children with more multiplistic views acted as a 
scaffold for other children who were not as comfortable and/or able to discuss their views 
on their ov/n. These findings support the theory that students are receptive to peer- 
learning environments. It also suggests that affective and social factors are important 
influences in epistemological development and peer-learning.
3. Importance o f  group dynamics. In comparing Groups 1 and Group 2 within the 
category o f social statements and behavior, the child-participants had more statements
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and behaviors categorized as social than the other two categories (epistemological and 
affective).
The social group dynamics o f the focus groups were interesting because without the 
teacher as the clear authority, the peer groups seemed to work more efficiently within the 
structure o f the focus groups than what they demonstrated in their peer-play 
environments. One interpretation o f this finding is that the children seemed to have 
grasped their different roles in certain social environments and/or were able to conform to 
the social conventions expected w ithin different focus groups and peer-play 
environments. During the focus groups the children were less egocentric and less 
aggressive toward their peers. When those same child-participants were observed during 
unstructured play intervals, they seemed to display behaviors that were more 
characteristic o f their age. The results indicate that the child-participants demonstrated a 
greater sense o f social conventions w ithin the more structured environment o f the focus 
groups in that they utilized more appropriate behaviors and implemented more 
appropriate problem-solving and critical thinking skills.
4. A ffect -positive affect. The dimensions w ithin this category were defined as 
positive comments regarding the lesson and processes o f the group. It was apparent in 
the children’s enthusiastic responses, their eagerness to participate, and the cohesiveness 
displayed in the focus groups when discussing their views o f knowledge. The affective 
nature o f the child-participants is critical because it appears to be an important part o f the 
foundation o f how they interact w ith one another as they construct group knowledge.
Lack o f  negative affect. There were extremely low numbers o f negative responses 
generated w ithin the groups. The low negative affective component supports the
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generally positive outlook most young children have for learning; they are upbeat and 
excited about what they know (Rosenburg, 1998).
5. The role o f  peer groups in evaluativism. Is evaluativistic thinking even possible in 
young children? The results indicate that child-participants did display this more 
sophistieated way o f thinking about knowledge and knowing but only in a group sense.
In essence, patterns emerged from the data showing evidence that discussion during the 
focus groups allowed for evaluativistic-like thinking to occur. In other words, by 
building on what each o f the group members had to say, instances o f evaluativistic 
thinking in more o f a collective sense was apparent..
Discussion
In terms o f preschool education, exposure to group evaluativism may allow students 
to generate higher levels o f thinking, and this reciprocal influence among group members 
is consistent w ith theory in the field o f personal epistemology (e.g., Bendixen &  Rule, 
2004) and in the framework o f Vygotsky’s (1978) sociocultural theory o f child 
development.
The study uses real-world examples and an authentic classroom setting; therefore, it 
was integral to achieve relationships w ith the child, the teacher, and peers. It was a goal 
to maintain the organization and flow  o f the classroom; therefore, it was important to 
structure the study around the teacher’s lesson plan and instructional style rather than 
develop a study and incorporate it into the classroom.
Another facet o f the study that was driven by the findings o f the pilot study was the 
types o f questions that needed to be asked o f the children. On the surface much o f the 
information may seem subjective and fragmented, but collectively there are visible
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patterns o f developing personal epistemologies that emerge from the children’ s own 
words as collectively interpreted from three or four different perspectives (i.e., the 
teacher, the researcher, and peers).
There were two outcomes o f the first focus groups that really laid the groundwork for 
what turned out to be many successful focus groups. First, developmentally, preschool 
children have significantly shorter attention spans and cannot focus for more than 15 to 
20 minutes. Therefore, the length o f the focus group was decreased. Second, 
preschoolers like to interact; therefore, six children in a group was too many. By 
decreasing the number o f children in each group to three, everyone had a chance to 
participate without falling over another ch ild ’s responses. Reducing the number o f 
children in the focus group also distinguished it further from the child’s experience in the 
whole group instruction experience. Six children in a group ended up mimicking the 
complexities o f the whole class instruction. In order for the children’s voices to truly be 
heard, the number o f children per group needed to be decreased by half.
On a larger scale the pilot study was integral in constructing a framework for future 
research. There were several themes that emerged dealing with the classroom teacher, 
parents, and the children’ s peers. In addition, characteristics that may influence 
preschool children’s personal epistemology were identified (i.e., affect, social skills, 
language, setting). The complexity o f personal epistemology and researching very young 
children guided the construction o f the Dynamic Systems Framework fo r  Personal 
Epistemology! Development (Winsor, 2005) (See Figure 1). This framework w ill be used 
in Chapter 5 as part o f the discussion o f the results in this current study.
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Considering the Dynamic Systems Framework for Personal Epistemology 
Development, the current study incorporates only a fraction o f the system. The goal o f 
the current study is to investigate the relationship between the individual child and his 
peers in a classroom environment while considering several o f the developmental issues 
that coincide to preschoolers.
Figure 1 : Dynamic Systems Framework for Personal Epistemology Development
(DSFPED)
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Purpose o f the Study
The purpose o f this study is to investigate three- to four-year-olds’ personal 
epistemology through the use o f peer focus groups. The cun ent research stems from a 
larger study that includes the Dynamic Systems Framework fo r  Childhood Epistemology 
(Winsor, 2005; see Figure 1) that w ill be elaborated on in the discussion portion o f this 
article. Investigating personal epistemology using focus groups is a new and innovative 
approach for the age group being investigated. In terms o f developmental theory, this 
research offers a more integrated and comprehensive view o f the child ’s experiences and 
the ch ild ’s world. For example, in this study we use the ch ild ’s words to guide the line o f 
questioning in individual interviews, focus group sessions, and classroom observations. 
This study contributes to personal epistemology research by addressing several needs o f 
the field and offers new insights into the education o f young children.
The purpose o f this study is to develop a framework which investigates children’s 
personal epistemology. To understand the dynamic aspects o f children’s epistemology, 
the framework focuses on the child and includes its theory o f mind, affect, and language. 
The framework also w ill investigate the subsystems that exist in the ch ild ’s external 
environment, including the child ’s parents, teacher, and peers. It is the aim o f the study 
to contribute to personal epistemology research by meeting the future needs o f the field, 
enhancing educational perspectives for young children, and impacting the larger 
spectrum o f personal epistemology with insights about early childhood epistemological 
development.
The area o f researching young children’s personal epistemologies is virtually absent 
in the literature, and many personal epistemology researchers suggest this is an area that
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needs investigation. We know little about what children know and understand about the 
nature o f knowledge and the processing o f knowing. Therefore, the primary purpose o f 
this study is to look elosely at a small group o f young children’s personal epistemology 
w ithin a preschool classroom environment.
The results from this study may offer new insights in several ways: (a) It could 
provide information about an early onset o f personal epistemology, (b) it might serve as a 
foundational perspective regarding the trajectory o f epistemological growth or change 
throughout the lifespan, (c) knowing more about the trajectory o f epistemological 
development can contribute to the understanding o f the role o f epistemic doubt in 
epistemological development (Bendixen, 2002), and (d) it may open the door for more 
innovative methods o f measuring personal epistemology.
Research Question
To guide the current study’s exploration o f young children’s personal epistemology, 
the research question was as follows: What are the personal epistemologies o f preschool- 
aged children?
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD AND DESIGN 
This is a qualitative research study that examines the personal epistemologies o f very 
young children. The theoretical framework used to place a new perspective on child 
cognitive development is complex and multi-faceted: (a) There are multiple perspectives 
(i.e., the individual child and interactions with their peers), (b) The individual and peer 
interactions are observed and epistemologies are questioned in various ways as a means 
o f looking for themes and patterns o f individuals and w ithin peer relationships, and (c) 
Various qualitative research methodologies are used (i.e. formal and informal classroom 
observation, cognitive and epistemological screening, individual semi-structured 
interviews, and semi-structured focus groups). A ll data was analyzed independently. The 
data was analyzed daily using a constant comparative method o f analysis. This type o f 
method allowed for constant analysis o f the data making it possible to continually probe 
specific aspects o f the ch ild ’ s belie f system. It was useful for identifying themes among 
the participant early and made it possible to target certain aspects during subsequent data 
collection. When data collection was completed, despite the constant comparative 
method o f analysis throughout the study, all data was ultimately triangulated to gain a 
broader perspective about individual child epistemology and within group interaction.
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Design
The design o f the study is based on a case study approach to investigating the beliefs 
about knowledge and knowing in preschool children. A case study is a detailed 
examination o f one setting, and/or a single/multiple subject(s), or one particular event 
(Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003; Merriam, 1988). The current study incorporates multiple 
components o f a case study; (a) I look at one setting, the Cricket classroom, set within the 
context o f a preschool environment; (b) there are six child-participants; therefore, there 
are six case studies; and (c) 1 utilize several protocols (i.e., whole class instruction, 
informal center activities, individual interviews, and peer foeus groups). Creswell (1998) 
defines a case study as, “ An exploration o f a bounded system or a case over time through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources o f infomiation rich context”  
(p.61). The primaiy event that is being investigated is the use o f focus groups to 
understand preschool children’s epistemological development. The current study looks at 
six cases o f children interacting with their peers during several focus group tasks. 
Researching children in this field is relatively new; therefore, it does not warrant large 
samples or follow ing rigid protocols in order to examine a limited number o f variables. 
Rather, is it more useful at this stage in the investigation of young children’s developing 
epistemologies to use multiple instances or events as a means o f gaining a more in-depth 
perspective (Creswell, 1998; Merriam, 1998). Case studies can provide a systematic way 
o f looking at specific phenomenon, collecting data, analyzing infomiation, and reporting 
the results (Ellet, 2007). As a result, the researcher gains a sharper understanding o f why 
and how the instance/s have occurred and what might become more important or 
worthwhile to research in the future. Case studies lend themselves to both generating and
150
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
testing hypotheses (Merriam, 1998). Choosing a case study as the research strategy for 
the current study is critical for researching children and investigating epistemological 
development because the context in which the study is designed is a naturally occurring 
authentic learning environment, in which none o f the daily activities are altered but rather 
are elaborated upon to get a more in-depth perspective o f the thinking patterns o f the 
children.
1 rely on multiple sources o f evidence on which I use a constant comparative data . 
analysis method (which is discussed in Chapter 4) to continually reduce data to identify 
themes and regenerate details from each child to gain deeper knowledge and 
understanding about their epistemological understanding (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003). In 
other words, 1 used data as it was collected to construct more specific inquiry for fo llow- 
up interviews and peer focus groups (Corbin &  Strauss, 2007). Case studies are socially- 
constructed research approaches situated between concrete data collecting techniques and 
methodological paradigms and function as a tool that can assist in theoretical 
development as is necessary for investigating children’s epistemological development 
(Charmaz, 2006; Hancock &  Algozzine, 2006).
The very nature o f children’s epistemological development is complex, which 
supports the reasoning to understand the child ’s experiences using a case study technique 
and constant comparative data analysis. Multip le case studies provide a strong platform 
to investigate children’ s developing epistemologies in an authentic learning environment. 
This type o f approach does not make any assumptions about what meaning experiences 
have to a specific individual (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003). Grounding the research in the 
children’s fam iliar environment, it was possible to gain insights into their epistemological
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understanding and how they apply meaning to what they understand. One important 
component o f the semi-structured interview process w ill be a focus on the words o f all 
participants. Active listening and keen observations are necessary in case study research 
(Strauss &  Corbin, 2007) as the goal is to look for the meaning o f child perceptions and 
experiences, both working independently and during interactions with others.
According to Bogdan &  Biklen (2003), “ I f  you want to understand the way people 
think about their world and how knowledge is formed you need to get close to them, to 
hear them talk, and observe them in their day-to-day lives”  (p. 32). The current study 
utilizes whole elass instruction, informal center observation, individual semi-structured 
interviews, and structured to semi-structured peer focus groups as a means to understand 
the children’s experiences in their learning environment and learn how their experiences 
are related to epistemological development. The interviewing process is always 
unpredictable and ambiguous (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003.) Therefore, it was essential to be 
flexible about the sequence o f the interviews and activities (Merriam, 1998). By using 
case studies the interview questions were able to be adjusted as needed based on the 
disposition o f the participants and their ability and willingness to provide the requested 
information. During interview sessions, minor inquiry adjustments are often needed and 
this is a judgment call on the part o f the researcher (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003).
Role o f  Researcher
The role o f  the researcher in the current study was to become involved in the child’s 
“ conceptual world”  (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003, p.55) and to gain a deeper understanding 
o f their experiences and the meaning o f these experiences. This type o f involvement 
could be an intrusion on the daily activities o f the child and the teacher; therefore.
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thought was given to put time and effort into building a cohesive relationship including 
trust, mutuality, and honesty w ith all o f the people involved. Once relationships were 
established, it was important to eonform to the schedule that best fit all o f the individuals 
involved in order to effectively collect the data without being intrusive or disruptive to 
the schedule or routine. This type o f protocol is fundamental in establishing a successful 
m ilieu in which the researcher is the participant observer. This occurs when the 
researcher seeks to maintain a balance between being an insider and an outsider. There 
were instances during the study where it was productive and informative to be an active 
participant; however, conversely there were times when more information could be 
acquired as a passive outsider.
A role as a participant observer entails fitting  into the everyday setting in ways that 
enhance awareness and curiosity about the interactions taking place in the setting 
(Glesne, 1999). The researcher becomes immersed in the research questions, the 
individuals, and the environment in ways that are uncommonly heightened and that they 
themselves would not witness ordinarily. The participant observer comes to a social 
situation w ith two purposes: (a) to engage in activities appropriate to the situation, and 
(b) to obseiwe the physical characteristics, the individuals, and the activities (Spradley, 
I980y
A role as participant observer can be challenging. It requires that the researcher is 
eonsciously aware o f the environment and its multi-faceted activities and interactions, 
which means overcoming years o f attempting to block out these same kinds factors. Due 
to the nature o f this study, it is necessary to look broadly at seemingly trivial items and 
probe deeply at others. This technique can be more effortless i f  the researcher perceives
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her role to be as an insider/outsider simultaneously to help experience the situation as a 
participant and an observer (Spradley, 1980).
Conducting a case study provides an opportunity to utilize the researcher’s 
background knowledge and previous experience to capture the “ essence”  (van Maanen, 
1988, p. 78) o f the children’s subjective voice in their understanding o f what, how, and 
why they know themselves and others..
Setting
A public preschool program in a Southwestern city in the United States was the site 
for this study. It is a university-run preschool; it employs certified teachers and is open to 
children o f students, faculty, staff, and members o f the community. It is a two-story 
building w ith convenient parking, and the hours o f operation are accommodating from 
7:30am until 7:00pm. The campus is handicap accessible for physically challenged 
students, and they have the capability to accommodate visual and auditory impaired 
students too. The school also has a thorough security protocol for visitors so that the 
children are safe.
The center recently opened, in 2004. The purpose o f the preschool is to provide 
assessments and training opportunities for the local university students and staff with 
young children birth to 60 months, their families, and community members. The new 
facility is state-of-the-art, utilizing student-friendly classrooms with a video-recording 
system for teacher observation, training, and research. They have a multi-purpose room, 
playground, and administrative offices for meetings and conferences.
The Cricket elassroom where the study took place is open and bright. One entire wall 
consists o f two large garage-type doors (40ft. x 40 ft. clear plexi-glass windows). These
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doors open to a secure private courtyard that can be opened on nice days. The Cricket 
classroom frequently has some activity going on in its courtyard, such as growing herbs 
and vegetables, conducting various science experiments, or creating a product too large 
for the inside. The colorful and friendly environment displays a large amount o f the 
students work on the walls. They have five small tables and chairs in a cluster where 
they have centers fo r activities throughout the day. There is a large open area w ith a 
carpet that has each student’s name, indicating where each student should be seated for 
the collaborative inquiry instruction.
As for the more infonrial areas o f the classroom, the students are equipped nicely for 
free time. They are encouraged to interact with their peers, work on the computer, 
pretend in the dramatic play area, construct in the action area (this area has blocks, 
puzzles, and games), or create in the craft area. The students are allowed to choose what 
activities they want to do, and they can move from area to area. The classroom has its 
own kitchenette where the staff prepares their snacks and lunch/dinner; children are 
prohibited in the kitchen. They also have their own lavatory in the classroom, so that it is 
easy for s ta ff to address any o f the children’s needs easily.
There are 28 total students enrolled in the Cricket classroom, but there are never more 
than 17 students in the room at one time. Some students only come for a-half-a-day 
while others come for only 2 or 3 days per week. The Cricket classroom follows the 
campus-wide rule o f one aide for every three children in the classroom. This is strongly 
monitored and enforced. The center has someone who goes class-to-class for attendance 
so the aides can get to the classrooms i f  they are needed. They try to keep the aides 
consistent in the classrooms, but they do have a couple that float among classrooms as
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needed. The classroom aides are undergraduate and graduate education or psychology 
majors.
Whole Class Instruction
A central component o f the teacher instructional technique is an activity that begins 
the school day. This activity w ill be referred to as whole class instruction and had a 
different theme each week (See Table 5). There were four weeks o f whole class 
instruction observation. The themes were as follows: Week One was monsters, Week 
Two was winter, Week Three was building and construction, and Week Four was airports 
and airplanes. The whole elass instruction involved question and answer interactions 
between the teacher and the children and was the basis for the follow-up epistemological 
probing. The theme carries a week-long (five days) progression o f group and individual 
activities which center on that single theme. Whole class instruction included a discovery 
learning technique that encourages children to reflect on their knowledge and actively 
participate.
Students are in itia lly  drawn into their room from the playground in the morning w ith 
a “ Good Morning”  song. When the students hear this song, they know it is time for the 
school day to begin and time to prepare for the whole class instruction. They promptly 
sit in a semi-circle on the floor around the teacher. During this time, the teacher 
introduces the theme (e.g. monsters) o f instruetion for the week and begins to ask the 
students questions, constantly probing their knowledge and their experiences regarding 
the theme. Frequently, when the teacher asks a question, there may be several students 
who answer. This prompts more in-depth questioning o f all o f the students. The students 
build upon each others’ knowledge and contribute their experiences, which in turn
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prompts other students to think o f more information to contribute. A t times this process 
can become quite escalated because the students are enthusiastic about answering the 
teacher’s questions about what they know and how they know what they know.
This whole class instruction ranges from 20 to 30 minutes and includes the teacher 
reading a book to the children. During the read aloud, the teacher w ill frequently pause 
and ask more questions about what the students think w ill happen next or why they think 
something is happening or even why someone is doing something.
When the instruction is over, the children participate in a round-robin format o f 
centers that include dramatic play, art, snack, manipulatives, and computer. The theme o f 
the week is the central focus o f  the activities w ithin the classroom and therefore it 
became the central theme o f all individual interviews and focus groups.
Participants
Clhldren-Participants
Participants are six preschool children; their ages range from three years ten months 
to four years four months. The gender was balanced evenly between girls and boys. The 
students were enrolled in the Cricket classroom at a diverse public elementary school. 
Demographic information was collected on the child-participants regarding their cultural 
background, socioeconomic status, and parents’ educational history (See Table 5). 
Teacher
The teacher in the Cricket classroom is male. His nationality is Hawaiian/ Asian; 
however, he was bom in the United States. He is openly homosexual and is highly active 
in gay rights and culturally diverse programs in education. He is 22-years-old, s a first- 
year teacher, and at the time o f the study was currently enrolled in the teacher education
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program at a local university but had not completed his Bachelor o f Arts degree in 
Elementary Education. He has attempted to adapt his teaching style to conform to the 
characteristics o f the teacher who led the classroom during the pilo t study. More 
complete information regarding the teacher w ill be discussed at the end o f this chapter.
TABLES: Child-Participants’ Demographics
Participant Age
Years &  Months
Gender Cultural
Background
Economic
Status
Parent
Education
C-P # One 3 yrs., 10 mos. M African-American
Caucasian
$62K M=H.S.
F=H.S.
C-P # Two 4 yrs., 4 mos. F Caucasian $75K M=B.A.
F=H.S
C-P # Three 3 yrs., 11 mos. F Caucasian $45K M=H.S
F-H.S.
C-P # Four 4 yrs., 1 mos. M Caucasian $52K M -H.S.
F=M.A.
C-P # Five 3 yrs., 11 mos. M Caucasian $80K M=M.A.
F=B.A.
C-P # Six 4 yrs., 1 mos. F Caucasian $70K M=M.A.
F=B.A.
Data Sources
Child-Participants ’ Prescreening
There were 28 students enrolled in the Cricket classroom at the time o f the current 
study. Parent permission forms were required for all 28 students to proceed with the 
study. The parent permission allowed the researcher to: (a) observe and assess each 
child in the classroom, and (b) continue to observe the classroom for the duration o f the 
study after the six child-participants were identified. There were three phases o f 
prescreening for this study: (a) one week o f classroom observation, which included the
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whole class instruction and the informal center activities, (b) a battery o f cognitive 
achievement assessments, and (c) a standard theory o f mind task (W iminer &  Perner,
1983). The fo llow ing three sections describe the procedure and materials used for each 
phase o f prescreening.
Prescreening Phase One. Phase 1 o f the prescreening lasted for a week and included 
the researcher passively observing the daily routines within the Cricket classroom. This 
observation included the formal whole class instruction and the infonnal center activities. 
The whole class instruction began each day, and every child enrolled in the classroom 
attended this gathering in the center o f the room where the teacher would read a book 
which was selected based on the theme o f the week. During the whole class instruction 
the teacher would frequently interact w ith the children by listening to their comments and 
addressing their questions; also he would engage the children in a brie f inquiry session 
pertaining to the details o f the story. The whole class instruction usually lasted 15 to 20 
minutes. The purpose o f observing the whole class instruction was to: (a) observe the 
teacher’ s instructional technique and become familiar w ith the types o f questions he 
would typically ask the children; (b) observe the interactions o f each child w ith the 
teacher in a structured learning situation; (c) observe and assess social, affective, and 
cognitive abilities o f the children in a structured learning environment to better 
understand their level o f functioning; and (d) begin to build a rapport with the students 
and the teacher through consistent presence in the classroom.
Materials. The materials used for the whole class instruction included a notebook 
and pen to take notes about student engagement. Examples o f student engagement 
include which children were able to fo llow  classroom rules such as raising a hand to be
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called on in order to participate, their ability to maintain attention and sit still during the 
instruction, and how relevant a ch ild ’s comments or questions were to the content being 
presented. Another reason for note-taking was to begin to learn the names o f the students 
and make notes regarding the disposition and particular characteristics o f each child.
The researcher designed a checklist o f age appropriate personality traits/dispositions, 
cognitive abilities, and social characteristics commonly present in well-adjusted 
preschool-age children. This checklist was used during each whole class instruction 
observation during the prescreening week. The purpose o f the checklist was to 
systematically observe and assess social, affective, and cognitive abilities o f the children 
in a structured learning environment to better understand their level o f functioning. 
Everyday a new checklist was used. The checklist was dated, and each child had his own 
checklist. Therefore at the end o f the first week o f prescreening each child in the Cricket 
classroom had a checklist for each day he had attended the preschool. Some children had 
only two checklists while others had five; it depended on the number o f days they were 
enrolled and present in the classroom.
The informal center activities frequently aligned with the theme o f the week and 
consisted o f dramatic play, art, table games, and computer. Immediately fo llow ing the 
whole class instruction, the children were given the option to choose which center they 
wanted to attend. The center activity time was typically one-and-a-half hours. Other 
routines in the classroom were exercise, snack, nap time, and playtime (inside or outside, 
depending on the weather). The purpose for observing the informal center activities was 
to: (a) formulate a presence in the classroom and to begin to build relationships with all 
o f the children during unstructured interactions prompted by the children; (b) observe and
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assess the children’s social interactions with their peers; and (c) become acquainted with 
how the structured whole class instruction transferred into unstructured learning 
activities. The goal was to observe the students engaging in their daily routines and 
provide another modality o f assessment as a means to strategically evaluate all 28 
students and gather information for the selection o f the six child-participants.
Materials. The materials utilized by the researcher during the informal center 
activities included any of the props, objects, and games currently present in the classroom 
which the children used at their designated center. A ll o f the items that were used by the 
researcher to interact with the children were items they were familiar with and invited 
interaction with the researcher. During observation of the center activities i f  no child 
engaged the researcher, a notebook and pen were used by the researcher to take notes 
regarding the activities in the classroom. Again, more notes pertaining to individual 
students were taken including: which students interacted frequently, which students did 
not interact with their peers, and which students chose to be at which centers.
The researcher designed a checklist of age-appropriate peer social behavioral 
characteristics for preschool age children. It was utilized in the same manner as the 
checklist for the whole class instruction, in that a new checklist was used daily and each 
child had his own checklist. Often it was difficult to complete this checklist for each 
student during the observation because o f note-taking or interaction with the children. 
Therefore, each day when the center activities concluded and the students were involved 
in one o f the other activities, the researcher would take the time to complete the checklist 
while the experience was still clear and easily recollected.
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Prescreening Phase Two. The next phase o f prescreening the Cricket students 
consisted o f standardized measures used with presehool-age children; this took one week 
and occurred the week fo llow ing phase one o f the prescreening process. Each child- 
participant was individually administered all three screening measures consecutively in a 
single session, and all o f the children received the assessments in the same order. The 
order o f administration was as follows: (a) The Peabody Picture Vocabiilaiy Test (PPVT- 
III), (b) Phonological Awareness Literacy Screening Pre-K  (PALS), and (c) Get I t  Got It 
Go (GGG). Collectively, all three assessments took approximately 20 minutes per ehild- 
participant, and six to eight children were assessed daily.
The screening process consists o f visual and verbal assessments for cognitive 
functioning o f preschool children. A battery o f cognitive ability tests were administered 
to each child individually. Phonological Awareness Literacy Screening Pre-K  (PALS) 
measures knowledge o f factors essential in emergent literacy (See Appendix A on CD- 
ROM (Curry, University o f Virginia, 1991). The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
(PPVT-III) is an assessment o f receptive (hearing) vocabulary and is a test o f listening 
comprehension for the English language (See Appendix B on CD-ROM (ECRI/MGD, 
1983). Get It Got It Go measures the developmental growth o f young children through 
skills sueh as picture naming, alliteration, and rhyming (See Appendix C on CD-ROM 
(ECRI/MGD, 1994). It is typieal for académie achievement, ability, and intelligence tests 
to be used as tools for research participants o f all ages (Flavell, 1983.) In schools these 
types o f assessments are used for placing students w ithin a school, determining learning 
disabilities and developmental delays, identifying giftedness, and tracking development 
(Kaplan &  Saccuzzo, 2005).
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The purpose o f the cognitive screening was to ascertain the child-participants’ 
cognitive ability level with standardized measures o f mental functioning. Achievement 
and ability tests are designed to measure the ab ility level o f the child-partieipants’ 
intellectual level and cognitive ability (Sternberg, 2004). It is recommended that they 
never be used as the sole basis o f any investigation (Greig &  Taylor, 1999). These 
cognitive ability assessments are widely aceepted as more objective measurement tools 
and provide another element o f investigation. It is heavily suggested that these types o f 
assessments be complemented with an in-depth personal history, aeademie performance, 
and observation (Greig &  Taylor, 1999). In addition, three variables need to be 
considered with standardized measures: (a) cultural background, (b) language ability, and 
(c) motivation to complete the tasks (Poole &  Lamb, 2002; Wood, 1988). These factors 
were taken into consideration when all o f the data was collectively evaluated.
As a courtesy, the parents were invited to observe the cognitive screening o f their 
child, but it was not a requirement o f the study. This strategy was to alleviate child and 
parent anxiety regarding the assessments as children at this level are not accustomed to 
standardized testing, and it was believed that optimum results could be achieved i f  the 
children felt comfortable and relaxed. Out o f the 28 children in the classroom, 11 
children had parents present for the assessments. Two o f the children who had parents 
present for the cognitive screening were ultimately chosen as ehild-partieipants for this 
study.
Materials. The PALS test includes a photocopy o f a box containing all 26 letters 
(capital letters) o f the English alphabet. This test requires that the researcher point to 
each letter saying, “ Can you tell me what this letter is?”  I f  the child gets the letter
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correct, the researcher circles the letter; however, i f  the ehild provides the incorrect 
response for the letter, a line is drawn through the letter. A fter all o f the assessments 
were administered, the test was scored using the standardized scoring criteria.
The PPVT-III has a picture plate chart that consists o f several different age-level 
sections, beginning at two years six months up to age 11. The picture plates show four 
different pictures, and the child points to one o f the pictures when asked. For example, 
the researcher asks, “ Can you point to the picture o f the broom?” , and the child points at 
the picture o f the broom. The test has a scoring form where the child’s answers are 
recorded and later scored. The scoring form includes the following: (a) the age-level set,
(b) the picture item that the child is asked to point to, and (c) a space for marking the item 
i f  it is inconect. The test continues until the child has missed eight items at a single age- 
level. A total o f all correct responses is tallied. There is a norm-reference manual which 
is used to convert the scores.
The GGG assessment has three sections that are administered in the follow ing order: 
(a) rhyming, (b) picture naming, and (c) alliteration. Each section has a separate set o f 
pictures, and each card in the set has three different pictures. The assessment is timed, 
and the child is informed about the time restriction and is encouraged to respond as 
quickly as possible. In addition, each section has sample cards that are reviewed w ith the 
child until he understands the procedure. (For an example from each section, see 
Appendix C on CD-ROM).
Prescreening Phase Three. The third and final task for the prescreening process was 
a false-belief task or theory o f mind task. A  theory o f mind task was used as another 
screening tool primarily because recent research in children’s epistemological
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development has been linked to children’s theory o f mind development. In addition to 
this reeent link, theory o f mind has been strongly emphasized in the research literature 
(Wellman, 1990). Including theory o f mind tasks as a prescreening tool may provide 
valuable information in terms o f prospective methodologies for future research. The 
prescreening theory o f mind task was administered to all students in the Cricket 
classroom during phase two o f the prescreening process; however, it was given separately 
from the cognitive assessments and took approximately ten minutes per ehild. The 
puq-)ose o f the false-belief task was to identify six students that were able to successfully 
complete the false-belief task.
Each child was told a story to see i f  he was able to understand another person’s wrong 
belief, which requires explicit representation o f the wrongness o f the person’s belie f in 
relationship to one’s own knowledge (Wimmer &  Perner, 1983). The child listened and 
watched as a protagonist put an object in location .v and then left. While the protagonist 
was gone, the object that was placed in location .v was subsequently moved to a second 
location y, unbeknownst to the protagonist. The child was asked a series o f questions that 
have different purposes: (a) a belief question, (b) an utterance question, (c) a reality 
question, and (d) a memory question. The follow ing questions form the set o f questions 
that screened for theory o f mind ability:
1. Where w ill the individual look for the item?
2. Where w ill the individual say the item is?
3. Where is the item really?
4. Do you remember where the individual put the item in the beginning?
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In order to pass the false-belief task, the child had to correctly predict that the 
individual would look for the item in location x and that the individual w ill be able to 
demonstrate deception by saying that the item is in location x while at the same time 
realizing the item is really in location y.
Materials. The materials for the false belief task included two puppets and a candy 
bar. The story involved one puppet, which was the main character o f the story, and the 
other puppet that acted as the protagonist. The candy bar was the item that was displaced 
from the main character. The questions were predetermined and based on the child’s 
responses. The child’s responses were reported in the researcher’s notebook. Scoring for 
the false-belief task was recorded as pass or fail.
Child-Participants ’ Persona! Epistemology
Assessing the child’s personal epistemology in the present study entailed the 
following: (a) whole class instruction observations, (b) child interviews, and (c) peer 
focus groups. These three components signify the heart o f the current study and occurred 
for the four weeks of the study following pre-screening with the six child-participants 
whom were selected from the Cricket classroom.
Whole class instruction. This section deals with the emphasis on the whole class 
instruction. There were four weeks of this technique that were observed and w ill be 
referred to as: Week One, Week Two, Week Three, and Week Four. The parents of the 
six children selected for the study were contacted, the details o f the study were explained, 
and they were asked to sign informed consent releases which signified their approval for 
their child to participate in the rest of the study.
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Table 6: Protocol Overview
Week One 
A ll
students
♦Î* Presereening Phase 1
•  Observation o f Whole Class Instruction (structured)
• Observation o f Center Activities (unstructured)
Week Two 
A ll
students
*î‘  Prescreening Phase 2
* Cognitive A b ility  Assessments
•  Theory o f M ind Task 
> Identify six child-participants 
! Sign Informed Consent
<* Conduct Introductory Peer Focus Group 
(2 groups o f 3 children)
Week 
Three 
Six Child- 
Participants
❖ Theme-of-the-Week: Monsters 
*t* Pre-Instruction Peer Focus Group
♦Î* Whole Class Instruction Obseiwation x 5 days 
*> Center Activities Observation x 5 days
❖ Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per ehild 
< Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group
*1* Constant Comparative Data Analysis (daily)
Week Four 
Six Child- 
Participants
Theme-of-the-Week: Winter 
Pre-Instruction Peer Focus Group 
<* Whole Class Instruction Observation x 5 days 
Center Activities Observation x 5 days 
I Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per child 
Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group 
*> Constant Comparative Data Analysis (daily)
Week Five 
Six Child- 
Partieipants
<* Theme-of-the-Week: Buildings &  Construction 
<* Whole Class Instruction Observation x 5 days 
*1* Center Activities Observation x 5 days 
*1* Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per child 
*1* Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group 
*> Constant Cc'Tiparative Data Analysis (daily)
Week Six 
Six Child- 
Participants
<♦ Theme-of-the-Week: Airports &  Airplanes 
<♦ Whole Class Instruction Observation x 5 days 
*t* Center Activities Observation x 5 days 
*> Individual Interviews 2-to-5 per child 
<♦ Post-Instructional Peer Focus Group 
❖ Constant Comparative Data Analysis (daily)
Week 
Seven 
Six Child- 
Participants
Wrap-up Peer Focus Group 
< Begin data analysis (Triangulation)
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Forma! observations refer to the whole class instruction led by the teacher. As was 
discussed, the whole class instruction is what drives the theme o f the week and is the 
foundation from which all future child-participant questions were derived. In other 
words, the informal center activities, individual interviews, and peer foeus groups 
incorporate the theme from the whole class instruction and utilize specific details that 
originate during whole class instruction using specific quotes or behaviors from the child- 
participants that are observed during the whole class instruction. A ll questions posed to 
the children during the study probed and prompted personal epistemological reasoning 
and beliefs. The focus was to monitor the cognitive ability in connection with developing 
epistemological theories.
Week one-Whole class inslniction observation. The whole class instruction began 
each week on Monday morning from 8:30am to 9:00am and is held every day at the same 
time. This instructional observation took place on the third week o f the study. This first 
week focused on the six child-participants; the theme-of-the-week was “ Monsters.”  The 
whole class instruction acted as the catalyst for the child-participant interviews and the 
focus group as a way o f tapping into the ehild-partieipants’ understanding o f the current 
theme.
The researcher and the teacher met each morning before the school day for 15-30 
minutes to discuss the plan for the day. This daily meeting time was spent having brie f 
conversation about each o f the child-participants’ performance in the whole class 
instruction. It is estimated that the amount o f time spent on eaeh ehild-participant was 
approximately four minutes. This time served as a member cheek; it was a chance to
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compare the investigator’s impressions, observations, and perceptions with those o f the 
teacher.
Week two-Whole class instfiiction observation. Week two o f whole elass instruction 
was identical to Week One in terms o f purpose and goals. It took place under all o f the 
same conditions as Week One. The single difference is that the theme o f the week was 
different from the first week; the theme o f the week for Week Two was “ Winter.”  The 
investigator and teacher resumed the morning meetings for scheduling, review o f the 
daily lesson plan, and member checking. The second week o f collaborative inquiry 
observations took place during the fourth week o f the study.
Week three-Whole class instruction observation. Week Three o f whole elass 
instruction was identical to Weeks One and Two in terms o f the procedure and took place 
under all o f the same conditions as Week One and Two. There were two main 
differences: (a) The theme o f the week was “ Buildings and Construction;”  and (b) due to 
the constant comparative data analysis, the focus became more narrow in the sense that 
themes and patterns had started to emerge; therefore, the target (i.e. epistemological) 
information was generally different for eaeh o f the six ehild-partieipants. The differences 
among the children prompted the concentration away from the peer focus groups and 
required follow-up sessions w ith the ehild-partieipants to be more centered on the 
individual interviews. However, at the end o f the week, there was a post-instructional 
peer focus group as an attempt to maintain the fide lity o f the design for the study. The 
investigator and teacher continued the morning meetings for scheduling, review o f the 
daily lesson plan, and member checking. The third week o f collaborative inquiry 
observations took place during the fifth  week o f the study.
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Week four-W ho le class instruct ion observation. Week Four o f whole class instruction 
was identical to Weeks One, Two, and Three in terms o f the procedure and took place 
under all o f  the same conditions as Week One, Two, and Three; however. Week Four was 
more in-line with the puqoose and goals o f Week Three. Using the constant comparative 
method o f data analysis provided preliminary results that urged the researcher to alter the 
focus o f follow-up investigations. The design o f the study was more individualized in 
order to target specific epistemological information. The theme o f the week was 
“ Airports and Airplanes.”
Child-Participant Interviews
Procedure. During each o f the four separate weeks o f whole class instruction, the 
child-participants were involved in individual interviews (See Table 6). The interviews 
were semi-structured and did not exceed 15 minutes per child at one time. Each child- 
participant was interviewed a minimum o f two times in each week but could be 
interviewed up to five times per week. The number o f times a child-participant was 
interviewed in one week had no bearing on how many times they were interviewed 
during other weeks. For example, an individual could be involved in four individual 
interviews in Week One but only be interviewed two times during Week Two, then three 
times during Week Three and Week Four. The number o f times a child-participant was 
targeted for an individual interview was dependent on the context and their participation 
in the whole class instruction. The more engaged a child was or the more frequently he 
participated provided more infonuation to follow-up on in an individual interview; 
therefore, it was more likely that he was interviewed more frequently. Interestingly, the
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six child-participants involved in the study typically were more involved in the whole 
class instruction than the other students.
The interviews consisted o f questions or activities that came directly from the 
follow ing: (a) the whole class instruction, (b) a previous peer focus group, and/or (c) 
investigator observations.
The purpose was to get more individualized information and also to gain a deeper 
understanding o f the child-participants’ epistemological understanding and beliefs.
Materials. The individual interviews were conducted in a small conference room 
which was attached to the classroom. The individual interviews were videotaped, which 
involved a small hard disk video-eamera and a tripod. It was common to bring the 
storybook which was read in the whole class instruction earlier that day in order to 
prompt the sim ilar cognitive processes that occurred during the whole elass instruction. 
Occasionally the researcher would bring other props such as pictures o f monsters for the 
child-participant to color while talking about the theme o f the week, play-dough to 
construct a building, or puppets for pretend-play scenarios in which the child-partieipant 
could respond to “ what i f ’ questions with more ease. In addition, there were individual 
interview sessions that required a laptop computer in order to show the child-participant a 
video-clip o f themselves during a whole class instruction or an infom ial center activity 
that the researcher wanted to inquire more about from the child-participant. 
Child-Participant Peer Focus Groups
The focus group activities were facilitated by the investigator and corresponded with 
the four weeks o f whole class instruction observation (See table 6). There were eight 
total peer focus group sessions; however, the six ehild-partieipants were separated into
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two groups o f three. It was a goal o f this study to identify subjeetive and objective 
perceptions o f the children using their own words during the whole class instruction and 
the focus group activities. In addition, the study was conducted in an authentic 
environment that was familiar to the children. There were eight peer focus groups. This 
section details the systematic organization o f the focus groups: (a) an introduction; (b) 
during week one/theme one there was a pre/and post-instruction focus group; (c) week 
two/theme two there was another pre/and post-instructional focus; (d) a wrap-up, (e) 
week three/theme three had a post-instruction focus group, and (f)) week four/theme four 
had a post-instruction focus group.
Intvoductoiy peer focus group. This group was to familiarize the children with the 
study and explain the format for the peer focus groups.
Pre-instruction peer focus group. There were two pre-instruction focus groups. They 
took place at the beginning o f Week One (Monster Theme) and Week Two (Winter 
Theme). These pre-instruetional focus groups centered on the theme o f the week and 
occurred prior to the whole class instruction. The purpose was to gain understanding 
about the child-participants’ background knowledge o f the theme.
Post-instruction peer focus group. There were four post-instruction focus groups. 
They took place after all four weeks o f class instruction observation (one at the end o f 
each week). Each week the post-instajction focus group centered on the theme o f the 
week. The post-instruction focus groups attributed more meaning o f the range o f 
knowledge gained during the week o f instruction both on an individual and group level.
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Wrap-up peer focus group. This group was to bring closure to the study. The 
researcher answered child-participants’ questions and asked them to share their 
experience about reviewing the themes o f the week and o f being asked questions.
Each focus group took approximately 20 minutes and took place in the small activity 
room attached to the classroom in order to alleviate confusion in the classroom and 
provide an atmosphere that was less stimulating for the child-participants.
The two groups maintained the same child-participants for peer focus group sessions 
1 to 6. For focus group sessions 1 to 6, Group 1 had two females and one male, and 
Group 2 had two males and one female. As mentioned earlier, some o f the whole class 
instruction follow-up procedure had changed due to the constant comparative method o f 
data analysis that had been consistently used throughout the study. While reviewing the 
preliminary results o f the constant comparative data analysis, it was elear that each child- 
participant had started to demonstrate specific patterns that may or may not have 
corresponded with other child-participants. Peer focus groups had been benefieial up to 
this point, but it was deeided to target more individual information as a means o f 
capturing more in-depth epistemological perspectives. Faced with the opportunity to 
make some changes to the format o f the peer focus groups, it was decided to make a 
participant change between the two groups. It was the small matter o f taking one o f the 
females from Group 1 and swapping her with the female in Group 2. This change kept 
the gender balanced between the two groups; however, it clearly made Group 1 a much 
stronger functioning epistemological group as compared to Group 2.
Focus group activities were an extension o f the whole-class instruction because the 
format and the content were similar to what has been previously introduced by the
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teacher. The primary difference o f the foeus groups is that the groups are considerably 
smaller, whieh provides the children with the opportunity to be more interactive and 
diseuss their knowledge in more depth. The smaller group size provides them with a 
more structured setting to listen and respond to their peers. Finally, the focus groups 
provide the researcher with the opportunity to design in-depth epistemological questions 
based on the whole class instruction and identify contributing factors to the child ’s 
developing personal epistemology.
Questions were directly related to the content o f the particular lesson as a way to 
better understand the child-participants’ beliefs about the nature o f knowledge and 
process o f knowing. Specifically, the questions were related to four dimensions o f 
epistemology: simplicity and certainty o f knowledge in reference to the nature o f 
knowledge and source and justification o f knowledge relating to the process o f knowing 
(Hofer, 2001.) For example, after an instructional lesson, the teacher may pose the 
question, “ Do you think Max was afraid o f the w ild things?”  A student may respond, 
“ No silly, the w ild  things are M ax’s friends.”  Because o f the multitude o f students 
participating at once, this particular student doesn’t get to elaborate in the context o f the 
whole elass instruction. The questions that w ill be asked individually w ill be follow-up 
questions such as, “ What makes you think the w ild things are Max’s friends?”  or “ What 
do the w ild  things do that makes you think they are friendly?”
The purpose o f the focus groups was to gain an understanding o f the child- 
participants’ preliminary knowledge and experiences as they relate to the theme o f the 
week. The focus group provided the child-participants with a platform for the
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investigator to capture the essence o f their knowledge and how it is impacted by the 
affect and environment.
The pre-instruction and post-instruction focus groups were compared to each other 
and then later analyzed collectively for similarities and differences. There are several 
purposes for comparing the pre-instruction focus group with the post-instruction focus 
group. First, children arc uninhibited with their peers, and they speak the same naïve 
language (in adult cognitive terms.) Second, young children arc eager to convey their 
knowledge and experiences. Third, the group interactions allow for finding transitions or 
changes in each child’s affect, language, and environment. This process captured and 
identified interactions between child-participants, as well as, transitions in language and 
affect that occur as peers at this age interact closely but in much smaller exchanges. This 
made it possible to maximize the observations and focus on possible dimensions of 
episfemie thinking, affect, and peer interactions.
Teacher
The role o f the teacher was another component o f identifying children’s beliefs and 
influenced the nature and level o f questions which occurred during the individual 
interviews and the peer focus groups. This section will talk about the methods used to 
obtain information from the teacher and understand his beliefs about the nature o f 
knowledge and the process o f knowing. The protocol for the teacher was as follows; (a) 
the Epistemological Belief Inventory (EBI), (b) three teacher interviews, and (c) a 
teaching style questionnaire.
Teacher EBI. The teacher completed a revised version o f the EBI (Schraw,
Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002), during the first week o f pre-study screening for child-
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participant selection. It took 10-15 minutes to complete. The results o f the EBI were 
compiled and served as the foundation for teacher interview #1; this meeting took place 
during the first week o f prescreening.
Teacher interview 1. The interview took place in the conference room in the 
administration building o f the preschool during scheduled teacher prep time by choice o f 
the teacher; it lasted approximately 90 minutes and was audio-tapped. The purpose o f 
interview #1 was to acquire as much information about the teacher’s epistemological 
beliefs. Further, it was important to identify any impact that his beliefs had on his 
approaches toward curriculum and instruction. Lastly, the interview aimed to collect 
infonnation about the teacher’s perspective regarding the child-participants’ 
understanding o f knowledge. Investigating teacher beliefs can provide insight on 
instructional strategies that may impact child cpistemologies. Asking the teacher about 
each child served as a way o f member checking the researcher’s observations.
Teaching sty’le survey. Prior to teacher interview 2, the teacher completed a teaching 
style survey designed by the researcher. The suiwey included topics such as: (a) teacher- 
student relationship, (b) instructional goals, and (c) teacher expectations. It is a 40-item 
self-report instalment and is measured on a five-point Likert Scale. The purpose for 
administering the survey was to help the teacher become more cognizant about his 
teaching style. Raising his metacognitive awareness about his area o f expertise allowed 
for a richer interview and provided opportunities to draw connections between his beliefs 
about knowledge and his classroom strategies. The questionnaire was reviewed prior to 
the second interview and a set o f semi-structured questions were developed.
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Teacher interview 2. This interview took place in the classroom prior to the start o f 
the school day and was lim ited to one hour, at which time the children were supervised 
by the teacher aides on the playground. The teaching style survey was the focus o f the 
inter\dew as a way to identify his beliefs about curriculum and instruction and how it is 
impacted by his epistemological beliefs. The purpose o f teacher interview #2 was to 
focus more intricately on beliefs about teaching, specifically the whole class instruction. 
Questions were construeted prior to the interview based on the teaching style survey, but 
the interview was not limited to those questions.
Teacher interview 3. This interview took place during the final week o f the study. It 
was in the conference room during teacher prep time and lasted 90 minutes. The purpose 
o f  teacher inteiwiew #3 was to bring closure to the study; it also served as a debriefing 
session to ask questions that had surfaced during the study that required clarification or 
elaboration. Another function o f the interview was to conduct final member checking for 
re liability and validity.
Videotaping
The entire classroom experience was overtly video-taped; intentionally selected 
pieces o f the recording were used as a catalyst for individual interviews w ith the child- 
participants and during the child-participant focus groups.
Equipment
A  hard-drive digital video camera was used to record all participant interviews, the 
focus groups, the whole class instruction, and selected classroom centers in whieh the 
child-participant was engaged in an activity. A ll video footage was downloaded to D VD  
daily. Complete transcription was done for the individual interviews and the focus
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groups, and partial transcription was completed for the classroom center activities and the 
whole class instruction.
In order to use the video camera in the classroom, all parents who have students in the 
classroom needed to sign a general consent form and a separate videotaping consent form 
according the Office for the Protection o f Research Subjects.
A  laptop computer was used during some o f the individual intendews and the focus 
groups in order for the participants to monitor video-clips.
Constant Comparative Method 
This section discusses the use o f the constant comparative method o f data analysis 
that took place in conjunction with data collection. The constant comparative method 
(Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003) is used with research designs that incorporate multiple data 
sources (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003) and is consistent w ith analyzing case study data 
(Strauss &  Corbin, 1998). This is a complex method o f data analysis and requires 
persistent, consistent, and simultaneous ongoing data collection and data analysis, so that 
the researcher can identify preliminary characteristics o f the individual child or group. 
Using the constant comparative method assists with the process o f classifying 
words/behaviors into preliminary categories and sub-categories as well as assists with 
documenting particular strengths and weaknesses o f individuals and groups (See Figure 
2). Over time as new and existing information emerges, reoccurring data analysis allows 
for more in-depth investigations.
In this study, the constant comparative method allowed for many accommodations 
which reflected the purpose o f  the study: (a) It assisted the researcher in identifying 
preliminary individual and group traits throughout the data collection phase; (b) it
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provided opportunities to construct specific in-depth questions for each o f the child- 
participants; (c) it made preliminary patterns in the data visible so that gaps could be 
easily identified, targeted, and probed during future data collection; and (d) because o f 
the recursive nature in the design o f the study, comparing the data continually maximized 
the researcher’s ability to build strength and richness to the questioning (i.e., use the 
child’s own words to get him or her to elaborate about a specific topic), compare 
individual and group data (i.e., probe a topic more deeply when patterns or themes were 
identified for and individual or group interaction), and link theory to individual and group 
cpistemologies as patterns and themes began to emerge (i.e., preparing a line o f 
questioning according to current developmental and epistemological theories).
Figure 2: Constant Comparative Data Analysis Method
Peer Focus 
Groups
Whole Class 
&  
Center 
Activities
Individual
Interviews
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Reviewing the data daily enhanced the researcher’s ability to investigate specific 
child-participants in certain topic areas and in particular, at a level that was consistent 
w ith their individual psychosocial developmental level and w ithin their cognitive range 
o f ability. Using the constant comparative method accentuated the focus o f the study as 
categories; (a) became more developed and visible, (b) new categories began to emerge,
(c) sub-categories were unpacked, and (d) some simply diminished. Over time, 
categories and subcategories became more apparent from an individual and a group 
perspective and across individuals and groups. This constant integration o f information 
ultimately informed the researcher about possible areas that would be beneficial to tap 
into for each individual and group epistemology. The fo llow ing explains how the 
constant comparative method was applied to the current study. Each step is explained, 
and an example is provided.
This study spans four weeks o f whole class instruction, and data was reviewed daily 
as a function o f the constant comparative method (See Figure 3). Whole class instruction 
and center activity data were collected daily, and peer focus groups occurred on Monday 
and Friday each week. Individual interviews for each child-participant occurred at least 
one time per week but could have occurred as many as five times per week. The number 
o f individual interviews depended on three main issues: (a) the child-participant’s level o f 
engagement in the whole class instruction, (b) the researcher’ s subjective nature o f 
inquiry based on the research question (more so during initia l data collection), and (c) 
characteristic and traits identified in previously analyzed data (progressively dominant as 
more data was collected).
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Each subsequent week followed the same format, for each o f the six participants, as a 
means to inform the researcher how to proceed in terms of: (a) individual interviews, (b) 
concentrating on a specific method o f data collection, and (c) fonnulating more in-depth 
epistemological questions.
Figure 3: Steps o f Constant Comparative Method
Step 6:
Constant Comparative Weekly 
Looking across groups
Step 5:
Comparing group characteristics to 
Epistemic Levels &  Dimensions of Knowledge
Step 4
Comparing Individual Characteristics to 
Epistemic Levels and Dimensions of Knowledge
Step 3:
Constant Comparative weekly 
Looking across individual characteristics
Step 2:
Constant Comparative Daily 
Individual Characteristics for next day questioning
Step 1 :
Collecting Data Daily 
Whole class Instruction, Center Activities, Individual Interviews, Focus Groups
There are six steps that Bogdan &  Biklen (1998) recommend for use in constant 
comparative data analysis. Using this as a guideline, the preliminary data analysis steps 
during data collection adhered to in the current study are described next in more general
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terms, followed by specific examples. There were four weeks o f data collection; each 
week was exactly the same format with two exceptions: (a) The topic o f instruction was 
different each week; therefore, the center activities were changed to reflect the nature o f 
the instruction, and (b) the number o f individual interviews was different because it was 
based on the child ’ s level o f engagement or contributions.
Step 1
Whole class instruction was generally 30 minutes each day and was video-recorded. 
During the whole class instruction the researcher was observing and taking notes on the 
six child-participants who were present during the instruction. Immediately fo llow ing the 
instruction, a checklist was completed for each child-participant while the class was 
preparing for the center activities. Center activities lasted one hour, and video was taken 
o f each o f  the six participants during his/her involvement in the center activity o f choice. 
During this time the researcher was observing, taking field notes, and moving the camera 
around the classroom. Later a checklist was completed for each participant. Individual 
interviews were generally 10-20 minutes each and included the researcher and one child. 
The interviews took place in a private area eonnected to the classroom, and they were 
video-recorded. The peer foeus groups were also video-reeorded and took place in the 
same location as the interviews; each group was approximately 20 minutes. The pre- 
foeus groups occurred on the Monday or Tuesday morning prior to the instruction, and 
the post-instruction groups were on Friday afternoons.
Step 2
Each day the video was reviewed, and field notes were amended to reflect 
observations that were not fu lly  addressed during the observation in real-time. Field
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notes and checklists from the whole elass instruction and center activities were 
transcribed. Individual interview videos were reviewed on the same day as the inter\dew 
occurred; however, the number o f interviews fluctuated from partieipant to participant 
and varied from week to week. Peer focus groups were video-reeorded and immediately 
reviewed by the researcher; notes were taken and transcribed by the researcher for 
planning the next week’s focus groups. This immediate preview o f the data helped 
prepare for the next day o f data eollection in terms of: (a) identifying specific language 
the children used most spontaneously and with ease, (b) identifying the types o f 
associations that were made to the instructional topic, (c) identifying which context eaeh 
child seemed to provide the most interest and productivity, and (d) identifying which 
peers were drawn together and observing their social interactions.
The questions pertained to contributions or interactions during the whole class 
instruction or center activities’ observations as a way o f probing the child-participant to 
elaborate on his/her statements. This ineluded reminding the child o f his/her own words 
using one o f two methods: (a) verbally reminding the child-participant what was said and 
asking specific follow-up questions or (b) visually reminding them by showing a video 
clip o f the specific instance that was being referred to and asking a series o f related 
questions. For example, during whole elass instruetion, a ehild-participant says the 
follow ing statements:
“ 1 had to go to the doctor and get a shot, and 1 still feel sick.”
“ We go to the doctor to make us better so we can feel better.”
He also knows that one o f his friends’ mother is sick, saying, “ Joe’s mother was sick 
so his dad had to bring him to school.”
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A peer says something about medieine and he says, “ Medicine is not good for 
ehildren.”  {Tone o f Voice Change} “ Only when mommy and daddy tell us too.”
To demonstrate how the constant comparative analysis assisted the researcher in 
identifying areas o f  strength and pinpoint reoccurring characteristics that may exist, the 
transcripts were reviewed and specific questions were later used in an individual 
inter\dew format w ith this child-participant. In this case the researeher verbally reiterated 
the statements the child had made separately; the fo llow ing are some o f the researcher’s 
questions. “ You said that you had to go to the doctor and get a shot but that you still feel 
sick. Can you tell me more about how you feel sick?”  “ What was it like for you to go to 
the doctor?”  “ What was the best part, and why?”  “ What was the worst part, and why?”  
“ You said that we go to the doctor so we can feel better. How do you know that the 
doctor makes us feel better?”  “ You are very observant. You noticed that Joe’s dad 
brought him to school. How did you know his mother was sick?”  “ What happens when 
your mother is sick?”  “ What changes for you when your mother is sick?”  “ You said that 
medicine is not good for children. Why do you think medicine is not good for children?” 
“ Do you think that is always true?”  “ Can you think o f times when it is good for ehildren 
to take medicine?”  “ You said that it was okay to take medicine when your mommy and 
daddy tell you to take it. When do they tell you it is okay to take medicine?”  “ You 
seemed very sure when you said it was okay to take medicine when your mommy and 
daddy said it was okay. Do you think they are always right?”  For this particular question 
the researcher showed the child a brie f video-clip o f the whole class instruction when he 
made the comment. The question was to tap into the cognitive as well as the affective 
aspects o f the response. Then a series o f questions continued, “ Who is usually more
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right, your mom or your dad?”  “ What other things do your parents tell you it is okay to 
do?” “ Do you always listen to what your parents say?” “ What happens when you 
do/don’t listen to your parents?” “ Why do you think you do/don’t listen to your 
parents?”
Also, because the children related Where the Wild Things Are to their knowledge 
about rules and discipline, this opened the door for moral questioning that was 
appropriate for their developmental level. For example, it became possible to ask what 
they know about the difference in the rules at home versus their rules in school and 
“ getting in trouble”  at home versus at school. Evaluating their response to such questions 
lead to hypothetical questions such as giving a scenario about a boy who does not listen 
to his parents regarding a bedtime and is tired the next day at school, then asking “ what 
do you think his parents should do?”  or “ what do you think his teacher should do?” This 
type of question requires complex thinking skills and evolved from preliminary analysis 
o f previous data. It definitely was not an initial question but instead was constructed by 
knowing infonnation about the ehild’s current epistemic ability.
Questions like this may not always be appropriate for all preschool-age children; 
however, given the content o f the lesson and the subsequent questioning of individuals 
and groups in the current context it was constructed and proved to be an appropriate 
question tailored for the purpose o f the research question. There is no agreed upon 
fonnat o f questioning for preschool epistemology, so it was imperative to identify how 
children associate new information to their prior knowledge to ask appropriate age level 
question in a manner that they can relate to and answer in a way that demonstrates their 
cpistemologies. The exploratory nature o f the study required constantly evaluating the
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data and assessing the trustworthiness o f the statements and going back to the source and 
asking more questions that would allow the child to elaborate upon his/her knowledge.
The process o f reviewing the field note transcripts and watching the videos facilitated 
the constant comparative method. In this step the individuals and groups were compared 
prim arily to themselves more in isolation. This allowed the researcher to collect data 
each day and review the data to inform the next day’ s data collection and so on.
Step 3
A t the end o f each week, field notes and checklists were updated, and/or videos had 
been transcribed. A  closer more in-depth review o f the data occurred at this time in 
which notes and preliminary traits were compared across individuals to obtain a more 
general perspective about the preschoolers’ epistemologies. Looking across the 
individuals at this point allowed for pre-planning activities for the next week. The main 
idea here was to look at the range among the child-participants to be able to coordinate 
individual and group tasks that corresponded to the theme o f the week but also to work 
w ithin the individual and group ability level. A t this point many things had to be 
considered: (a) language ability, (b) cognitive ability, (c) social skills, (d) behavior, and 
(e) interests. This process continued to be in-line with the constant comparative method 
in terms o f previewing the growing data in order to target specific characteristics, plan 
appropriate activities, and construct questioning pertaining to the theme and the activity 
that would tap into the individuals’ and groups’ epistemologies. This provided a glimpse 
into potential areas to probe the children’s epistemologies in more depth and to identify 
strong and weak areas; it also directly influenced the semi-structured interviews and the 
focus groups.
186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In itia lly , the preliminary analysis set up a broad foundation and over time 
distinctively separate hierarchical characteristics such as: (a) areas o f interest (i.e., 
cartoons, toys, movie characters), (b) levels o f attention or engagement, (c) amount o f 
detail and associations (i.e. drawing comparisons to fam ily, personal experiences, peers),
(d) problem-solving and decision-making (i.e. strategies, understanding, need for 
redirection), (e) patterns o f behavior (i.e., mimicking, facial expressions, non-verbal 
gestures, animation, coping skills), (I) social behaviors (i.e., eye contact, cooperativeness, 
sharing, influence of/on peers, curiosity), (g) use o f language (i.e., ability to answer 
questions, ability to answer questions, spontaneity and relevance o f responses to topic). 
Ultimately, over the course o f the study certain characteristics became targets that 
influenced what type o f activities worked best, whom to question, what to question, 
which method to use, and how frequently to question. Responses to these questions 
during an individual interview were later compared to other statements from the same 
child, as well as other child-participant’s responses, and i f  there were even vague 
categorical similarities (i.e., family, peers, associations, interests, imagination) then the 
researcher developed a set o f questions to be discussed among the three child-participants 
in the peer focus group activity at the end o f the week.
Step 4
The constant comparative method allows for the design o f the study to be somewhat 
malleable. The researcher has the ability to adapt the study and questioning to address the 
research question. Therefore, once specific characteristics have been identified and 
questions that address these characteristics have been implemented, this step begins to 
look at these identified characteristics in relationship to the epistemological
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developmental levels (i.e. absolutist, multiplist, evaluativist) and the dimensions o f 
knowledge (i.e. simple, certain, source, justification). Characteristics that are apparent 
during the data collection are prelim inarily assessed in two ways: (a) i f  they are 
epistemologically meaningful, and (b) how they could be labeled epistemologically. This 
allowed the researcher to develop specific epistemological questions that are modeled 
after adult epistemological surveys but that address the interests and abilities o f 
preschool-aged children. This approach contributed to tapping into their epistemologies 
in more depth by scaffolding previous actions/responses with their own words and 
interests to more clearly identify epistemological strengths and weaknesses. For 
example, a child-participant frequently talks about Transformers; therefore, questions are 
tailored around what he already has disclosed that he knows or takes interest in. This 
more direct line o f questioning provided a more visible link to his multiplistic 
perspectives and captured simple, certain, and source o f knowledge dimensions. He was 
able to make associations independently between the Wild Things (monsters) and 
Transformers (toys). However, after direct questioning, he was able to elaborate upon his 
knowledge and understanding to Power Rangers (cartoon characters), then further 
compared the “ powers”  o f each to determine that some o f the Transformers and some o f 
the power rangers are “ bad guys”  and fall more in-line with monsters than others. This 
led to another line o f questioning regarding which ones they like/dislike and why. Using 
his affective responses, he demonstrated his knowledge regarding fear and his knowledge 
o f follow ing rules and being a “ good person.”  Detailed questions which integrated their 
individual characteristics with an epistemological focus demonstrated a deeper level o f 
intellectual power.
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Step 5
This step is similar to step 4. The difference is that rather than prepare 
epistemological questions for an individual interview, this step addresses the 
characteristics o f the group and allows the researcher to design even more direct and in- 
depth epistemological questioning for the post-instruction focus group. Taking 
preliminary findings from classroom instruction, center activities, and individual 
interviews and transferring them to the focus groups provided further reliability and 
valid ity to the interpretations. The recycling o f child-participant knowledge provided 
insights into the follow ing areas: (a) the consistency o f each ch ild ’ s epistemological 
thinking o f the instructional content or according to an identified theme or pattern, (b) 
comparisons o f the individual child-participants epistemic ability, (c) assessment o f peer 
group ability, (d) identification o f the hierarchy w ith in the group to see which individual 
characteristics led to more sophisticated epistemologies, and (e) the social dynamics o f 
epistemological thinking. By using constant comparative analysis, comparing 
individual’s responses was beneficial for tapping into areas o f knowledge that were 
pertinent to the children and connected with their experiences. This allowed the 
researcher to identify the strongest characteristics and epistemological levels and 
dimensions o f knowledge from the week and incorporate them into the post-instructional 
focus groups for each group. Using the constant comparative method it was possible to 
look across the individual child-participants to scaffold their strengths so that 
theoretically all members o f the group had an equal vantage point. This proved to be a 
beneficial collaborative activity that yielded a greater amount o f knowledge from their 
personal experiences and prior knowledge. For example, taking a consistent response
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that reoccurred with each individual throughout the week such as (for the fam ily theme), 
“ I love my mommy and daddy”  (or some form o f the same). Every child demonstrated a 
non-verbal gesture (hugging themselves) in conjunction with the statement. This same 
behavior was addressed in an individual interview context, but each response varied 
slightly; therefore, it was introduced again in the focus group to see how they would 
respond collaborativcly. This technique yielded several interesting observations 
regarding the importance o f personal experiences, prior knowledge, and social 
interactions.
Step 6
This step is very sim ilar to step 3. The difference is that comparisons were made 
across groups rather that across individuals. Looking across the groups provided for 
more reliable and valid interpretations because it allowed the researcher to double check 
on identified characteristics, investigate new characteristics, and continue to search for 
embedded developmental levels or dimensions o f knowledge. This filtering o f group 
data occurred for the focus groups weekly.
Narrowing the data in such a manner made it possible to characterize each child- 
participanf s epistemic thinking in relationship to previously identified traits (i.e., family, 
peers, affective dispositions, creativity, good/bad decision-making, ability to fo llow  
direction, on/off-task) and behaviors (ability to change, role as leader, autonomous, 
animated, eye contact) as a means o f constantly using the children’s words and actions to 
investigate their epistemologies more deeply and more clearly.
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C onfidentia lity
Confidentiality o f all participants was a priority; Bogdan and Biklen (2003) urge 
researchers to “ be discreet”  (p. 181). A ll names and identifying information were 
removed from the documents and properly coded to ensure the participants confidence 
(Berg, 2001); some of the information that is shared may be o f a personal and sensitive 
manner (Bogdan and Biklen, 2003). Since confidentiality is o f utmost importance and is 
indicative of professionalism, all documents w ill be turned over to the Lynn Bennett 
Early Childhood Education Center and stored in a safe and secure locked cabinet.
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CHAPTER FOUR
D ATA AN ALYSIS  &  RESULTS 
The research question addressed in this study was as follows: what are the personal 
epistemologies o f preschool children? The research in children’s personal epistemology 
is sparse, but, according to the literature, very young ehildren are either incapable o f 
demonstrating epistemological beliefs or they are merely capable o f functioning at an 
objective (i.e. absolutist) perspective. Based on the literature and expectations from the 
pilot study, there were two hypotheses. First, preschool children can and do individually 
demonstrate personal epistemologies; that is, that three- and four-year-old children 
express their beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Second, preschool children’s 
personal epistemologies vary in regard to developmental levels and dimensions o f 
knowledge; in other words, preschooler’s epistemologies range in sophistication or 
complexity and d iffer in scope o f knowledge.
This chapter has three sections: (a) content analysis and ATLAS-TI, (b) levels o f data 
analysis and (c) results. First, based on the preliminary constant comparative analysis that 
accompanied the data collection procedure, it was neeessary to eontinue to organize and 
reduee the data still further to identify individual and group epistemologies. Content 
analysis describes how the codes were assigned to generate categories and subcategories. 
Following Level 1 (Coding), the use o f  ATLAS-TI, a qualitative software tool, is 
discussed. Second, using content analysis, 12 levels o f  data analysis are outlined and
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described. Third, the results section o f the chapter is divided into three parts: (a) 
individual results, (b) group results, and (c) overall preschooler’s personal 
epistemologies. The individual results w ill be presented as six case study formats, and 
individual’s epistemic profiles are provided to demonstrate how final individual personal 
epistemological results emerged. The group findings arc discussed. One group’s profiles 
are provided as a means o f  understanding the process o f identifying patterns and themes. 
The overall preschooler’s personal epistemological results are reported and are derived 
from ;he individual and group results.
This study investigates six child-participants and triangulates four methods o f data 
collection: (a) observation o f the whole class instruction, (b) center activities’ 
observation, (c) individual interviews, and (d) focus group data. There were four weeks 
o f data collection, and each week had a different instruetional topie. There were four 
primai-y tasks during the data analysis: (a) to identify individual epistemological profiles 
for each o f the child-partieipants; (b) to identify relationships among the individual 
epistemological profiles, (c) to identify epistemologies that were generated between focus 
groups (here the focus was on peer interactions and collaboration), and (d) to draw final 
conclusions regarding preschooler’s epistemologies based on individual and group 
epistemological themes.
Content Analysis Proeedure
This section describes the content analysis procedures utilized using levels o f analysis 
that were rigorously executed in order to zero in on preliminary categories and 
subcategories that had been identified and probed during the data collection steps (i.e..
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dimensions o f knowledge, cognitive and social behaviors, verbal and nonverbal 
characteristics). There were two distinctive types o f content analysis used including: (a) 
Conceptual Analysis and (b) Relational Analysis.
Content analysis is a method used regularly in the social sciences for investigating the 
content o f communications and relationships. The foundation o f content analysis is 
attributed to Harold Lasswell who introduced the core questions o f content analysis: 
“ Who said what, to whom, how, to what extent and with what effect?”  (Flick, 2006, p. 
56). One goal o f content analysis is to reduce large amounts o f data by compressing the 
data into categories. These categories can be derived from a theoretical model or emerge 
from the data. In this study, the categories are drawn from the personal epistemology 
literature, from emerging categories using constant comparative analysis, and from 
observation. Many o f the observational categories that surfaced are consistent with early 
childhood theories but were not in itia lly sought out at the onset o f data collection. In this 
study content analysis was used as a researeh tool to investigate the area o f personal 
epistemology from an individual perspective as well as a group perspeetive. Therefore 
the data were analyzed in two sections, individual and group, and the results o f each 
section were combined in the final results to answer the research question: what are the 
personal epistemologies o f preschool children? .
The individual and group analysis followed the same format; in itia lly  the conceptual 
approach was used followed by the relational approaeh. Conceptual Content Analysis 
involves first establishing the presence and frequency o f concepts in the text. In this case 
the text data were the transcriptions from the individual interviews and the focus groups. 
Other text included researcher notes taken from the actual observations o f the whole class
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instruction and center activities as well as notes that were made by the researcher as the 
videos were reviewed later. The researcher notes included observations o f cognitive, 
affective, and social behaviors that coincided with the individual’ s statements. Since the 
eategories could be im plicit and explicit, to avoid subjectivity, all codes and emerging 
eategories were defined in advance for consistency and thought out in comparison to the 
research. The process o f coding and categorizing is basically one o f selective reduction, 
that is breaking down the content o f all the information into meaningful and pertinent 
units o f information and certain characteristics for later interpretation, which is the 
central idea o f content analysis (Merriam, 2002).
Relational Content Analysis builds on conceptual analysis by examining the 
relationships among the concepts in the text. The idea o f relational analysis is to be able 
to map networks or interrelated ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and other information available 
to the researcher when making decisions or inferences about the text, coding, or 
categorization. In this study the relational analysis is represented in mental models or 
networks using ATLAS-TI. These networks demonstrate the strengths and weakness o f 
the interrelatedness between the categories.
ATLAS-TI.
A ll o f the data was transcribed and uploaded and stored into ATLAS-TI, a powerful 
qualitative software program that assists the researcher to uncover and systematically 
analyze complex phenomena w ithin rich text or multi-media data (Lewins &  Silver, 
2007). The program provides tools that allow the researcher to locate, sort, code, and 
annotate preliminary data material; to weigh and evaluate their importance; and to 
visualize complex relationships among them (Lewins &  Silver, 2007). This study is
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comprised o f a large amount o f transcribed documents, fie ld notes, and codes which 
ATLAS-TI was able to keep track o f for preliminary analysis and retrieve upon request. 
In addition, ATLAS-TI provided analytie and visualization tools designed to lead the 
researcher to a variety o f unique interpretive views o f the information. ATLAS-TI 
(qualitative software) was used to organize the coded data.
In order to attribute specific characteristics and traits into categories and 
subcategories, ATLAS-TI has a code manager to retrieve certain categories and run a 
code forest seareh to find out which o f the highest ranked categories originated from 
which context (i.e. classroom instruction, center activities, individual inteiwiews, or focus 
groups). For example, there were 1439 units coded for the subcategory o f multiplist. 
When asked, ATLAS-TI was able to sort these units and identify that: 531 units were 
derived from the classroom instruction, 83 units derived from the eenter aetivities, 611 
were a result o f the individual interviews, and 214 derived from the peer focus groups. 
The ATLAS-TI software was also able to run another code forest search for the content 
o f each context in this case. For example, o f the 531 multiplist units found resulting from 
the classroom instruction, 209 were pertaining to monsters, 79 were identified when the 
instructional topic was winter, 111 were present during the week when construction was 
the topic, and 132 were present during the week o f instruction about airplanes.
Using A T LA S -T I’s Code, Family, and Network Managers and the Memo Board, 
epistemological subcategories (absolutist, multiplist, evaluativist, simple, certain, source, 
justification, and the integrated levels and dimensions) were combined w ith each 
component o f the network profile. This “ epistemic wash coupled the children’s own 
words and behaviors to produced a direct connection between their epistemic
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development and the developmental components representative o f their performance and 
ability in the network profile.
Levels o f Data Analysis 
There are 12 levels o f data analysis in the present study, and these w ill be outlined in 
this section (See Figure 4). Although it is illustrated as a single proeess it depicts the 
individual participants and the group analysis. U ltimately the results from the individual 
profiles were combined w ith the group profiles, so that the study technically has three 
sets o f results: (a) an individual epistemic profile (See Figure 11), (b) a group epistemic 
profile (See Figure 33), and (c) an overall preschooler epistemic profile (See Figure 35). 
As with all hierarchical representations the levels o f  analysis begin at the bottom and 
work to the top, all along the way data is being condensed in such a way that themes and 
patterns become more visible and consistent. W ithin each level o f analysis there are 
multiple sub-levels, a miniature graphie w ill assist in identifying the actual 
epistemological construct (i.e., developmental level, dimension o f knowledge, matrix 
cell) that is being analyzed at each level o f analysis.
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Figure 4: Levels o f Data Analysis
Level 12
Preschoolers’ Personal Epistemologies
Level 11
Across Group Epistemic Profile Results
Level 10 
Group Epistemic Profiles
Level 9
Focus Group Theme-Based Epistemic Profiles
Level 8
Focus Group Themes Prc/Post-lnstruction
Level 7
Across Individuals’ Epistemic Profiles
Level 6 
Individual Epistemic Profiles
Level 5
Individual Matrix: Integrated Dimensions
Level 4 
Individual Matrix: 12 Cells
Level 3
Individual Dimensions o f Knowledge
Level 2
Individual Developmental Levels
Level 1 
Coding
Level I :  Coding
This section conveys details regarding the coding o f the data using ATLAS-TI. 
Coding is the process o f organizing data according to ideas, units, or sentenees in a way 
that collapses the data so that meaning can be made based on relationships that are 
identified w ithin the data (Creswell, 2003). The data were coded inductively and
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deductively during the data colleetion and after data collection was completed leading up 
to the findings o f the research question; what are the epistemologies o f preschool-age 
children w ithin a classroom context? This section discusses the initial coding scheme 
(inductive, based on observation and inferences) and the epistemological coding scheme 
(deductive based on developmental levels and dimensions o f knowledge). This first 
section is divided into three parts: inductive coding, deductive coding, and ATLAS-TI.
The coding for this study was developed using inductive and deductive reasoning. 
Inductive reasoning is more open-ended and exploratory, especially at the beginning o f 
research such as the current study. It pertains to methods that begin with specific 
observations and work toward broader generalizations and theories. Deductive reasoning 
assumes a more naiTOw perspective in that it is concerned w ith testing or confinning 
hypothesis. It begins w ith existing theories and works toward more specific observations. 
Most social or authentically approached research tends to utilize both inductive and 
deductive reasoning processes at the same time (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003). Due to the 
exploratory nature o f the eurrent study, a more inductive approach was predominant in 
that in itia lly nearly every idea was given a code but at the same time as data was being 
evaluated according to the research question (i.e. what are the epistemologies o f 
preschool children), it was imperative to keep in mind theories o f development and 
current theories o f personal epistemology which called for more deduetive reasoning 
skills. In itia lly  all data was coded by idea units; a unit o f data is any meaningful or 
potentially meaningful segment o f data (Merriam, 1998). The coding scheme was 
developed by reviewing the transeripts and field notes to see what types o f information 
had been eollected.
199
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Jnduclive coding scheme. The data was coded based on verbal and nonverbal units, 
and then items were coded based on a particular idea (See Table 7). Many o f these eodes 
emerged during the constant comparative method o f analysis that oecuiTcd during data 
collection. The codes developed as a starting point due to obseiwations o f the oceurrence 
in the elassroom. Later many o f the eodes began absorbed into the epistemic categories. 
Verbal information was coded based on an individual’s ability to demonstrate an idea; in 
some cases an idea was represented by a complete sentence, but often it was a portion o f 
a thought (i.e., a single word or phrase). Nonverbal behaviors required more 
interpretation and needed to be considered w ithin the content o f the responses; therefore, 
it was more challenging but pertinent to the study. Due to the age o f the participants, 
their verbal ability to articulate certain information was limited, but it was thought that 
they made conscious attempts to communicate information through their behaviors. 
Therefore, individual verbal and nonverbal ideas that were believed to be relevant were 
coded.
M ultip le units o f  data were used, ranging from a single word that a child-participant 
used consistently to a complete thought. The child-participants’ complete thoughts varied 
among the ehildren in terms o f the number o f sentences and included repetitive behaviors 
such as, using their body or voice to explain what happened (e.g., standing up from a 
sitting position and falling to the ground; stretching their arms out to show emphasis o f 
size or proportion; displaying approval or disapproval with facial expressions; making 
sound effects such as, boom, crash, bang; and fluctuating the tone o f their voice).
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Table 7: Inductive Coding Scheme
I 1=M “ 1 don't know” UC 73 LA Looking for Approval
2 JUST/AB “ WHY?” 74 MMC Mimic
3 AB Absolute 75 NEG Negative
4 AHLP Accept Help 76 NIWP NeglnterWPeers
5 AFP Affect 77 NPl NcgPeerlnteract
6 AG Aggressive 78 NV Nonverbal
7 ACT Agitated 79 OBS Observing
8 AGR Agree 80 FT Off-Task
9 AN Animated 81 NT On-Task
10 APP Appropriate 82 OPIN Opinion
lOA AFHLP Ask for help 83 0 Other
11 ASS Association 84 PART Participates
12 AS Attention Seeking 85 PTT Patient
13 ATT Attentive 86 P Peers
14 A Authority 87 PM Psychomotor
15 AV Avoidant 88 PT Pointing
16 B Behavior 87 POS Positive
17 BC Behavior Change 88 PIP Positive Peer Interaction
18 BR Bored 89 PT Pretend
19 C Cognitive 90 PSB Problem Solving Bad
20 COL Collaborative 91 PSG Problem Solving Good
21 CC Compare/Contrast 92 PR Prompted
22 CMPT Competitive 93 OU Ouestion
23 c x Complex 94 OA Ouestion Authority
24 CNFD Confident 95 0 Oui et
25 CF Confused 96 RDRT Redirect
26 cs Consistent 97 RFHLP Refuse Help
27 CON Contradictory 98 RL Relevant
28 CO Cooperative 99 R Repetitive
29 CP Correct Peer 100 RTA Response To Authority
30 CT Correct Teacher 101 RTP Response To Peer
31 CU Curious 102 S Self
32 DCB Decision Bad 103 SEN Sensory
33 DCE Decision Easy 104 SH Shake Head
34 DCG Decision Good 105 SH Sharing
35 DCFl Decision Hard 106 SM Smiling
36 DEP Dependent 107 SE Sound Effects
37 DTE Detail 108 SPB Spontaneous Behavior
38 DIFF Differentiate 109 SPV Spontaneous Verbal
39 DIF Difficulty 110 SO Squealing
40 DP Direct Peers 111 STR Strategy
41 DGR Disagree 112 TLK Talking
42 DSA Disagreement 113 T Teacher
43 DENG Disengaged 114 TOM Theory o f Mind
44 DRL Disregard Rules 115 TH Thinking
45 DRPT Disruptive 116 UC Uncertain
46 DTR Distracted 117 UC Uncertain
47 ECO Ecolahlia 118 U Understanding
48 ELE Elaborate 120 UPR Unprompted
49 E Emotion 121 V Verbal
50 ENG Engaged 122 VB Verbal + Behavior
51 EVAL Evaluativist 123 VC Voice
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52 EXC Excited 124 VO L Volunteer
53 EXP Experience 125 W Watching
54 ECB Eye Contact Bad 126 A Absolutist
55 EGG Eye Contact Good 127 M M ultip lis t
56 FE Facial Expression 128 E Evaluativist
57 FAM Family 129 SIM Simple
58 FLRL Follow Rules 130 CER Certain
59 FR Frustrated 131 SRC SoLiree
60 GULP Gives Help 132 JST Justification
61 HO Hands-on 133 ASIM Absolutist Simple
62 IBC Immediate Behavior 
Change
134 ACER Absolutist Certain
63 MPTT Impatient 135 ASRC Absolutist Source
64 INAP Inappropriate 136 AJST Absolutist Justification
65 NCS Inconsistent 137 MSIM M ultip lis t Simple
66 IND Independent 138 MCER M ultip lis t Certain
67 IBO Influenced By Others 139 MSRC M ultip lis t Source
68 IRL Irrelevant 140 MJST M ultip lis t Justification
69 J .ludgment 141 ESIM Evaluativist Simple
70 LD Leader 142 ECER Evaluativist Certain
71 I.ST Listening 143 ESRC Evaluativist Source
72 L Looking 144 EJST Evaluativist Justification
Deductive coding scheme. Merriam (1998) states that identifying categories and 
distributing codes can come from the literature and the researcher; however, Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) caution researchers about using categories that are “ borrowed”  (p. 183) 
from other research unless they are compatible with the purpose and the theoretical 
framework o f the study. The epistemological categories used in this study are present in 
the research literature and are concurrent with the purpose and the theoretical framework 
o f this study. The unique part o f the epistemological categories is that, in the literature, 
personal epistemology is viewed as either levels o f development (i.e., absolutist, 
multiplist, evaluativist) or dimensions o f knowledge (i.e., simple, certain, source, 
justification) and are viewed more as contrasting perspectives. In the cunent study each 
level and each dimension were coded separately (first as developmental levels, then as 
dimensions o f knowledge); and then the developmental levels and dimensions o f
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knowledge are combined in a matrix (i.e., absolute simple knowledge, multip list 
justification o f knowledge) (See Table 8).
To thoroughly grasp the epistemological matrix it is necessary to review how 
personal epistemology is defined in the current study. Personal epistemology is generally 
accepted as being comprised o f two dimensions concerning beliefs about the nature o f 
knowledge and the process o f knowing (Burr &  Mofer, 2002). The nature o f knowledge 
includes (a) the simplicity o f knowledge (i.e., the relative connectedness o f knowledge); 
and (b) the certainty o f knowledge (i.e., the perceived stability o f knowledge). The 
process o f knowing includes (a) the source o f knowledge (i.e., where knowledge resides, 
internally or externally); and (b) the justification o f knowledge (i.e., how individuals 
evaluate and warrant knowledge claims). In addition to the dimensions o f  beliefs just 
described, the current study also examines epistemic development in the fonn o f three 
levels: (a) absolutism (i.e., simple, dichotomous views o f knowledge), (b) multiplism 
(i.e., reasoning is more complex and relativistic), and (c) evaluatism (i.e., views o f 
knowledge focus on evaluation and decision-making among differing views) (Kuhn &  
Weinstock, 2002). Units o f data that had been previously coded using the inductive 
coding scheme were also coded using the deductive coding scheme in order to identify 
overlapping characteristics.
The purpose o f coding the data in all three ways was to allow a unit to be one or two 
dimensional. This distinction is important for this study and the research literature 
because little is known about preschool children’s epistemologies; using the epistemic 
matrix demonstrates the complexity o f  preschooler’ s thinking. Identifying preschoolers’ 
ways o f interpreting knowledge in the epistemic matrix achieved three main goals: (a) It
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helped illustrate the varying ability o f the individual child-participants, (b) each cell o f 
the matrix made the preschoolers’ thinking more visible in terms o f an individual’s 
strength in specific content areas and context, and (c) it illustrated the advantages o f peer 
social interaction and collaboration in learning environments.
Identifying cells in the epistemic matrix was more deductive reasoning in nature 
because the two theories (developmental levels and dimensions o f knowledge) exist in 
the literature although they are not typically integrated in this manner and particularly not 
w ith participants as young as in the current study. In this sense identifying 
epistemological thinking w ithin the matrix was more o f an inductive reasoning task 
because o f the exploratory objective o f the study. Table 8 provides general examples o f 
each cell o f the matrix as a category. The columns across the top o f the matrix are the 
dimensions o f knowledge and the rows down the left-hand side are the developmental 
levels, so that each cell identifies characteristics or features o f one developmental level 
and one dimension o f knowledge (i.e., absolute simple knowledge, multiplist source, 
evaluativist certain). W ithin each cell o f the matrix, an example is provided to illustrate a 
more general description. More specific examples related to this study w ill be reported in 
the next section o f this chapter for each case study.
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Table 8: Epistemological Matrix Examples
Simple Certain Source Justification
Absolutist 1 think teachers 
should focus on 
facts rather than 
theories.
I f  two students are 
arguing about 
something, at least 
one o f them must 
be wrong.
I think children 
should always 
listen to their 
parents.
1 am going to do 
what I want to do 
because 1 know 
what is best for 
me.
M ultip list Some basics 
require basic 
factual knowledge, 
but other times we 
need to have a 
deeper
understanding o f 
concepts.
Every student has 
equally valuable 
contributions and 
their opinions 
should be heard.
A t home I listen to 
my parents, but 
when 1 am at 
school I listen to 
my teachers 
because they know 
what is best for me 
at that time.
In some situations 
ignoring a 
student’s behavior 
is more productive, 
but other situations 
require timeout 
because it is 
necessary to get 
them under control 
more quickly.
Evaluativist The more you 
know about a topic 
the more there is to 
know.
The best way to 
leam about global 
warming to present 
several theories &  
allow the student 
to decide which is 
best based on their 
knowledge &  
experience.
I think children 
should be able to 
question their 
parent’s authority.
Being an effective 
teacher means that 
you consider the 
individual students 
needs and apply 
what you have 
learned from 
books, experience, 
&  others.
Level 2: Individual Developmental Levels
Level 2 o f the analysis is comprised o f organizing the data into individual 
developmental levels (i.e., absolutist, m u ltip lis t, evaluativist). In-line w ith Piaget’s 
developmental stage theory, epistemological development is thought to occur in the same 
general trajectory, that is from more naïve to more sophisticated. In addition, individuals 
are thought to advance from lower levels to higher levels; absolutism is an objective view 
o f knowledge, multiplism is a subjective view o f knowledge, and evaluativism allows the 
individual to move betv/een and coordinate objective and subjective perspectives while 
using valid warrants for their knowledge claims. The identifying feature o f this level o f 
analysis is that it seeks to find the specific characteristics that might define and
205
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
distinguish one level from the others in a qualitatively distinct manner. Also, it provides 
an opportunity to identify sequences o f epistemological development and shifts in 
epistemological understanding 
Level 3: Individual Dimensions o f  Knowledge
Level 3 o f the data analysis is comprised o f organizing the data into categories based 
on the dimensions o f knowledge. There are four epistemological dimensions o f 
knowledge (i.e., simple, certain, source, justification). The four dimensions are divided 
into two central themes, the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. The nature 
o f knowledge is represented by simple and certain knowledge, and the process o f 
knowing incorporates the source and justification o f knowledge. The identifying feature 
o f analyzing the dimensions o f knowledge is to unpack what the participants know and 
how they know the infonnation. Analyzing the data according to the dimensions o f 
knowledge provided a better perspective about each dimension; for example, whether the 
dimensions are separate constructs or more integrated. Also, it allowed a clearer account 
o f which dimensions or themes (nature o f knowledge, process o f knowing) are more 
potent in preschooler’ s developing epistemologies. Analyzing the dimensions o f 
knowledge can also lead to evidence involving issues o f domain-generality and domain- 
specificity. In addition, breaking epistemological thinking into potential dimensions 
provides an opportunity to identify i f  sim ilar dimensions are characteristic o f each 
developmental level.
Level 4: Individual M atrix: 12 Cells
Level 4 integrates the developmental levels (absolutist, multiplist, evaluativist) and 
the dimensions o f knowledge (simple, certain, source, justification) into twelve cells.
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The idea o f a matrix is to show the relationship between the two categories 
(developmental level and dimensions o f knowledge).
Level 5: Individual Matrix: Integrated Dimensions
Level 5 summarizes each developmental level individually (absolutist, multiplist, 
evaluativist); however, each developmental level integrates the dimensions o f knowledge 
into two larger categories: the nature o f knowledge (simple and certain) and the process 
o f knowing (source and justification). Each developmental level conveys the strengths 
and weakness at that level in terms o f the nature o f knowledge and the process o f 
knowing. This provided a closer glimpse o f reoccurring themes and patterns (i.e., family, 
peers, nonverbal) and how they related to epistemological themes and patterns that were 
beginning to emerge. Examples include overlapping characters between simple and 
certain knowledge, links between certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge, and 
inability to identify sources o f knowledge. This level had three sublevels: (a) Absolutist 
+ Nature o f Knowledge/Process o f Knowing, (b) M ultip lis t + Nature o f 
Knowledge/Process o f Knowing, and (c) Evaluativist + Nature o f  Knowledge/Process o f 
Knowing.
Level 6: Individual Epistemic Profile
Level 6 is an individual epistemological profile for each o f the six child-participants; 
therefore, there are six epistemic profiles. This epistemic profile represents the four 
strongest epistemological themes that consistently resurfaced throughout the in-depth 
analysis. Included in the epistemological themes are general patterns that were 
associated with the child ’s epistemic perspective (i.e., using background knowledge, 
personal experiences, association to family, mimicking peers). Included in the epistemic
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profile are specific examples from the data that portray the child ’s words. These 
examples are embedded in the epistemic matrix as a way to illustrate how words, phrases, 
sentences, and behaviors were coded w ithin the integrated description o f  the 
developmental levels and the dimensions o f knowledge. In addition, the individual 
examples that represent each cell w ithin the matrix provided an authentic perspective o f 
how each child demonstrated his/her personal epistemologies w ithin the classroom 
environment.
Level 7: Across Individuals ’ Epistemic Profile
Level 7 is the final individual level o f analysis in the current study. Here all six o f the 
individual’s epistemic profiles were analyzed for consistent epistemological themes and 
corresponding patterns that occurred across all six o f the child-participants. Level 7 
represents a single epistemic profile for preschooler’s w ithin a classroom context. These 
results are reported in the next section o f this chapter.
Level 8: Focus Group Themes Pre-Post-Instruction
Level 8 begins the group analysis. A t this level the data were divided into themes. 
There were four weeks in which each week had a different theme o f the week (i.e., 
monsters, winter, construction, family). Each theme had two focus groups (i.e., pre­
instruction and post-instruction). The six child-participants were divided into two groups 
o f three for the initial two themes (monsters and winter). Therefore, the data were 
analyzed according to the following sublevels: (a) Group 1 Monster Pre/Post-lnstruction,
(b) Group 2 Monster Pre/Post-lnstruction, (c) Group 1 W inter Pre/Post-lnstruction, and 
(d) Group 2 Winter Pre/Post-lnstruction. For the final two themes (construction and 
fam ily), the researcher selected the three child-participants who demonstrated the
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strongest epistemological ability using the individual results and results from the first two 
theme-based focus groups. These three child-participants made up Group 3; the format 
for the final two themes followed the same format as the others, in that there was a pre- 
instructional focus group and a post-instructional focus group for each o f the two themes 
(construction and family). However, rather than two groups doing the same themes there 
was only one (Group 3). The sublevel analysis included the follow ing: (a) Group 3 
Construction Pre/Post-lnstruction and (b) Group 3 Family Pre/Post-lnstruction. Group 
data was coded according to developmental levels (sim ilar to Level 2), dimensions o f 
knowledge (similar to Level 3), and epistemic matrix (similar to Level 4).
Level 9: Focus Group Theme Based Epistemic Profiles
Level 9 continues to further analyze the focus groups, but at this level the focus 
groups are collapsed into theme-based profiles for each o f the three groups. The sublevel 
analyses at this level are as follows: (a) Group 1 Monster, (b) Group 1 Winter, (c) Group 
2 Monster, (d) Group 2 Winter, (e) Group 3 Construction, and (f) Group 3 Family. In 
contrast to looking at the type o f group that it was (pre-instruction or post-instruction), 
this level o f analysis considers the content o f  the themes being discussed. Here 
epistemological themes and behavioral patterns were identified between the groups based 
on the topic. This allowed a clearer perspective o f the significance that the topic might 
have on how the individuals demonstrate their epistemologies as well as how that might 
impact the group epistemic climate. This level o f analysis also sought out individual 
epistemological contributions, group interactions, and changes in themes or patterns 
among the different topics.
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Level 10: Focus Group Epistemic Profile
Level 10 reduced existing epistemological themes and patterns further to identify a 
group profile for each o f the three groups; therefore, this level has three sublevels: (a) 
Group 1, (b) Group 2, and (c) Group 3. This level accomplishes the same general task as 
Level 6 (Individual Epistemic Profiles).
Level 11: Across Group Epistemic Profile Results
Level 11 is the final level o f focus group data analysis, and it is similar to Level 7 
(Across Individual Epistemic Profiles). Here the analysis looks across the epistemic 
group profiles to identify the results o f preschooler’s personal epistemologies w ithin a 
focus group setting. There are four main results that w ill be reported in the next section 
o f this chapter.
Level 12: Preschoolers ’ Personal Epistemologies
Level 12 is the final level o f  data analysis for the current study. In this level o f 
analysis the individual epistemological results and the group epistemological results are 
compared to identify overall preschooler’s personal epistemologies. There are four 
themes and patterns that make-up the overall results for the current study, and they w ill 
be reported in the next section.
This section has described the twelve levels o f data analysis for the current study. 
These levels o f analysis have garnered three sets o f results for preschooler’s personal 
epistemologies w ithin an authentic classroom environment: (a) individual results, (b) 
group results, and (c) overall study results. The next section reports these results 
according to the fo llow ing format. First, six individual case studies are presented; each 
case study gives a description o f the child-participant as viewed by the researcher within
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the classroom environment, followed by a discussion o f that child-participant’ s 
individual epistemological results. Preceding the discussion o f the results, the child- 
participants epistemic profile is presented. Second, a discussion o f each o f the three 
group epistemic profiles is followed by the network model o f their group epistemic 
profile and the preschool epistemological group results. Third, a discussion o f overall 
results from the current study.
Case Studies
In this section the results o f the six case studies are presented in a case-by-case 
format. Each case study w ill fo llow  the same outline: (a) a description o f the child within 
the classroom including behavioral, social, and affective characteristics as a way to 
become familiar w ith the child-participant as an individual in his/her environment; (b) a 
network profile created in ATLAS-T l which illustrates the hierarchy o f the strongest 
identified categories, the corresponding subcategories, and the epistemic cell that was 
coupled most frequently from each the categorical and subcategorical frame o f reference;
(c) an epistemological matrix that summarizes the individual results from the study with 
specific quotes (i.e. the child’s words) in each cell o f the matrix that the child-participant 
was capable o f fonnulating with or without probing; and (d) a report o f individual results 
regarding major epistemological patterns and themes. In the final section, results from 
each case w ill be reported in terms o f connecting the themes and patterns across the 
child-participants, as well as report focus group themes. The case studies w ill be 
presented in order according to the child-participant’s number in descending order which
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were coded in alphabetical order: (a) Adam (IM ), (b) Amy (2F), (c) Carl (3M), (d) GiGi 
(4F), (e) Trudy (5F), and (f) Jeremy (6M).
Case Study: Adam
Description
Child-Participant #1 is a 3yr-10 month-old African-American (father) and Caucasian 
(mother) male. He attends the preschool five days per week for the fu ll day. His mother 
or grandmother usually drops him off, and their relationship is a close one. It is standard 
to get a kiss good-bye, but he does not seem to mind being left. Adam explains, “ 1 really 
like coming to school, 1 get to play w ith my friends, I learn new things all o f the time, and 
my mommy misses me when I am here.”
During the whole class instruction, Adam is very articulate, frequently raising his 
hand to volunteer his experiences or to answer questions; however, he is easily excitable 
and w ill frequently disregard the classroom rule o f raising his hand to be called on before 
contributing. Adam’s pattern for raising his hand is consistent; he raises his hand when 
there arc only a few other students who are sharing, but when peer contributions are high 
he talks out more regularly. He has an intuitive sense for d ifficu lt questions that he 
understands his peers w ill not be able to answer. Often, it is common for him to mumble 
the correct (i.e. declarative knowledge) answers to himself, in a way that confirms to 
himself that he knows the answer but is less interested in making the effort to raise his 
hand and tell the teacher or the class. For example, the teacher asked, “ What do we call 
the person who writes the story?”  He put his head down and quietly said, “ The author.”  
Or the teacher asked, “ What do we call the person who draws the pictures?”  Again, he 
turned away and quietly said, “ The illustrator.”  Adam is more inclined to tell others
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about his experiences or how he knows something. He is forthright about making his 
knowledge associations verbal. For example, when the teacher asked, “ What is it like 
when it is cold?” , he responded, “ The wind blows and my ears get cold. I have to get my 
jacket because I w ill get sick and have to go to the doctor and take medicine. I hate 
taking medicine so I wear my hat when it is cold outside.”  It is very common for him to 
ask several questions before, during, and after the story. For example, he asked, “ Why is 
the bear sad?”  or “ Why do you think they are not friends?”  I f  the teacher does not 
immediately announce the author, he w ill ask, “ Who wrote it?”  His questions and 
comments are always relevant to the topic.
Adam’s behavior during whole class instruction is to be applauded. He comes in from 
the playground and knows to wash his hands and go to the circle for instruction without 
direction. He promptly sits “ criss-cross applesauce”  and patiently waits for the 
instruction to begin. He typically sits very close to the teacher and makes sure he can see 
the pictures during the story. I f  he chooses a place to sit that impairs his vision, he w ill 
always move to a spot he is able to see. When other children are behaving 
inappropriately during whole class instruction, he does not pay attention to them and 
remains focused on the stoiy. Adam is attentive, engaged, and enthusiastic about the 
topics that are chosen as the theme o f the week.
Center activities are more unstructured, and the children get to choose which center 
they want to go to. Adam never has trouble making a decision as he always has a center 
in mind. He likes to go to the reading center and look at the books. He also enjoys the 
block center where he builds things or does puzzles. This is a time when the children get 
to interact freely w ith their peers. During this time he generally w ill interact w ith one
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other male friend. Interestingly, Adam’s friend is not as socially well-adjusted nor is he 
as inquisitive, but they have many o f the same interests and have talked about spending 
time together outside of school. When it is an instance where there are several peers at 
one center, he is socially well-adjusted. He is conscientious about taking turns, keeps his 
hands to himself, and has a good concept of right and wrong behavior. I f  the center holds 
his attention, such as the treasure hunt bin, he w ill stay at the center. However, i f  there 
are several children and he has to compete for space, he w ill wander to a center that is 
less occupied.
During the individual interviews Adam was initially quiet and uncertain about what to 
expect, but he quickly became adjusted and would request to have an individual 
inter\'iew. He appeared to enjoy the individual attention and was eager to please the 
researcher by answering questions or completing a task. Adam particularly liked to 
watch himself on the videos that had been taken of him in whole class instruction or 
center activity. When asked to elaborate on his comments or behaviors, he was always 
able to provide more details about what he was thinking or doing. Adam was cooperative 
and attentive, but when the interview was over, he would invent things to do or things to 
talk about to make it last longer. For example, anything in sight would prompt him to 
encourage the researcher to reengage in a one-on-one interaction; there was a book Give 
a Pig a Party and he said, “ I w ill read this to you (he cannot read) and ask you questions 
now.”  Adam would want to look in the researcher’s bag to see i f  there was anything we 
could use to talk about; often he was creative about how he approached it. For example, 
one day there was play dough and the theme was construction, he said, “ We can use this 
to build the big bridge that was in the story today.”  He required frequent redirection to
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bring the session to a close. Interestingly, he did have a concept that the goal was to talk 
about topics related to the theme o f the week. The theme o f the fourth week was 
airplanes and airports. When time was up he said, “ Did you see that airplane (there was 
no airplane)?It was green and yellow. I was on an orange and blue airplane once, but I 
fell asleep and didn’t get a drink.”  He asked, “ What color o f airplanes have you been on 
before?”
During the peer focus groups, Adam was in group 1 w ith two female peers. He was 
easy to engage and interacted well with the others. They had very dissimilar interests, 
and it was sometimes d ifficu lt to keep him on the topic. Adam frequently wanted to run 
the group and would correct the other child-participants i f  he thought they were incorrect. 
However, i f  he believed they just had a different experience, he would appropriately 
share his experience. He was an initiator o f ideas and asked many questions o f the 
researcher and his peers on several o f the topics discussed. He demonstrated excellent 
listening skills and was able to elaborate often on what others had said.
Adam’s affect and disposition was consistent from day-to-day throughout the study. 
He was pleasant, cheerful, bright, and energetic. Adam appeared well rested, and his 
hygiene was good, although his hair was primarily unkempt. He is potty trained and had 
no accidents during the course o f the study. He is animated but can be shy and quiet at 
times when he seems uncertain o f himself or his knowledge. Adam is one o f the highest 
functioning students in the class despite that he is one o f the youngest in the class and the 
youngest o f the six child-participants.
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Epistemic Themes
Table 9: Adam’s Epistemological Matrix
ABSOLUTIST: 
Objective view o f 
knowledge
M ULTIPLIST 
Subjective view 
o f knowledge
E V A LU A TIV IS T  
Shift o f objective &  
subjeetive stanee when 
claims are evaluated &  
warranted.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
S IM PLICITY
Megatron is the 
baddest, but remember 
Megatron got Optimus 
&  knocked him down.
1 think the baby is 
trying to get in the 
water. That’s what 1 
see in the picture.
1 think that dog is sleeping 
because his eyes are 
closed, but my dog sleeps 
w ith one eye sometimes 
openfgesture w ith eye).
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
CERTAINTY
The picture shows when 
a monster attacked a 
bear. That was in the 
story and that is how it 
was.
I ’m making a dotted 
monster, not like his. 
1 know how to make 
it, watch me do it.
1 like my food hot but 1 
don’ t like Chinese food 
because it spices me. My 
mommy and daddy like it a 
lot. When we have 
Chinese food 1 have a 
peanut butter and je lly  
sandwich.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
SOURCE
Row, row, row your 
boat gently down the 
stream. M errily, 
m errily, m errily life  is 
but a dream, (singing)
When I ’m sick my 
head hurts. M y dad 
said he gets the same 
way as me.
1 think it was Megatron 
who saved Jack. Do you 
know who it was? He 
knows more about them 
than me.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
JUSTIFICATION
Optimus is most 
popular because 
everyone likes him  and 
he beats Blackout.
1 just know it 
because 1 just do.
We go to the doctor when 
we are sick in the w inter 
because he w ill make us 
feel better or else we get 
sicker and 1 can’ t come to 
school.
Theme 1: M iiltip lis tic  level o f  development. Adam demonstrated perspectives 
regarding his knowledge at each o f the three developmental levels (absolutism, 
multiplism, evaluativism) and in all four dimensions o f knowledge (simple, certain, 
source, justification) during the course o f the study. The developmental levels and 
dimensions o f knowledge did fluctuate depending on the content that was being discussed 
(i.e. monsters, winter, construction, fam ily) and the context that the discussion took place
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(i.e. whole elass instruction, center aetivities, individual interviews, focus groups). Table 
9 provides a glimpse at some o f his statements out o f the context o f the discussions; 
however, they reflect how the researcher interpreted them within a specific context. Each 
cell in the matrix identifies a statement that was viewed as tapping into a developmental 
level as well as a dimension o f knowledge.
Overwhelmingly, Adam presented himself at a multiplistic developmental level. That 
is, he portrays his knowledge on most topics from a subjective point-of-view, sometimes 
in an egocentric way but more often speaking from his personal experiences. The 
egocentric subjectivity (i.e., “ 1 want,”  “ I have,”  “ I need.” ) appeared more in group 
settings such as whole elass instruction and the focus groups and seemed to be o f a 
competitive nature. He has a good memory and conveys his personal experiences with a 
great deal o f affect, not as matter-of-facts. For example, he acknowledges that his 
experiences are different from others and makes statements such as “ I know because 1 
feel and got my knee hurt, maybe that didn’ t happen to you but it did to me.”  In 
conjunction with this verbal statement he points to himself and then to his peer and holds 
his up his arms and shrugs his shoulders. This type o f behavior was interpreted as 
affectively communicating that they have a different understanding because they have 
had different experiences. Adam generally accepts others’ points-of-view and listens to 
his peers. He often w ill build on what others say. He is also accepting that others have 
different ways o f thinking. For example, he was coloring w ith a peer and asked for the 
blue crayon. The peer gave him a shade o f blue but not the one he wanted. He said, 
“ That’s not the one 1 want.”  The peer responded, “ But you are making Optimus right?”  
Adam said, “ Yes, but I think he is closer to this blue.”  The other boy said, “ You should
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make it more like this color.”  Adam said, “ He eould be either eolor but i f  you think he 
should be that eolor then you should make Optimus cuz I want him to be w ith this eolor, 
it doesn’t matter they w ill both be Optimus.”  He made the statement, “ we are all 
different”  several times throughout the study.
His multiplistic perspectives are more spontaneous, but when his knowledge is 
probed slightly, he leans toward evaluativistic statements but gets confused by what he is 
saying. He does catch himself off-topic or not making sense and constructs his 
knowledge from an absolutist perspective. For example, he confused the words 
construction and destruction; “ there is destruction all over the place and that makes 
people get to work a lot, wait what is that word again?”  When he heard the word 
construction he immediately referenced the story that was read in the whole class 
instruction by saying, “ You need to have really big truck to make construction, that 
building things like skyscrapers and bridges.”  Once he feels stable in his understanding 
he shifts to a multiplist perspective by elaborating on his experience. For example, he 
said, “ I have been on a big bridge over the water when we went to California. It was 
scary being so high but bridges are strong so lots o f ears can be on it and it won’ t fa ll.”  
Although this is a common pattern, he often uses a variety o f strategies that distract the 
process as he moves between developmental levels. In addition, he relies heavily on his 
charm and animation as coping skills which deflect the attention o ff o f him. This was 
observed in all formats throughout the data collection. Adam’s multiplistic knowledge 
revolves around his past experiences and prior knowledge primarily in relationship to pop 
culture, his fam ily, and interactions with his peers.
218
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Theme 2: Strength o f the nature o f knowledge. The nature o f knowledge (simple and 
certain) is more potent than his understanding through the process o f knowing (source 
and justification). He conveys his knowledge through simple and certain knowledge 
more often and with more ease. For example, “ 1 know wintertime is eold, and summer is 
really really hot.”  He does use justification o f knowledge (“ because in the winter I have 
to wear my hat and mittens to stay warm and not get sick” ) but far less and source o f 
knowledge rarely. Even when probed for the source o f knowledge, he has d ifficu lty 
understanding what is being asked and responds using his internal source o f knowledge. 
For example, “ 1 think it is that way so we feel clean and get ready for school”  (in 
responding to why they have to wash their hands when they come in from outside).
A t times it is d ifficu lt to assess his simple knowledge from his certain knowledge; 
they seem to have a great deal o f overlap, and there is a tendency to link them together. 
He begins with simple and certain views o f knowledge, but when probed his knowledge 
appears more complex and uncertain. However, when his knowledge is simple and 
certain, he is more affectively and behaviorally stable in his performance. When 
knowledge shifts to more complex and uncertain, he becomes curious and engages the 
teacher in a line o f questioning. For example, he does not understand why he cannot see 
himself in the camera during videotaping and asks, “ Why am I not in there? The red light 
is on so I know it is running but I am not there.”  When he makes connections to prior 
knowledge or past experiences he remains engaged and on-task, but i f  his questions do 
not yield advancement in his understanding, he becomes disengaged and disruptive. For 
example, he eould not make sense about the camera so he began to run in front and 
behind the camera quickly trying to see himself in the camera. The researcher allowed
219
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
him to look through the camera at the others and had them walk out o f view, and he 
began to understand and became more engaged. He said, “ I w ill be able to watch me 
later when you show it to me, right?”
He does appear to contemplate his responses for a moment, but once he begins he is 
quite spontaneous. He makes strong associations between the classroom topic and 
instances o f play with his friends and interactions based on rules with his family (mainly 
his father and grandmother). When he discusses his mother, it deals w ith associations 
that are affective in nature. He regularly compares himself to characters in the stories in 
terms o f their emotional disposition and w ill incorporate experiences he has had with his 
mother. For example, “ When I ’m bad like Max, my mommy makes me eat away from 
the table by myself; then we talk about what I did. I feel sad and she hugs me and 1 feel 
better, 1 think that is why Max left the W ild Things.”
Theme 3: Interaction with other Jink the nature o f  knowledge and process o f
knowing. This result is in direct relationship to result two, his understanding o f the nature 
o f knowledge is strongest in an individual setting, but when he is in a group, his pattern 
shifts to incorporating the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. Specifically, 
he shifts from linking simple and certain knowledge to linking either simple or certain 
knowledge w ith justification o f knowledge. He excels w ith the unintentional probing o f 
his peers in a structured setting. By relying on his prior knowledge and interacting with 
his peers, he combines ideas and experiences to develop reasoning for his knowledge; 
that is he chooses what others say i f  it coincides with his present understanding and 
applies it as justification for his current knowledge. For example, one o f his peers is 
telling how he went hiking in the woods with his family. Adam said, “ 1 think you have to
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stay w ith your mommy and daddy so you don’ t get lost because then you w ill be scared 
and need water and animals might get you, i t ’ s the same in the desert too, right?”  This is 
particularly noticeable when his knowledge is followed-up on at the end o f the week, and 
he is consistent w ith his knowledge and associations made earlier in the week or even the 
previous week. He was asked, “ Why is it important to stay w ith other people when you 
are in an unfamiliar place?”  He responded, “ You should always be with a grown-up 
because they w ill keep you safe and you won’t get hurt, like hiking. I f  you get lost from 
your fam ily you could get hurt bad and be a scared and be lost.”
Taking into consideration that he is generally outgoing and confident in his 
knowledge, he is more so when he is on the verge o f more complex and uncertain 
knowledge. He is aware that questions posed to him by the teacher, researcher, or peers 
probe his knowledge and understanding; he has a developing sense o f being motivated to 
learn from others. However, he demonstrates signs o f cognitive overload and becomes 
quite frustrated when he is unable to make sense between his present knowledge and new 
knowledge, whether it is subjective or objective knowledge. His breaking point is 
observable by his confused facial expressions, the increase in questions that are not 
coherent, and deterioration o f behavior (psychomotor agitation, laughter, disengagement). 
However, when he conveys knowledge as simple and certain, he can be lethargic and 
uninterested. He w ill intentionally attempt to challenge himself. For example, he w ill 
pose hypothetical scenarios, contribute an affective response, or ask questions to the 
researcher that scaffold with his knowledge. These types o f behaviors (i.e. strategies to 
acquire knowledge) seem indicative o f self-regulated learning and a naïve evaluativistic
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developmental level although he is not eonsciously aware that he is engaging in a 
sophisticated manner.
Theme 4: Limited ability fo r  source o f  knowledge. Source o f knowledge is the 
weakest dimension o f knowledge for Adam. Because he demonstrates more multiplistic 
ways o f thinking, source o f knowledge is accounted for most often internally. He 
watches others and listens; he reflects on his personal experiences and generates his 
knowledge internally. However, he is unable to articulate how he filters knowledge and 
because this internal process is not observable, the researcher probed his source o f 
knowledge continually. The patterns surrounding his source o f knowledge were similar 
throughout the study. In itia lly  his responses are multiplistic and are constructed 
internally and filtered in a way that relate to things he knows or has experienced (i.e., 
characters, consequences). He makes attempts at evaluativism, but he has d ifficu lty 
making sense o f his internal filtration process (most likely because o f a lack o f 
experience) and cannot coordinate internal and external sources o f knowledge in a 
coherent way. He then shifts to an absolutist perspective and with probing can articulate 
the external sources o f knowledge in his associations. For example, he w ill identify rules 
and reasons for the rules that originate from interactions with his father or grandmother. 
He clearly links himself to characters in a story and makes comparisons to experiences 
that are highly emotionally charged between himself and his mother.
He links much o f his knowledge to television characters and toys; therefore, another 
external source o f knowledge that he defers to is his peers. It is a common bond that 
he has with his peers that contribute to his understanding o f knowledge; he perceives 
his peers as being knowledgeable and uses them as a tool to demonstrate how he
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constructs his knowledge. He frequently asks his peers about behaviors and 
eharacteristies o f animated characters or storylines that can contribute to his 
knowledge and understanding. It is common for him to evaluate what his peers say; 
he w ill accept some aspects and discard other aspects o f their contributions, just as he 
does from other aspects o f authority.
Case Study: Amy
Description.
Child-Participant #2 is a four-year-and-four-month-old Caucasian female. Amy is 
tiny for her age and has long blond hair that is typically not brushed and falls in her face; 
however, on the rare occasion that it is pulled back, she always removes the tie. She 
attends the preschool five days per week for the fu ll day. Her mother brings her to 
school, and the routine is the same each time. Amy carries all o f her daily materials (i.e., 
blanket, lunch, change o f clothes). She places them in the appropriate places in the 
classroom (i.e., cubby, refrigerator), gives her mom a hug, and joins the group on the 
playground. Her mother leaves immediately. It is common for her mother to arrive early 
for pick-up to observe what is going on in the classroom, and she corresponds regularly 
w ith the teacher about A m y’s behavior during the day. Mother and daughter appear to 
have a good relationship; however, neither has any d ifficu lty  leaving the other.
When asked what she likes best about coming to preschool she replied, “ Because one 
day 1 am going to be beautiful and smart just like my mommy.”  Amy added, “ 1 like 
when my mommy puts all o f my pretty pictures on the refrigerator for my daddy to see.”  
Her father travels for work and is typically away from home for extended periods o f time. 
She has a two-year-old brother who she describes as “ bad.”  She is aware o f the routines
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surrounding the daily activities (i.e., washing her hands, sitting on the earpet, choosing a 
center, singing the welcome song).
Although she is eager to play with her peers in the morning, she is a slow starter for 
the structured routines o f the classroom. Am y appears tired and sluggish and rarely 
smiles. Her affect is flat early in the day, but she seems to brighten after the whole class 
instruction when the activity is not so structured. During the whole class instruction, she 
typically sits in the middle o f the group or in the back. Her disposition fluctuates daily 
between paying attention to the stoiy and being preoccupied with what is going on 
around her. Amy is highly distractible and rarely raises her hand to answer questions 
posed by the teacher although she frequently interjects comments about her experiences. 
She can be disruptive during whole class instruction and requires frequent redirection 
from the teacher because she makes noises or repeats a word or phrase accompanied by 
laughing and restless nonverbal behavior (i.e. rolling on the floor, touching a peer’s hair, 
playing with her shoes).
A m y’s verbal and nonverbal behavior is spontaneous, and i f  she is receiving attention 
for her inappropriate behaviors, they seem to escalate. She can become quite silly and at 
times it negatively impacts the behavior o f her peers. She enjoys looking at the pictures 
in the book, but never asks any questions. I f  she cannot see the pictures, she is even more 
detached from the activities and her behavior deteriorates. I f  she is engaged in the story, 
she is not affected by any negative influences o f her peers; however, when not engaged in 
the story, she w ill pick-up on the behavior o f peers and jo in in causing a greater 
disruption to the activity. On the occasion that she requires redirection from the teacher 
or an aide, Amy is able to change her behavior independently, that is she does not require
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any physical assistance and never needs to be removed from the activity for a time-out to 
regain control o f  her behavior.
She is very adept at choosing her desired center activity; she w ill generally go to the 
art center or the journal center. When she chooses the journal center, she is resistant to 
fo llow ing the format o f the center. They have to interact with the teacher to complete a 
sentence and then draw a picture and tell the teacher about what they have drawn. 
Generally, her sentence completion portion o f the activity does not make sense in the 
context o f the sentence. Her drawing is not consistent with her sentences, and she refuses 
to discuss the drawing afterward. It appears that her only reason for choosing the journal 
center is to draw the picture. Whether she is at the art center or the journal center, she 
very rarely interacts with her peers, and i f  she does, it is in a pretend or animated manner. 
Am y is able to work side-by-side with her peers and fo llow  directions; she shares the 
materials but w ill become agitated i f  a peer forces her to interact. Her tolerance for peer 
interaction in a structured activity is low; she w ill typically leave the center and move to a 
less busy center. For example, Amy w ill move to the dramatic play area i f  there is one 
other person there, but i f  two or more peers attempt to jo in  and try to pretend-play, she 
w ill immediately leave that center. It is not uncommon for her to leave her initia l center 
activity and just wander around the room watching her peers but not really participating 
in any center because there is simply too much activity.
When she does interact w ith her peers, she has a good sense o f social nonns, and the 
other children seem to like her; however, she does not initiate any positive interactions 
with her peers. In fact, it is common for her to be a lead in negative and disruptive 
behaviors. The one thing that she does consistently is watch and listen to her peers and
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then piek-up on a word or phrase that she becomes focused on. She w ill repeat the word 
or phrase even i f  it is not relevant to what is going on. It is not uncommon for her peers 
to fo llow  this behavior which results in a lot o f  laughter and other silly behaviors. For 
example, i f  a peer is talking about snow, she w ill say, “ snow buggers”  repeatedly and 
laugh uncontrollably. Another time a peer was talking about standing on a ladder, and 
she began to repeat “ ladder badder poopy badoopy.”
During the individual interviews, she immediately was receptive to the individual 
attention and was able to be more focused and serious in her responses as compared to 
her irrelevant comments during whole class and center aetivities. Her affect was much 
brighter, and her animated personality persisted. Am y did continue to have d ifficu lty 
staying on topic but resorted to baby-type talking when her comments did not make 
sense. The feeling was that this was due to the fact that a lot o f her interactions at home 
were with her baby brother, and she was m im icking his language. Contrary to other 
interactions w ith authority, during her individual interviews she asked many questions o f 
the researcher in relationship to the story or the theme as well as taking many o f the 
questions that were directed to her and turning them around and asking the researcher. 
For example, when asked “ What is your favorite type o f weather?” , she responded, “ 1 
like hot and sunny weather. What is your favorite type o f weather?”  When asked, “ What 
do you think it means to fo llow  the rules?” , Am y responded, “ When you fo llow  what 
your mommy and daddy tell you it is so you don’ t get hurt and you don’t get in trouble 
like Max did. What rules do you like?”
During the individual interviews she proved that she can be extremely motivated by 
rewards. Her attention span was much greater than in any other context and needed ver)'
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little redirection to stay on task; she excelled particularly well w ith the individual 
aetivities such as sequencing o f activities cards, making objects w ith play-dough, 
coloring and discussing her monster, and making the fam ily tree. She takes great pride 
and enthusiasm in her projects, and she was not as stubborn about discussing them with 
the researcher. Am y never wanted the researcher to keep her work; she always wanted to 
take it home to show her parents.
Her participation in the focus group activities was more consistent with her behavior 
in the whole class instruction and center activities but a little toned down because o f the 
fewer number o f peers. Amy was in group 1 and appeared to be less advanced (i.e., 
language, cognitive, behavior) than the other two members o f the group. Amy is more o f 
a negative behavioral influence to her peers, and she tends to mimic her peers’ verbal 
contributions. It appears that her idea o f interacting with peers involves playing and 
being silly. One main difference is that she tends to be more engaged in the focus group 
than many o f the other contexts, and she continues to pay very close attention to what her 
peers are saying and doing. Am y adapts well to the rules o f the focus groups and had a 
knack for surprising the researcher. Just when it was thought that she was missing the 
main idea o f a question or a discussion, she would come up with a unique or creative 
thought that would move the discussion along.
Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Absolutist level o f  development. Amy demonstrates absolutist and 
multiplist levels o f development (See Table 10). She never successfully constructs 
evaluativistic perspectives, even when probed specifically at all four dimensions o f 
knowledge. However, when unprompted, she has primarily an absolutist perspective o f
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knowledge and knowing. A m y’s knowledge is objectively eonstructed on all four 
dimensions o f knowledge (i.e., simple, certain, source, justification).
A m y’s absolutist point-of-view is most frequently demonstrated through her 
associations to her knowledge o f classroom rules and procedures and her fam ily. She 
spontaneously engages her peers by directing them on the appropriate behavior during 
di fferent parts o f the day. For example, “ Hey you guys, you need to be sitting criss-cross 
applesauce.”  When linking her prior knowledge with new information, she refers to 
experiences w ith her family. For example, “ You need to use a tissue. I f  I do that (picking 
her nose), my mommy tells me, i t ’s not polite and gives me a tissue to get the creatures 
out o f my nose.”
Despite the developmental level, her attention span is extremely limited. She can 
become distracted easily. For example, she is prone to giggling and joking around. I f  
someone moves around a lot or gets off-topic, she uses that as an opportunity to jo in in 
the disruption. She is typically a follower in her ways o f knowing and play; in addition to 
her high distraetibility, she mimics her peers. In terms o f knowledge, her mimicking is 
lim ited to absolutist and multiplist levels o f development. Interestingly, i f  a peer makes 
an evaluativistic statement, she w ill not mimic these types o f statements. She 
immediately becomes distracted or disruptive.
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Table 10: Amy’s Epistemological Matrix
ABSOLUTIST 
Objective view o f 
knowledge
M U LTIPLIST 
Subjeetive view o f 
knowledge
E V A LU A TIV IS T  
Shift o f objective &  
subjective stance when 
claims are evaluated &  
warranted.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
SIM PLIC ITY
Slihhh, you need to be 
quiet now, it is time to 
listen to the story.
In that story (pointing) 
Max misses his 
mommy. 1 miss my 
mommy, but 1 know 
she comes to get me.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
CERTAINTY
You could make 
either one. It just 
depends on what kind 
o f  s tu ff you have to 
make it.
Only 1 know what this 
is. I ’m drawing it for 
my daddy to show him 
what book 1 read 
today, (pointing and 
facial gestures).
Nature o f 
Knowing 
SOURCE
Max want to go home, 
that is what is in the 
story and that’s what 1 
think, he goes back 
home.
I f  1 would build a 
snowman 1 would do it 
like the one in the 
story. 1 would make a 
big snowman and a 
little  reindeer. 1 would 
give it eyes, nose, 
forehead, and hair.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
JUSTIFICATION
1 know plants and 
trees grow outside and 
not in the room 
because they don’ t 
grow on the carpet. 
They grow outside 
and outside o f  the 
carpet.
1 don’ t think the forest 
really grew in M ax’ s 
room and that could 
not happen in my 
room because 1 have 
bunk-beds, and 1 am 
on the top because 1 
am the biggest 
between me and my 
sister.
Theme 2: Simple and certain knowledge are more independent. Am y is able to 
independently construet absolutist perspectives o f simple and certain knowledge. For 
example, “ Families do things together, like hug and that’s how you know they love you.’ 
When probed, she shifts to multiplistic levels in her knowledge related to simple and 
certain knowledge. When asked, “ What does your fam ily do that makes you know they 
love you?”  She replied, “ 1 think we do a lot o f things. 1 always give my mommy and
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daddy hugs and kisses in the morning but mostly when 1 go to bed, I ask my mommy to 
read me stories and she does. I always miss my daddy but talk to him lots on the phone. I 
tell him I love him lots too.”
As Amy’s absolutistic perspective becomes increasingly more complex, her ways of 
knowing become increasingly less independent and become more dependent on authority 
(i.e., books, teacher, peers). The most noticeable pattern here is that she begins to repeat 
single words and phrases from a character in the story or echoes things that her peers say. 
For example, when she is asked to compare her family with her friend’s family, she 
begins to repeat a line from the stor>' that day: “ one bear, two bears, three bears 
(laughing).”  At this point, she does not appear to have a conscious understanding o f the 
meaning o f what she has said and is unable to elaborate upon any o f her prior knowledge 
or experiences. Due to her limited understanding and lack o f coherent contributions, she 
becomes animated and disruptive.
Another characteristic presented commonly when Amy conveys simple and certain 
knowledge is her tendency to combine verbal and nonverbal behaviors to emphasize 
meaning. The more simple and certain her knowledge, the more she relies on her verbal 
skills, but as her knowledge becomes more complex and uncertain the amount o f 
nonverbal behaviors increase (i.e., facial expressions to emphasize emotions o f others, 
use o f amis to draw attention to sizes and shapes, behaviors that correspond to her words, 
such as marching in place, acting out climbing, running). When she is no longer 
successful at describing her knowledge using verbal and nonverbal communication, she 
resorts to mimicking her peers.
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When knowledge is complex, she can remain engaged but is dependent on others to 
stay on-topic. However, when knowledge is uncertain, she quickly becomes 
uninterested, disengaged, and disruptive. For example, during a discussion with her peers 
regarding monsters, the discussion shifted to pop culture characters (i.e., transformers and 
ninja turtles) which she is unfamiliar with. She did not even make an attempt to 
participate. She became frustrated and withdrawn from the group to the point she 
requested to leave the activity. Although she is highly motivated by reinforcement, 
attempts to reengage her failed.
Theme 3: Strong peer influence. Her knowledge and understanding is strongly 
influenced by her peers; therefore, she is able to articulate more sound absolutist and 
multiplist perspectives in the whole class instruction and the focus group activities. She 
is less productive and less motivated during individual interviews and center activities 
because these activities require her to be an independent thinker. Amy has d ifficu lty 
concentrating and making associations between prior knowledge and personal experience 
and new information.
Due to the dependence on her peers, her overriding source o f knowledge comes from 
her peers and other external sources (i.e., teacher, parents, books). In a group setting she 
verbalizes her sources o f knowledge more readily without probing than many o f the other 
child-participants. She equates peers as an authority equal to that o f the teacher or her 
parents. Am y frequently asks peers questions about ideas from the story or their 
experiences, and mimics their language and behavior. Amy follows their lead and their 
way o f thinking and making associations. W ith this peer scaffolding she is able to 
construct knowledge that is consistent with the process o f knowing (i.e., source and
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justification). For example, she may correct a peer or build on something one o f her 
peers says by saying; “ my mommy says...,”  “ my teacher d id ...,”  or “ the picture o f the 
three bears in the story had...”  These types o f statements were not typically initiated by 
Am y in an individual or less structured setting.
Although there were source and justification o f knowledge demonstrated during 
individual inter\dews, the source o f knowledge appeared to be internally constructed and 
included pretend associations that were transferred from another peer. For example, “ 1 
want to be just like a princess and wear pretty clothes and walk in high shoes.”  The 
justifications were tangential or unrelated to the topic. For example, when asked about 
the theme winter, she stated, “ I could tell you what my mommy tells be to do in the cold 
but 1 don’t want to.”  “ I think summer is more fun than winter because 1 just do and I am 
not telling you why.”  These attempts at source and justification during individual 
interviews could indicate a transition in developmental ability, or it could be more social 
in nature. Perhaps the researcher did not provide adequate scaffolding or the relationship 
between Amy and the researcher does not meet her emotional needs thus inhibiting her 
ability or motivation to demonstrate her epistemic ability.
Regardless o f the developmental level or the dimension o f knowledge, she has more 
interest and motivation to continue a discussion when there are others involved. When 
she is alone interacting one-on-one with authority (including peers), she disengages more 
rapidly and demonstrates signs o f frustration and cognitive overload. Her coping 
strategies include the following: to become silly, to use echolalia to disrupt the activity, 
and to begin pretending. Her pretend play is egocentric but modeled after things she has 
seen her peers do or say. This pattern is the same in a group or individual setting.
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Theme 4: Dimension o f knowledge associations linked to the stories. Another 
significant influence on Amy’s dimensions o f knowledge are the stories that are read to 
her primarily during whole class instruction, but also she references stories that she 
reports her mother reads to her at home. Amy makes connections between herself and 
characters in the stories she has heard. For example, “ I want to be like Max and be the 
kings o f the wild things.”  She w ill also repeat lines from the story to explain her actions. 
For example, “ I w ill run and leap and have a rumpus.”
When she references excerpts from the book or a character, she is more confident 
about her knowledge and therefore is more interested and engaged. Simple knowledge 
becomes more complex; rather than single words, mimicking peers, or making irrelevant 
phrases, she demonstrates complete thoughts that pertain to the question or part of the 
discussion. For example, she constructs a more complex thought process by saying, “ I 
know why we have a family. It’s like the tree in the story. I t ’s our roots.”  Amy 
acknowledges that some knowledge is certain but other knowledge can be more 
uncertain. For example, ” My mommy teach me it is not good to take things that aren’t 
mine but that girl (pointing) took the bear’s shoes and didn’ t get in trouble, I don’t know 
why she didn’ t. Maybe she was allowed.”  She is more explicit in stating her source of 
knowledge when it is something that she associates with a story. She usually w ill refer to 
the “ story”  or the “book”  in her responses; for example, “ that bridge in the story looks 
like the bridge I was on a long time ago and it was really big.”  Her justification of 
knowledge is more advanced and coherent when she relates new information to a story. 
For example, “ I think Max did the right thing by coming back home and his mommy was
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glad he did because she is smiling in the picture and that means they made up and she 
wasn’t mad at Max no more.”
In terms o f the developmental levels in relationship to her associations toward books, 
there is no observable pattern. She continues to shift from absolutist to multip list ways o f 
knowing. The identifiable feature is that she starts o ff more from an objective 
peispective and probing her knowledge assists her toward more multiplistic thinking.
This is similar to the pattern that is seen when she uses peers as a means o f scaffolding 
her knowledge. The main difference that is observed when she uses the books as 
scaffolds is behavioral. For example, she remains on-task w ith little need for redirection, 
is less disruptive w ith her language and her behavior, and directs quality questions to the 
teacher or researcher as the authority, rather than her peers.
Case Study: Carl
Description
Child-Participant #3 is a three-year-and-11-month old Caucasian male. He is a 
“ boy’s boy”  as his mother describes him. Carl is an unkempt and untidy boy. His hair is 
never combed, and his clothes are typically dirty. He wears them inside-out or 
backwards. He spends a lot o f his time in his pretend or imagined world. Although he 
can respond using his prior knowledge and past experiences, he really chooses to talk 
from his pretend world. This usually revolves around his girlfriend (a cartoon character) 
or embellishing an outrageous event (from a movie or T ’V show) as i f  it had happened to 
him or he was directly involved.
Carl is quiet and shy and keeps to himself. He is not a trouble-maker and follows the 
rules o f the classroom. He does not generally volunteer any information, but i f  he is
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asked a question, he w ill respond in a very soft voice. A ffectively Carl is a bit different 
from his peers. He rarely smiles. His demeanor is serious (uncharacteristically so), and he 
does not have the capacity or tolerance for the s illy  animation o f his peers. His responses 
are direct and intense. For example, there are a few girls in the classroom who can 
become quite playful and giggly in the dramatic play area where he likes to pretend in the 
kitchen. A t one point, his play was interrupted by the girls, and he left the area. When 
questioned why he left, he responded, “ They make me mad, I am really ti-ying to make 
something and all they want to do is make noise. They don’t do things that matter, they 
just making noise.”
Carl attends the preschool three days per week for the fu ll day. When asked what he 
likes best about preschool he replied, “ I t ’s a fun time. We just do stu ff and then I go 
home and do more stuff.”  Since his response was on the vague side, some probing about 
his preschool experiences provided comments such as the follow ing: “ These kids are 
crazy, they are always yelling and screaming,”  “ I think it is boring a lot, I want to go 
outside and be doing stuff,”  and “ I don’ t learn nothing I can know from home stuff.”  His 
mother brings him to school, and their separation is interesting. Mom blows him a kiss, 
and he just runs o ff  to the playground while mom brings his belongings (i.e. lunch, 
change o f clothes, blanket) into the classroom.
Carl gets along well w ith all o f his peers but usually plays w ith the boys. His 
behavior outside on the playground is very different from his inside behavior. Outside he 
is a “ w ild  man,”  again as his mother describes him. Carl is active, energetic, and vibrant 
(i.e., running around, interacting verbally w ith his peers, pretending). On the playground 
he is a leader, and his peers are receptive to his pretend playing. In the classroom he is the
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opposite. He barely moves (i.e. sits very still in one place for a long period o f time), and 
he is calm and quiet. His play inside the classroom is strictly nonverbal (i.e., sound 
effects, body and facial gestures). His only verbal interaction is demonstrated when the 
teacher or an aide asks him a direct question. He w ill share materials and toys with his 
peers but never makes an attempt to engage in verbal exchanges. He simply goes on 
about his playing as i f  no one is around.
During the whole class instruction, Carl sits “ criss-cross applesauce”  and claps with 
the welcome song but does not sing. When it is his turn to say good morning, he does not 
know his classmates’ names; however, he does accept the help from the teacher and 
echoes the name for that day. He sits in the back o f the group and o ff  to the comer so 
that he is away from his peers. Carl is always well behaved during the whole class 
instruction. His attention and eye contact are excellent. Once the story begins he is 
engaged and oblivious to anything else that might be happening (i.e. people coming 
in/out, peers not fo llow ing rules or being disruptive, the camera). Although he does not 
volunteer responses or ask questions, he does indicate understanding o f the story by 
shaking his head or tapping his nose (a technique used by the teacher to cut-down on 
interruptions during the story). In addition, he participates by using several types o f 
nonverbal gesturing (i.e., pointing, motioning with his arms, affective facial expressions) 
that effectively indicate his interest and understanding.
Carl regularly chooses the dramatic play area, manipulatives, or the computer. His 
attitude toward the center activities is consistent with how he manages himself in the 
whole class instruction; he is compliant with the rules and procedures, non- 
eommunicative, and avoidant o f his peers unless they are w illing  to play without verbal
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interactions. For example, he will play alongside his peers in the treasure box (a box of 
sand with coins and other small toys) because it is a quiet activity in which eveiyone is 
sifting through the sand, and he can observe what others are finding. He w ill also play in 
the dramatic play center i f  his peers follow along with his pretend play or i f  his play is 
not changed by what his peers are doing. The duration of his time at a center is directly 
related to the amount o f stimulation at the center; the more stimulation the less likely he 
is to stay at the center. Carl can be found for the longest stretch of time at the computer 
because he is able to work independently; it is not uncommon to see him talking to 
himself while his is engaged in one o f the activities on the computer. The interesting 
thing about Carl is when he exhausts one center he w ill quickly find another center to 
occupy himself. Whereas many o f his peers w ill wander around the room to see what 
others are doing, he rarely is interested in what his peers are doing.
The individual interviews were a great opportunity to understand Carl’s way of 
thinking (i.e., how he makes associations, his sources o f knowledge, preference for 
solitude, serious intensity o f his demeanor). He is quite creative and ingenuous in the 
way he combines his internal imaginary understanding of the external world. He is an 
only child and does not have access to many friends outside o f school. Unlike many of 
the other children who eome to the preschool because at least one o f their parents is 
employed or attends the university, Carl comes to the preschool because he is in the local 
area. His family rents in the local vicinity which is not a typical neighborhood 
environment; there are many college students and transient people who come to the city 
to work. He spends a lot o f time alone playing or watching television. His father works 
10-14 hours a day, and his mother works from home. On the weekends they spend
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quality fam ily time doing outdoor types o f activities (riding motorcycles, four-wheeling, 
camping, hiking) w ith friends, but these friends have children that are older than Carl.
The individual interviews provided a quiet time to probe his often d ifficu lt to 
understand responses during the whole class instruction. Come to find out he is a 
sensitive and passionate individual who is driven by his emotions. Many o f his 
seemingly detached imaginary experiences that he links to the stories evolve from very 
real expectations modeled by his family. Carl is in touch w ith adult-like behaviors and 
concerns (i.e., marriage and relationships, the idea o f working hard to earn money, 
fo llow ing rules and consequences). For example, he says, “ I am going to many Ariel. 
She is my girlfriend, I love her. Just like my daddy loves my mommy, he makes her feel 
special.”  When asked how he knows this he replied, “ 1 just can tell. She smiles, and she 
puts special things in his lunch. 1 am going to do that for Arie l because she is special.”  It 
is never clear i f  he is aware that A rie l is a character from a cartoon, but the point is that 
he uses his imagination to understand other adult-like behaviors, especially in 
relationship to other emotional constructs, such as anger and fear, and adult-like 
characteristics, such as responsibility and expectations. Arguably, he is not fu lly  
cognizant o f the types o f things that he says in a mature adult-like manner, but the 
important point is that the associations he makes are relevant and appropriate.
Carl was in group 2, he was not a big contributor, but he did put forth an effort to 
participate and when he did his ideas were accepted by the group. When he seemed to 
lack understanding o f what was being asked, he would repeat what his peers had said. 
Focus groups were the only context during the study that it was visibly clear that Carl
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was somewhat influenced by his peers. In this format he was a follower, and his 
insecurities surrounding his knowledge were identified.
Table 11: Carl’s Epistemological Matrix
ABSOLUTIST 
Objective view o f 
knowledge
M U LTIPLIST 
Subjective view o f 
knowledge
EV A LU A TIV IS T 
Shift o f objective &  
subjective stance 
when claims are 
evaluated &  
warranted.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
S IM PLIC ITY
That was like the 
monkey in Dora the 
Explorer.
1 seen a real bear once.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
CERTAINTY
W ell, they said 1 had a 
nightmare, but I ’ m not 
sure. It was kind o f 
funny, and I had to 
wake-up while  1 was 
sleeping, (confused 
facial expressions).
1 know that a lot o f cars 
can drive on a bridge or 
else my daddy would 
take us on a bridge.
When we were outside 
and it was hot, 1 watered 
the tomato plants, but 
they still died because 
the sun is too hot for 
them to bake.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
SOURCE
Arie l said she w ill 
marry me, and we can 
have our own family.
1 think me and A rie l 
could go to the forest 
and play w ith the w ild 
things, but we would 
bring presents and they 
would like us better 
than Max.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
JUSTIFICATION
It is bad to take that 
bear’s shoes. I f  they 
knew someone would 
take them then they 
would have locked their 
doors so no one could 
get in.
1 am going to build big 
buildings like this 
(pointing) because 1 am 
going to make a lot o f 
money and have a 
house and car and dirt 
bike. That w ill make 
me rich!
There is no way a tree 
forest can grow in his 
bedroom like that 
(pointing) because look 
(pointing) they have to 
grow outside in the dirt.
Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Fluctuates between absolutist and multiplist. Carl demonstrates the ability 
to move liberally between absolutist and multiplist perspectives o f knowledge. 
Occasionally, he constructs evaluativistic knowledge but not w ith much consistency (See
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Table 11). His knowledge is faeilitated by his capacity for imagination and pretend; 
therefore, many o f his evaluativistic thinking were dismissed because they did not pertain 
to the topic. Unprompted, Carl spontaneously constniets his absolutist and multiplist 
knowledge as simple and certain; however, when he is probed about his knowledge from 
authority or peers, he demonstrates more complex and uncertain dimensions to his 
knowledge. His absolutist views tend to deal with the external world, whereas his 
multiplistic perspectives are typically pretend or imaginaiy ideas. An absolutist certain 
view, for example, relates to his personal experiences, “ snow is freezing eold, once I put 
my face in it.”  A m ultip list certain view includes a pretend experience, “ I have my own 
ear that me and Arie l drive in and I take her on the bridge and we have to pay to drive on 
it, that’ s to pay for the people who run it.”
When asked a question, it was common for Carl to reply with one or two words. For 
example, “ M y mommy;”  “ I t ’s wrong;”  or “ Like him (pointing).”  He almost always 
needs probing from authority or peers to elaborate. However, once he is asked a fo llow - 
up question he responses appropriately and in some detail. His simple knowledge 
responses are generally associated with the book, classroom rules, or personal 
experiences (real and imagined). For example, “ Blaekout is black. I am him and he’s 
blaek;”  or “ when we come inside we have to first wash our hands and then sit in eircle 
time.”  Carl’ s responses are quick and confident. He does not appear to eontemplate his 
thoughts prior to his responses, and once probed he provides a good amount o f detail.
For example, “ I think it beeause one time me and my daddy were fishing and we had 
three poles so then we had to thread them but we didn’ t cateh anything w ith the one pole
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so we used the last pole and the fish really like it and we caught them and cleaned them 
and ate them. We did it all ourself.”
Theme 2: Nature o f  knowledge and source o f knowledge impacted by others. When 
he is in an individual setting, his way o f knowing is primarily absolutist, and he generally 
constructs his knowledge using simple and certain dimensions o f knowledge. His 
responses are sometimes so brie f they arc d ifficu lt to distinguish simple from certain 
knowledge. When his knowledge is probed in an individual setting, he moves to a 
multip list perspective and accesses all four dimensions o f knowledge (i.e. simple, certain, 
souree, justification) with ease. However, he can become verbose by incorporating a 
large amount o f imaginary and pretend knowledge w ithin his multiplistie views. Carl 
does not appear his most comfortable in a one-to-one situation; he does not take a great 
deal o f pleasure in relaying his understanding independently. For example, he remains 
serious w ith a flat affect, his animated side is inhibited, and he waits for the researcher or 
the teacher to initiate the activity or discussion.
Conversely, when he is in a group environment (i.e. whole class instruction, centers, 
focus group), there is less absolutist thinking and far more multiplistic thinking. Again it 
appears to be in a somewhat competitive nature with his peers (i.e. he seems to enjoy 
telling his stories). Also, the multiplistic perspectives appear to be less restricted to the 
nature o f  knowledge and more integrated among the four dimensions o f knowledge. For 
example, his eomfort level includes moving between the dimensions o f knowledge 
without much intentional probing. Also, in peer group situations, he is more inclined to 
ask questions o f his peers that also prompt responses from all four dimensions o f 
knowledge. Additionally, there are hints o f his pretend world but considerably less than
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during individual interview time. There is a sense that he understands that it is less 
socially accepted, and his peers do challenge him on his pretend stories. This peer 
eonfrontation leads him to contribute more authentic experiences that are similar to his 
peers. Therefore, his contributions and associations are realistic and coherent regarding 
his personal experiences w ith family and situations that occur w ith peers in the 
classroom.
Theme 3: Combining verbal and nonverbal epistemologies. Carl’ s initia l responses 
are always verbal only but typieally quite b rie f and require some probing from the 
researcher or the teacher. When he addresses the questions posed to him, he begins an 
elaboration process in whieh he eombines his verbal language w ith nonverbal gestures 
when describing his knowledge. For example, he uses his words but w ill regularly point 
toward whatever he is discussing. He also w ill aet out behaviors and emotions to 
demonstrate meaning in a visual manner. For example, he was describing how he and 
Ariel would go to see the w ild  things and have a party. He jumped up and did a dance 
and pretended to have a w ild  thing on his back. He tw irled around and said “ Hooray!”
Although he has good verbal skills, he communicates his way o f knowing by using a 
combination o f verbal and nonverbal skills. For example, his affect is normally flat and 
serious, but often when his knowledge is questioned or probed, he has a way o f using 
faeial expressions that add an affective component to his way o f knowing information. 
Also, he uses body gestures to emphasize specific components o f his knowledge. 
Interestingly, he seems to use this type o f communication to construct knowledge when 
he is elaborating about his personal experiences and pretend situations and while talking 
about his family.
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Theme 4: Justification o f knowledge at an absolute level versus a multiplist level. 
Carl’s justifications for knowledge, at the absolutist level o f development, include 
responses that are more linked to the story or the theme of the week (from a peer). For 
example, he w ill use what he hears during whole class instruction or the focus groups to 
clarify his thinking; . .because it was in the story. Max did a bad thing and got into 
trouble by his mommy;”  or “ ...because it ’s like we talked about getting dressed right for 
the cold weather, i f  we don’t has hats and mittens we can get a cold and sick.”
When Carl demonstrates justification o f knowledge at a multiplist level o f 
development, he references his own experiences or conceptions related to his family. 
Both domains (i.e. his experience or family) include more animation and affect from him 
during his descriptions. For example he stands up from the sitting position and says, “ I 
think we don’t touch other people’s food because when I take the food out o f my dog’s
dish it can make me sick and throw-up.”  He goes on to describe how he feels when he 
gets sick to his stomach; the whole time he is telling this scenario he is using a variety o f 
facial expressions and body gestures. At the end he says, “ I think I w ill only eat the food 
on my plates because 1 can’t play when I am sick and I don’t want to either.”
Case Study: GiGi
Description
Child-Participant #4 is a four-year-one-month-old Caucasian female. She attends the 
preschool five days per week for a full day. GiGi is dropped o ff at school by her father 
and, on a rare occasion, her mother. She is a light-hearted individual who makes 
everything about the chore of coming to school appear easy. She is bright and cheerful, 
and she is always smiling. The interesting observation about GiGi is that she is not
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drawn to one or two o f her peers; she plays well w ith all o f her peers. Her behavior and 
her disposition are extremely consistent from day-to-day and context-to-context. When 
her father drops her o ff at preschool, she knows just what to do and directs her father on 
what he needs to do, what she is doing, and where she is going (i.e., “ Daddy you put the 
bag in my cubby and I am going to see Mr. I.”  or “ I am going potty, you wait for me 
here and we can walk to the playground together.” ).
GiGi always appears well rested and alert. She is resilient and adapts to change well. 
For example, the preschool classroom can be unpredictable, and she is cognitively and 
emotionally equipped and prepared for whatever is going on that day. She is dressed 
nicely in colorful clothes that are clean and neatly pressed. Her hair is combed and 
pulled back away from her face. When she has barrettes in her hair, they match her outfit. 
When others comment on her appearance, she appropriately thanks them and reciprocates 
the compliment. GiGi is compassionate and genuine in her interactions with others.
When asked what she likes most about coming to preschool, she replied, “ 1 get to play 
w ith my friend, I love Mr. 1, and we do lots o f fun things when we learn.”
W hile observing her interactions with both o f her parents, they appear to be very 
affectionate (i.e. always saying, “ I love you”  or “ how was your day?” ) and attentive to 
her needs. She has a gentle way about her, but she is very articulate and straightforward 
with her language. GiGi is aware o f her suiToundings and oriented to the rules around 
her. She has a good moral compass in which she can confront her peers about their 
inappropriate behaviors. For example she says, “ You’ re not being very nice, i t ’s not hard 
to share.”  “ We are supposed to be quiet and wait for Mr. I to get started.”  Her peers are 
receptive to her direction and her ideas. She has the ability to interact and respond in a
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pretend manner but typically approaches things as they appear to her external reality 
according to the rules. She was never a behavior problem. She raises her hand to talk and 
uses her prior knowledge and past experiences to contribute in a relevant manner.
During whole elass instaiction, she independently prepares herself for the story. GiGi 
is very proud o f her knowledge about the rules and procedures o f the classroom. She has 
good eye contact; her affect and disposition are vibrant and receptive to listening and 
watching. She regularly participates in the welcome song and the question and answer 
session led by the teacher. She avoids any negative behavior from her peers and, in fact, 
is a positive influence on her peers. When she participates during the whole class 
instruction, she uses her words to articulate her thoughts and ideas rather than nonverbal 
gestures as a way to convey meaning.
The center activities allow her more freedom; however, she continues to fo llow  the 
rules and procedures. Most days she w ill choose her own center, but on some occasions 
she waits until everyone has chosen and allows the teacher to place her in a center. GiGi 
likes all o f the centers and does not appear to have a favorite; her behavior is consistent 
no matter what center she is in. She is quiet and works independently; her only 
interaction with her peers during this time is to give them direction about their behavior 
or the details o f the task. For the most part she is engaged in her center, but i f  she is has 
to wait for her turn or wait for the teacher, she w ill discretely observe the activities o f her 
peers in a close proxim ity to where she is located. She can get back to focusing on her 
activity whereas many o f the children are easily distracted by their peers.
During the individual interviews she was eager to please the researcher (i.e., leaving 
her center voluntarily, attempting to answer all the questions, never needing any rewards
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for her participation). GiGi was easy to engage in the activities and/or questions; she was 
inquisitive about the project and asked excellent questions about her involvement in the 
projeet. She made insightful eomparison between her behavior and the behavior o f her 
peers. For example, “ I bet I am the best one. I never cry or run out.”  “ I like doing this 
because we talk more about the story and I get to see the pictures again.”  “ We are doing 
this because you want to see how much we know about what we are learning.”
The individual interviews allowed another side o f her to shine; she showed more of 
her ability to tap into a pretend world. GiGi demonstrated a child-like animated 
disposition, and her favorite phrase was, “ 1 am so silly.”  When she was not completely 
sure what was being asked or how she needed to answer, she would make tangential 
statements about television shows, toys, and her personal experiences, but they were not 
always relevant to the question or the topic. She appeared to be relaxed and laughed at 
her comments, particularly when she was aware they were not relevant. In addition, she 
demonstrated more nonverbal body gestures to assist her verbal descriptions; this 
prompted a bit more psychomotor activity (i.e., moving around the room, flailing her 
arms and legs) and confused expressions (scowling, poor eye contact, talking more 
softly).
GiGi’s behavior and contributions in the focus groups mirrored the individual 
interviews much more than the whole class instruction and the center activities. Again, 
she was more animated, still engaged and articulate but sometimes silly and off-topic.
She seemed to enjoy this interaction with her peers more than the other contexts. She 
was still a bit authoritative but not with the consistency or intensity observed in the other 
contexts. Here she was more affected by peer’s negativity, primarily when the
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researcher’s questions required more cognitive ability or were more cognitively 
demanding. She continued to be well-behaved and on-task but certainly more animated 
and playful w ith her peers.
GiGi was in Group 1; her involvement w ith this group was interesting in that she was 
frequently tom between matching her ability with the more articulate boy or diminishing 
her behavioral capacity to match the more disruptive girl in the group. The more 
consistent pattern regarding her decisions about the group involvement revolved around 
her prior knowledge and past experiences that she could associate with the different 
topics. Her cognitive, affective, and behavior contributions during the focus groups are 
thought to also be related to her ab ility to understand what the researcher was asking and 
the ease with which she could understand what her peers were contributing. Therefore, 
the greater her associations were for the topic or relating to her peers, the more she 
demonstrated her cognitive abilities; however, when she failed to make meaning from her 
peers or could not interpret the researcher’s questions, she opted to demonstrate 
inconsistent behaviors that bordered on disruptive at times.
Epistemic Themes
Theme I :  M ultip list level o f development. G iGi demonstrated her knowledge 
according the epistemological matrix at all three developmental levels and all four 
dimensions o f knowledge (See Table 12).
Overall G iG i’s views o f knowledge appear to be at a multiplistic level o f 
development. Her ability to communicate her knowledge was more content specific than 
dependent on the context. Specifieally, she demonstrated more versatility in her ability to 
shift between dimensions and levels o f development i f  she had more prior knowledge or
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personal experiences regarding the topic (i.e. monsters, winter, construction, family). For 
example, she was able to demonstrate the complexities o f her knowledge while talking 
about the monsters and fam ily themes o f the week as compared to her inability to show 
the same levels and dimensions during the weeks when winter and construction were 
covered.
Her knowledge was much less affected by the type o f setting she was in (i.e., whole 
class instruction, individual interview, focus group). For example, on the topics that she 
conveyed her knowledge more thoroughly (i.e., monsters and family), there was little 
difference between how she responded in a group setting versus how she responded 
individually. When she had a greater understanding o f the content, the context did not 
negatively or positively impact her ability. When she was unfamiliar about the topic (i.e., 
winter and construction), it was clear in her contributions that she had limited background 
knowledge and personal experience. When this was the case, GiGi functioned better 
w ithin a group environment (i.e., whole class instruction, focus groups). For example, 
during an individual interview about construction, she did not independently reference 
the story that had been read earlier; she quickly gave up and said, “ I don’ t know.”  Once 
the researcher prompted her with a picture in the story, she attempted to make 
associations but due to the lack o f prior knowledge she responded, “ Well looks like that 
big truck is making the building fall down. I ’m not sure, I don’t know, I don’t know.”
On the same topic (construction) in the focus group she was not as inclined to give up 
and she shared her knowledge and understanding. For example, she listened to her peers 
talk about how the “ big machines”  are used to “ help men make the building bigger.”
Then the same question that was asked in the individual interview, “ Look at this picture.
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Can you tell me what is happening that makes this construction?”  GiGi replied, “ I am 
not so sure about astruction, it ’ s a weird word but A said the big trucks put the building 
together and up (pointing), so I would say astruction here is that (pointing to the machine) 
helping them (pointing to the men).”  It appears that more self-efficacy to build 
knowledge exists in group formats for GiGi.
Another obseiwation that began to emerge as a developmental pattern was more 
noticeable as she shifted between developmental levels rather than between dimensions 
o f knowledge. There was however a pattern for the dimensions o f knowledge at the 
multiplist level. There were two characteristics that were identified as she communicated 
her knowledge: (a) her choice o f communication (i.e., verbal, nonverbal, combination), 
and (b) the amount o f affect used to demonstrate her knowledge. A t the absolutist level 
o f development, she only used her words to show her knowledge and used less affect and 
emotion (i.e., animation, facial expression, body gestures). A t the multiplist level, she 
integrated verbal and nonverbal expressions in which her affect and emotions 
corresponded appropriately with what she was saying and doing. There was an affective 
pattern that became clear throughout the study (reported in the next paragraph). A t the 
evaluativist level, she combined her verbal description with less eonsistent nonverbal 
behaviors, and the combination o f words and gestures appeared to be fragmented and not 
necessarily in-line (i.e., inappropriate or naïve understanding).
The multiplist level o f development was where GiGi functioned from most 
frequently. There was a distinctive affective pattern that developed at the multiplist level 
in relationship to the nature o f knowledge (simple, certain) and the process o f knowing 
(source, justification). M ultip list simple and certain knowledge and multiplist
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justification o f knowledge were affectively consistent; that is her words matched her 
disposition. For example, “ 1 am excited that we are going to talk about this story. 1 really 
liked it. The pictures are colored nice and 1 like the w ild things. They don’t scare me 
because I know it is just pretend.”  Her affect was bright and cheerful; she was smiling 
and confident with good eye contact. She demonstrated many body gestures consistent 
w ith a positive accepting attitude and excitement. However, at a m ultiplist source o f 
knowledge, she was seemingly more confused about the questions, as well as her 
answers. It appeared to be a struggle between internal and external sources o f knowledge 
and, regardless o f the source, her affective disposition was inconsistent with her 
responses. For example, when the question was, “ How do you know the dogs in the story 
are mean?” , she made eye contact w ith the researcher, paused for about 15 seconds, then 
looked at the floor during her response, “ I have two dogs and I think they are nicer than 
those dogs (pointing). I have B &  L and I love them and they love me back.”  Typically 
when bringing up “ love”  she would hug herself or smile; in the case o f multip list source 
o f knowledge her affect and emotional gestures were completely inconsistent. Her voice 
became softer, she did not appear confident or enthusiastie, and she demonstrated a 
neiwous psychomotor agitation (i.e., picking at her shoelaces, twisting her hair), rather 
than behaviors that complemented her knowledge.
Theme 2: Knowledge is complex and uncertain. Regardless o f the level o f 
development, G iGi expressed her knowledge most commonly in terms o f the nature o f 
knowledge (simple and certain). This theme appeared to be strongly conneeted to her 
fam iliarity with a topic. When she had limited knowledge and experience (as discussed 
in theme 1 with group versus individual), she demonstrated knowledge as simple and
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uncertain. However, the more background knowledge and past experience she seemed to 
have about a topic, her knowledge was interpreted as more complex and certain.
Although the more her knowledge was probed, she maintained the complexities o f her 
knowledge but shifted to a more uncertain perspective o f knowledge. Interestingly, when 
the simple and certain dimensions were questioned in more depth to uncover the process 
o f knowing dimensions, she was able to link simple and certain knowledge with 
justification but rarely source o f knowledge, The example about the dogs used above to 
demonstrate inconsistencies with affect would demonstrate this well too.
Theme 3: Source o f knowledge weakness. Source o f knowledge appears as a 
weakness in every visible pattern that emerged for G iG i; therefore, it is a theme all o f its 
own. Her lack o f ability to demonstrate source o f knowledge related to the follow ing 
areas: background knowledge and personal experience (theme 1 and 2), affective patterns 
(theme 1), and absence o f links to the nature o f knowledge (theme 2). Her responses to 
source o f knowledge probing met with many negative cognitive features that are 
consistent w ith overload, such as confused expressions, decrease o f interest and 
motivation, disengagement leading to disruptive behaviors, visible frustration (i.e., hands 
over face, poking the pencil into her leg, walking away), and nervous/anxious behaviors 
(i.e., biting her hand, twisting hair, darting eyes).
I f  a source o f knowledge question was related to a story that was read in whole class 
instruction, she was able to identify it as the source o f her knowledge. However, when 
follow-up questions that targeted source o f knowledge specifically and were in 
relationship to a previous statement, she was prim arily nonverbal (i.e., shrugging
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shoulders, closed eyes, made some s illy  facial expression). On occasion she might say “ I 
don’t know” , but that was not a standard answer.
Table 12: G iG i’s Epistemological Matrix
ABSOLUTIST 
Objective view o f 
knowledge
M ULTIPLIST 
Subjective view o f 
knowledge
E V A LU A TIV IS T  
Shift o f objective &  
subjective stance 
when claims are 
evaluated &  
warranted.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
SIM PLIC ITY
No, you can only wear 
your bathing suit when 
you go swimming, and 
you don’t go swimming 
in the winter.
1 am not your friend, 1 
am friends w ith Robin, 1 
like her.
I f  you go away from your 
mommy and daddy, 
strangers can come and get 
you. But sometimes 1 get 
scared because 1 think 1 
don’ t want to be taken 
away from my mommy 
and daddy. They make me 
safe.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
CERTAINTY
They are hiding from 
their mommy and they 
are hiding in the snow 
(pointing).
1 wear a hat and mittens 
when it is winter so 1 
stay warm and 1 don’t 
get sick. I f  1 get sick 
then 1 don’ t want to take 
my medicine, YU C K!
No silly , flowers and trees 
can’ t grow inside because 
they need to grow big and 
tall like me. See 1 am big 
and tall (compares herself 
to a smaller peer).
Nature o f 
Knowing 
SOURCE
In the story his mommy 
said ‘ go to sleep M ax.’ 
(Adds affect in tone and 
body.)
1 have two dogs and 1 
think they are nicer than 
those dogs (pointing). 1 
have B and L and 1 love 
them and they love me 
back.
Max had a boat outside his 
w indow in his imagination; 
he wanted it so he made it 
up. He wanted it because 
he wanted it to go to see 
his friends, the W T ’s .
L ike 1 have friends but 1 
don’ t want to take a boat to 
sec them, 1 pretend 1 drive 
my car.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
JUSTIFICATION
Sometimes you have to 
wear your coat because 
it is cold, like in the 
w inter it is cold and 1 
wear my coat.
1 like to sing the hello 
song because 1 know all 
o f the k id ’s names. You 
have to watch me do it, 
sometime 1 want you to 
see how 1 know all the 
names.
1 am making a monster to 
look like the W T ’s and 1 
am going to name it J like 
my sister and it is going to 
be so scary but you w on’ t 
even know it is scary 
because then you w on’ t 
like it.
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Theme 4: Linking the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. GiGi is an 
independent thinker and a leader of her peers. Many o f the themes presented included 
responses that were eonstructed due to follow-up questions and probing by the 
researcher. This theme deals with patterns that GiGi presented independently within the 
daily activities o f the classroom and spontaneous interactions with the teacher, peers, or 
the researcher. Her spontaneous statements followed the same general pattern as the 
probed responses; that is she automatically linked the nature o f knowledge and the 
process of knowing in similar ways whether her knowledge was probed or not. The most 
common links between GiGi’s understanding of knowledge from a dimensions 
perspective were between the following: (a) simple and certain, (b) simple and 
justification, and (c) certain and justification. Again, the source of knowledge is absent 
even when her knowledge is not intentionally probed. Perhaps her interactions with peers 
automatically prompt her knowledge in much the same way as with the researcher’s 
probing questions. It is important to note that the amount of interactions and statements 
for the automatic connections are much less than the probing exchanges, however the 
trend was the same. She continually demonstrated that she linked new information to her 
prior knowledge and past experience by making associations. The associations she relies 
on are the same despite the setting (i.e. constructed probe or spontaneous interaction). 
They are family, classroom rules, peers, and characters in the story. These areas are her 
most common connections to new information and are more accentuated in a group 
setting.
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Case Study: Trudy
Description
Child-Participant # 5 is a three-year-eleven-month-old Caucasian female. Trudy 
attends the preschool three days per week and is escorted by her mother, who is very 
involved in what is going on in the Cricket classroom. Their relationship and routine 
appears to very business-like. Trudy’s mother talks with the teacher daily when she 
drops Trudy o ff and again when she picks her up. Trudy’s mother helps the teacher with 
organizing parties and special events at the school and regularly brings supplies for the 
children to work and play with during their center activities. Trudy is an empowered 
young lady who speaks clearly and directly in a matter-of-fact manner. When asked what 
her favorite thing about preschool is, she replied; “ 1 think it’s getting ready to go and 
wearing my pretty clothes and listening to the stories.”
Trudy is alert and well prepared for the day. She is always dressed impeccably in a 
nice dress and matching shoes. Her hair is always curled and pulled back with matching 
ribbons. She is very dainty and likes to compare herself to a “princess.”  She has a good 
balance between her pretend and real worlds. She has a knack for integrating the two 
(i.e. real and pretend) in her interactions with others. Her statements are generally 
relevant and on-task, but she makes associations to pretend situations, mainly in 
conjunction with what a princess would do. Trudy is eager to please authority and peers; 
she is not confrontational and plays well with all o f her peers. When there is a disruption 
or someone is behaving inappropriately, she quietly removes herself from the situation. 
She is never a behavior problem and does not require redirection; she knows the rules and 
procedures and acts accordingly. She is proud o f her good behavior and ability to follow
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rules. For example, she frequently makes statements such as “ Look, I am being good. I ’m 
sitting here waiting for my turn.”  “ They are not being good, look at me, I am being good, 
1 washed my hands before snack.”  “ I am just like a princess and I know what to do to be 
good and fo llow  what Mr. I said.”
During whole class instruction Trudy participates appropriately in the welcome song. 
She knows all o f her peer’s names and helps others by telling them the names. She sits 
right next to the teacher for the story; she clings to every word and focuses on every 
picture. Sometimes she w ill stop the teacher and ask a question, but she raises her hand 
first. When the teacher asks questions before, during, or after the story, she volunteers 
spontaneously. Her responses are relevant, but she incorporates her imaginary 
associations with being a princess. For example, “ I know a princess doesn’ t want to take 
those bear’s shoes and I wouldn’t take them because they aren’t mine and you should do 
that.”  She is excited about her responses, smiling and using minimal nonverbal gestures 
to get her meaning across.
During the center activities Trudy chooses art or journal. She is conscientious about 
her work and handles it w ith care as she shows the teacher. She is enthusiastic about 
telling her projects and promptly places them in her cubby to take home. She has no 
d ifficu lty  engaging in a variety o f activities and seldom is distracted by her peers. In fact, 
she appears to be in her own world and w ill sing and dance while she is working. Trudy 
talks to the characters she is drawing and has pretend conversations. When asked about 
her pretend play, she is happy to explain the details from an affective point-of-view. For 
example, “ I am drawing cuddly bear and he said he wants to wear a blue shirt because 
princesses like blue. They are going to a festival and have a nice time eating and
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playing.”  She does not engage in spontaneous interactions with her peers during this 
time unless it is to share materials. She is respectful o f others’ space and their work. 
When she chooses to switch centers, she tells the teacher where she is moving to and 
what she w ill be doing there. She is patient with her peers. When she changes centers, 
she is careful not to disrupt the activity and w ill observe for a minute to figure out what is 
happening and how she can blend in.
Trudy’s participation in the individual interviews was similar to other contexts; she 
was quiet but compliant w ith the researcher. She is w illing  to please and frequently 
would confirm “ I am going to be good today.”  She is able to fo llow  rules and listens 
carefully to what is being asked; it is common for her to pause to think before she 
responds to a question. When she does not understand, she either asks a question or uses 
a standard “ princess”  response. She is bright and cheerful although not nearly as 
animated as many o f her peers. She leans more to a serious disposition. Her defense 
mechanism for not understanding is her pretend scenarios rather than laughing, getting 
agitated, or being disruptive. Trudy is somewhat motivated by rewards but more often 
just seeks praise for her work. During the interviews, she demonstrated her curious 
nature by asking questions and talking about her personal experiences, primarily 
involving her family.
Trudy was in group 2 for the focus groups; she was the most articulate child in her 
group and regularly demonstrated her ability to be a leader. The interesting dynamic 
about her involvement in the group was that there was a boy who could match her 
tendency for the imagined world, and they developed a unique way o f interacting while at 
the same time staying close to the topic in terms o f generalities. They both seemed to
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have a passion for seeing things through fairytales, some o f which they had heard or 
some they created. They interacted from an emotional perspective (i.e., love, fear, anger) 
and had a good understanding o f rules that they fall back on. This sense o f rules kept 
them and their pretend world centered on the topic. She would try to engage the other 
member o f their group; however, this was a d ifficu lt task and she often would give up 
and proceed as i f  he was not there even i f  he was disruptive.
Trudy seemed to enjoy the focus groups, but perhaps the personalities and talents o f 
the group never seemed to build a cohesive bond because o f the differences in their 
language ability and interests. Despite the disconnectedness o f the group, Taidy still 
managed to build on what others in the group said and tried very hard to make the group 
a positive experience. Another interesting characteristic which she demonstrated 
regularly after the focus groups was to offer a summary o f what they had discussed. She 
appeared to always want to recap the discussion so she could evaluate i f  it was “ good”  or 
“ bad.”
Epistemic Themes
Theme! : Fluctuates between absolutist and multiplist level o f  development. This 
developmental pattern is one that has been seen in other child-participants in this study. 
Trudy fluctuates between absolutist and m ultiplist levels o f development and sporadically 
constructs knowledge that is evaluativistic-like, in that the process o f integrating 
objective and subjective knowledge is present but the content is at the cognitive 
sophistication o f a preschool-age child (See Table 13). A t the absolute and multiplist 
level, she is able to construct knowledge according to all four dimensions o f knowledge. 
A t the evaluativist level o f development (like others in the study), she exhibited one
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dimension o f the nature o f knowledge (certain) and one dimension o f the process o f 
knowing (justification). Again, there was an absence or weakness in the area o f source o f 
knowledge.
Trudy was eager to express her knowledge and did so regardless o f the developmental 
level or dimension o f knowledge. A t the absolutist level, she initiated her ideas more 
independently and used a combination o f verbal and nonverbal behavior. She frequently 
compared characters in the story to being a princess. For example she pointed out the 
similarities and differences between the w ild  things and a princess. She fluttered her eye, 
gracefully held her arms extended, and flipped her hair back to assist her representation 
o f a princess. On the other hand, when she was describing the w ild  things, she crunched 
her shoulders up to her chin, put a scowl on her face, and lowered the tone o f her voice. 
This pattern was predominantly during individual interviews, in which she stayed close to 
the topics and dealt more with objective knowledge.
She demonstrated similar verbal/nonverbal patterns at the multiplist level o f 
development. Although she did derive knowledge independently at a multiplist level, it 
was more related to interactions with her peers during group situations. She was 
observant and could shift w ith the flow  o f the discussion. It appeared that the majority o f 
her multiplistic knowledge was in support o f a previous contribution, and she 
incorporated her personal experiences with her imaginary experiences as she saw them 
relating to the discussion. The content o f her imaginary understanding was different at 
the multiplist level; she ventured away from external sources (i.e., fact, rules, procedures) 
and placed herself in the experiences (i.e. internal source o f knowledge). However, 
regardless o f her pretend ways, her knowledge was relevant to the topic, coherent, and
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creative. For example, ‘T know when I am a princess the constaiction people w ill build 
me a big palace to live in and I w ill give them snacks so they have energy to keep 
working and I w ill let them have music because I want them to do a good job and be safe 
at my palace.”
Interestingly, Trudy used her imagination at the absolutist and multiplist levels o f 
development. However, she never explicitly acknowledged real versus pretend at the 
absolutist level but when she was functioning at the multiplist level she regularly pointed 
out that she was aware the two realities are different. For example, “ 1 am making a 
princess going to a big party. Like when I pretend I am a real princess and I dress-up. 
That’s when I put on a pretend dress but it is a real dress and I pretend it is beautiful.”  
This pattern has also been seen w ith other child-participants in this study and seems to be 
an egocentric subjectivity laced with objective knowledge but not as refined as at an 
evaluativistic perspective due to the internal and imaginary nature o f the knowledge.
Theme 2: Certainty o f  knowledge and personal experience. Trudy demonstrated a 
developed understanding from a certainty o f knowledge perspective which was seen at all 
three developmental levels. She emphasized her certainty o f knowledge using her 
personal experiences and never appeared to be at a loss for ways to verbally describe her 
certainty or uncertainty (i.e., “ Sometimes,”  “ 1 can’t be sure,”  “ You never know,”  “ I don’ t 
know but my mommy does” ). She elaborated independently or w ith probing. It is a 
dimension o f knowledge that she always seemed to understand what was being asked.
For example, from an absolutist level, she understood that there are classroom rules and 
procedures that must be followed daily; however, she verbalized that these same rules 
and procedures vary when there is a special occasion or a holiday.
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M ultip lis tic  certainty o f knowledge was demonstrated frequently as she described the 
differences between what she does “ for real”  and what she does “ for pretend.”  Even 
though she showed hints o f egocentrism at the multiplist level, her understanding o f 
others, in relationship to herself, seemed to exceed the expectations o f classical 
egocentrism. For example, “ 1 think 1 want to wear beautiful dresses and go see the w ild 
things that way they w ill know I am special and they would not hurt me. I f  1 have a 
beautiful dress 1 don’ t need to be a scared o f them but I know A won’ t want to wear a 
dress he would look s illy so he would have to think o f some way to make them not as 
scary.”
Theme 3: Patterns fo r  source o f  knowledge. Trudy has some characteristic and not 
so characteristic traits regarding the source o f knowledge. There were four dominant 
qualities regarding Trudy’s expressions for source o f knowledge: (a) Clearly her source 
o f knowledge was internal, and she seemed to be in touch with the internal nature, at least 
o f her imaginary knowledge; (b) she used the stories as a source and related characters 
and events from the story to her personal experiences; (c) she did not refer to her peers as 
any source o f authority, nor did she defer questions to her peers, and she docs not mimic 
their language or behaviors that could be construed as peers as a source o f knowledge; 
and (d) she used her knowledge o f the rules in the classroom and at home as her sources 
but, when asked explicitly, she did not identify a source, such as the teacher.
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Table 13: Trudy’s Epistemological Matrix
ABSOLUTIST 
Objective view o f 
knowledge
M ULTIPLIST 
Subjective view o f 
knowledge
EV A LU A TIV IS T  
Shift o f objective &  
subjective stance 
when claims are 
evaluated &  
warranted.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
SIM PLICITY
Now, that's two 
snails. They move 
slow. And Crickets 
tiiey move really slow 
too. Not our class. 
We move last but we 
are really fast. We are 
not real Crickets. We 
they go really slow, 
like this (gesture).
1 learned that everyone 
don’ t hit each other and 
keep my body safe. My 
knowledge is 1 think in 
my head.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
CERTAINTY
You get punished i f  
you're bad. 
Sometimes you can 
get punished when 
you don't know.
1 am making a princess 
going to a big party. 
Like when 1 pretend ! 
am a real princess and I 
dress-up. That’s when 1 
put on a pretend dress, 
but it is a real dress and 
1 pretend it is beautiful 
(gesture).
Sometimes the bears 
should be in trouble for not 
listening to the mom but 
sometimes it is different. 
Sometimes 1 have to listen 
to my mommy and 
sometimes I have to do my 
daddy's way beeause 1 
don't want to get in trouble 
but it is different.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
SOURCE
M y mommy knows 
how to dress in the 
winter. She makes me 
wear a coal and a hat 
and mittens.
1 know everything that’s 
about penguins. I 
watched penguins at the 
zoo, so I know they live 
in the cold, like bears do 
too.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
JUSTIFICATION
Those monsters 
(points to book) are 
scary because they are 
scary and ugly. They 
are growling their 
teeth and they have 
big bugging eyes.
1 like to dress-up like a 
princess because my 
mommy and daddy 
think I'm  so pretty and 
then 1 feel pretty and 
beautiful.
1 think the mom should be 
different beeause i f  he’ s 
(Max) so bad and hurts her 
ears then she could have 
walked him right up to his 
room. That’ s what my 
mommy w'ould do to me.
Theme 4: Absolute justifica tion o f  knowledge requires probing. Another pattern that 
developed throughout the course o f the study was Trudy’s d ifficu lty  w ith absolute 
justification o f knowledge, both during individual and group situations. She was 
typically quick to initiate a topic and put her knowledge front and center. However, a
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reoccurring deficit was in the lack o f spontaneity to be able to respond to intentional 
follow-up questions designed to probe this cell o f the matrix. When probed repeatedly 
w ith questions constructed specifically using her words to probe this type o f 
understanding, she was able to demonstrate her ability to construct absolute justification 
o f knowledge. For example, most o f her absolute simple knowledge was linked to rules 
and procedures; she knows the rules etc. but had no immediate understanding o f why the 
rules are good from an objective perspective; therefore she resorted to making subjective 
claims about her knowledge (i.e. multip list justification).
It was suspected that this pattern is a negative effect o f pretending beeause she has a 
strategy where everything filters through her imaginary world in which things can be 
manipulated. Since she was always interested in “ being good”  and staying “ out o f 
trouble,”  she was able to manipulate the realities o f the objective nature o f the rules 
because they did not apply to her. This rationale was tested during a focus group. There 
was a hypothetical situation in which the child was resistant to fo llow ing the rules in the 
classroom. Then questions were asked as a means to scaffold absolute justification o f 
knowledge responses. Questions were as follows: “ What are the rules in the classroom?” 
“ What do you think should happen to the child?”  and “ Why are the rules so important?”  
She adapted to the nature o f the questions, and what ultimately resulted was that she 
accommodated her understanding o f the information based on her existing knowledge. 
The change was how she interpreted the rules as they became more subjective and 
gradually honed in on a very specific way o f knowing.
Her overt lack o f understanding for the rules that she follows each day was surprising 
because tapping absolute justification was so prevalent w ith many o f the other children in
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the study. It was a puzzle at first and became a challenge. Looking at knowledge through 
her ways o f knowing highlighted the importance o f the link between absolute simple 
knowledge and absolute justification o f knowledge. Due to the nature o f the study, it 
was possible to attempt to identify potential reasons for the gap as well as some potential 
solutions.
Case Study: Jeremy
Description
Child-Participant #6 is a four-year-one-month-old male who attends the preschool 
three days per week for the fu ll day. Jeremy’ s parents are divorced, and he lives w ith his 
father and two older brothers. He rarely visits his mother. His dad brings him to 
preschool, and it is very rushed. He walks Jeremy to the corner o f the building and pats 
him on the head and says, “ Be good.”  Jeremy is quiet; he seems to play well with his 
peers but does not communicate verbally. He is quite shy and has extremely poor eye 
contact; he is usually looking down at the ground. When someone in authority interacts 
w ith him, he w ill respond, but his voice is soft to the point that it is d ifficu lt to hear or 
understand what he is saying. When he is asked to repeat what he said, he barely speaks; 
he needs to be directed to look up and speak louder, which he does on occasion when 
redirected.
When asked what he likes most about coming to preschool, he replied, “ I don’t ! ”  
Trying to make light o f his comment and attempting to give him a second chance, the 
question was asked again; he replied, “ the toys.”  When asked which toys he liked best, 
his reply was nearly nonverbal, “ them”  as he pointed to the dramatic play area. His 
reaction to the individual attention was a surprise because he did very well on the
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prescreening assessments for receptive and expressive language and cognitive ability, and 
he passed the false-belief task. Despite the conflicting impressions between the 
observations o f him w ithin the classroom context and his assessment scores, Jeremy 
seemed like a desirable candidate for the study.
During the whole class instruction, his behavior was always appropriate. Jeremy 
would come in from outside, promptly wash his hands, and sit in the circle quietly 
waiting for the story to begin. Although he was one to fo llow  all o f the social and 
behavioral rules, he was not one to fo llow  the procedures. For example, Jeremy never 
once participated on the good morning welcome song. While everyone else was clapping 
and singing, he was pulling on his shoelace, staring outside, or lying on the floor 
practically asleep. Interestingly, Jeremy was not a behavior problem, so neither the 
teacher nor any o f the aides ever attempted to engage him during the course o f the study. 
He would usually sit o f f  to the side or in the very back o f the circle. He vacillated from 
day-to-day in terms o f looking at the pictures during the story and actually sitting with his 
back to the teachers and his peers. Again, when he had his back turned, no one ever 
addressed his behavior. Occasionally, on days when Jeremy was paying attention and 
appeared to be more alert, the teacher would ask him questions about the story; however, 
he would speak so softly that no one could hear him, and the teacher would say, “ Thank 
you Jeremy. That’s ver>' interesting.”
During the individual interview activities, it was quickly noticeable that for the 
purpose o f the study that these sessions would be for relationship building more so than 
identifying epistemologies. First, he never made any contributions during the whole class 
instruction, so there was no individual questioning to construct for him personally.
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However, some attempts were made to ask follow-up questions about what his peers or 
the teacher had said.
Epistemic Themes
Table 14: Jeremy’s Epistemological Matrix
ABSOLUTIST 
Objective view o f 
knowledge
M ULTIPLIST 
Subjective view o f 
knowledge
EVALU ATIV IST 
Shift o f objective &  
subjective stance 
when claims are 
evaluated &  
warranted.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
S IM PLICITY
Yes, no w ild  things. Look, that momma bear 
is hugging the baby 
bears. I like hugs, my 
daddy gives me hugs too.
Nature o f 
Knowledge 
CERTAINTY
We have to get ready 
for the story first and to 
get ready for the story 
you sit like this 
(gesture).
1 am afraid o f monsters 
but Max has them as 
friend but not me. M y 
mommy keeps me not be 
scared.
When you don’ t follow 
the right way, you get 
lost because once 1 go 
lost and it was no fun. 
The bears maybe have 
fun getting lost because 
they know about the 
forest.
Nature o f 
Knowing 
SOURCE
Some o f  them are 
purple and some o f 
them are green but 
some are black 
(pointing). Look can 
you see, they are like 
Transformers.
I like the w ild thing 
monsters (pointing) but 1 
am afraid o f monsters so 
I would run real fast. M y 
mommy says there is no 
monsters (emotion).
Nature o f 
Knowing 
JUSTIFICATION
Those bears w ill get in 
trouble because they 
ran from the momma 
bear and she w ill be 
mad and them bears 
w ill be in big trouble 
(gesture/emotion).
1 had it first so he can’ t 
have it because 1 am still 
needing it to color 
Blackout, so it looks like 
how 1 want it like on the 
TV.
Theme 1: Absolutist and multiplist levels o f development. Jeremy’s developmental 
pattern shifted primarily between absolutist and multiplist views o f knowledge (See 
Table 14). Most o f his knowledge came through in group settings where he needed to
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interact with others. V irtua lly  none o f his individual interviews yielded any tangible 
information regarding his level o f development or dimensions o f knowledge. Therefore 
all o f the themes that are reported come from group involvement (i.e. whole class 
instruction and focus groups). In addition, w ithin the group contexts, he very rarely 
interacted or communieated spontaneously, including during the less structured center 
activities. He needed to be prompted to speak and when he did, his initia l responses were 
objective and simple. For example, when asked, “ What do you think the w ild  things are 
doing in this picture?” , he responded “ Playing.”  When asked, “ What makes them 
scary?”, he said, “ W ild Things.”  When the question was a yes/no question, he responded 
only w ith a “ yes”  or “ no”  response and offered no elaboration. The outstanding 
absolutist patterns that emerged are related to simple knowledge and source o f 
knowledge. (For examples see Theme 3 below.)
Absolute certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge patterns were more 
d ifficu lt to take hold o f beeause he demonstrated a great deal o f his knowledge in 
fragments and nonverbal gestures (i.e., pointing, shaking his head, shrugging shoulders). 
He would say a couple o f words and gesture; his meaning came across in his way o f 
communicating but the limited language made inferences necessary. His knowledge was 
strongly dependent on others (i.e. peers, teacher, researcher); Jeremy observed and 
processed what others wcie saying, then he echoed the general idea but not the language. 
For example, someone contributed the idea that monsters are scary; Jeremy grasped onto 
the idea o f “ scary”  and made fragment sentences and gestures.
He was more articulate and forthright with his multiplist perspectives and conveyed 
his subjective knowledge by demonstrating much improved language skills; he still used
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a lot o f nonverbal behaviors, and he clearly had less dependency on others to make his 
thinking explicit. His multiplist perspectives were more clearly noticeable in terms of all 
four dimensions o f knowledge (i.e. simple, certain, source, justification); that is they were 
more identifiable with less reading between the lines. Similar to his absolute views, these 
multiplistic ways o f thinking were only conveyed in group settings.
Throughout the course of the study, every occasionally Jeremy constructed a 
surprising evaluativistic-like statement that was piggy-backed on a statement made by 
someone during a discussion. These rare but occasional excerpts of his knowledge led to 
Theme 4 because it appeared that he had the cognitive ability but not the motivation to 
engage in the activities. This raises an important question that is not so obvious with the 
other child-participants, which is, how important is emotional disposition in developing 
knowledge?
Theme 2: New information is generally linked to the hooks and family and is strongly 
influenced by peers. When it came to linking new information to existing knowledge and 
experience, Jeremy had a small repertoire o f associations; however, there were 
identifiable behavior patterns that emerged throughout the study which distinctively 
identified characteristics that separated each type o f connection. For example, his 
absolutist views o f knowledge were primarily linked to the stories read during whole 
class instruction. His multiplist views included references that link his knowledge to his 
family, primarily his mother. This seemed a bit contradictory to what was observed and 
what was known about his home life (i.e. very limited contact with his mother); therefore, 
this again raised questions regarding sources o f knowledge and the emotional component
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to the knowledge o f preschooler’s. Evaluativistic statements were generated and 
primarily influenced by others and related to the stories.
Jeremy did not interact verbally with his peers; however, he did appear to listen and 
watch what his peers were saying and doing in the classroom and during playtime. 
Although his verbal interactions with peers were restricted by choice rather than ability, 
he did initiate play on the playground and during center activities. Otherwise, his 
involvement was awkward and strained but effective because he was heavily influenced 
by his peer’s knowledge.
Theme 3: Simple/ Source o f  knowledge have distinct verbal/nonverbal patterns. This 
theme was most prevalent in the analysis o f his absolutistic thinking. Besides being 
strongly associated to his obser\'ations o f others, it deals with the ways in which he 
conveyed his simple and source o f knowledge. Absolute simple knowledge ideas began 
with independently derived nonverbal gestures (i.e., pointing, nodding his head, using 
arms and legs to demonstrate his words). These gestures were followed by brie f simple 
verbalizations which occurred in a single word which he was able to generate 
independently or repetitions o f the same word or phrase echoed from a peer. For 
example, when asked “ ’What in the picture makes the monsters scary?” , he placed his 
finger on their eyes and bulged his eyes. When direct probing about their eyes was in 
progress he repeated, “ Eyes,”  “ Eyes,”  “ Eyes.”  followed by, “ B ig,”  “ Big,”  “ B ig.”  This 
was a naïve and gross misrepresentation o f his ability to convey his understanding o f 
knowledge and the question. Any attempt to identify depth to his absolute simple 
knowledge resulted in visible frustration, disengagement, and disruption. A  similar 
pattern exists in absolute source o f knowledge; he never explicitly verbalized sources o f
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knowledge although some sources were embedded in his responses (i.e., the book, 
family, television characters) or were internal generalized and verbalized (i.e., “ need,”  
“ want,”  “ have” ). Here the verbal/nonverbal pattern was opposite in that he used his 
words first followed by the facial and body gestures. For example, when asked, “ Who 
are you closest to in your family?” , he responded, “ M y dad, my says.”  He stopped 
verbalizing the rest o f the thought and placed his hands to his mouth and moved them in 
an up-and-down motion sim ilar to imitating a duck quacking. Again, i f  the researcher 
probed for more information about his source o f knowledge, his animated behaviors 
escalated, he disengaged, and became disruptive.
The reasons for this consistent behavior for simple and source o f knowledge at the 
absolutist level partially led to Jeremy’s fourth theme. One reason for the pattern could 
be related to cognitive or language ability, but this is not likely based on his scores on the 
prescreening assessments. It eould be indicative o f a type o f cognitive overload; 
however, when compared to his peers, this could be the case for source o f knowledge (i.e. 
this was a d ifficu lt dimension for all o f the child-participants) but not so for simple 
knowledge (i.e. this dimension was not found to be highly challenging for his peers). The 
other thought for the pattern is the role o f affect in developing epistemologies o f 
preschoolers. This rationale seems to fit with the data. W ithin absolute certain and 
justification and all dimensions o f multip list levels o f development, he could either 
construct knowledge independently, or he used his peers as scaffolds to aid his 
knowledge. He did not do either o f these patterns for absolute simple or source o f 
knowledge; therefore, these areas received the most amount o f follow-up questions from 
the researcher.
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Theme 4. Negative impact o fa jfect on the nature and process o f knowing. As 
reported in Theme 3, simple knowledge (w ithin the nature o f knowledge) and source o f 
knowledge (w ithin process o f knowing) posed the most cognitive and behavioral 
challenges for Jeremy as a direct result from probing. This included the negative 
behaviors and other characteristics such as: lack o f independent thinking (individual 
interviews and groups involvement), dependency on peers when in a group environment, 
frequent repetition, and vast use o f nonverbal expressions. This prompted a closer look at 
his affect and disposition.
What can be seen is that he was consistently sitting away from the group, seemingly 
disengaged but picking-up infonnation through his observations o f others. He was 
generally quiet and withdrawn w ith a flat affect. He did not smile or respond with much 
emotion o f animation that was typical o f his peers. Jeremy did not spontaneously engage 
peers or authority and was in itia lly  resistant to attempts to engage him. He did not move 
quickly (characteristic o f preschoolers) and lacked energy, interest, and motivation. For 
example, he never selected center activities; rather he waited for the teacher to appoint a 
center. A ll o f these behaviors seem to contribute to his epistemological development in 
negative ways. Interestingly, the teacher never confronted his lethargy or his negative 
attitude. Throughout the entire study, there was not documentation o f a single interaction 
in which the teacher seemed to be in touch with his social or emotional well-being. In a 
word, Jeremy appeared to be detached, cognitively, socially, and emotionally.
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Individual Epistemic Profile 
In this section, the individual epistemic themes are reported as an individual 
epistemic profile (See Figure 11). These are four o f the most common patterns that 
consistently reoccurred across all six o f the child-partieipants. This is not to say that 
every child-participant demonstrated the pattern with the same intensity or frequency, but 
rather collectively these themes emerged contiguously.
Figure 11: Individual Epistemic Profile
Theme 4
Positive 
Impact o f  
Peers in the 
Classroom
Theme 2
Dimensions
Knowledge
Peer
Scaffolds
Impact
Motivation
Knowledge
Real=
Nature
Link 
Simple &  
Certain
Theme 3
Use o f Real 
and Pretend 
Knowledge
Individual
Epistemic
Profile
Link 
Simple or 
Certain &  
Justification
Absolutist
Followed Pretend=
Justification
Most
common
M ultip lis t
Theme!
Patterns o f 
Development
Individual Epistemic Themes 
Theme I :  Patterns o f  Development
Individually the child-participants demonstrated variability in their developmental 
levels. The malleability o f their epistemologies seemed to be influenced by external
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factors such as the content, the context, and peer influences. Therefore, this theme deals 
with the developmental patterns that emerged despite the external factors. There were 24 
(6 participants x 4 themes) possible individual trajectories, from which three distinctive 
patterns reoccurred across the participants. Two o f the patterns were identified multiple 
times for each participant, and the third pattern was identified at least three times in all 
but one o f the participants.
The first developmental pattern that was found and is the most common trajectory 
found with this sample was beginning with unprompted multiplist assimilations about 
their knowledge (See Figure 12). That is they began w ith observations regarding peers, 
family, or prior experiences, and follow-up questioning typically resulted in a transition 
to an absolutist view as they searched for the “ right”  answer. I f  probed further, they 
resorted back to the subjective or multiplistic references. The interesting observation 
with this pattern was that, although they seemed to have an understanding that there is a 
“ correct”  answer, they tended to the urge to find it for a very brie f time before they 
retrieved more fam iliar knowledge. They were content with their multiplistic ideas and 
were much less inhibited about integrating their opposing ideas with others. There was a 
sense o f competition among the peers but it did not appear to be competition over the 
“ correct”  knowledge as much as competition for voice. They listened and contributed 
their background knowledge and prior experience as i f  one was just as good as the other. 
They were respectful o f their peer’s experiences and used them as a source o f objective 
knowledge. This multiplist, absolutist, multiplist trajectory was comfortable for all o f the 
participants and was visible in the way that they made meaning from new information.
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Figure 12: Individual Developmental Pattern #1
M uliiphst Absolutist M ultip lis t Absolutist
Figure 13: Individual Developmental Pattern #2
Absolutist M ultip lis t Absolutist M ultip list
The second developmental pattern began with absolutist accommodations o f new 
information taken from the stories, peers, or classroom rules and procedures (See Figure 
13). This infonnation was taken as fact and converted quickly to more multiplistic views, 
in which the new information was linked to existing knowledge or experiences o f their 
own. However, when questioned about their knowledge, they appeared to encounter 
some doubt and searched for the “ right”  response (i.e. absolutist). They responded with a 
scenario from the story or mimicked a peer’ s statements. I f  encouraged to elaborate in 
terms o f certainty or justification, they immediately bailed on their objective sense and 
fell back on multiplistic ways o f knowing. For example, a child-participant’s responses 
progressed as follows; “ Max was bad, he was not nice to his mommy so he get into 
trouble about his dinner.”  “ L ittle kids should not be bad to their parents.”  “ When 1 was
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bad once like that my daddy put soap in my mouth, not give me dinner but I know I was 
wrong for say bad things.”  “ When M ax’s mother brought him food to his room they 
made up and Max was not in trouble anymore.”  “ 1 think that is good to do.”  “ Once 1 
couldn’ t sleep when my daddy yelled at me and he had to come and tuck me in again but 
then I sleeped right away and it was better.”
The interesting finding with these seemingly ritual or habitual patterns is that they 
could be construed as linear (as seen in Figures 12 &  13) i f  considered in isolation. 
However, when looked at over the course o f one week or throughout the four week 
duration o f the study, it becomes clear that these patterns are not linear; they repeated 
time after time (See Figure 14). When these two linear patterns are thought o f in terms o f 
circular processes, they appear to be similar. It became clear that the follow-up 
questioning process, even though it was based on the ch ild ’s own words, was critical in 
two ways: (a) how they viewed or understood their prior knowledge in relationship to 
new information; and (b) how they conveyed their understanding o f their knowledge in 
relationship to the type o f question being asked.
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Figure 14: Recursive Developmental Pattern 1 & 2
Multiplist
Absolutist
Absolutist
Multiplist
The third developmental pattern was not as commonly tapped into as the previous 
two patterns but occurred in most o f the participants when probed for specifically by the 
researcher. The child began spontaneously with a multiplist perspective, then with 
probing turned more absolutist, and then probed further the participants demonstrated the 
ability to link their objective knowledge with their subjective knowledge and respond 
naively evaluativistically. For example when asked, “ Where do you think you w ill find 
the coins in the treasure box?” One participant answered, “ I think the coins are way deep 
in the bottom under the sand. 1 found other things at the bottom of my sandbox before
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(multiplist).”  “ Why do you think they are at the bottom?”  “ Jamie (a peer) was reaching 
way down, and he got some coins down there (absolutist).”  “ Yes, he did but why do you 
think they would be at the bottom?”  “ Because he did and I did before and because things 
fall to the bottom (evaluativist). Once my mommy dropped her earring in the toilet and 
my daddy had to reach all the way to the bottom to get it back to her (multip list).”  A t this 
point there is a return to a multiplistic vantage point. Once they began to link objective 
and subjective ideas they appeared to be at a loss; this state appeared in conjunction with 
several observable indicators similar to when adults encounter doubt (i.e., facial 
expressions for approval, shrugging shoulders, poor eye contact) or cognitive overload 
(i.e., frustration, putting their hands over their face, wandering around, psychomotor 
agitation) and they quickly returned to their personal experiences (See Figure 15).
Again, w ith this developmental pattern, a circular trajectory takes forni, in which the 
participants begin with spontaneous multiplism and are probed through less unfamiliar 
ways o f thinking about infonnation. At a personal threshold that was different for each 
child, they fell back into their comfort zone. Figure 16 represents this pattern o f 
development in the recursive nature that more closely resembles how the child- 
participants moved with the researcher through the different levels and helped shape 
discussions and follow-up questions in a way that really pinpointed their individual zone 
o f proximal development. W ithin this zone they appeared to be more engaged in the 
activities, adapted to and demonstrated appropriate social conventions, and were 
motivated learners.
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Multiplist
Figure 15: Developmental Pattern #3
Absolutist Evaluativist Multiplist
Figure 16: Recursive Pattern #3
Multiplist
Evaluativist
/
Absolutist
Multiplist
Theme 2: Dimensions o f  Knowledge
Dimensions o f knowledge involve the nature o f knowledge, which pertains to the 
simplicity and certainty o f knowledge, and the process o f knowing, which refers to the 
source and justification o f knowledge. There are three patterns that emerged in terms of 
dimensions of knowledge throughout the study: (a) the way in which simple and certain
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knowledge were coordinated, (b) the alignment o f the nature o f knowledge (simple and 
certain) w ith justification o f knowledge, and (c) the absence o f the child-participants o f 
overt utilization o f sources o f knowledge.
The child-participants in this study demonstrated an obscure distinction between 
simple and certain knowledge, so much so that often identical units were coded as both 
simple and certain knowledge (See Figure 17). When their knowledge was conveyed as 
simple (i.e., single word responses, such as, "yes"), it was also certain (i.e., " I know", 
confident dispositions, good eye contact, enthusiasm); conversely, when knowledge was 
complex (i.e., integrating new information w ith prior knowledge or past experiences; 
observations), they acknowledged that it was uncertain (i.e., “ I ’m not sure,”  “ I don’t 
know, maybe” ).
Figure 17: Nature o f Knowledge Pattern
Sim plicity Certainty o f  
Knowledge
Knowledge
In this study the nature o f knowledge is the overwhelmingly predominant way the 
preschoolers constructed their knowledge. The successful integration o f new information 
was seen as complex and uncertain. This harmony between sim plicity and certainty o f
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knowledge was demonstrated regardless o f the developmental level; in addition, this was 
the only pattern that did not have any bearing on the content o f the information or the 
context o f the interactions. They continually synchronized these two dimensions o f 
knowledge to the point that they could be considered one dimension that consists o f 
interdependent parts in a definite pattern of organization (i.e., perhaps unpacked too 
much).
The second dimensional pattern that garnered attention was the integration between 
simple and certain knowledge and justification of knowledge (See Figure 18).
Figure 18: Dimensional Pattern #2
Certainty of 
Knowledge
Justification
Simplicity o f 
KnowledgeKnowledge
The overlapping o f simple and certain knowledge from the previous dimensional 
pattern remained a constant when probing knowledge and understanding for the process
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o f knowing (i.e. source and justification). This pattern involved the children linking one 
or the o f simple or certain knowledge or both in alignment with justification o f 
knowledge. For example when asked, “ What do you think fam ily means?”  “ M y family 
is my mommy, and my daddy, and me, and my little  brother, and we live in our house, 
and do fun things, and we love each other, and they keep us safe.”  “ Why do you think 
your fam ily is important?”  “ M y mommy and daddy are important because they love me 
and they help me grow bigger and smarter. Because I have to help my brother too, so he 
don’ t get hurt i f  he does things that w ill make him hurt. And you need your fam ily for 
hugs and kisses and stuff.”
This idea o f  aligning the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing is another 
pattern that happened liberally throughout the study and without very much probing. In 
many cases they spontaneously offered some justification for what they were verbalizing 
and often it was accompanied by an increase in their nonverbal communication. Using 
the example in the previous paragraph, this child used his arms to indicate to smaller size 
o f his brother compared to himself; and when he said “ hugs and kisses,”  he leaned over 
to the researcher and gave a hug and kiss. When their thinking was more complex or 
sophisticated, they had a tendency to be more active in their expressions (i.e., facial 
expressions, body gestures, using items nearby as pretend objects, use o f emotional 
energy to indicate meaning).
The third dimensional pattern that was identified on the individual level was the 
diminished ability or absence o f the source o f knowledge. Source o f knowledge was the 
least referenced o f the dimensions o f knowledge throughout the study by all o f the 
participants. They were less inclined to overtly articulate their sources o f knowledge
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independently or when probed although they did regularly im plic itly reference sources o f 
knowledge (i.e. internal and external) in their responses (i.e., “ mommy,”  “ daddy,”  “ the 
book,”  “ at school,”  “ at home” ). They rarely answered a direct question related to the 
source o f knowledge, for example, “ How do you know the rules in the classroom?”  or 
“ How do you know that the momma bear knows the baby bear is hiding in the snow?” 
When faced with these types o f questions, they responded using a combination o f certain 
and justification o f knowledge. For example, “ I know the mommy bear sees the baby in 
the snow because look”  and then pointed to the picture in the story where the mamma 
bear is watching the baby bear hide in the snow, and the expression on the mamma bear’ s 
face indicates she knows. Again, there was an increase in the nonverbal indicators o f 
knowledge and understanding or a use o f the combination o f verbal and nonverbal 
markers.
When these patterns began to emerge (cutting-off their words and using more 
nonverbal traits), the books were removed as an anchor to see i f  they would identify the 
source o f knowledge using their words rather than pointing or using other nonverbal 
means o f identifying how they know. When anchors were removed, they continued to 
struggle with source o f knowledge questions; signs o f frustration and cognitive overload 
emerged and escalated. For example, “ How do you know Bob and Karen were friends at 
the end o f the story?”  or “ How do you know that your mommy and daddy love you?”  In 
both o f these instances, the child refused or was unable to respond verbally. There was 
quick eye contact with a look o f confusion, and then no more eye contact, a couple o f 
grunts, arms wrapped tightly around her chest, bottom lip protruding, and shaking her 
head. In this case no more questions were asked; however, in other similar scenarios
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further probing followed, which precipitated the conversation to veer off-task, a b rie f 
period o f behavioral disruptions, followed by disengagement either physically or 
emotionally.
ThemeS: Use o f Real and Pretend Knowledge
Preschooler’s knowledge is highly malleable. They transition between real (i.e. 
external) and pretend (i.e. internal) worlds with ease; oftentimes it can be d ifficu lt to keep 
up with where they are mentally. Working with small children one should be 
knowledgeable about the pop culture o f the age group at the time. In this study the 
children used that pop culture porthole as a link to their pretend world. Unlike adults, 
children’s pretend world, although internal, is uninhibited and becomes part o f the 
external experiences as they integrate and transfer pretend knowledge to new infonnation 
in the real world. There are two patterns that emerged from this study in terms o f their 
real and pretend; (a) the nature o f knowledge experience and (b) the process o f knowing 
experience (See Figure 19).
The first pattern is real versus pretend in the nature o f knowledge dimensions (i.e. 
simple and certain). This pattern continued to identify the coordination between simple 
and certain knowledge. In itia lly, the children tolerated the new information in the forniat 
presented to them in the way o f the story, activities, their peers, or questions. In other 
words it was tolerated as it appeared in the external world. In addition, it tended to be 
developmentally absolutist. For example, “ When we are ready to listen to the story we 
have to sit criss-cross applesauce, that way Mr. 1 (teacher) knows we are ready for the 
story to start.”  However, when probed about the simple/certain knowledge they 
explained the aile by elaborating into their pretend knowledge. Here they identified
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themselves with some pop culture character (i.e., Transfomiers, ninja turtle, princesses, 
or a character from the story), but they eontinued to deal with the topic or question. For 
example, “ Why do you sit criss-cross applesauce?”  “ 1 want to be just like a princess and 
be good like a princess so I can see the pictures and 1 don’t get into trouble but not 
everyone is like a princess and they get into trouble with Mr. 1 (facial expressions and 
body gestures).”  This example illustrates the ability to answer the question in a 
meaningful way by associating herself with a princess. In addition, it is representative 
that as knowledge becomes more complex and sophisticated their ability to express their 
knowledge is scaffolded by their nonverbal ability and the transfer of pretend to real 
world experiences (i.e., princesses are good and well-behaved and follow the rules).
Figure 19; Dimensions o f Knowledge -  Real Versus Pretend
Certai
u s t i  f  i c a 1 1
REAL Source 
External
Intem ar,
ncertai
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The second pattern deals w ith how these children used real and pretend occasions 
as a means o f expressing their process o f knowing, specifically the justification o f 
knowledge (as the source o f knowledge was no different when using pretend knowledge). 
When the topic was fam iliar to the child, meaning they had personal experience or 
background knowledge o f the topic, they typically responded in a developmentally 
multiplistic fashion and used real life  scenarios or information. For example, “ Why do 
you think it takes all different types o f trucks to make a big building?”  “ 1 would need 
more trucks because they all do different stu ff and 1 would build a enormous (arms) 
building.”  As his understanding was probed further, “ Yes, but why so many o f them?” 
Adam said, “ Well ummm (pause and expressions) it takes so many trucks for that 
because it is a lot o f work and they share doing stuff, like when the Transformers fight, 
they each have special powers like Blackout (a transformer) kicks good, and Optim us...”  
In this example, he transferred his knowledge about Transformers to the question about 
the equipment; he remained on-topic and was able to answer the question in a meaningful 
way but used pretend resources as a means o f making connections between background 
knowledge and past experiences and new information.
When the children had less background knowledge/personal experiences or were 
unfamiliar with the topics or did not understand the question (i.e., questions about the 
source o f knowledge), they still attempted to respond. Typically it began using simple 
and certain knowledge, followed by a way to justify  what they knew using some 
associations or pretend knowledge. Usually this type o f response was less meaningful, in 
that it was off-topic, lacked coherent sense, or was a complete behavior disruption (i.e., 
singing, dancing, repeating a word from the question). The example from Adam used
284
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
above was said in whole class instruction. Later all o f the children were asked, “ Do you 
think Adam was right that the trucks are like Ninja Turtles, they all do different things?” 
They responded, “ yes”  or “ no”  and were asked why. These were some o f the responses: 
“ Trucks, trucks, trucks, turtles, turtles, turtles;”  “ Like princesses too because they are 
pretty and beautiful because they wear different clothes, and go to different parties;”  “ I 
think yes but (standing, jumping, swinging his arms, sound effects) and (more gestures) 
and because trucks w ill go in there and (sound effects) beat em up and tear em down and 
(gestures and sounds effects) because they need a lot o f em.”
When the responses got to this level and probing justification o f knowledge persisted, 
the characteristics were similar across all o f the children. They were clearly beyond their 
zone o f proximal development; they became less motivated and cooperative, disengaged 
to the point o f even walking away from the situation, used strategies to distract the 
researcher (i.e., engage in a different conversation, ask questions, tell a story), or became 
behaviorally disruptive (i.e., jumping, banging on the floor, yelling, repeating the same 
words).
Theme 4: Positive Impact o j Peers in the Classroom
Peers could be a positive or a negative influence in the construction o f knowledge; 
both scenarios were observed in this study. However, peers appeared to be positive 
influence more frequently. They assisted one another in several ways: (a) cognitively, (b) 
emotionally, and (c) behaviorally. There was a pattern o f peer scaffolding that unfolded 
which appeared to assist the children individually construct knowledge developmentally 
and dimensionally. The participants did not overtly identify their peers as a source o f 
knowledge; however, they demonstrated various observable ways in which peers
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positively influenced their knowledge and knowing. For example, they watehed and 
listened to each other respeetfully; this was more apparent in structured (whole class 
instniction) and semi-structured (focus group) settings as opposed to the less structured 
settings (center aetivities and playtime).
Cognitive peer scaffolding was identified when an individuals would build on one o f 
their peer’s statements or experiences. For example, in the whole class instruction, one 
student said, “ Max had to go to his room for his dinner, and he pretended to go to see the 
w ild  things.”  A  participant who rarely contributed during whole class instruction replied, 
“ Me too, sometimes 1 am bad and I have to go to my room but I pretend to be a race car 
driver and I w in the race w ith a trophy and I get lots o f money.”  In this case, the boy 
never responded spontaneously to something that the teacher said and rarely responded 
when the teacher posed a direct question; however, he frequently expressed his 
understanding follow ing a peer statement. Peers seemed to provide information that led 
others to make associations or tap into their background knowledge that the teacher did 
not seem to promote. For example, during a story about winter in which bears were ice 
skating (most children had a d ifficu lt time with the theme o f winter because they lacked 
experience w ith snow etc.), a student (Caren) said, “ They are skating on the lake, that is 
ice, once my dad went ice fishing in the cold and got all wet and cold and sick.”  Later 
during an individual inter\'iew a participant unfamiliar w ith winter said, “ I don’t know 
about making a snowman cuz I never did.”  Asked, “ Can you tell me anything that you 
know about wintertime?”  He responded, “ Well, I know Caren’s dad went fishing on ice 
but I only went fishing in the water, do you think the fish in the winter are freezing?”
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This instance demonstrates how the child tried to incorporate knowledge from a peer into 
their existing knowledge.
The ehildren in this study were able to tap into their own emotional place and that of 
their peers. In other words they frequently made attempts to feel success and 
accomplishment by helping others, whether it was to keep them engaged/interested, to 
give instruction, or help them remember a person’s name. They were in touch with the 
frustrations o f their peers and tried to positively promote success in others. For example, 
“ Let me show you a better way, it is easier i f  you hold the paper this way and you don’ t 
get the stuff all over (smiling, proud)” or “ It’ s okay i f  you don’t know. I w ill help you. 
See wateh me 1 did this before.”  Also, on an individual basis, they wanted to share how 
they helped someone. One example was, “ Did you see .leremy fall? 1 fell bad so I showed 
him where the band-aids are and 1 told Mr. 1 he fell and got hurt and because he needed 
help so I showed him so he would know.”
Children in this study used peer scaffolding as a behavioral tool in order to stay on- 
task. Often in whole class instruction, center activities, and focus groups, individual 
participants both gave and received behavioral support from their peers which in turn 
positively impacted their ability to demonstrate their knowledge and understanding. For 
example, child-participants would direct others regarding the rules o f the classroom, 
“ You have to get ready for the story, look sit like this criss-cross applesauce;”  or “ It’s 
your turn, now you try to do it and we w ill watch;”  or “ You’re acting like a baby, stop 
yelling and jumping we are trying to make our journals now,”
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Focus Group Epistemic Profiles 
Focus Group 1 Epistemic Profiles
Figure 20: Focus Group 1 Epistemic Profile
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Epistemic Themes
Theme 1 : Three developmental levels, patterns vary based on the content. Group 1 
demonstrated all three levels o f development (i.e. absolutist, multiplist, evaluativist) (See 
Figure 21). There was a trend that was identified in how they collectively constructed 
their knowledge between the pre-instructional and the post-instructional focus groups 
(regarding the themes monsters and winter) that could be attributed to the content o f the 
focus group. The main difference was that the monster theme tapped into their ability to 
construct knowledge based on their background knowledge and past experiences. In these 
instances they resorted to connecting real and pretend scenarios. W ith the winter theme 
participants had far less background knowledge, and many had no experiences similar to 
the stories that were discussed (i.e., snow, shoveling snow, building snowmen, ice
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skating). Therefore, the pre-and post-instruction focus groups for w inter had the same 
patterns which mirrored the pattern o f the post-instruction monster focus group
The monster theme pre-instruction focus group began developmentally with a 
m ultiplistic perspective; they immediately commanded the group with their knowledge 
and experiences based on associations o f being “ afraid”  or “ scared.”  They then moved 
toward an absolutist view, in which they discussed the differences between real and 
pretend experiences. They had several ideas that were agreed upon as a group such as; 
“ monsters are just pretend, like in your mind;”  “ monsters come into your head at 
nighttime”  and “ in the dark;”  “ mommy and daddy keep you safe from monsters but still 
they are scary;”  and “ monsters can be nice sometimes i f  you want them to be.”  To this 
point they were able to be autonomous; they had shifted from multiplism to absolutism 
meanwhile demonstrating various dimensions o f knowledge, primarily simple and certain 
knowledge. From individual patterns that had been emerging through the week, the 
researeher probed for process o f knowing and evaluativistic thinking. The group was 
versatile and responded to both frames o f questioning (i.e. justification only and 
evaluativist).
Probing for process o f knowing w ithin the pre-instruction focus group context posed 
many o f the same challenges in terms o f source o f knowledge as seen in the individual 
settings. However, justification was again actively accommodated through personal 
experiences, and interestingly the im plic it sources used to emphasize their justifieation 
for knowing revolved around family, peers, and pop culture (i.e. appropriate use o f 
pretend). For example, “ 1 think that monsters can be nice sometimes because they are
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ugly and gross but I have Leonardo and 1 make him nice because he is a good guy in the 
cartoon.”
Probing evaluativism again was met w ith knowledge from their personal experiences 
and incorporated family, peers, and pop culture associations. For example, “ 1 don’t think 
that monsters are like turtles, they are like more scarier, and cuz they are nice, they keep 
people safe from the bad guys, they beat them bad guys up and they smile and do lots o f 
nice things, monsters try to hurt me.”  Evaluativistic thinking occurred by individuals in 
the focus group but more commonly then was generated in individual settings. 
Evaluativistic thinking was generated from multiple contributions by members o f the 
group in which they built on each other’s experiences and constructed group 
evaluativistic thinking, again at a naïve level o f development based on their associations. 
This transcript from the pre-instructional focus group demonstrates group evaluativism: 
Adam: “ 1 like monsters; I don’t think they are scary.”
GiGi: “ No, 1 think they can be but not all the time.”
Adam: “ Maybe they can be both scary sometimes and not scary sometimes. 1 think 
ya, that’ s right (gestures).”
Amy: “ Well, i f  1 am by myself in the dark, then 1 think they could be scaring me but 
then my mommy comes to make me not scared no more (gestures).”
GiGi: “ Me too (facial expressions), my mommy tells me they are not real and 1 feel 
better but sometimes 1 can still be afraid o f them, unless they are good monsters. 
Adam, when don’t you get afraid by monsters (body gestures)?”
Adam: “ M y mommy and daddy say they not real so 1 am not afraid and turtles are 
monsters and they I ’m not afraid o f them but 1 know my little brother is sometimes
290
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and I help him but I am not afraid because sometimes yes and sometimes no (voice 
and gestures).”
GiGi: “ I know they are pretend and that’s not real but I can be frightened (face/body 
gestures) sometimes (laughing).
This example illustrates how they build on each other’s point o f view and knowledge, 
constantly moving from objective knowledge and understanding about monsters to their 
more subjective ideas. They acknowledged the other’s ideas and used fam ily and pop 
culture; also the amount o f nonverbal (i.e., facial expressions, animation, body gestures) 
communications increased.
Figure 21 : Group 1 Pre-Instruction Monster Focus Group 
Developmental Pattern
M ultip list Absolutist Evaluativist M ultip lis t
In the post-instruction monster focus group the children’s spontaneity persisted. They 
were energetic and eager to engage in the focus group activity. This focus group took a 
slightly different course because there seemed to be two different processes occurring 
based on the semi-structured questions; therefore, two pattems emerged as follows: (a) 
the nature o f knowledge (i.e. simplicity and certainty) and (b) the process o f knowing (i.e. 
justification).
The simple and certain knowledge pattern circulates through all three developmental 
levels; however, the children actively take an absolutist perspective rather than the
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m ultiplistic view they demonstrated prior to instruction (See Figure 22). As identified in 
the individual and pre-instruetion focus group, the child-participants systematically 
linked their simple and certain knowledge.
They tolerated a fair amount o f probing at the absolutist level before they became 
bored and uninterested. For example, they were asked a question, and each child 
participated in the discussion based on a single question. By the fourth absolutist question 
their affective disposition began to deteriorate (i.e., rolling around on the floor, grabbing 
for toys in the comer, daydreaming). ,j
To maintain organization o f the activity, they quickly reengaged in multiplist attitudes 
and attempts to revisit absolutist perspectives were met w ith group resistance as 
identified through their affect and behavior. For example, they were weary o f questions 
such as “ What did Max do?” , “ Where did Max go?” , and “ What were the Wild Things!”  
They continued to link their knowledge (i.e. simple/certain) and understanding in a 
m ultip list manner but rather than use personal experiences (internal) they made personal 
connections between characters in the story and fam ily or peers as a way o f making 
meaning o f new information. For example, “ Max was bad to his mother, I was bad and 
my mother...”
However, they were open and competent at engaging in evaluativistic (i.e. simple 
and certain) types o f questions. For example, “ What do you think about what Max’s 
mother did to Max?” , and “ What do you think Max thought about his punishment?”
They responded hesitantly w ith their evaluativistic responses. One example is “ I think his 
mommy did that so he would have time to think about what he said but Max felt bad (an 
idea from a peer in the focus group) but I know he could, she could o f let him just eat at
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the other table away from everyone instead o f him going to his room (his idea), like a 
time out (an idea from a peer in the focus group). I f  she did that. Max would still know 
he did a wrong thing and not do it again.”  Evaluativistic statements like this one were 
constructed by one child in the group but after everyone had contributed their own 
individual ideas; additionally, there was always a child-participant who would come up 
with a statement that summarized everyone’s ideas in a group evaluativistic-like fashion.
This group evaluativistic process was not guided in any way other than probing for 
deeper understanding. They began to become frustrated with the complexity o f the 
questions; using their words to formulate follow-up questions gave them less words to 
use in their responses. The frustration that was observed before the transition away from 
evaluativistic thinking was not one of boredom or a lack of interest; rather it was more 
•signs of cognitive overload (i.e., facial confusion, long pauses in speech, shrugging 
shoulders) and did not have the inappropriate or disruptive behaviors (i.e., wandering 
around, singing, laughing).They made attempts to respond, but the content o f their 
responses began not to make sense. For example, “ Lalala, maxy waxy, mommy wammy, 
no no no no, be good be good.”  Once the group took on this type o f ambivalence, they 
resorted to their multiplistic subjectivity o f personal experiences.
Figure 22: Group 1 Post-Instruction Monster Focus Group 
Developmental Trajectory #1 (Nature of Knowledge)
Absolutist EvaluativistMultiplist Multiplist
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The second pattern that was identified in the post-instructional monster focus group 
emerged primarily when probing for the process o f knowing. The source o f knowledge 
continued to evade the child-participants, even when probing occurred; therefore, this 
pattern revolves around the justification of knowledge and is identical to the pattern seen 
in the pre-instruction monster focus group (See Figure 21).
There are some outstanding characteristics regarding the post-instruction pattern for 
justification o f knowledge for both the monsters and winter groups. First, the child- 
participants did not require much probing for justification at the absolutist or multiplist 
level o f development. They were actively engaged and worked individually and 
collectively as they collaborated on various ways to respond to questions. For example, 
they asked each other questions, redirected one another on inappropriate behaviors to 
keep them on task, and shared their experiences by associating characters from the story 
and applying them to themselves. Probing justification allowed for the complexity of 
their knowledge to be highlighted in terms of the depth o f associations that they possess 
regarding a fairly limited foundation o f information (i.e. family, peers, pop-culture) that 
appears to be a repertoire o f interconnected events and experiences that was seen in this 
group only while probing for justification of knowledge. For example, “The monsters in 
the story have big eyes (eyes bulge), and big scary teeth (show teeth), and big claws 
(show hands) but when we drawed them we didn’ t make them so ugly, see (points to the 
pictures), because we made them nice (gestures) like princesses and princes so they won’t 
be so scaiy when new mommies and daddies come to the Cricket classroom. Like 
sometimes i f  it ’s too scary (facial) then we won’t sleep and have bad dreams and 
nightmares and will be so tired but i f  they are beautiful then when new people who don’t
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know w ill look at our pretty pictures and want to read about the w ild  things because it 
looks like fun and funny.”
The second characteristic was that evaluativistic justification required far more 
probing questions and posed individual and group challenges. For example, repeating 
each other’s, ideas, repeating the teacher or researcher’ s ideas, and repeating the text from 
the story were common responses. Although the group did generate evaluativistic-like 
justified responses, they were generally mimicked from the story, the teacher, or the 
researcher, and there was not enough evidence to indicate that they had complete 
understanding about what they said. On the other hand, this was an interesting finding 
because they could at least understand the question and respond appropriately whereas 
with source o f knowledge questioning they rarely were able to explicitly identify their 
sources o f knowledge, even i f  it was modeled for them in the whole class instruction (by 
the teacher) or the focus group (by the researeher). This indicated that they could not 
process the source o f knowledge questions.
The third characteristic that is associated with justifieation o f knowledge is the 
obvious inclusion o f nonverbal traits, such as facial expressions, body language, and 
pointing. This appeared to be symbolie o f  higher order and more complex organization 
o f knowledge. For example, the more challenging the questions, the more they 
incorporated nonverbal communication. Rather than simply disengaging as was seen in 
retrieval o f the nature o f knowledge, they were motivated to continue to convey their 
understanding. It is as i f  justification o f knowledge takes them to a place that they 
regressed in their communication skills, but the use o f nonverbal cues acted as a scaffold 
that held their attention longer, or the increase in psychomotor activity allowed them to
295
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
stay motivated and engaged to keep trying to make sense. This was seen over and over in 
examples like the one used above where the child continued adding and adding; this was 
particularly the case with justification questions because they appeared to be invested and 
emotionally engaged in what they were saying. They didn’t want to let it go.
Figure 23: Group 1 Post-Instruction Monster Focus Group 
Developmental Trajectory # 2 (Process o f Knowing)
AbsolutistMultiplist Evaluativist Multiplist
Theme 2: Cornent matters how they integrate the dimensions o f knowledge. Just as the 
content mattered in their developmental ability, it appeared to be similar in how they 
demonstrated their dimensions o f knowledge. As reported in Theme 1 for this group, 
their ability and inability to tap into specific dimensions o f knowledge advanced or 
inhibited, but nonetheless guided, their developmental level. For example, in the monster 
focus groups, they were more inclined to connect simple and certain knowledge 
independently without probing. In addition, they automatically linked the nature of 
knowledge and the process o f knowing by linking a combination of the following 
dimensions: simple and justification, certain and justification, or simple/certain and 
justification. Linking these dimensions together means that in the same response or 
within the same idea unit they elaborated upon their knowledge independently. These 
examples are reflected in the patterns for the developmental levels (Theme 1). This
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section talks about how the content o f the themes varied their ability to link specific 
dimensions o f knowledge between the monster and winter groups.
The developmental patterns o f the pre-and post-instruction group were completely 
reversed in the winter groups (See Figures 24 and 25). In the pre-instructional group they 
demonstrated significantly less prior knowledge and background experience. They 
articulated this deficit, as in the example, “ I don’t know anything about snow.”
Therefore, their capacity to generate independent knowledge and associations was 
diminished in three ways: (a) The relevance o f their responses to the topic was lessened, 
(b) they were dependent on others for assimilating and accommodating their construction 
o f knowledge, and (c) they activated knowledge construction from an objective 
perspective. Conversely, the post-instructional focus group lacks the dual pattems seen 
in the monster group for the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. Also, it 
was consistent with the pre-instructional pattern seen in the monster focus group. Again, 
when looking at the characteristics w ithin the content o f their responses, their knowledge 
construction was restricted in two ways: (a) Experiences were distantly connected, and 
(b) the negative affective and behavioral indicators seen in the monster groups were 
exacerbated. It appeared that the opposite pattems occurred due to the subject being 
discussed (in this case the theme was winter).
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Figure 24: Group 1 Pre-Instruction Winter Focus Group 
Developmental Trajectory (Nature of Knowledge 
and Process o f Knowing)
Absolutist Evaluativist IMiiltiplislMultiplist
Figure 25: Group 1 Post-Inslruction Winter Focus Group 
Developmental Trajectory (Nature of Knowledge 
and Process o f Knowing)
EvaluativistAbsolutist MultiplistMulliplist
The relevance o f the responses, primarily to simple and certain knowledge were more 
distant to the topic or question when the child-participants lacked the prior knowledge 
and past experiences to draw upon similar associations. Once they make the associations 
their nature o f knowledge and process o f knowing are aligned, so that they used the 
simple and certain dimensions o f knowledge to advance their justification. Without the 
nature o f knowledge foundation, they did not demonstrate justification of knowledge. 
Therefore, the children in this group identified a topic they thought to be correlated. In 
this case the tendency was to make connections to the opposite o f winter, which was
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summer, a topic they know and have experienced well. For example, they changed the 
topic o f the discussion from winter to summer by saying, “ I don’t like winter, I like 
summer, it is nice and I get to play outside;”  o r ‘T like what GiGi said, monsters don’t 
have to be ugly and they could play w ith us in the summertime because sometimes you 
need more people to play w ith.”  This latter example demonstrates how they continued to 
link dimensions o f knowledge but in terms o f relevance to the topic, they strayed off- 
topic.
The off-topic pattern does not appear to be an effect o f their lack o f epistemological 
thinking but rather a cue that they lack other necessary cognitive constructs that lim ited 
their ability to convey their epistemologies. Therefore, they resorted to a pattern o f 
pretend reality; in which they took ideas that are fam iliar to them, such as monsters (the 
topic one week prior to winter) and summer, and attempted to make meaningful 
responses. This type o f compensation made their knowledge often less coherent or less 
relevant, which resulted in disruptive behaviors.
The content matters because when there was a lack o f prior knowledge and past 
experiences the child-participants were prevented from being active contributors w ithin 
the group. In this way they were removed or detached cognitively and emotionally. In 
this group the cognitive and emotional disconnect fostered two pattems: (a) behavior 
disruption and disengagement; and (b) dependence on others as a means o f constructing 
knowledge. The former produced no epistemological pattern; however, the latter was a 
productive technique that was utilized by the group in both the monster and the winter 
themes. In both themes, when this pattern emerged, it revolved around one or more o f 
the children not having adequate background knowledge or prior experiences; therefore.
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the knowledge was fragmented or absent. A child-participant would build on a statement 
that activated associations by using the story or peers. This pattern was more prominent 
when a justification was provided, so that the justification was used by others to 
formulate a simple/certain understanding that they did not possess or could not verbalize 
prior. For example, the researeher asked, “Okay so we know that in the winter we wear 
our hats and coats. Why do you have to wear a hat and coat in the winter?”  A child that 
might ordinarily respond gave nonverbal indications that she was unsure how to respond. 
Adam responded saying, “ Sometimes in the winter you can get sick and get a bad cold, i f  
that happens to me my mommy makes me go to the doctor.”  This prompted the quiet and 
uncertain child to contribute because she had made an association. She said, “ Ya, like i f  1 
get sick then 1 have to go to the doctor and get some medicine; that can happen in the 
winter i f  I don’t dress in my winter clothes.”  This is a simple/certain dimension of 
knowledge that the child had not had, and she had clearly integrated contributions from 
her peers. Being able to make the connection among being sick, going to the doctor, and 
winter gave her the ability to articulate simple/certain and justifications. For example she 
later said, “ That’s why my mommy and daddy make me dress warm to go outside, 
because they know it is cold and 1 would catch a cold, they love me so they want to keep 
me (hugs herself). That’s why that mommy bear was trying to find her babies because 
they needed to come inside, it was cold, and windy, and snowing outside; they would get 
sick and sicker.”  This pattern o f moving away from the topic to formulate a stable 
foundation provided an opportunity to demonstrate multiple dimensions o f knowledge 
that may not have been tapped due to the unfamiliar topic.
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When the children had limited knowledge and understanding o f the theme or 
question, they usually reflected their knowledge first through absolutist attitudes dealing 
with the story or rules. They naturally touched on the simple, certain, and justification 
dimensions at the absolutist level before feeling confident to talk about their experiences, 
perhaps because they did not relate directly. Once they demonstrated competence (i.e. an 
internal comfort level that was judged by them), they would move on to more multiplistic 
comments. Regardless, they always seemed to be striving to get to their comfort point 
whether it was multiplistic, pretend, or disengagement.
Theme 3: There are positives and negatives when probing in and around Zone o f  
Proximal Development. There were positive and negative pattems surrounding this 
group’ s nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing that can be identified in 
relationship to the theory o f the Zone o f Proximal Development. Many o f the examples 
used thus far indicate some o f the positive areas that w ill be reported in this section. 
However, there are unarticulated and unforeseen boundaries surrounding the children’s 
knowledge and understanding that seem a bit counterintuitive.
First, they were capable and productive at conveying past experiences and prior 
knowledge (i.e. what they know and understand now without assistance or below their 
zone o f proximal development). For example, despite their practical experiences with 
snow and the winter theme, they associated the idea o f w inter to what they do know but 
not w ith as much ease and confidence as what they have actually experienced that is 
close to the topic. For example when asked, “ What do you know about winter?”  One 
child responded, “ Well, 1 know that it is cold and windy and I can’t wear my shorts, I like 
the summer and wearing my shorts and swimming.”  In this case she made associations to
301
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
personal preferences (i.e. what she knows and likes) rather than knowledge related 
closely to the winter theme. It just so happened that with many o f the children in the 
group the associations occurred in the same manner, in which they drew comparisons to 
the opposite when they lacked prior knowledge and experience. They demonstrated their 
command over absolutist and multiplist ways o f knowing and the ease with which they 
linked the dimensions o f knowledge.
However, the negative aspect o f continued probing the simplicity and certainty o f 
knowledge at all three developmental levels despite their fam iliarity, or lack thereof, 
beyond a specific point yielded greater and greater resistance from the group. One might 
think that because a theme was fam iliar or interesting that their attention and motivation 
would endure prolonged investigations o f deeper and deeper understanding and 
associations, but quite the contrary was the case. A fter a sequence o f questions that were 
below their zone o f proximal development the children became bored with the 
discussion; it seemed no longer interesting or challenging. It became mundane, and their 
behavior and ability or willingness to convey their knowledge deteriorated dramatically. 
For example, they would refuse to respond, became disruptive (i.e., laughing, yelling, 
dancing, jumping), or they disengaged (i.e., playing with other books and toys in the 
room). This negative impact o f belaboring an area that was developmentally below what 
they found to be challenging did not just impact an individual in the group; it had the 
potential to take the whole group down. This finding spiked curiosity about the strength 
o f the peers as scaffolds versus continuity o f ability between individuals in the groups. 
Therefore, an idea to formulate a group that had all o f the highest performing children to 
see the following; i f  they continued to scaffold one another even when pushed to
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boredom (as w ith simple and certain probing) and frustration (as w ith evaluativistic 
justification) or i f  the first child to fold would be able to bring down the momentum o f 
the entire group. These themes w ill be presented in Group 3.
Second, they were efficient at working collaboratively with others who were assisting 
them with new information which they could effectively relate to their prior knowledge 
and past experiences when given an anchor or a scaffold that actively expanded their 
knowledge and understanding w ithin their zone o f proximal development. They listened 
and observed the teacher, researcher, and their peers to identify information that could be 
linked to or overlapped with their existing knowledge. They latched on to that 
information as a tool in their expressive and receptive abilities. For example, one child 
sat quietly when the discussion about winter began. When asked a couple o f simple and 
certain knowledge questions regarding winter, Adam replied, “ 1 don’ t know about snow.”  
The researcher said, “ We are talking about winter and that doesn’ t always mean that it 
has to snow. We live in Las Vegas and we don’t see snow but it is still winter here. What 
is winter like in Las Vegas?”  Adam did not respond, and another child said, “ M y 
mommy makes me wear my mittens because it is cold and 1 have to wear my big coat and 
sometimes my boots.”  A fter a couple o f  the children shared their experiences, Adam 
said, “ Well ya, I wear my hat, and coat, and scarf when it is cold but 1 don’ t play in no 
snow cuz there is no snow in Las Vegas but I think it gets snowy like when the bears 
played and hided in the snow away from their mommy.”
In itia lly  he was uncertain about how to connect new information with existing 
infomiation, and his nonverbal communication was consistent with his uncertainty (i.e., 
hung his head but listened attentively to the discussion, shrugged his shoulder hopelessly.
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partially smiling, speaking quietly). After some assistance from others, he coordinated 
his knowledge with information from others that he could make sense from and 
personalized it in his own way of making sense and responding to the question. He was 
persistent and motivated; therefore, he remained appropriately engaged in the activity 
without frustration or disruption. As long as they believed they were still understanding 
or fell they had the ability to eventually be successful, they remained engaged and kept 
trying.
At the peak o f their zone o f proximal development was where they began to 
demonstrate a dramatic blow to their level o f confidence. Doubt began to appear in their 
nonverbal demeanor and began to present in their verbal jargon. What seemed 
counterintuitive about this pattern at the peak o f their zone o f proximal development was 
the absence o f disruptive behaviors as an indicator that they had reached a threshold. 
Rather there emerged control that their affective dispositions appeared to have over their 
cognitive ability. For example, internally they had an emotional sense that was 
observable (i.e., looks o f confusion, shame, doubt, poor eye contact) but at the same time 
they remained physically part o f the activity minus the behavioral distractions seen as a 
result o f boredom when they were being successful (i.e., yelling, squealing, dancing, 
wandering around).
Third, this pattern involves characteristics from both o f the previous two patterns by 
linking them together. They demonstrated a positive but brief range of engagement in 
areas that were above their cognitive ability (above their zone o f proximal development). 
Here they demonstrated partial understanding of what was being asked (i.e. having 
command o f receptive language), but they were unable to organize their knowledge or
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make appropriate associations in a relevant and coherent manner (i.e. demonstrating 
understanding using expressive language) with or without assistance. They would remain 
attentive and engaged insomuch as they would listen to the question, pause to 
contemplate a response, and make an attempt to respond but would quickly realize that 
what they were saying did not make sense. This was similar to when they were working 
within their zone o f proximal development. Following this b rie f attempt to successfully 
respond, the emotional impact o f their failure to understand escalated into behavioral 
disruption. This was consistent w ith that seen when functioning for extended periods o f 
time below their zone o f proximal development, which seemed to evoke boredom.
Theme 4: Associations related to personal experiences and lim ited pretend. The 
child-participants in this group demonstrated a clear pattern that is woven through the 
previous three themes; that is they were most confident and competent when they could 
relate new information to their personal experiences or use pretend as a means o f taking 
risks and remaining safe. Many o f the examples used to clarify the other themes for 
group 1 demonstrate clearly this pattern. This theme can be elaborated upon by 
mentioning that they seemed to have an instinctive characteristic that helped them 
monitor what they w ill and w ill not engage in; they were very savvy about staying w ithin 
a level and dimension o f knowledge that they felt most comfortable. Sometimes it 
appeared to be a conscious and deliberate manipulation, but other times it appeared to be 
an innate and unconscious response to feeling vulnerable. Regardless, they repeatedly 
retreated to multiplistic responses that reflected their personal experiences or their own 
individualistic pretend realities. For example, when they talked about monsters, they 
made associations to things that they know about (i.e.. Transformers, ninja turtles).
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“ Monsters are like the same as Blackout, and Optimus Prime, Bumblebee, Megatron, and 
Cybertron, some people think they are scary but I think they are cool.”  Then they took 
their fam iliar connections and advanced their knowledge from simple and certain to how 
they know it, sometimes using pretend. For example, “ 1 make Blackout and Leonardo 
fight and the loser is scary, he looks like this (facial gestures).”  In cartoons these two 
characters (Blackout the Transformer and Leonardo the ninja turtle) would never be in 
the same cartoon, let alone fighting. Fie completely made up a pretend scenario to 
convey what he thought would be scary.
Focus Group 2 Epistemic Profiles
Figure 26; Focus Group 2 Epistemic Profile
Epistemic Profile 
GROUP 2
Theme 4
Lack o f peer 
scalTolding had a 
negative impact on 
group epistemological 
ab ility
Theme 2
When dimensions are 
not integrated 
associations relate to 
fam ily, book, and 
personal experience
Theme 3
Pretend knowledge is 
dominant
Theme 1
Developmental 
Pattern 
M ultip lis t to Absolutist 
Content not a factor
Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Developmental patterns are consistent and not injhienced by content. 
Group 2 had less malleability in the way they conveyed their epistemologies from a
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developmental perspective. They transitioned between absolutist and multiplist points of 
view. There were two patterns that emerged from this group; they were different 
between pre-and post-instruction groups but were consistent week-to-week. More 
specifically the pre-instruction groups for monsters and winter were the same (see Figure 
27) and the post-instruction groups had the same pattern (see Figure 28), Therefore, it 
was thought that the content that was being discussed had no positive or negative impact 
on their epistemological development.
Figure 27: Group 2 Pre-Instruction 
Developmental Trajectory
Absolutist Multiplist Multiplist
Figure 28: Group 2 Post-Instruction 
Developmental Trajectory
Absolutist Multiplist Absolutist
In the pre-instruction focus groups the child-participants began with an objectively 
constructed knowledge. For example, when asked “ What can you tell me about winter?” , 
they responded, “ Winter is now, when it’s cold” , “ cold” , or “ rainy.”  They demonstrated 
their knowledge in brief fragtuented words or phrases, which were indicative o f simple
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and certain knowledge. They were slow to respond, and often their words appeared to be 
labored (i.e d ifficu lt to find) and hesitant. Onee they were comfortable with the 
foundation they had construeted, more multiplistic ways o f knowing were produced. For 
example, “ I like winter time; 1 ean be more like a princess and wear my pretty hats and 
my scarf matches, sometimes when 1 get dressed-up I feel like a princess and 1 just walk 
around but 1 stay warm.”  These multiplistic associations were constructed with more 
ease; their affect was more relaxed, and they used more animation (i.e. facial expressions 
and body gestures) to express eonfidenee. Onee they had gotten to this level o f knowing, 
it was impossible to get them to move to evaluativistic or absolutist perspectives.
When probing deeper for evaluativistie outlooks, they did not attempt to respond. For 
example when they were asked questions using their own words, such as; “ You said you 
like winter time. Why do you think you like it better in the winter?”  or “ Carl said he 
thinks winter is bad. Why is winter bad?”  These types o f questions appeared to be too 
d iffieult for the group to proeess, which resulted in behaviors eonsistent with eonfusion 
(i.e., looking away, shrugging shoulders, facial distress). The behavior was not disruptive 
in any way; they seemed eurious and attentive. However, their responses eontinued to be 
multiplistie and reflected personal experienees and prior knowledge. For example, their 
responses to the previous questions were as follows: “ I like it better in the winter, it is a 
good time and 1 have fun playing,”  and “ 1 like winter.”
Attempts to transition baek to absolutist attitudes eontinued to yield multiplistic 
statements. They wanted to diseuss topics that were closely associated with their 
preferenees and eould do so at all four dimensions o f knowledge in both the monster and 
winter focus groups. For example when asked, “ What happens in the winter that is
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different from summer?”  a response was, “ I know I can jum p through the water in the 
yard. I do it in my bare feet and jump and play and my mommy watches me beeause no 
water eomes out when it ’s eold outside. I ’m not allowed when it is eold.”  Onee they 
began to share their experienees, any movement away from multiplistie perspeetives 
resulted in resistance from the group in the way o f behavior disruptions. For example, 
they began to ro ll around on the floor, touch each other, and talk about what they were 
going to do when they got home.
The post-instructional focus groups took on a slightly different developmental 
pattern. They still did not demonstrate any type o f evaluativistic-like characteristies and 
maintained the ability to eonvey knowledge in both absolute and multiplist ways. Again, 
they initiated the group with absolutist ways o f knowing and moved to multiplist points- 
of-view; however, this appeared to bore them. They were not as content discussing their 
personal experiences as in the pre-instruetion groups. For example, when questioned 
about their experiences using their own words and seenarios, they began to demonstrate 
inappropriate behaviors and verbalizations sueh as repeating words from a story over and 
over, wandering around the room, jumping, and squealing. Typieally, they would 
respond positively from redirection from the researeher but would want to discuss a story. 
For example an exehange between two o f the children went like this;
Carl: “ I don’ t want to talk about her stuff. Let’s look at the rumpus in that book.”  
Jeremy: “ Me either, I want to look too.”
Carl: “ That rumpus was fun and they made Max the king o f them beeause they like 
him and we don’t like to hear about eold stuff.”
Jeremy: “ Ya, this is no fun.”  He grabbed the book from the table and opened it.
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Another instance o f this type o f behavior oecurred the seeond week, was when a 
child-partieipant, wandering around the room, picked up one o f the books that had been 
read during the week and said, “ Look, that baby bear liked the cold because remember he 
sneaked away from his mommy and got in the snow h ill so she eould not find him.”
The return to absolutist perspeetives and wanting to focus on the eontent o f the stories 
was a curious pattern sinee they had been so persistent in their need to remain multiplistic 
in the pre-instructional groups. When analyzed more closely, there eould be several 
reasons for their developmental trajeetory: (a) The topie o f winter was less fam iliar or 
interesting, (b) they had less new information to link to prior knowledge in the pre- 
instruetion group and did not generate it, (e) the members o f the group were at 
significantly different developmental levels and the majority overpowered the group 
dynamic, or (d) the redundancy o f reviewing the storyline helped them link the new 
information to their existing knowledge so it was more ehallenging, so they were seeking 
the more challenging way o f knowing. These ideas are important and w ill be touehed on 
in the overall group results.
Theme 2: Integrating dimensions o f  knowledge. Integrating the dimensions o f 
knowledge in Group 2 oeeurred in much the same way as was deseribed for Group 1 (See 
Figures 14 &  15). There are three distinetive pattems that emerged; (a) the nature o f 
knowledge (linking simple/certain knowledge), (b) the process o f knowing (linking 
simple/justification, certain justification), and (c) the absence o f source o f knowledge. 
There are two primary differences that presented with Group 2, neither having to do with 
the aetual patterns, but rather the manner in which the patterns occurred. First, there was 
a much more prominent pattern among the associations that they made to books, family.
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and personal experiences. It was more clearly mainstreamed between the dimensions and 
the developmental levels. Second, the simple and certain dimensions o f knowledge 
in itia lly  were presented as more simple and certain rather than complex and uncertain (as 
in Group 1 ). An important characteristic appeared in Group 2 that was similar to Group 
1, which was the increase o f nonverbal communication as their knowledge became 
apparently more complex and uncertain in nature.
When the patterns for the dimensions o f knowledge are looked at for Group 2, there is 
a precise organization between the dimensions o f knowledge and the associations that are 
linked to each dimension w ithin specific developmental perspectives. When these child- 
participants contributed their understanding o f knowledge from an absolutist point o f 
view, which they did more spontaneously yet with d ifficu lty, they tended to include a 
combination o f associations between the book and their family. For example, “ You 
should never go way from your mommy and daddy, see the mommy bear is worried 
about her babies. M y mommy watches me when I play so she don’ t worry,’’ or “ Them 
monsters are scaiy but my daddy says they are not real monsters.”  They made this same 
combination o f book-family association at the absolutist level for simple, certain, and 
justification o f knowledge. However, when they shifted to a multiplist perspective, the 
combination o f associations dramatically converted to personal experiences and family 
and was carried out through all o f the dimensions at the multiplist level o f development. 
For example, “ 1 know parties are fun, I like parties because one time my mommy and 
daddy gave me a party and we went to bowling and ate pizza. It was a lot o f fun and we 
played a lot (facial and body gestures). I was not ascared.”  These examples show how 
they coordinated the contextual meanings to convey the understanding o f their
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knowledge. The next characteristic that was identified has to do with how they shifted 
through the dimensions o f knowledge.
Although the pattern o f linking their knowledge was consistent, the structure and 
stability o f their knowledge varied from Group 1, in that this group gradually progressed 
from simple to complex knowledge and from certain to uncertain knowledge. Also when 
simple and certain knowledge were linked to justification, they seemed to convert to 
simple and certain dynamics. It was with probing questions that their knowledge 
appeared to advance. For example, when asked, “ What could monsters do to have fun?” , 
“ Piggy-back rides”  was the response. Then w ith probing, “ Yes, piggy-back rides. Tell 
me about how monsters can have fun doing piggy-back rides,”  the responses became 
more elaborate, in that their knowledge came across as more complex and that there was 
uncertainty in knowledge. For example, “ Sometimes, i f  monsters play and have fun, I 
think they would put the girl monsters on their back and spin around real fast like this 
(spinning) and some o f the monsters could do this (jumping and falling) and some other 
monsters could do this (falling backwards) but i f  I was a monster 1 would put Arie l high 
(arms) on my shoulders, up here (looks up and anns) and we would have fun and laugh 
because we would be being like monsters having a party because it would be a birthday.”  
The same type o f progression was seen with justification o f knowledge as well; in itia lly, 
their construction o f justifications for knowledge lacked evidence and was simple. For 
example, “ Why do monsters have parties?”  An immediate response was, “ Because.”  
Persistent probing resulted in this sequence o f responses from one o f the participants in 
the group; “ Because”  “ Because, they just do.”  “ Monsters just have parties because.”  “ I
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think they have a party because they are happy and they want to celebrate, like me I have 
a party at my birthday and my brother’s birthday too and my mommy and daddy’s too.”
Another important characteristic that developed during analysis o f the patterns that 
were presented for the dimensions of knowledge was the children’s use o f tools to 
communicate their knowledge and understanding. This group demonstrated verbal 
means o f conveying their knowledge when their knowledge was simple and certain; 
however, as their knowledge and understanding became more complex and uncertain, 
they began to incorporate verbal and nonverbal means o f communicating. Very similar 
to the previous group, they complemented their words with the use o f facial expressions, 
body gestures, and pointing. They never jointly nor individually generated evaluativistic 
ways o f knowing, but this coordination o f verbal and nonverbal communication presented 
itself more in the process of knowing (i.e. justification) in both the absolutist and 
multiplist. A great example of this communication process can be seen in Carl’ s 
statement above about piggy-back rides.
Theme 3: Use o f pre tend  knowledge is dominant. There was less group cohesiveness 
within this group; they appeared to be functioning from different levels o f interest and 
personal experiences. However one similarity among the children was their inclination 
for relying heavily on pretend realities. For the most part they did not have a smooth 
discourse pattern and took turns talking and answering questions and occasionally 
responded to one another. Typically, when they were responding to one another, it was 
based on pretend associations that were made. The following exchanges are examples of 
how the group excelled when identifying with each other’s use of pretend as a way o f 
making meaning:
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Trudy: “ When I am having a party I am only inviting princesses. I don’ t want to have 
no monsters or scary people and we w ill dance beautiful-like (demonstrates).”
Carl: “ Ya, that’s a girl party, me and Ariel danced before but not at a party but 1 
would have them Www Things at my party because we would have more fun and 1 
am not afraid so they could be invited too.”
Trudy: “ 1 don’t think that princesses would like to have monsters at my party. We 
are going to eat little sandwiches and have a tea party (pretending to drink tea). 
Jeremy: “ No, no, no!!”  “ Monsters, monsters we want the Wild Things.”
Carl: “ Sometimes my mommy and daddy have some parties, and they swing from 
the trees and give piggy-back rides, and all o f their friends laugh but they don’t the 
monsters come to it because they aren’t real and only me and Ariel know about 
them.”
Jeremy: “ The wild things aren’ t real.”
Trudy: “ My mommy and daddy have princesses at their parties because they want to 
and they know the monsters are not real but the princesses can be if  they want. 1 
think they have real parties sometimes, and they make big messes and have to clean 
up. The princesses don’t clean their messes and the wild things made a big mess to.”  
They were able to identify with each others’ ways o f incorporating the new 
information with their pretend world. This was an area where they found success and 
mutuality which was observed in their affective dispositions (i.e., affect became bright, 
more enthusiastic, more animated, laughing) and level o f engagement (i.e., better eye 
contact, improved listening and observing their group members, asking questions).
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Theme 4: Lack o f peer scaffolding had a negative impact o f  the group 
epistemological ability. The group dynamic present in Group 2; that is, their individual 
differenees (affective ability, gender, interests, social skills, and individual 
epistemological levels); appeared to have a negative impact on characteristics that might 
promote their level o f group epistemologieal funetioning. The primary deficit appears to 
be in the way that the group interacted together; they failed to identify with each other on 
a cognitive, affcetive, or behavioral level. These peer seaffolding qualities have been 
identified in the individual epistemic profiles and strongly influenced the productivity o f 
Group 1. Interestingly, these three child-participants demonstrated these very same traits 
during other group activities such as whole class instruction, center activities, and 
playtime, so it is curious why they failed to engage in similar characteristics fo r the focus 
groups, making it seemingly uncharacteristic that they would not reconstruct a similar 
pattern w ithin the focus groups. In all four o f the focus group activities, they did not 
meet nor exceed many o f the traits that could showcase the flex ib ility  o f epistemological 
development or versatility to access multiple dimensions o f knowledge independently 
without probing questions.
This group was eognitively inefficient in that they did not demonstrate the ability to 
expand their knowledge and understanding by building on their peer’ s contributions or 
experiences. They utilized the use o f pretend far more than they demonstrated the ability 
to tap into constructing knowledge based on mutual collaborative efforts; therefore, it 
inhibited their opportunity to retrieve baekground knowledge and elaborate upon that 
knowledge. The focus group interaction was fragmented. For instance, a child said, “ I 
like the sunny weather beeause 1 ean wear my bathing suit and go swimming and not in
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the winter.”  Immediately following this response, another member of the group said, 
“ The bears have lots of fur to keep them warm in the winter, so they like to play in the 
snow, we don’t have fur on us.”  This example demonstrates how the child-participants in 
this group were somehow detached from each other; they lacked the spontaneity and 
mutual interests that may be needed in order to cognitively extrapolate or elaborate upon 
another’s knowledge. The only attempt that was made to combine their knowledge was 
when they discussed pretend scenarios and, even with this trait in place, it did not expand 
nor contribute to their individual or collective epistemologies.
Another mode o f peer scaffolding that did not appear in this group was the ability to 
connect on an affective level. The child-participants were as disconnected emotionally 
from one another as they could be; however, individually they were so different, from an 
affective standpoint, that it could have been an unrealistic goal. There was no group 
motivation nor joining o f enthusiasm for each other’s experiences that would suggest 
their epistemological development or their dimensional knowledge was supported by 
their peers. In fact, in this group, there was negative affective support. For example, at 
one point the two young boys in the group teamed up against the girl. They talked apart 
from one another and on occasion demonstrated inappropriate behaviors such as telling 
someone to “ shut up,”  putting their hand over one of their peer’s mouth, sticking out their 
tongue, and covering their ears while a peer was talking.
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Focus Group 3 Epistemic Profiles
Figure 29: Focus Group 3 Epistemic Profile
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Focus Group 3 was methodologically organized in the same way as Group 1 and 
Group 2 and included three o f the original child-participants. The difference was the 
participants were selected by the researcher from the previous two groups based on their 
individual and group epistemological thinking and behavior. Therefore, Group 3 
consisted o f Adam and GiGi (from Group 1) and Trudy (from Group 2). Everything 
about these two weeks of instruction and activities was the same, except the themes were 
construction and family, and there was no other group to compare to Group 3. The 
purpose o f coordinating a third group in this way was threefold: (a) methodologically, to 
preserve the relationships that had formed between the researcher and the child-
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participants and maintain children who were already familiar with the procedures o f the 
current study, in partieular the focus group activity; (b) epistemologically, to attempt to 
probe in more depth their knowledge and understanding from a developmental and 
dimensional perspeetive; and (c) socially, to investigate more vigorously the potential 
influenees o f positive group interactions on epistemological thinking (i.e., peer 
scaffolding o f cognitive, emotional, and behavioral eharacteristics).
Epistemic Themes
Theme 1: Three levels o f  developmental (group evaluativism). Group 3 demonstrated 
their knowledge and understanding at all three developmental levels; the patterns nearly 
mirrored Group 1 in many ways. The main difference was that rather than two patterns 
in the post-instruction group, they had only one for both themes. In this section the 
themes from Group 3 are presented, along with some charaeteristics that are noteworthy 
as compared with the previous two groups.
The first week’s theme was construetion. In terms o f the child-participant’s 
fam iliarity this theme compared more closely to the winter theme and likewise in the 
developmental patterns (See Figure 30). It was apparent from the pre-instruction focus 
group that the partieipants had some understanding o f the idea o f construetion, but the 
aetual word was somewhat foreign. In itia lly, they were very slow to start; the question 
was “ What do you know about construction?”  A ll eyes were on the researcher; their 
interest was piqued, but the expressions on their faces noted contusion, curiosity, and 
hesitation. The same child-participant who had taken a leader role in Group 1 maintained 
his leader status in Group 3. He began saying, “ I t ’ s when people (agitated gestures) and 
then they (more gestures) and I would (gestures) and karate kiek them, like this.”  The
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two girls followed in this string o f theatrical demonstrations that appeared to be 
meaningless. This type o f scenario had been antieipated due to the laek o f background 
knowledge and experience in the winter focus group; therefore, the researcher had 
pietures o f eonstruction. The researeher presented the pictures to the group without an 
explanation o f them but said, “ These are some pietures that I think show construetion. 
Take a look. Do they help you talk about construction?”  Although still unfamiliar with 
the term (i.e. they had diffieulty saying the word), they were now w illing  and more able 
to talk about their knowledge o f eonstruction. Does the content matter to the 
developmental o f preschooler’s epistemologies? Three eharaeteristics standout about the 
way this focus group began that may be important later: (a) their willingness to attempt to 
eonstruct understanding despite their confusion, (b) their behavior was more constructive 
rather than disruptive, and (c) their epistemological level o f development and the parallel 
charaeteristies that seemed to promote their ability.
In the pre-instruction focus group, they had some reservations about their knowledge; 
therefore, they began from an absolutist perspective. Their associations were linked to 
their personal experienees and peers. Immediately, they began to scaffold one another’s 
knowledge, both eognitively and affectively. A fter the pietures were shown and the 
question was repeated, the group began with the following:
Trudy: “ I think Adam showed instruction good like (similar gestures).”  “ What is 
going on in the pietures is that these (pointing) big trucks are helping these (pointing) 
boys in making some house or something. I see trucks like them by where we live 
and that’ s what my daddy says they are doing.”
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Adam: “ Ya, it ’ s when big trucks go (sound effects) and they make a really big 
building like really big (arms out), like a, like a, like Wal-Mart is a huge store. I 
don’t like when we have to walk all over that store it takes too long and 1 get tired.”  
Trudy: Do you have big trucks where you live?”
GiGi: “ Yes, we have all o f them; they are same like yellow like them ones (pointing). 
Sometimes they make too much noise and it is loud and they make dirt all over 
(gestures). One time I was outside and I got d irt in my mouth, YUCK! I had to cover 
my mouth and my eyes to keep away from the dirt.
This example demonstrates information about the developmental patterns. It shows 
the initial absolutist way o f knowing, and it also begins to show the transition to 
multiplist views. Going back to Adam’s initia l demonstration, this example shows how 
the source o f knowledge moved from internal to external although the source o f 
knowledge was never fu lly  acknowledged. Also, this example shows many o f the 
characteristics o f how peers scaffold each other w ithin the grouping, such as using their 
peer’s words to help him/her find his/her own words (i.e., “ big truck” ) and building on 
the general ideas o f peers. Also, they provided emotional support for each other. Also, 
the use o f body gestures and facial expressions surfaced during discussions o f more 
complex cognitive infonnation. In this case the topic was more challenging for them 
because they were unfamiliar w ith the actual word construction; however, they did have 
an understanding o f what construction is in an activity sense. Nonetheless they were quite 
guarded.
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Group 3 demonstrated a group-evaluativistic way of constructing knowledge with 
very little probing. They did so in a relevant and coherent manner. For example the 
following transcript shows how this unfolded;
Researcher: “ When I look at the picture, 1 see a bunch of different kinds of trucks; 
can you tell they are different?”
All: “ Yes”
Researeher: “ How arc they different?”
GiGi: “ (pointing at the front loader) This one has this thing, I think it goes up and 
down but this one has this in the back (pointing at the dump truck) and it goes up and 
down too but only different like, like, like (shrugs, head down).
Adam: “ This one (pointing) is a dump truck and 1 don’ t know what that one is but 
they both carry dirt and dump dirt like on Dora the Explorer. 1 saw them filling in a 
hole with dirt and it was like that truck they had it in.”
Trudy: “ 1 watched Dora the Explorer; 1 didn’t see them trucks with Dora. 1 see them 
by where I live all o f the time! They are big and heavy and they are way up high.”  
Adam: “ Well, I think you see the real big trucks, Dora’s are not real trucks but they 
are suppose to be; they still maked a lot o f noises and runned over somebody, 1 don’t 
think that could happen. I f  a real truck runned you over I would be (sound and 
gesture).
GiGi: “Yes, 1 think you would be (sound and gestures). 1 think on TV it is only play 
not for real, 1 wouldn’t want to get squeezed by them big trucks because then I would 
miss my mommy and daddy, I don’t want to go to the hospital.”
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Trudy; “ I f  you get (sound and noise) I w ill come to visit you and bring you some 
stu ff that would make you feel better but I won’ t bring you a big truek because you 
won’t want that. Only guys making houses and schools need to have a big truck like 
them euz they need it to help and they need money.”
In this example the child-participants collectively introduce the idea o f objective facts 
and subjective thinking in a single thought process and in terms o f simplicity o f 
knowledge, certainty, and justification. They also have demonstrated many o f the group 
characteristics that seem to promote this type thinking through group cohesiveness. 
Ultimately, they returned to a form o f multiplistic organization o f information. A t this 
point, the multiplistic view was where they chose to continue after a brie f length o f 
probing questions. It was the perspective that they referred to most frequently in this and 
other groups and the developmental level that they articulated with the most confidence 
and meaning. Also, multiplism was a level that the least amount o f pretend information 
is referenced.
The post-instruetion developmental pattern for the construction theme was similar to 
the pattern seen in the pre-instruetion focus group (See Figure 31). There are two 
charaeteristics that make this pattern distinctly different from the pre-instruction focus 
group: (a) The associations are more reflective o f the stories that were read throughout 
the week, peers, and background knowledge; and 2) the amount o f statements at the 
absolutist and evaluativist levels were doubled. M ultip lis tic  perspectives continued to 
dominate their ways o f thinking and understanding but with much less intensity as they 
seemed eager to engage in more challenging exchanges o f information.
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Figure 30; Group 3 Pre-Instruction Construction
Developmental Pattern
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As with the developmental pattern theme, there was one additional but distantly 
related point; the length o f time they continued to remain engaged even when challenged 
by higher order thinking tasks was far greater than had been seen at the individual or 
group level. The amount o f  tolerance they demonstrated for probing questions and 
inquiry about their experiences was noticeably longer; they seemed to be engaged for 
more extended periods o f time, and the disruptive behaviors due to boredom were almost 
extinct. The verbal and nonverbal behaviors seemed to be more consistent with requiring 
too much cognitive effort as seen when working in the exterior o f their zone o f proximal 
development.
323
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The developmental pattern for the family theme was the same at the pre-instruction 
and post-instruction focus group (See Figure 32). They demonstrated the ability to 
function at all three developmental levels and did so without much probing. When 
probing questions were presented, they were able to respond appropriately. The 
motivation and emotion that was presented implied that they had a certain amount o f 
competence in their knowledge and confidence in their understanding. This was 
demonstrated in the persistent positive facial expressions (i.e., smiling, good eye contact, 
expressions consistent w ith their words), communication (i.e., more frequent use o f their 
words, less redundancy o f what others said, no eeholalia), appropriate behaviors (i.e., 
attentive, curious, sitting still, listening to others), and cognitive indicators (i.e., staying 
on-topic, relevant to topic, coherent responses).
Figure 32: Group 3 Pre-and Post Instruction 
Family Developmental Pattern
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The most important point to make about the developmental pattern that emerged from 
the fam ily theme was the increase in absolutist and evaluativist ways o f knowing. This 
was identified in the construction theme post-instruction focus group. However, in the 
fam ily theme this trait was present in both the pre-and post-instruction focus groups.
They allowed and tolerated extended probing and, as a result, produced richer and deeper
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knowledge. For example, the follow ing question, which was based on one o f their 
statements, “ Why do you think we have a mommy and a daddy in our families?”  initated 
the discussion below.
Adam: “ We have both mommies and daddies because it takes two people to make a 
baby, and they don’t have to be the same color. Like me, my mommy is real white 
and my daddy is real brown but me 1 am just a little brown.”
GiGi: “ Ya, God made us have mommies and daddies so we would have them to love 
us and keep us safe and not get hurt. So we would have parents, like mommies and 
daddies.”
Adam: “ Ya like Adam and Eve had a baby boy like me.”
Trudy: “ I have a mommy and a daddy because they wanted me and my sister so we 
would be a family. That was we could go places and do things together like a family. 
A  fam ily can have a small amount (hand) or a big amount (arms). It ’s doesn’t matter 
how many babies you’ ll be a fam ily w ith a mommy and a daddy.”
Adam: “ Do you think God makes babies?”
Trudy: “ M y mommy and daddy made me. I know because they said that is why 1 am 
here.”
GiGi: “ God makes everything happen that is good. Sometimes some kids don’ t have 
a mommy and daddy that stays with them and that is bad to be away from them 
sometimes but you would get more toys at Christmas I think.”
Researcher: “ Do you know what it is called when kids don’t live with their mommy 
and daddy all the time?”
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This example illustrates the developmental pattern as well as a much deeper level o f 
understanding than in many o f the other groups. There could be a number o f reasons to 
support their epistemological perfomiance; these w ill be discussed in chapter 5.
Theme 2: Patterns o f  Unking nature o f  knowledge and process o f  knowing. The 
dimensions o f knowledge appear to fall into a pattern in Group 3 that is identical to the 
patterns identified in the other two groups. They linked simplicity and certainty o f 
knowledge; then they linked justification o f knowledge with either or both simple and 
certain knowledge. For example in this group; “ Sometimes when my fam ily does things 
together we have fun but sometimes we have to be serious, like when we go to the store 
we can’ t touch things or laugh; and we have to stay with my mommy because we w ill get 
lost and not find her and someone bad could take us.”  This example reflects a 
combination o f simple and certain knowledge with justification o f knowledge.
In Group 3, their knowledge appeared to be more complex and uncertain (as in Group 
1). They rarely initiated a thought or responded to a question or someone else’s 
contributions with a simple or certain way o f knowing (as seen in Group 2). I f  they did 
respond in a simple or certain manner, it was at an absolutist level and revolved around a 
classroom nile/procedure or some objective fact that was in the story or related to the 
story. For example, “ Miss Mary was their mother.”  During times when they 
spontaneously constnicted knowledge evaluativistically or used justifications for their 
knowledge (or were probed in that direction), there were no signs o f simple or certain 
knowledge but rather the nature o f knowledge in conjunction w ith the process o f 
knowing appeared to be predominantly complex and uncertain. In other words, they 
perceived knowledge as complex and integrated w ith their personal experiences, peers.
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the story, and family. (In this case this may not have been significant since the topic was 
‘ fam ily ’ .) In addition, they acknowledged that knowledge is changing and can be 
different based on the person, place, and time; they associated knowledge with rules and 
procedures.
Source o f knowledge was a dimension that had been challenging in the other groups 
and was no different in Group 3. They regularly referred to their family, the book, and 
their peers in im plicit ways and explicitly in their responses. However, when asked a 
specific source o f knowledge question, they did not understand the meaning o f the 
question. For example, “ How do you know that your mommy and daddy love you?”  No 
verbal response was given by any o f the child-participants in the group; one child 
responded by wrapping her arms around herself. Others in the group followed her lead, 
but no could verbalize an internal or external source fo r their knowledge. Later in a 
comment the same girl responded to the question, “ What does your mommy or daddy do 
that makes you think they love you?”  “ I know my mommy and daddy love me because 
they always give me hugs and kisses; and they tell me they love me all the time. 
Especially at when I go to bed at nighttime.”  Another interesting response that was 
typical: “ How do you know that your mommy and daddy love you?”  “ Because they do.”  
Starting a sentence with “ because”  was common when source o f knowledge questions 
were asked; this indicated to the researcher that they needed or wanted to give a 
justification for their understanding. This indicated that they had a sense that the answer 
needed to come from a dimension or way o f knowing that would be consistent with the 
process o f knowing. Since they had command o f justification o f knowledge, in that they 
could provide evidence o f their knowledge and understanding, this was where they felt
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most comfortable and competent; therefore, their answers to source of knowledge were 
confused with justification o f knowledge.
Theme 3: Peer scaffolding had a positive influence on epistemological thinking. The 
child-participants in this group were intentionally chosen from the six child-participants 
because o f their individual and group epistemological and behavioral productivity. It was 
thought that, by selecting the children that had demonstrated the greatest capacity to 
convey their epistemologies and do so within a group using appropriate social skills and 
positive affective traits, a deeper level o f epistemological thinking could be uncovered. 
This group relied heavily on their peers as scaffolds for their knowledge and 
understanding. Many of the same characteristics that have been previously mentioned 
are again mentioned in this section with specific examples unique to this group.
Cognitively peers were utilized as scaffolds when they listened and observed others. 
These contributions from their peers prompted background knowledge. For example, 
“ Ya, Dora, I have a truck like the one in the book, it doesn’t move up and down though 
but it’s yellow too and has a place to put the dirt and take it to another place.”  They used 
other’s experiences and elaborated upon what had already been said, as in the following 
“ My mommy makes me breakfast too, like Trudy’s mom. 1 have to eat it or I can’t play 
with the dog. Sometime I give some o f my food to my dog because 1 don’t want to eat it. 
My mommy doesn’t know or I would be in big trouble.”  They sometimes did not agree 
on their knowledge and engaged in a form of argumentation or debate. For example: 
Adam: “They build bridges the same as a house. I think with them trucks but a 
bridge is bigger.”
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Trudy: “No, they don’t because a bridge is made in the water, like over water 
(gestures). How would the big trucks get into the water to make it go across?”
Adam: “ But that’s when it’s all done and the trucks are on the ground. Bridges stop 
people from getting in the water.”
GiGi; “ I don’t know, probably you need to have the trucks but maybe other trucks 
are special. Miss Denise do they have special trucks to make a bridge? Maybe they 
walk on the water trucks.”
Adam: “ I never seen trucks walk on the water. Have you seen them Miss Denise?” 
An interesting point about this example is that they conversed a short period before 
they sought authority, but they were willing and motivated to figure it out. When they 
couldn’ t, they asked questions. This was a characteristic not terribly prominent in the 
focus groups but was seen in the individual epistemologies profile.
As just illustrated in the previous example, there was a high degree of motivation and 
self-efficacy for the challenge o f discovering new information. A ll o f the child- 
participants seemed to be equally weighted in their ability to stay interested in the topics 
and motivated to engage in the task. They did this primarily independently and required 
no redirections from the researcher. This level of engagement allowed them to generate a 
positive group disposition in which they laughed and smiled appropriately during 
discussions and were respectful o f their peers by taking turns and making each other feel 
they had important things to say and encouraging them. The high level o f affective 
engagement deterred the children from veering off-topic. They were focused on the task. 
In addition, they were mutually invested in the focus group activity which may have
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accounted for the extended amount o f probing that was tolerated and the increase in other 
developmental thinking outside o f their multiplistic comfort zone.
Theme 4: Increase in background knowledge and personal experience disrupt 
pretend knowledge. This theme has to do with the absenee o f pretend knowledge. In the 
other group themes and the individual epistemic profile, it has been identified that a large 
part o f preschooler’s repertoire o f construeting knowledge and making associations 
involves the integration o f their pretend world. Group 3 demonstrated quite the contrary 
experiences; they remained on-task, as attributed to peer seaffolding above, and required 
no behavior nor cognitive redirection to stay on-task. There was minimal redirection in 
that the researeh did interject probing questions which were not resisted by the group as 
seen in Group 1. Rather their pattern appeared to utilize their background knowledge and 
past personal experiences to proceed through the focus group. This intensity practically 
eliminated the pretend associations that might have been thought typical.
On the rare instanee that a member o f the group contributed a pretend scenario; for 
example, “ Dora the Explorer;”  Adam was very quick to say, “ That’s not real.”  GiGi was 
another keeper o f what was real and what was pretend. For example, she said, “ I don’ t 
think mommies wear aprons; I think that is just in the pieture. I think when my mommy 
bakes pies she wears her old sweat pants so i f  they get dirty then i t ’ s okay.”
As an observation, one o f the things that also appeared to keep the partieipants 
focused on real-world scenarios (i.e. background knowledge and past experiences) was a 
degree o f non-threatening competition that presented itse lf in this group. This 
eompetition was seen m inimally in an earlier group and in the individual profiles but has
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not emerged through the participants. It could be a competition o f knowledge or due to 
gender (Both Group 1 &  3 had one boy and two girls).
Across Focus Group Epistemic Profile
Figure 33: Focus Group Epistemic Profile
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Theme 1: Epistemologies are Multidimensional.
Preschooler’s group epistemologies are multidimensional as seen primarily in Groups 
1 and 3. M ultip list ways o f knowing were the most common; however, they 
demonstrated the ability to shift among absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist with and 
without probing from the researcher. In addition, they demonstrated a shift between 
developmental levels when prompted by peer influences. The most reoccurring 
developmental pattern begins and ends w ith multiplistic ways o f knowing and includes 
absolutist and evaluativist viewpoints (See Figure 34). Out o f nine developmental
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patterns, this developmental sequence appears in five group themes (See Figures 21, 23, 
25, and 32). A portion of this trajectory was identified in the post-instruction focus 
groups (monster and winter) for Group 2, that is the transition between multiplist and 
absolutist perspectives (See Figure 28).
Figure 34: Group Epistemic Developmental Pattern
EvaluativistAbsolutistMultiplist Multiplist
There are distinctive patterns o f development that appear within the same theme of 
the week but between pre-and post-instructional groups. The most consistent 
developmental pattern that was identified between pre-and post-instruction focus groups 
was onset o f conveying their knowledge. For example, in the pre-instruction group, their 
knowledge was activated at the multiplist level; however, in the post-instruction focus 
groups their knowledge was activated at the absolutist level (See Figure 22, 28, 31). This 
pattern appears to have taken form in the lower epistemological group (i.e., Group 2) and 
in the groups in which the theme of the week was more unfamiliar to the child- 
participants (i.e. winter and construction).
A final developmental trend that can be identified in the group themes is the influence 
that background knowledge and personal experiences played in maintaining the 
children’s interest or motivation to attend to a topic. This allowed them more time and
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patience to investigate their alternative ways o f knowing, such as absolutist and 
evaluativist points o f view. This was primarily seen in Group 3, but when comparing 
Group 1 and Group 2 the same pattern emerges, in which Group 1 had longer duration o f 
time-on-task and greater absolutist and evaluativist substance within their group.
Theme 2: Linking Nature o f  Knowledge and Process o f  Knowing.
A ll three groups demonstrated identical patterns for linking the nature o f knowledge 
and the process o f knowing. This pattern existed so strongly that despite the 
developmental level, the pattern persisted. When associating new information w ith prior 
knowledge and past experiences, they linked the nature o f knowledge together 
simultaneously and seemingly automatically. Here they joined the simplicity o f 
knowledge and the certainty o f knowledge as i f  they were one dimension o f knowledge. 
For example, “ I know; its M ax;”  In this example the knowledge is simple and certain. 
However, they also integrate knowledge dimensions when the knowledge was complex 
and uncertain; for example, “ Sometime I think i t ’ s good to fo llow  the rule, like in the 
Cricket classroom, but sometimes at home 1 don’ t always fo llow  my mommy’s rules.”  In 
this example the simple and certain dimensions are integrated, but the knowledge appears 
to show complexity and uncertainty. The structure and the stability o f their knowledge 
appear to be operating in unison.
This same simple-certain pattern gets carried over to the process o f knowing, or at 
least w ith the justification o f knowledge, because source o f knowledge consistently 
eluded all o f the child-partieipants in this study. Looking at the process o f knowing 
pattern, whether the knowledge is simple and certain or complex and uncertain child- 
participants activated their justification o f knowledge with the nature o f knowledge
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almost as a prerequisite or as a means o f arriving at a justification o f knowledge. For 
example, “ I have two trucks, one looks like this one (points) and the other one is like that 
(points). Well, I have lots o f trucks but they are all different, mostly I play with the ones 
like them because they are the biggest and they have parts that move because sometimes 
when I play I have to have the trucks carry some stuff for me.”  This example 
demonstrates how they linked the three dimensions; simple, certain, and justification; 
however, there were instances in which they may have used the dimensions in other 
combinations, such as simple and justification (“ Max because that is what his mommy 
called him.” ) or certain and justification (Yes, because that’s what mommies and daddies 
do because they like to have fun sometimes.” ).
Theme 3: Peers Scaffold Alternative IVays o f  Knowing.
This was a theme that was cultivated by the researcher when specific characteristics 
emerged early on in the study between Group 1 and Group 2. Peer interactions and 
relationships needed to be investigated closely when there were dramatically different 
findings in the focus groups, specifically their epistemological capabilities. This was 
particularly o f interest because Group 2 actually functioned better (epistemologically) on 
an individual basis, but even with that impression, when they were investigated 
individually, it was based on interactions in group settings such as whole class instruction 
and center activities, so it did not make complete sense that they would regress (so to 
speak) within the focus groups. Therefore, the group dynamic became an area o f interest. 
Why would they demonstrate weaker potential w ithin the focus group?
What emerged from this question was the foundation o f this theme. The interaetions 
among peers w ithin a group could be positive or negative influences on their capability or
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willingness to report their knowledge and understanding. There were multiple activities 
that peers engaged in that contributed to epistemological diversity and depth o f 
understanding. This was thought to be a form o f scaffolding or peer scaffolding. In this 
scaffolding, peers assisted others in their group cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally 
by using appropriate social skills or social conventions. Group 1 demonstrated positive 
peer influence in all three categories (i.e., cognitive, affective, behavioral). Alternatively, 
Group 2 did not engage in several o f the characteristics available in any o f the eategories, 
and the lack o f peer scaffolding created a negative impact on the group’s epistemological 
functioning. Group 3 was purposely arranged to test the strength o f positive peer 
scaffolding and did show some positive impact. Specifically, the cohesiveness o f the 
group and subsequent peer scaffolding produced a closer glimpse at the absolutist and 
evaluativist developmental levels and allowed for greater depth o f understanding 
regarding their epistemologies.
In this study three categories o f peers scalTolding developed; cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral; and an example o f each follows. Cognitive peer scaffolding occurred most in 
terms o f the children being able to relate to or make associations based on what another 
child had contributed. This occurred most eommonly when the associations could be 
made to fam ily, peers, personal experiences, rules, and books. Their ability to form 
associations tended to vary depending on the children’s fam iliarity with the topic, their 
personal experiences, or, even in some cases, the mutuality or overlap o f their pretend 
world. When the child-participants were able to identify with their peers they would 
build on what was previously contributed. They would draw similarities and differences, 
challenge their peer’s knowledge, offer help in the form o f creative ideas, or discuss how
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they reasoned about an idea or decision. For example, “ I think I am going to make my 
monster like this because I want it to look like Blackout, he is big and strong and I want 
to be like him but 1 think it is good that the girls don’t want to make it like mine because 
that would be silly because it’s not a girl toy. What are you going to make your monster 
like?”  This example could also be viewed as a form o f affective peer scaffolding. He 
explained his reasoning for designing his monster in a certain way. but he also was 
positive and supportive o f his peer’s lack of interest in wanting to make it similar to his 
and showed a curiosity about what they w ill make. Later, during the activity, he did 
question them about why they chose the colors and template that they chose.
Affective peer scaffolding included constructs such as motivation and interest which, 
when positively generated, promoted longer engagement in a task, more relevant on-task 
potential, and more coherent and meaningful exchanges. The child-participants, when 
positively charged, demonstrated bright, cheerful affect (i.e., smiling, laughing 
appropriately not out o f control or disruptive), and they were relaxed, active, and willing 
participants.
Behavioral peer scaffolding occurred when the child-participants would gently 
redirect their peers i f  they were behaving inappropriately or distracting from the 
experience. For example, “ GiGi you need to come and sit down so we can finish and go 
to snack.”  Also, “ I f  you slide down then he won’t be touching you.”  While leaning 
forward making eye contact with her peer she said, “ Stop touching her, you aren’t 
suppose to touch anyone. You’re being bad.”
The key to behavioral peer scaffolding (more so than the other ways o f scaffolding) 
was that the peer had to be willing to redirect their behavior based on the feedback from
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another peer. There were several instances that this behavioral scaffolding backfired due 
to uncooperative participants. This was the case frequently in Group 2. However, the 
preschoolers were generally receptive to this technique. In fact there were often times 
when a redirect from authority (i.e., teacher, researcher, aides) was ineffective, but the 
children’s redirecting o f their peers was acceptable and effective. There is more o f a 
social hierarchy that, although it includes authority, it also includes peers so it works with 
the preschoolers. (This might be questionable with older children.)
Theme 4: Relevance and Real-World Experience
The more relevant the topics are to the group, the more they associate new 
information to real-world personal experiences and bypass the ambiguity and solitude o f 
their internal pretend knowledge. The themes o f the week were designed by the group o f 
preschool teachers at the preschool; on what basis they decided on the topics o f monsters, 
winter, construction, and family is unknown. However, it became apparent throughout 
the study and the focus groups in particular that the subject matter used in preschool 
classrooms is more effective at generating epistemologieal understanding when it is 
closely related to knowledge or experiences that the children already possess. In this way 
it gives the child-participants a foundation to work w ith, as opposed to having to create 
that foundation.
When a foundation is already in place, such as w ith  the themes o f monsters and 
family, they tended to draw associations fa irly quickly, took the initiative in constructing 
knowledge, and linked new information to prior knowledge to perpetuate understanding. 
For example, “ Maybe i f  some kids don’t have both mommies and daddies, they eould 
borrow somebody’ s. I know kids who have lots o f mommies and daddies. 1 have two
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mommies and one daddy. The one mommy is my step mommy and I share her w ith a 
bunch o f her other kids. Sometimes they stay w ith us but sometimes they go see their 
other daddy. Their other daddy is mine too.”  This is a complex situation that this child 
has a good understanding of, and her peers listen attentively to her because they have 
experience and understanding o f a fam ily. Whereas, when a child goes on about 
something that the peers don’ t grasp themselves and have no interest in, both sides 
become disengaged. For example, “ I don’ t know about winter.”  It is d ifficu lt for the 
children to become enthusiastic about winter when their experience is completely 
different from what is being presented in the stories (i.e., snow). It was seen in the focus 
groups; it was too cognitively and affectively demanding to try to absorb new 
information and identify associations without foundational knowledge.
Two scenarios were identified as a result o f  content not being relevant to the child- 
participants’ needs in order to be able to successfully convey their knowledge and 
understanding. First, they attempted to formulate a foundation based on what they know. 
They know that their pretend knowledge can be anything that they want it to be even i f  it 
does not make sense. The problem was not simply an individual problem. In this study it 
was identified in Group 2 how perpetuating pretend knowledge can evoke frustration 
among members o f a group.
The second scenario is a behavioral perforation o f the members o f the group and was 
identified as being facilitated by two types o f frustration. One was a bit milder and more 
controllable, in which the children became ovei-whelmed or frustrated seemingly as in 
cognitive overload scenarios; The other scenario was where the children were probed 
beyond their zone o f proximal development. In these type o f instances the behavioral
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consequences that emerged from the group could be modified by adjusting the type o f 
questioning or the degree o f d ifficu lty o f an activity. I f  the cognitive load was alleviated, 
the activity survived with all members still interested and engaged (as seen in portions o f 
Group 1 and Group 2). However, i f  the situation surpassed the challenge o f the 
participants, then the result was often just disengagement, but other times complete 
disruption o f the group could result. The other more uncontrollable behavioral outbursts 
were activated by boredom due to lack o f interest or failure to challenge the participants. 
In this situation the group was foreclosed on and could not be salvaged easily (as seen in 
portions o f Group 1 and Group 2). When the child-participants were bored and felling 
unchallenged, they became completely disruptive.
Therefore, having information relevant to the interests, background knowledge, and 
personal experiences was the most effective and efficient way to identify the child- 
participants’ knowledge w ithin a focus group setting. They had a zone o f comfort about 
conveying their knowledge and knowing that was more thoroughly and generously 
conveyed when the information was relevant to them. In this way it reduced the pretend 
knowledge they were inclined to resort to for a level o f comfort and diminished the 
potential for them to rely on inappropriate behaviors as a means o f distraction and to 
retrieve their safety net.
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Preschoolers’ Epistemic Profile
Figure 35; Preschoolers’ Epistemic Profile
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Theme 1: Predominantly M ultip list Level o f Development.
Preschool children demonstrate their epistemologies predominantly at a multiplist 
level o f development. This was found in the individual and group setting. They are 
confident and competent at these levels when the information is relevant to them and they 
can make connections between new information and existing information based on 
personal experience or pretend scenarios. However, there are distinctive patterns that 
emerge based on the content o f the new information and the context o f the setting in 
which the knowledge is activated or cultivated.
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Theme 2: D is tinc tive  Patterns o f  L in k in g  D im ensions o f  Knowledge.
This was the most consistent pattern identified in this study. Individuals and groups 
o f preschool children link the dimensions o f knowledge into the nature o f knowledge and 
the process o f knowing; they do not appear to do this in an intentional or conscious 
manner. The most identified patterns o f linking the dimensions o f knowledge were as 
follows; (a) simplicity and certainty o f knowledge, (b) simplicity and justification o f 
knowledge; (c) certainty and justification; and (d) simple/certain and justification o f 
knowledge. The context o f the situation did not seem to have relevance in this study for 
linking the dimensions o f knowledge. However, the content o f the infoiTnation appeared 
to play an important role; that is, the more fam iliar or comfortable the child was w ith the 
content, the more they used the nature o f knowledge and the process o f knowing. 
Whereas, the less relevant the topic was, so that they had very limited resources (i.e., 
background knowledge, personal experience), the more confined they were to the nature 
o f knowledge, and the more cognitively demanding it was to tap into justification o f 
knowledge. In this study the source o f knowledge went virtually unattainable in an 
explicit manner but did appear to exist in guiding preschoolers implicitly.
Theme 3: Indicators o f  Cognitive Overload When Probing Outside Their ZPD.
The impact o f cognitive overload appears to negatively influence preschooler’s 
epistemologies. In this study, while investigating knowledge below their ZPD, it was 
recognized that the children can become bored and insufficiently challenged in their 
knowledge ability. When they were probed beyond a point o f discomfort to them (i.e. 
presumably emotionally), they began to lose interest; that is, they maintained a physical 
presence, but mentally and emotionally they were elsewhere. After a b rie f period, they
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began a course o f disruptive behaviors (i.e., jumping, yelling, screeching) followed by 
complete disengagement, in which they physically removed themselves from the activity. 
Once in motion this sequence was d ifficu lt to salvage.
Probing beyond a preschooler’s zone o f proximal development can be 
epistemologically costly but can be diffused i f  identified quickly and efficiently. In this 
case, probing higher than the ch ild ’s ZPD identified specific cues that the children 
exhibited to indicate their frustration, confusion, doubt, and anxiety. One thing for sure 
was clear; preschoolers want to be successful in their knowledge. When they have a sense 
that they cannot be successful, they become ovenvhelmed (i.e., cognitive overload).
There were many indicators, both verbal and nonverbal, as it was emerging. For example 
nonverbal cues identified included the follow ing: poor eye contact, facial expressions o f 
shame and doubt, increased tapping any part o f their body, restlessness, anxiety, less 
attention span, putting their hands over their face, deep breathing. The verbal cues 
identified included the following: repeating the same word or phrase, coming up with 
nonsense words or sounds, yelling, squealing, saying “ I don’t know,”  “ I don’t care,”  and 
other articulations that emphasized their dissatisfaction.
I f  these cues o f distress were acknowledged and the cognitive load was neutralized, 
then the child regained productivity on the task. However, i f  the cues were not respected, 
then the child skipped the uninterested scenario. When the children in this study arrived 
at this point, two courses dominated as follows: (a) The child became disruptive and then 
disengaged, or (b) the child skipped the disruptive episodes and simply removed him or 
herself from the activity. On the occasions when the latter was the case, it was extremely
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difficu lt to reengage those children in a future activity. This was particularly the case 
with Carl and Jeremy on an individual and group situation.
Theme 4: Epistemologies Are Promoted Through Peer Interactions.
This overall theme impacted the individuals’ as well as the group profiles. 
Preschooler’s epistemologies are portrayed most thoroughly at the developmental level 
and dimensions o f knowledge when they are scaffolded by their peers. This emerged as a 
consistent theme and surprisingly more so than any other authority in the classroom (i.e., 
teacher, aides, researcher, books). Peers scaffold the epistemologies o f preschoolers 
primarily in positive ways; cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally.
This theme has been reported in great detail in this chapter, but to reiterate, these 
categories o f peer scaffolding were more powerful in being able to understand the 
breadth and depth o f the child-participants in this study. Cognitively, preschoolers 
depended on their peers to assist in the sharing o f the their personal experiences and the 
activation o f their prior knowledge; also they utilized them as a resource to test higher 
order thinking skills such as decision-making, reasoning, critical thinking (i.e., drawing 
similarities and differenees, arguing their point o f view). When preschoolers cannot 
relate to their peers as source o f knowledge, epistemic potential is inhibited.
A  sim ilar pattern existed in this study in terms o f the process o f listening and 
observing their peers. The positive or negative energy that preschoolers produced for a 
topic or an activity seriously predicted the nature o f the individuals w ithin the classroom. 
For example, when a child was motivated and interested, he/she was inclined to exert that 
motivation onto their peers. Often with this age group and in this study, the children are 
receptive to this type o f emotional guidance.
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Behavioral scaffolding was also identified as a tool that the preschoolers used to help 
their peers notice their inappropriate or unacceptable behavior. This characteristic was 
less predictable than the affective or cognitive scaffolding because the child had to be 
willing and able to change his/her behavior and get back on-task. Although it was less 
predictable, it was a common denominator in the successful productivity o f the focus 
group activities in this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION
This study includes case studies for six participants and provides a glimpse into the 
developing epistemologies o f preschool children individually and through interactions 
with their peers. The themes that are identified come from individual interviews and 
focus group activities that were precipitated by observing the children’s engagement with 
others in an authentic classroom environment (i.e., whole class instruction and center 
activities). This chapter discusses the preeminent themes that emerged from this study as 
they relate to personal epistemology and child development research. The chapter is 
divided into four parts: Part 1 includes the most consistent themes; Part 2 discusses the 
limitations of the study; Part 3 includes implications (i.e., theoretical, methodological, 
and educational); and Part 4 brings in ideas for future research in children’s personal 
epistemology.
Part 1 -  Themes
The most reoccurring and consistent themes in the current study are discussed in Part 
1. There are three individual themes: peers, affect, and pretense. In addition, there are 
four themes that were characteristic o f the children throughout the entire study: 
multiplism, group evaluativistic-like traits, linking dimensions o f knowledge, and
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nonverbal epistemologies. Remember, the eurrent study is exploratory in nature; this 
type o f investigation is necessary for the purpose o f tapping into an entirely uncharted 
field o f personal epistemology research w ith a focus on preschool children. Exploring 
preschooler’s developing epistemologies is d ifficu lt because we know virtually nothing 
about this area o f child development. Therefore, the themes that emerged from the 
eurrent study are viewed as being somewhat similar in the broadest sense o f subjective 
and objective perspectives. Also, the perspectives that the children demonstrate are not 
intended to reflect perspectives regarding knowledge as described in the research in adult 
personal epistemology. However, they are meant to represent the children’s knowledge 
and understanding about a specific theme and their beliefs about the themes. This 
investigation is intended to document epistemic patterns in preschoolers. The themes 
discussed in Part 1 appeared more vehemently throughout the study and are thought to 
have considerable influence in preschooler’s epistemic development.
Peers arid the Personal Epistemology’ Literature.
Peers are present in the classroom and have personal epistemologies that impact each 
other. Peers collaborate and use each other as a way to scaffold their knowledge and 
understanding o f what they currently know (i.e. assimilate) and what they do not yet 
understand (i.e. accommodate) until they reach some equilibrium that satisfies their need 
and desire to know and understand. The influence o f peers on personal epistemology 
development has been proposed in the literature. Bendixen and Rule (2004) included 
peers as part o f an individual’s epistemologieal environment in accordance with Piaget’s 
notion that peers are relatively at the same level o f power. Alexander et al. (2002) 
included a comparison o f science lessons and found the student-led groups were more
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effective in achieving a deeper level o f understanding because the instruction was divided 
into small peer groups. The peers were able to present the information in terms that those 
students who may have been unlikely to grasp the concepts in a traditional lecture could 
understand. In the current study, peers used each other to accomplish focus group tasks. 
This use o f peers as scaffolding was identified when an individual would build on one o f 
his/her peer’s statements or experiences. Peers seem to provide information that leads 
others to make associations or tap into their background knowledge that the teacher does 
not seem to promote.
The children in this study were able to tap into their own emotional place and that o f 
their peers. In other words, they frequently made attempts to feel success and 
accomplishment by helping others, whether it was to keep them engaged or interested, to 
give instruction, or to help them remember a person’s name. They were in touch with the 
frustrations o f their peers and tried to positively promote success in others. Often, the 
children would doubt their own and other’s knowledge and were faced with the dilemma 
to accept or reject their own knowledge or the knowledge o f others that required them to 
change their perspective. Bendixen (2000) found that reflection and social interactions 
are mechanisms o f change in college student’s epistemologieal beliefs. Using much 
different content but similar processes, the children in the current study sought to change 
and be changed through their interactions with each other. What strategies do 
preschoolers rely on to help the process o f epistemic doubt that peers instill in one 
another? How do they acquire these characteristics? How might epistemic doubt and 
epistemic change promote preschooler’s epistemic development among peers?
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Children in this study used peer scaffolding as a behavioral tool in order to stay on- 
task, which is consistent w ith Vygotskian theory. Often, in whole-class instruction, 
center activities, and focus groups, individual participants both gave and received 
behavioral support from their peers, which in turn positively impacted their ability to 
demonstrate their knowledge and understanding.
In recent epistemologieal research, Valanides and Angeli (2008) found that college 
students excelled in a group over individual performances. The idea o f peer mentoring 
has become popular w ithin social learning theory. Fair, Vandermaas, Beaudry, &  Dew 
(2005) also used peer scaffolding to examine the context o f an ongoing community 
outreach program in which third-grade children are paired w ith preschool-aged children 
once a month to do crafts and other activities. The pairs were observed, and the third 
graders wrote reflective journals on their mentoring experiences and were interviewed at 
the end. The results indicated that the children did provide age-appropriate and task- 
appropriate scaffolding in the craft activities. Also, the reflective journals indicated that 
the third graders’ metacognition was strengthened by their mentor experiences. In the 
current study, the focus groups were not arranged to be mentor relationships, however, 
these characteristics emerged in the data analysis from open-coding procedures. 
Therefore, all o f the children were equal but possessing different strengths and weakness, 
which they appeared to be aware o f and utilized to their benefit. It is in each student’s 
strengths and weaknesses that the collaborative nature o f their knowledge sharing and 
building was able to profit in the end. They conducted themselves naturally in a way 
dissimilar to the way they interacted w ith their peers in an unstructured play setting.
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The positive characteristics that may be supporting their personal epistemologies are 
at an advantage w ithin a semi-structured setting in which peer interactions promote more 
advanced ways o f thinking and knowing. This is an important area for future 
investigations in the field o f personal epistemology at all age groups.
Ajfect and the Personal Epistemology Literature.
Bendixen and Rule (2004) introduce the idea o f an affective component being 
present in epistemologieal development o f college students; and evidence from this study 
strongly supports their notion. Their model con esponds w ith many o f the components o f 
conceptual change, in which Pintrich et al. (1993) proposed that characteristics o f 
motivation be more elaborately investigated. Affective characteristics being so explicit in 
the current study suggests that researching young children’s role o f affect in 
epistemologieal development eould use further exploration. There seem to be different 
categories o f affective contributions from the children in this study and perhaps this is an 
area that needs some weeding out or disentangling and more fine tuning. A place to 
begin would be to distinguish between what is affective as being that which can be 
observed or extrinsically conveyed (i.e., facial expressions, level o f engagement, 
positive/negative interactions, body gestures) versus that which is emotive or more 
intrinsic by nature and unobservable (i.e., motivation, mood, interest). In the current 
study these traits are simply identified as affective characteristics; however, it should not 
go unnoted that they appeared to be o f very different origins.
Decorte, Eynde, and Verschaffel (2002) recognized a trend that has occurred in the 
epistemologieal research. Despite the fact that student’s attitudes about math could 
predict their beliefs about math, as research in educational psychology became more
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cognitively foeused, there was a parting o f the sea. Attitudes about math were viewed as 
an affective construct, and beliefs became a cognitive construct. They further and report 
that there was a tension in the field, as some considered beliefs about math as affective 
while others viewed it as more metacognitive. Regardless, the point is that affective roles 
continue to be a much needed area o f investigation in the field o f personal epistemology. 
Beginning some investigations o f this sort in the early years o f development may 
contribute to identifying how affective characteristics relate to our beliefs, perhaps 
assisting with the debate in the beliefs about math.
In a study o f student’ s epistemologieal beliefs Schommer (1993) identified beliefs 
about simple and certain knowledge, quick learning, and innate ability as being strong 
predictors of, not only cognitive ability, but also, affective responses. Also, Pintrich 
(2002) points out that research in the field o f personal epistemology has shown that more 
advanced beliefs are related to student’ s ability to adapt or change their motivational 
tendencies although he does not refer to them as affective tendencies. Is this too close to 
the math debate? I f  motivation is an affective construct is it less likely to be linked to 
epistemologieal beliefs? Does affect have multiple dimensions, one being emotions and 
another being motivation? How does the field o f personal epistemology categorize these 
constructs? Perhaps, this is an area that should stand on its own, which provides another 
suggestion for research in young children’s developing epistemologies; what motivates 
young children to choose some information or knowledge beliefs over others?
Seemingly, affect versus emotion versus motivation could be an epistemic debate all 
on its own. Valanides and Angeli (2008) define emotion as, “  knowledge, experience, 
event, or activity that is either directly or indirectly emotionally charged, defined by the
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learner’s ehoice o f a word, phrase or clause, and/or the presence o f a punctuation o f unit”  
( p. 207). The construct o f motivation has been applied in various ways to children in 
terms o f learning; for example, some researchers conceptualize motivation in terms o f 
intrapsychic mechanisms, incentives, self-efficacy beliefs, attribution, locus o f control, 
achievement, and goals (Reeve, 1996). However, few o f these theoretical approaches 
have shed light on how young children integrate learning experiences into their own set 
o f values and how this integration facilitates learning and achievement (Pintrich, 2003). 
Pintrich and Anderman (1994) explain their conceptual model for student motivation as 
follows: expectancy components (self-efficacy and attributions), value components 
(intrinsic goal orientation), and affective components (anxiety). The point here is that 
affect is an important factor, as evidenced in the current study, to the personal 
epistemologieal development o f young children.
Theory o f  mind researchers extrapolated the belief-desire reasoning to the area o f 
children’s emotions and found that emotions could predict belief-outcomes versus desire- 
outcomes (Wellman 1990). In a multi-experiment study, Wellman &  Bartsch, 1988) 
found that in one experiment four-year-old children have some understanding o f desire- 
dependent emotional reactions (i.e., happiness) and belief-dependent emotional reactions 
(i.e., surprise). However, a comparison experiment showed that four-year-old children 
used their belief-desire reasoning not only as a way to predict appropriate actions from 
beliefs and desires but to predict the emotional reactions o f other individuals. The 
difference in the methods was that in the comparison study the protagonist’s reactions 
could not be easily predicted because the scenarios were constructed so that they eould be 
construed as happy or sad, depending o f the context o f the scenario. W ith specific
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emotional components linked to children’s understanding o f belief-desire and that three- 
year-olds demonstrate very similarly (i.e. they can explain actions and emotional 
reactions by falling back on their belief-desire mechanism), it seems a likely avenue to 
pursue from and epistemic stance, especially, since work in the connection between 
theory o f mind and personal epistemology has broken ground (Burr &  Hofer, 2002).
Moving a bit further from the personal epistemologieal perspective but nonetheless an 
interesting study with children and emotions, Ambert (1994) drew conclusions about the 
affective nature of the responses young children gave to a question and answer session 
about family issues based on their level o f attachment to their family members, 
specifically their parents. She claimed that the reason that the children communicated in 
such an emotionally charged manner had a direct relationship with how close they were 
to their parents. Also age was significant; the younger they were, the more their 
attachment to their parents and the more animated, expressive, and engaged they were in 
the discussion. The age o f the children in this study was two years younger than the 
children in Ambert’s (1994) study, but similar findings resulted. GiGi, for example, had 
one o f the strongest relationships with her parents, and she was also the most expressive 
o f the group.
Pretense and the Personal Epistemology’ Literature.
Pretend is a construct from early childhood development literature and does not exist 
anywhere in the personal epistemology research, mainly because there is practically no 
research in this area. However, in the theory o f mind literature, pretend (i.e. pretense) is 
rampant (Astington, Harris, & Olson, 1988; Astington & Jenkins, 1995; German &
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Leslie, 2001; Leslie, 1987; Sobel &  L illard, 2001; Sharon &  Woolley, 2004; Wellman, 
1990) and has been for the past 40 years.
Leslie (1987) asserts that the intricate task o f having “ beliefs about beliefs”  (p. 368) 
places an information-processing overload on a young child; therefore, they retreat to a 
less cognitively demanding task, which is pretending (which a child begins to do at 
between one- to one-and-a-half-years o f age). An example is a child pretending that an 
abstract object is more concrete, like a banana is a telephone. This strategy allows the 
child to then perform more complex and systematic tasks. This is possible, according to 
Wellman (1990), because very young children are developing a representational system, 
and it is this system that allows a theory o f mind; they are not one in the same. I f  this is 
true and the ability to pretend is scaffolding the child ’s ability to have theory o f mind, 
then perhaps pretending contributes to a ch ild ’s developing epistemologies in the same 
complementary fashion.
Children’s nature o f pretend is closely linked to aspects o f social learning theory. 
Research w ith autistic children, for example, can demonstrate the significance o f pretend 
play and interactions w ith peers. Using pretend play and peer engagement are commonly 
used as intervention techniques to teach autistic children communication skills. Liber, 
Frea, &  Symon (2008) did case studies on three autistic boys in a public school setting. 
They found that combining play w ith the assistance o f  peer mentoring increased the 
boys’ ability to engage in pretend play independently and among other peers. The boys 
also demonstrated a generalization o f social skills that were learned during the study. 
Some researchers (Kuhn, Seigler, Damon, &  Lerner, 2006) believe that it is d ifficu lt to 
deny that sensitivity to individual differences is part o f children’s early social cognition;
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others agree by claiming that it is social cognition that distinguished humans from 
animals (Tomasello, 2007).
A good deal of childhood pretense research is done in connection to theory of mind 
(Astington, 1993; Bruell & Woolley, 1998; Flavell &  Miller, 1998; Harris, Lillard, & 
Perner, 1994). Therefore the question that arises as a result o f the many instanees of 
pretend that were identified in the current study is as follows; what does children’s ability 
to pretend tell us about understanding their beliefs about knowledge and knowing? This 
is an area that is, again, virgin to the field o f personal epistemology and desperately in 
need o f further research.
Musatti (1993) found a specific type o f symmetry among young children’s social 
knowledge and pretending. The common thread, the socially constructed meaning that 
underlies all pretend activities, is that all children have a need to make pretending 
explicit. It is not strictly an internal cognitive phenomenon. Is pretending really some 
form o f practice?
Leslie (1988) argued that children’s pretend is the first sign o f a system in action and 
is an innate cognitive mechanism in which “ 1 am pretending”  becomes “ 1 think.”  An 
example is the difference between “ I am pretending to be a cow”  versus “ 1 think that is a 
cow.”  This is where another potential link between personal epistemology and theory of 
mind may exist, or maybe it is just that we can learn from theory o f mind research. 
Moving from “ I am pretending” to “ 1 think” , Leslie says, is metarepresentational because 
it is a secondary representation. Meta implies that it is recursive in nature, just like 
metacognition is thinking about thinking. I f  young children are capable to demonstrate
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metarepresentational thinking, whether innate or socially developed, it is worth 
investigating from an epistemologieal perspective.
In this next seetion more specific epistemologieal themes are discussed in relationship 
to the personal epistemology literature and then some o f the broader areas that are 
influenced by the overall themes that emerged through the study as a whole. This 
includes themes that were present individually and in the focus groups. Themes are 
discussed as follows: (a) multiplism, (b) group evaluativism, (c) linking dimensions o f 
knowledge, and (d) nonverbal epistemologies.
Multiplism
Most o f the child-participants in the current study were dominantly multiplistic 
thinkers in that they demonstrated subjective orientations o f knowledge and knowing. 
Olson and Astington (1986) found that children by three-years-old demonstrate signs o f 
epistemologieal thinking; they make references to their own knowledge. For example 
they say, “ I think”  and ” 1 know.”  Further, Flavell, Miimme, Green, and Flavell (1992) 
demonstrated that three and four-year-olds do not always attribute false knowledge to 
others, and that it goes beyond factual knowledge to values, social conventions, and 
moral rules, which children perceive to be true. For example, the children are told a 
story about a girl who believes it is acceptable to put her feet on the table. Then, they are 
asked i f  the girl thought it was okay to put her feet on the table. The children responded, 
“ No”  in most eases, and the four-year-olds did better than the three-year-olds in the 
study.
Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) claim that four-year-olds begin to recognize assertions as 
the expression o f someone’s beliefs. This, they say, “ is a milestone in their cognitive
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development”  that opens the doors for further achievement in epistemologieal thinking ( 
p. 126). I f  this is true, then the current study and other research with preschool children’s 
personal epistemology can be effective for gaining deeper insights into the cognitive 
developmental phase and the connection to their epistemic awareness o f the nature o f 
knowledge and the process o f  knowing.
Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) label the assertions o f expressions that four-year-olds 
have as a realist phase o f epistemologieal understanding because they are copies o f an 
external reality. However, the children in this study presented assertions o f facts 
(absolutist); copies o f opinions (multiplist); and copies o f judgments (evaluativist). In the 
current study, some o f the children did demonstrate the ability, on multiple occurrences, 
to shift their thinking across all three developmental levels. Often some probing was 
required, but this was not always the case. Their knowledge was more malleable w ithin a 
small group environment rather than individually. Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) describe 
a multiplist perspective o f knowledge as being generated by human minds and uncertain. 
This would characterize the majority o f the responses provided from the children in the 
current study. They talk about the information coming from their mind, particularly 
when they explain the differenees between what they know in reality and what they know 
for pretend.
When the child-participants demonstrated their multiplistic perspective o f 
epistemologieal awareness, they demonstrated knowledge at a factual level. This factual 
level was associated with fictional stories that are read to them during a whole class 
instruction, and many o f these facts are true in reality such as the uses o f a dump truck 
versus a front loading machine, that your father’s mother is your grandmother, and that it
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snows in the winter as opposed to the summer. However, they also demonstrated 
charaeteristies that apply to the classroom rules and procedures; they were partieularly 
connected to moral rules such as kindness and fairness, guidelines that they fo llow  for 
safety, and values that they bring with them from home.
There is much about preschooler’s multiplistic epistemology that is o f importance.
For example, in the current study, although the child-participants appear to be 
predominantly multiplistic, identifying source o f knowledge at all developmental levels 
(even multiplism) was especially challenging. Olson and Astington (1986) also found 
that very young children had d ifficu lty in this area. The findings in the current study 
support this; however, there are some differenees o f opinion in the literature. Kuhn and 
Weinstoek (2002) indicate that young children are realists and that their understanding o f 
knowledge comes from external sources and is certain. There were instances o f inferred 
external sources o f knowledge in the current study; however, these sources were not 
explicitly indicated by the children themselves, and this raises the question o f the 
children’s use o f pretend and mimicking. What is the reason for the pretend and 
mim icking behaviors o f young children? Is it really related to the source o f knowledge?
Burr and Hofer (2002) looked at the process o f knowing (i.e. source and justification) 
and found that young children developmentally progress from a pre-dualistie phase to a 
dualistic phase, which demonstrates their ability to provide justifications for their 
responses and a lack o f theory o f mind development. Overall Kuhn and Weinstoek agree 
with Burr and Hofer that there is a phase o f pre-dualistie development; these findings 
support Chandler &  Carpendale (1998).
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This study had a bit different findings because all o f the children were prescreened 
and found to have theory o f mind ability, and the multiplism in the current study varied 
from the pre-dualism found by Burr and Hofer (2002); however, sim plicity o f knowledge 
and certainty o f knowledge were also investigated in the present study. There needs to be 
more research to understand the developmental coordination o f objectivity and 
subjectivity.
There is another finding from the current study that applies to the children’s 
multiplistic perspectives: egocentricity and egocentric speech. This seems to apply most 
closely to multiplism because o f the subjective way that the children identified w ith new 
and existing knowledge. Piaget defined egocentricity and egocentric speech as indicators 
o f cognitive immaturity and indicated that it was a child ’s inability to account for the 
perspective o f others (Smith, Dockrell &  Tomlinson, 1997). However, it was not in this 
type o f context that it emerged in this study and is not described w ith the same likeness; 
in fact it is quite the opposite. When egocentric speech or behavior was identified in this 
study, the children were typically in the midst o f  collaborating with peers and 
acknowledging multiple perspectives. The egocentrism observed in this study was 
demonstrated as behavior that was motivating the children to compete w ith their peers in 
a productive manner or speech that assisted the children during their thought process and 
made some o f their thinking visible as they thought about d ifficu lt topics. This is more 
representative o f what Vygotsky viewed as private speech (Smith et al. 1997). Vygotsky 
(1987) emphatically opposed Piaget’s notion o f egocentric speech, proposing that private 
speech was not egocentric because it occurred when young children are presented with 
cognitive obstacles and is representative o f their attempt to be self-guiding. Today and in
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this study it was related to self-regulation or self-regulated learning. Vygotsky believed 
that private speech helped ehildren reflect on their own behaviors and played an 
important role in cognitive development (See review o f studies, Bivens &  Berk, 1990).
Group Evaluativism
One o f the overall themes in the eurrent study was group evaluativism. This study 
used focus groups consisting of three children, and the topics were integrated with the 
classroom theme of the week. The combination o f these two methods seemed to aid the 
children’s thinking in that they were topics that the children were familiar with and 
because the theme was consistently repeated in different activities throughout the week. 
Thus, the children became more confident in their knowledge and understanding of the 
topics. The focus groups were made up o f their peers; therefore, the setting was familiar 
to them and building trust within the group was not as complex as it was in an individual 
inteiwiew. Although some o f the ehildren demonstrated the ability to construct knowledge 
from all three developmental levels and all four dimensions o f knowledge, this was not a 
reoccurring theme in the study; however, their ability to demonstrate group evaluativism 
within the focus groups did reoccur. This epistemologieal perspective occurred most 
frequently in the pre-instruetional groups in which the topics were familiar to the children 
outside o f the classroom, such as, monsters and family, and in the post-instructional focus 
groups when the topics were monsters, family, and construction. Remember, that Group 
3 was intentionally chosen by the researcher and included the three ehildren that 
demonstrated the most epistemic potential during the first two weeks of the study.
These three children were those whose individual themes were discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Also, it is characteristics and themes that they consistently demonstrated
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throughout the study that may have contributed to the advanced epistemologieal 
perspectives that were generated by all three o f the ehildren drawing on their prior 
knowledge and past experiences. One o f the characteristics that may have contributed 
includes the ability to use peers as a scaffold in every facet o f development (i.e., 
cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally). These areas were emphasized by these three 
children repeatedly. They continually built on each other’s knowledge and experience 
almost in a competitive nature. They listened to each other, often agreeing and 
disagreeing; they were emotionally supportive, in that they motivated and prompted one 
another. They all had positive attitudes toward the activities and wanted to learn, and they 
did not tolerate inappropriate behaviors from their peers, often redirecting negative 
behaviors and attitudes.
Winsor (2005) found a comparable theme with preschoolers using a similar 
methodology and a systems approach that w ill be discussed in greater detail in the future 
research section o f this chapter. Kuhn and Weinstoek (2002) address the importance o f 
epistemologieal understanding in young children and claim that we need to be concerned 
with the very limited amount o f evaluativistic thinking in adults. Perhaps looking closely 
at how small groups o f preschool children interact and communicate their knowledge 
could be compared to how groups o f adolescents might respond in a group environment 
using a similar methodology. Would we see the same group evaluativism in adoleseents 
and in adults?
Maturation, educational experiences, and life experiences are thought to aid 
epistemologieal development, but evaluativistic thinking is rarely identified in adults.
This study is not suggesting that a group o f preschoolers are more epistemologically
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advanced than adults (Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997), but that group evaluatisitic-like thinking 
did emerge in the current study in the children’s language and behavior. This was 
possible because they were using knowledge that was developmentaliy appropriate, and 
they demonstrated the ab ility  to construct knowledge that links subjectivity with 
objectivity.
The preschoolers in this study generated evaluativistic perspectives that dealt 
primarily w ith their certainty o f knowledge and justifications o f knowledge. What is it 
about certainty o f knowledge and justification processes o f  knowing that could make 
evaluativistic thinking even imaginable in preschool-age children? Perhaps the window 
o f opportunity for evaluativistic thinking is quite small and includes educational 
experiences more so than life  experience or maturation. What is meant by this is that, 
perhaps it is the demands made upon students in structured classrooms or learning 
environments (rather than the duration o f education) that promotes this way o f thinking, 
and in the unstructured daily routines o f life we are pigeon-holed. This would mean that 
our inability to think evaluativistically goes deeper than the amount o f education and is 
more a result o f societal or cultural ways o f life (i.e., how we teach individuals how to 
think, learn, and solve problems).
Linking Dimensions o f  Knowledge
The lack o f research with young children has made way for researchers to speculate 
conceptually regarding the beginnings o f personal epistemological development. 
Chandler, Hallet, and Sokol (2002) point out that, regardless o f the age, the participants 
studied thus far demonstrate similar patterns o f thinking and seem to have similar starting 
points. There are five arguments for this phenomenon, and Chandler, Hallet, and Sokol,
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(2002) propose three o f the five: (a) Early onset suggests that young children have more 
sophisticated epistemologies than can be predicted based on studies o f college students; 
(b) recursion is conceptualized as a spiral-like development in which epistemological 
stages continue to occur and reoccur in a cyclic process, rather than in a linear motion; 
and (c) suppression suggests that prior to entering school and during school children’s 
advancing beliefs are discouraged which prompts them to suppress their epistemological 
development until adulthood.
Two other arguments can be identified in the literature: (d) late onset supports the 
idea that true epistemological development does not begin until students reach higher 
academic environments, and researchers have been overestimating the ability o f young 
children (Perry, 1970; King &  Kitchener, 1994), and (e) domain dependence suggests 
that early epistemic thinking is dependent on the domain in question. For example, 
young children may demonstrate multiplistic epistemological perspectives about 
subjective knowledge (i.e., personal judgments or procedural knowledge), and, on the 
other hand, not demonstrate objective-type-knowledge (declarative knowledge) until 
much later (Kuhn &  Weinstock, 2002; Mansfield &  Clinchy, unpublished). One o f these 
alternatives may be more valid than another, but it is much too premature to make this 
judgment.
Dimensions o f knowledge involve the following: the nature o f knowledge, which 
pertains to the simplicity and certainty o f knowledge; and the process o f knowing, which 
pertains to the source and justification o f knowledge. There are three patterns that 
emerged in terms o f dimensions o f knowledge throughout this study: (a) the way in 
which simple and certain knowledge are coordinated, (b) the alignment o f the nature o f
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knowledge (simple and certain) w ith justification o f knowledge, and (c) the absence o f 
the child-participants overt utilization o f sources o f knowledge.
In this study the nature o f knowledge is the oveiwhelmingly predominant way the 
preschoolers constructed their knowledge; the successful integration o f new information 
was seen as complex and uncertain. This harmony between sim plicity and certainty o f 
knowledge was demonstrated regardless o f the developmental level; in addition, this was 
the only pattern that did not have any bearing on the content o f the information or the 
context o f the interactions. They continually synchronized these two dimensions o f 
knowledge to the point that they could be considered one dimension that consists o f 
interdependent parts in a definite pattern o f organization (i.e., perhaps unpacked too 
much). When their knowledge was eonveyed as simple (i.e., single word responses, such 
as, “ yes” ), it was also certain (i.e., “ I know” , confident dispositions, good eye contact, 
enthusiasm); conversely, when knowledge was complex (i.e., integrating new 
information with prior knowledge or past experiences; observations) they acknowledged 
that it was uncertain (i.e., “ I ’m not sure,”  “ I don’ t know, maybe” ).
The child-participants in this study demonstrated an obseure distinction between 
simple and certain knowledge, so much so that often identical units were coded as both 
simple and certain knowledge. For example, at times it was d ifficu lt to assess Adam’s 
simple knowledge from his certain knowledge; they seemed to have a great deal o f 
overlap, and there was a tendency to link them together. He began w ith simple and 
certain views o f knowledge, but, when probed, his knowledge appeared more complex 
and uncertain. However, when his knowledge was simple and certain, he was more 
affectively and behaviorally stable in his performance. When knowledge shifted to more
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complex and uncertain, he became curious and engaged the teacher in a line o f 
questioning. When he made connections to prior knowledge or past experiences, he 
remained engaged and on-task, but i f  his questions did not yield advancement in his 
understanding he became disengaged and disruptive. He did appear to contemplate his 
responses for a moment, but once beginning he was quite spontaneous. He mades strong 
associations among the classroom topic and instances o f play w ith his friends and 
interactions based on rules with his family. When he discussed his mother, it dealt with 
associations that were affective in nature. He regularly compared himself to characters in 
the stories in terms o f their emotional disposition and incorporated experiences he has 
had with his mother.
GiGi was another good example o f linking simplicity and certainty o f knowledge. 
Dimensionally her knowledge was characteristically more complex and uncertain. 
Regardless o f the level o f development, GiGi expressed her knowledge most commonly 
in tenns o f the nature o f knowledge (i.e. simple and certain). This theme appeared to be 
strongly connected to her fam iliarity w ith a topic. When she had limited knowledge and 
experience, she demonstrated knowledge as simple and uncertain. However, the more 
background knowledge and past experience she seemed to have about a topic, the more 
her knowledge was interpreted as more complex and certain. The more her knowledge 
was probed, she maintained the complexities o f her knowledge but shifted to a more 
uncertain perspective o f knowledge. Interestingly, when the simple and certain 
dimensions were questioned in more depth to uncover the process o f knowing 
dimensions, she was able to link simple and certain knowledge with justification but 
rarely source o f knowledge.
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The second dimensional pattern that garnered attention was the integration between 
simple and certain knowledge and justification o f knowledge. The overlapping o f simple 
and certain knowledge from the previous dimensional pattern remained a constant when 
probing knowledge and understanding for the process o f knowing (i.e. source and 
justification). This pattern involved the children linking one or the other, simple or 
certain knowledge, or both in alignment with justification o f knowledge. This idea o f 
aligning the nature o f  knowledge and the process o f knowing is another pattern that 
happened liberally throughout the study and without very mueh probing. In many cases 
they spontaneously offered some justification for what they were verbalizing and often it 
was accompanied by an increase in their nonverbal communication. When their thinking 
was more complex or sophisticated, they had a tendency to be more active in their 
expressions (i.e., facial expressions, body gestures, using items nearby as pretend objects, 
use o f emotional energy to indicate meaning).
The third dimensional pattern that was identified on the individual level was the 
diminished ability or absence o f the source o f knowledge. Source o f knowledge was the 
least referenced o f the dimensions o f knowledge throughout the study by all o f the 
participants. They were less inclined to overtly articulate their sources o f knowledge 
independently or when probed although they did regularly im plic itly  reference internal 
and external sources o f knowledge in their responses (i.e., “ mommy,”  “ daddy,”  “ the 
book,”  “ at school,”  “ at home” ). They rarely eould answer a direct question related to the 
source o f knowledge such as “ How do you know the rules in the classroom?”  or “ How do 
you know that the momma bear knows the baby bear is hiding in the snow?”  When faced 
w ith  these types o f questions, they responded using a combination o f certain and
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justification o f knowledge. There was an increase in the nonverbal indicators o f 
knowledge and understanding or a use o f the combination o f verbal and nonverbal 
markers. When these patterns began to emerge (i.e cutting-off their words and using 
more nonverbal traits), the books were removed as an anchor to see i f  they would identify 
the souree o f knowledge using their words rather than pointing or using other nonverbal 
means o f identifying how they know. When anchors were removed, they continued to 
struggle w ith souree o f knowledge questions; signs o f frustration and cognitive overload 
emerged and escalated.
There is very lim ited research in preschoolers’ personal epistemology to compare 
these findings with, and the ones that are in the literature do not have the same amount o f 
in-depth detail to compare adequately. Bun- and Hofer (2002) did have a similar finding, 
that preschoolers do transition between subjective and objective understanding o f 
knowledge; however, the eurrent study details the social and emotional characteristics 
that support the developmental patterns. The laek o f this research is a good reason to 
pursue it in more depth.
Verbal and Nonverbal Epistemologies
So far, there has been discussion about patterns related to developmental levels and 
dimension o f knowledge; however, there is another pattern that, in the end, appears in the 
developmental patterns and the dimensional patterns and has been alluded to thus far. 
Throughout the study observations o f verbal and nonverbal ways o f communication 
began to take shape; in itia lly  it was noticeable as indicative o f developmental shifts but 
later was observed in the transitions between dimensions o f knowledge as well. The 
three patterns were as follows: (a) verbal only, (b) nonverbal only, and (e) a eombination
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o f verbal and nonverbal communication. Is this pattern in communicating learned? Is it 
an early childhood development trait that is somehow connected to early language 
development? Is it linked to affective dispositions (i.e., interest, attachment)? Is it a 
characteristic that is a result o f excitement and increased psychomotor activity? Could it 
be that children incorporate this as a tool to assist them in conveying their knowledge and 
understanding? These are all compelling questions that make this area fertile for 
investigation because it is right on the surface, so not much digging is required; however, 
it is an impression that it may very well be a complex trait to decipher.
As a case specific example, and by no means was this identified in all o f the 
participants, GiGi was the child who was the most intrinsically affective while 
demonstrating her knowledge. At an absolutist level she was primarily verbal in the way 
she conveyed epistemological thinking. When communicating multiplistically, she 
maintained a large part of her verbal ability and incorporated appropriate levels of 
nonverbal expressions, and animated perspectives. At an evaluativistic level the 
nonverbal had overridden the verbal; and at times she was even completely nonverbal. 
The nonverbal instances typically occurred when the cognitive load o f the questions or 
the information was far above her ability level, with or without assistance. GiGi 
demonstrated more nonverbal body gestures to assist her verbal descriptions; this 
prompted a bit more psychomotor activity (i.e., moving around the room, flailing her 
arms and legs) and confused expressions (scowling, poor eye contact, talking more 
softly).
There is no investigation o f the ways in which children, adolescents, or adults 
communicate their epistemologies or investigations of how individuals behave when they
367
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
report their epistemological beliefs. This was an interesting realization, considering that 
one o f the central components o f most researchers’ recommendations for future research 
indicates that we still do not know how individuals know what they know. It seems that 
our behavior is, in many ways, how we wear our thoughts on our sleeve. For example, 
often we do not have to ask someone i f  they like asparagus; we can just tell by their 
behavior.
Although behaviorism is not the paradigm o f the time, it once was held in the highest 
regard in this country; portions o f the theories continue to be recognized in certain fields. 
However, we fail to watch what people are not saying. One o f the perspectives in family 
therapy is to ask questions, not for the purpose o f hearing what the individual says but, 
rather, to watch how they behave and listen to what they tell you with their body. This 
perspective seems to apply to research in young children because they say a lot w ith their 
nonverbal communication. Surely the argument is that the inferences would be purely 
subjective and not proven as true', however, one o f the methodologies that w ill be 
discussed later is observation. W ith sound observation skills, reliable methods, and 
rigorous data analysis, perhaps legitimate and useful information could be used to 
generate more empirically-based research, but it must begin somewhere.
Doherty-Sneddon’s (2003) book. Children’s Unspoken Language, magnifies a topic 
that has been largely underestimated or overshadowed by child development’ s 
preoccupation with language development. This book goes from infancy to middle 
childhood, well after early language development. The central focus o f the book is to 
present nonverbal behavior as a critical part o f children’s communication skills. She 
provides a portal with which to more clearly see many o f the social, emotional, and
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cognitive development that was present through the current study and is referenced 
throughout this discussion. The important part o f the book is that it makes a practical 
attempt to teach adults how to interpret and respond appropriately to hidden meanings in 
children’s nonverbal behaviors that are commonly overlooked or misinterpreted. She 
describes four nonverbal channels: hand gestures, eye gaze, facial expressions, and touch. 
Doherty-Sheldon’s own work is in how gaze aversion can be used as a reliable index o f 
children’ s readiness to learn something new w ith in their zone o f proximal development. 
This would be a good reference to assist researchers w ith a starting point.
An account o f the children’s communication patterns was acknowledged; however, as 
was the case w ith the affective characteristics, in-depth systematic analysis o f possible 
underlying meanings was conducted. In the future it may be that the data is reanalyzed to 
include more in-depth looks at both the communication themes and the affective themes. 
There were a few ideas that came to mind during the data collection as the children 
continued to demonstrate the combination o f verbal and nonverbal behaviors. I w ill share 
them as things to think about in future research o f nonverbal communication specifically: 
(a) Nonverbal behaviors seemed to label, make, or punctuate their words; this seemed to 
be a way to gain acceptance from their peers; (b) when they received acceptance from 
their peers, the child has more like ly to make a claim, to “ know;”  (c) the more a child 
claimed, “ I know,”  the more children listened and watched that individual; generally, 
these children were the leaders in the group; and (d) in terms o f the patterns o f 
communications, peers were active as judge and ju ry  or organized an epistemic court as 
to the right or wrongness o f the individuals knowledge or experience.
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Part 2 - Limitations 
Methodology 
Qualitative Research Considered Too Subjective
The current study is a qualitative research study, and some would argue that it is a 
purely subjective account o f the researcher’ s point o f view, rather than empirically-based 
evidence (Boyd, 2001; Denzin &  Lincoln, 1998; Munhall, 2001). Thomas Kuhn (1962) 
introduced the term “ paradigm”  and the social sciences have debated quantitative versus 
qualitative research for decades. Nevertheless, many other psychological researchers 
questioned statistically-based research in favor o f qualitative research (Merriam, 2002). 
They argue that statistically-based research is invalid because it ignores context and 
concentrates on tiny parts o f  phenomena rather than on the phenomena as a whole. They 
also argue that quantitative research assumes a unitary reality, which does not exist, since 
researchers’ perceptions o f reality are influenced by their individual perceptions and 
predispositions.
These criteria, however, are based on debatable assumptions. For example, the 
traditional scientific method concept o f re liab ility  has been rejected by many qualitative 
researchers in part because some types o f  re liab ility require repeated observation; 
qualitative researchers say this “ is impossible”  (Lincoln &  Cuba, 1985, p. 186). They 
have proposed a qualitative analog to re liab ility  in the fo llow ing terms: “ dependability,”  
“ trustworthiness,”  “ credibility,”  “ transferability,”  and “ confirm ability”  (Lincoln &  Guba, 
1985, p. 193). This requires researchers explain how changes in context produced 
changes in observations. However, claim ing that repeated observation is impossible does 
not demonstrate that the traditional psychometric concept lacks u tility , even i f  repeated
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observation is in fact impossible. Furthermore, requiring researchers to explain how 
changes in context produced changes in observations raises the psychometric issues o f 
reliability and validity. The eurrent study attempted to address these issues in the design, 
data collection, and analysis phases o f the project.
Lincoln and Guba (1985) assert that distinctive qualitative and quantitative research 
paradigms do not exist because there are many research methodologies defined as 
qualitative which d iffer in underlying perspectives. However, qualitative research still is 
equated as being a “ naturalistic and interpretive”  research paradigm (Lincoln &  Guba, 
1985, p.21). Qualitative researchers have developed major paradigmatic research 
positions that reflect the complexity and rigor o f qualitative research: positivism, 
postpostitivism, critical theory, constructivism, and participatory (Denzin &  Lincoln, 
2005).
The current study is a ease-study design which is depicted as congruent w ith one o f 
the paradigms w ith specific philosophical underpinnings and is associated w ith distinct 
research methodologies that have been developed by scholars (Denzin &  Lincoln, 2005). 
However, despite the evidence resulting from qualitative research, it continues to be 
criticized for lack o f rigor (Denzin &  Lincoln, 1998). Silverman (2000) discusses 
approaches to evaluating the rigor o f qualitative research (i.e., field notes, interrater 
coding, deviant case analysis, eontextualizing data). This research adhered closely to the 
guidelines o f qualitative research from the research design through the data analysis 
procedures.
Creswell (1998) defines a ease study as, “ An exploration o f a bounded system or a 
ease over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources o f
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information rich context”  (Creswell, 1998 p. 61). This study involves multiple cases and 
multip le sources o f data. Creswell (1998) and Merriam (1998) also recommend using 
multip le instances or events as a means o f  gaining a more in-depth perspective, 
particularly w ith  young children. Using case study analysis in terms o f individuals and 
groups provided a systematic way o f looking at specific phenomena, collecting data, 
analyzing information, and reporting the results (Ellet, 2007). As a result, the researcher 
gains a sharper understanding o f why and how the instance/s have oeeurred and what 
might become more important or worthwhile to research in the future. Case studies lend 
themselves to both generating and testing hypotheses (M en iam, 1998). This was 
especially important to the current study because research into very young children’s 
personal epistemologies is new and still exploratory; therefore, the case study design 
assisted in keeping the individuals and characteristics about them independent and 
organized until it was time to integrate them for analysis.
Methodology Considered Leading
Another benefit o f the case study design was that it allowed fo r data collection to 
occur in an authentic learning environment. None o f  the daily activities were altered but 
rather were elaborated upon to get a more in-depth perspective o f  the thinking patterns o f 
the children.
The constant comparative method is recommended in case study research. Bogdan &  
B iklen (2003) provide steps for using this method, and they were slightly adapted to 
account for the multiple levels o f  analysis that were required to thoroughly use the 
epistemic matrix and also to account for the m ultiple data sources. Using the constant 
comparative method contributed incredibly to the rigor o f  this research. It required that
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data was reviewed multiple times during data collection and again during data analysis. 
During data analysis, the data was analyzed at multiple times, according to multiple 
processes (according to the epistemic matrix), and for multiple weeks. During data 
collection the data was evaluated to construct more specific inquiry for follow-up 
interviews and peer focus groups (Corbin &  Strauss, 2007).
Case studies arc socially-constructed research approaches situated between concrete 
data collecting techniques and methodological paradigms and function as a tool that can 
assist in theoretical development as is necessary for investigating children’s 
epistemological development (Charmaz, 2006; Hancock &  Algozzine, 2006). In 
hindsight, this was the best possible method for this type o f research. One o f the major 
themes that resulted from this research was that preschooler’s personal epistemologies 
appear to flourish when they are socially-constructed. According to Bogdan &  Biklen
(2003), “ I f  you want to understand the way people think about their world and how 
knowledge is formed, you need to get close to them, to hear them talk, and observe them 
in their day-to-day lives”  (p. 32).
Conducting a case study provides an opportunity to utilize the researcher’s 
background knowledge and previous experience to capture the “ essence”  (van Maanen,
1988, p. 78) o f the ch ild ’s subjective voice. The role o f the researcher in the current 
study was to become involved in the children’s “ conceptual world”  (Bogdan &  Biklen, 
2003, p. 55) and to gain a deeper understanding o f their experiences and the meaning o f 
these experiences.
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P artic ipan ts  and Measurem ent
Small Sample Size
The current study had six child-participants and three focus groups. This small 
number o f participants makes gencralizability d ifficu lt (Creswell, 2003). There are 
several reasons for having such a small sample size. Probably, the biggest reason is that 
gencralizability was not the purpose o f the study. Researehing very young children’s 
personal epistemologies has not been done in-depth; primarily this research is based on 
speculation with only a couple o f published research studies (Burr &  Hofer, 2002; 
Moschner, Ansehuetz, Wernke, &  Wagener, 2008). Therefore, this research with 
children is exploratory. Bogdan &  B iklin , (2003) recommends qualitative case studies to 
accomplish in-depth investigations o f this nature. Another reason a small sample size 
was chosen was due to the delicate nature o f researching very young children. Building a 
relationship as a priority (Flavell, Green, &  Flavell, 1995) takes individual time and a 
focus on the needs o f the children. A pilot study was conducted (Winsor, 2005) to assist 
in perfecting the design for the current study. The pilot used 28 students in the Cricket 
classroom, and it was simply too many children to conduct such a detailed and complex 
investigation.
Participants ’ Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status
Although the study was conducted in a public preschool that included children from 
diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, the child-participants in the study are 
primarily from white middle-class backgrounds. This was not an intentional choice, but 
very simply a decision based on prescreening assessment results, children whose parents 
would consent to the research study, and children who were consistent about attending
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the preschool on a regular basis. For reliability and valid ity o f the study, it was important 
to have w illing  and consenting children and parents. In addition, it is important to have 
all o f the participants exposed to the same procedures (Creswell, 2003). For example, i f  a 
child is not present for a day during whole class instruction, he/she misses the story, plus 
an individual interview to follow-up with the story and his/her peer’s contributions; 
therefore, the child misses a critical piece o f the study going into the Friday focus group. 
This makes the data less reliable and valid because o f the gaps created from when he/she 
was not present in the classroom.
Child-Participanis ’ Age
Lim ited research. As mentioned earlier, researehing very young children’s personal 
epistemology is strongly supported in the field (Burr &  Hofer, 2002; Haerle, 2005; Kuhn, 
1991); however, it is not a staple in personal epistemology research to date. This alone 
makes this type o f research quite d ifficu lt and challenging. In contrast, child 
development researchers have been investigating children for centuries and have a 
significant amount o f guidance (Astington, Harris, &  Olson, 1988; Flavell, Green, &  
Flavel, 1995).
Lim ited cognitive ability’. Despite the tremendous support in the field, there are 
skeptics who question the cognitive ability o f three- and four-year-old children in terms 
o f having or being capable o f communicating personal epistemologies. Perry (1970) and 
Kitchener (1994) concur with this perspective, believing that true epistemological 
development begins during the college years. This epistemological perspective is known 
as “ late onset”  (Burr &  Hofer, 2002, p. 206) and claims that researchers have incorrectly 
assumed that other cognitive constructs that develop in early childhood can predict
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epistemological development, thereby under estimating the epistemic ability o f  very 
young children.
Preschoolers may have lim ited cognitive ability as compared to adult cognitive 
ability, but they demonstrate distinct characteristics that perhaps foreshadow adult 
thinking in a number o f  cognitive developmental areas. Knowing more about children’s 
cognitive and metacognitive abilities as they relate to their developing epistemologies can 
be useful i f  they are perceived as contributing factors to their beliefs about knowledge 
and knowing. For this to be cultivated, their behaviors and interactions need to be 
investigated in-depth.
Questioning what is being measured. There may be a question in the minds o f some 
scholars as to whether what is being measured is really beliefs about knowledge and 
knowing or rather their knowledge about a specific topic (i.e., monsters, winter, 
construction, fam ily). This study looked closely at the children’s words and behaviors to 
identify the underpinnings o f  their knowledge; these topics were used as tools to identify 
how they construct their knowledge from an epistemological perspective. It is true that 
preschoolers do not demonstrate verbal ability to identify their be lie f about knowledge 
although they do attempt it; however, they can and do demonstrate overt language and 
behavior that conveys an im p lic it be lie f about their knowledge and ways o f  knowing.
For example, they are compelled to try to provide information even when they do not 
know. This can be viewed as the be lie f that successful knowledge comes from hard work 
and effort. They constantly link new information to prior knowledge and past 
experiences which is consistent w ith thinking or knowing that successful knowledge is 
complex. This study has provided numerable instances o f  evidence that support how
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very young children demonstrate at least the use o f beliefs about knowledge and knowing 
even i f  not the ability to articulate it overtly.
Part 3 - Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings from this study offer new and innovative theoretical significance; 
themes that emerged throughout the study suggest that preschoolers demonstrate 
identifiable epistemological patterns aeeording to developmental levels and dimensions 
o f knowledge. However, there need to be further investigations o f this type to make 
elearer distinetions between adults’ and children’s epistemic development. This may 
require adapting the cunent terminology w ithin the adult personal epistemology literature 
to be more fitting for the epistemic experiences o f presehoolers. These themes are 
discussed now: (a) Future research with very young children can be produetive and 
informative for the direction o f gaining knowledge about early onset o f personal 
epistemology; (b) it serves as a beginning look into aspeets o f epistemological growth 
and may help us understand developmental issues such as recursion (Chandler, Hallett &  
Sokol, 2002); (c) combining developmental levels and dimensions o f knowledge provides 
a more detailed perspective o f epistemological development; (d) the epistemic impact o f 
social and behavior indicators o f children’ s Zone o f Proximal Development can be 
understood; (e) the moral development and social conventions may parallel preschooler’s 
epistemology; (f) it supports how a systems approach can impact epistemic ability; and 
(g) knowing more about early onset o f personal epistemology can assist in clarify ing the
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role o f  epistemology in other cognitive constructs such as metacognition, motivation, 
self-regulation, and self-efficacy.
Insights into Early Onset
Maybe young children are more epistemologically gifted in their reasoning ability 
than has been assumed by the researchers in the past (Baxter Magolda; 1992; K ing &  
Kitchener, 1994; Peri-y, 1970). Chandler et al. (2002) and Burr and Hofer (2002) show 
that perhaps there is a m ultip lis t-like  epistemic stage prior to absolutist perspectives.
King and Kitchener (1994) looked at students from high school to college and determined 
that the cognitive measures used w ith  adults to identify epistemological beliefs are too 
complex, causing younger participants to struggle to understand them. L ittle -by-little  the 
age that researehers are identifying epistemological beliefs in is decreasing (Burr &
Hofer, 2002; Carpendale &  Chandler, 1996; Chandler &  Lalonde, 1996; Kuhn, Cheney,
&  Weinstock, 2000; Mansfield &  Clinchy, 2002; Moschner, Ansehuetz, Wernke, &  
Wagener, 2008). There is much to be learned about the early onset o f epistemological 
development, and we need to get clear about the underlying cognitive mechanisms that 
differentiate an epistemic stance (Chandler et ah, 2002). Even i f  researchers in the field 
o f personal epistemology or early childhood cognitive development have their doubts 
about whether the findings w ith very young children are tru ly epistemological, given the 
recent trends in the adolescent epistemic research, it is necessary to be actively pursuing 
research w ith younger children as a way to get more breadth and depth in our 
understanding o f cognitive mechanisms.
The current study suggests that researching preschooler’ s personal epistemologies is 
productive and informative for gaining knowledge, which supports the early onset
378
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
argument. It supports findings that young children have the capacity to demonstrate 
epistemologies at a developmental level and a variety o f dimensions o f knowledge. They 
demonstrate individual epistemologies that shift between absolutist and multiplist 
perspectives o f knowledge. The multiplistic phase could be consistent with Burr and 
Hofer’s (2002) o f a new pre-dualistic phase. However, further research is needed in this 
area to clearly identify it in either direction. Another finding that seems to overlap 
between the current study and Burr and Hofer (2002) is the essence o f egocentric 
subjectivity that the children presented, and more research is needed in this area to more 
clearly identify the origin o f this characteristic. Burr and Hofer (2002) identify 
egocentric subjectivity as paralleling Piaget’s notion in that it corresponds to a lack o f 
cognitive maturity; however, in the current study, it was viewed as more matching with 
Vygotsky’s developmental theories and appeared to contribute to advancing the 
children’s ability to think epistemologically.
In  the cLiiTcnt study one o f  the group find ings that stands out in the research o f  
ch ild ren ’ s epistem ologies and contributes to early an early onset argum ent is the idea o f  
group evaluativ ism . P re-instruction and post-instruction  focus groups were conducted 
based on the w ho le  class instruction  as a w ay to sim ulate m ore in-depth discussions. W ith  
a sm aller num ber o f  ch ild ren, everyone was able to speak, and the researcher could ask 
more probing questions. Because o f  the few er behavioral d isa ip tions, there was m ore o f  a 
focus on a specific  epistem ological area specific  to the ind iv idua ls . M ore im portantly , 
the focus group activ ities  a llow ed fo r a closer investiga tion  o f  the interactions between 
the ind iv idua ls  and the ir peers. Th is resulted in evidence that, co llec tive ly , supports that 
preschool ch ild ren were able to construct an epistem ological stance consistent w ith
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evaluativism or naïve evaluativtistic-like. In other words, as a group, they were able to 
stay on the same topic and shift between the objective and subjective while contributing 
justifications o f their understanding.
Information on Recursion
Recursion is a developmental pattern that suggests individuals are exposed and re­
exposed to the same epistemic issues at different milestones in their development (Boyes 
&  Chandler, 1992; Chandler, 1987). This type o f pattern represents a trajectory that is 
more spiral in that similar patterns are repeated numerous times throughout lifespan 
development. This is opposed to a linear trajectory in which a specific epistemological 
course is taken from start to finish and not repeated as in Piaget’s Stages o f  Cognitive 
Development. In a linear trajectory an individual must satisfy the requirements o f one 
stage before being able to successfully move to the next stage o f development. This 
would not be the first time that a recursive pattern in cognitive development has 
presented itself. Several researchers (Boyes &  Chandler, 1992; Chandler, 1987; 
Eckensberger, 1983; Overton, 1998; Zelazo, 1999) have found that children construct and 
revise “ mental models”  several times (Overton, 1998, p .l 11), and Kuhn (1989) compares 
children to scientists in her explanation (p. 678).
Knowing more about the early onset o f  children’s personal epistemology can 
contribute to a recursive trajectoiy theory. There are other developmental patterns and 
trajectories that can be informed or argued against with more information from children’s 
epistemological development such as late onset, suppression, or domain-specific versus 
domain-general trends in epistemological thinking. This is an area that the entire field 
eould benefit from in terms o f lifespan development.
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In te g ra ting  D im ensions and  Developm ent to Im prove M odels
Until recently there have been two separate ways o f looking at personal 
epistemology; one way is through developmental levels (i.e., absolutist, multiplist, 
evaluativist) (Baxter Magolda, 1986; Belenky et al., 1986; King &  Kitchener, 1994; 
Kuhn, 1991; Perry, 1970), and the other is through dimensions o f knowledge (i.e., simple, 
certain, source, justification) (Hofer, 2004; Schommer, 2002; Schraw, Bendixen, &  
Dunkle, 2002). There is a variety o f research that has begun to disentangle the 
dimensions o f knowledge including epistemic cognition (Kitchener (1983), epistemic 
reflections (Baxter Magolda, 1992), simple ways o f knowing (Belenky et al., 1986), 
personal epistemology as theories (Hofer &  Pintrieh, 1997), as resources (Hammer &  
Elby, 2002, 2003), adding beliefs about learning (Schommer, 1990, 1991, 1993), 
argumentative reasoning (Kuhn, Cheney, &  Weinstock, 2000), and epistemic doubt 
(Bendixen &  Rule, 2004).
Integrating the levels and dimensions o f knowledge in the form o f a matrix (i.e., three 
developmental levels and four dimensions o f knowledge resulting in twelve very specific 
cells) allows for more fine-grained perspectives. On the other hand the matrix could 
provide infonnation that suggests that some o f the dimensions are more similar to one 
another. For example, the children investigated in this study appear to use simple and 
certain knowledge together, rather than as two separate dimensions o f the nature o f 
knowledge. When they are asked simple knowledge questions, they respond with simple 
and certain knowledge responses and vice versa.
Another interesting finding in this study is that, regardless o f the developmental level 
o f the question, the children have d ifficu lty  explicitly stating their source o f knowledge.
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Gopnik &  Graf (1986) found that three-year-olds have d ifficu lty  in identifying and 
remembering their sources o f knowledge even when given explieit training in identifying 
sources o f knowledge. Wimmer, Hogrefe, and Pemer (1988) found similar results but 
further found that the children had d ifficu lty stating the sources o f their beliefs, whether 
they were their own beliefs or someone else’s beliefs.
Researching young children’s personal epistemologies from a developmental 
perspective as well as considering the dimensionality o f their knowledge and knowing 
w ill eontribute to the depth and breadth o f the literature regarding the nature o f 
knowledge and the process o f knowing overall. This line o f research could also be useful 
to researchers in ehild development and eognitive development as well.
The epistemie impact o f indicators o f children’ s Zone o f Proximal Development.\
The zone o f proximal development (ZPD) is a sociocultural perspective from 
Vygotsky’ s theory o f cognitive development, commonly referred to as sociocultural 
theory (W ink &  Putney, 2002) because it maintains that how we think is a function o f 
both social and cultural influences. In this theory, there is a difference between what 
ehildren can do on their own and what they ean do with assistance. What the child can 
do w ith assistance from others is refen ed to as the zone o f proximal development. 
According to Vygotsky (1969), children with greater zones o f proximal development can 
usually experience more cognitive development when information or instruction is aimed 
just above the lower lim its o f their zone o f proximal development.
The zone o f proximal development was clearly identifiable in the current study 
through the children’s verbal responses and nonverbal behaviors. The children in this 
study explicitly guided the researcher to their appropriate zones. This may be best
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explained with an example. When a question was asked that was below their zone o f 
proximal development (what they can do independently), they could easily respond and 
did so spontaneously and appropriately. When questions remained below their zone o f 
proximal development for extended periods o f time, or i f  questions o f the same caliber 
were repeated but in a different way; the children would begin to show boredom and 
eventually cause behavior disruptions. When the questions or the discussion was just 
w ithin the lower lim it o f their ZPD, they were interested and engaged, which meant the 
data was rich with epistemological perspectives, and the activity was epistemically 
productive. However, i f  the line o f questioning was at the top o f the ZPD, the children 
demonstrated completely different behaviors that were more consistent w ith eognitive 
overload. They would attempt to respond, but often their responses did not make sense, 
or the child retreated to a form o f pretend knowledge that might or might not be coherent 
but not relevant to the question. They would demonstrate many signs o f cognitive 
overload such as, facial expressions o f confusion and frustration, and body gestures like 
putting their hands over their face, banging on the floor, and nervousness and shame. 
However, they would continue to be actively engaged and motivated until the breaking 
point. The peak o f this experience did not, however, end in disruptive behavior, but 
rather just disengagement, wherein the child would just walk away or begin to daydream. 
On the other hand, when the questioning was above their ZPD, there was a b rie f instance 
o f confusion with no attempt to engage, followed by the disruptive behaviors. In this 
way the ehildren were aware and communicative regarding what they could do alone, 
what they could and would do w ith assistance from their peers or the researcher; and 
what they eould not and would not attempt w ith or without assistance.
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Vygotsky’s sociocultural theories o f cognitive development are making their way into 
the field o f personal epistemology. Bendixen &  Rule (2004) propose support for 
personal epistemology to investigate more social and cultural domains that may relate to 
an individual’s developing epistemologies. Baxter Magolda (2008) calls it a Learning 
Partnership Model that portrays knowledge as complex and socially constructed. Muis, 
Bendixen, &  Haerle (2006) developed a culturally inclusive model o f epistemic beliefs 
while others are exploring additional sociocultural aspects o f epistemological beliefs 
(Tabak &  Weinstoek, 2008).
Cognitive change takes place in the zone o f proximal development. Newman et al., 
(1989) liken it to a “ construetion zone”  (p.304). Adults are most commonly thought o f as 
the developing child’s support system, but some o f the findings in the cument study 
suggest that peers can also provide a support network for work w ithin the zone o f 
proximal development. How do the roles o f adults and peers resemble one another, and 
how are they different? This w ill be discussed in future research in terms o f the 
student/child-teaeher relationships involved in learning. It is w ithin these relationships 
that the cognitive processes o f children develop and change. Many o f the sociocultural 
themes that were identified in the current study and the application o f Vygotsky’s 
theories begin to be consistent with the Process Model o f Epistemic Belief Change 
(Bendixen, 2002).
Preschool children experience a large amount o f social development, going from 
home to a learning environment for the first time, making friends, follow ing new rules, 
and generally discovering a world away from their family. Due to the recent trend in 
personal epistemology research to embrace and apply Vygotsky’ s theories, researching
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preschooler’s developing epistemologies is fertile ground. Therefore, centering young 
ehildren’s developing epistemological perspectives around the ZPD is an inviting link.
M oral development and social conventions. Moral development is the process 
through which children develop proper attitudes and behaviors toward other people in 
small (classroom) or large (society) environments, based on social and cultural norms, 
rules, and laws (Snowman, McCown, &  Biehler, 2009). Research suggests that moral 
judgment and reasoning is impacted by social characteristics (Turiel, 1994) and peer 
relationships (Kruger, 1992; Tudge &  Rodgoff, 1989).
Bendixen, Schraw, &  Dunkle (1998), Schommer (1993), and King &  Kitchener 
(1994) using different methodologies found that moral reasoning and moral judgments 
are related to college student’s epistemological beliefs independent o f social and cultural 
processes, but recommend further researcher in this area.
Hoffman (1987) links social and moral awareness to the influence o f parents. This 
relates to this study in that Adam and the other child-participants (despite levels o f 
development and dimension o f knowledge) consistently and frequently made associations 
between new information and their parents and/or fam ily in relationship to rules or 
personal experiences. In addition, they verbally demonstrated their knowledge o f rules in 
relationship to making decisions and solving problems. The limited research w ith young 
children has not made a connection between moral development and epistemological 
development
Kohlberg &  Hoffman (2003) explored the nature o f moral development, social 
behavior, and human interconnectedness. Piaget (1932) wrote about the potential 
productivity o f peer interactions in relationship to cognitive and moral development.
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Specifically during concrete operations in very young children, he said it was their 
egocentrism that posed the most challenging hurdle to advance to an operational mode o f 
thinking and knowing. Thinking at the operational level requires decentration, which is 
the ability to take into account multiple points o f view. In terms o f epistemological 
thought, Chandler et al. (2002) sides w ith Piaget’s perspeetive, partieularly on the topie 
o f rceursion. They liken it to “ wholesale”  versus “ retail”  epistemie development ( p.
162), in whieh, during formal operations (adoleseenee or even as young as 6 or 8), 
epistemie ability is possible beeause they experienee the disturbing awakening that 
mutual knowledge or epistemie eommunity (Reseller, 1980) no longer exists; Chandler 
(1975) ealls it “ epistemie loneliness”  ( p. 229).
Smith (2004) proposes a “ developmental epistemology”  ( p. 176), in whieh eausal 
psyehology (CP, or for the purpose o f applying it to personal epistemology, objeetive 
perspeetives) and nomiative epistemology (NE, or subjeetive perspeetives) beeome parts 
o f the same phenomenon. In that, CP is an empirieal aeeount o f faets, and NE is the study 
o f norms. Developmental epistemology maintains the empirieal, observable, and 
measurable faets, but views norms as “ normative faets”  ( p. 176). In this way there is a 
human (i.e. qualitative or normative) eomponent to an individual’s thinking that ean be 
eausal or non-eausal in terms o f values and beliefs based on their experienees and eultural 
roots. In this study, eulture is not limited to ethnieity, but, rather, it is used broadly to 
inelude the ehildren’s areas o f interest, sueh as pop eulture. For example, when a ehild- 
partieipant in the eurrent study made an assoeiation with another individual due to a 
mutual personal experienee or expounded their knowledge, this is, aeeording to Leslie
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(2004), a normative fact and not necessarily eausal in nature; in that their experienee is a 
subjeetive one but a statement o f fact nonetheless.
Smith (2004) says, and 1 concur with this line o f thinking, that these individual 
convictions are “ central to human minds in action in social worlds”  ( p. 177). This means 
that an individual’ s subjective knowledge is critical because we are eontinually absorbing 
information as we interact with objects and other individuals. It is these normative 
experienees by whieh we determine how we w ill link or file new information (i.e. 
construct a schema). By engaging in this proeess, our objeetive and subjeetive realities 
beeome enmeshed or, maybe, dependent on one another. Perhaps it is much later, in 
early adulthood, that we begin to unpack the knowledge and make decisions about 
knowledge based on a different set o f criteria as our needs, desires, and motivations in 
life change. This way o f thinking about ehildren’s developing epistemologies makes 
perfeet sense; Chandler et al. (2002) talks about clearly stating epistemie criteria and the 
cognitive mechanisms that underlie epistemologieal beliefs. In working with young 
children, it may be essential to consider the broadest facets o f their experiences to 
effectively investigate their epistemie development.
In this study there are several eausal and normative oeeurrenees o f knowledge. In 
Adam’ s ease, the momentum o f soeial interaction perpetuated his engagement and 
adaptation to multiple soeial conventions. Soeial conventions are eongruent to soeial 
norms or socially accepted rules or proeedures (Piaget, 1932). Knowing and abiding by 
the soeial conventions o f his peer group provided him a foundation o f knowledge and 
confidence to be the leader o f his peers. For example, he often was direetive with his 
peers; “ Hey, you need to sit down and get ready for the story, go wash your hands and
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come sit in the circle;”  or “ It ’ s easier i f  you do it like me, watch me. You have to put the 
paper seraps in this eontainer and the markers go in here.”  This example conveys his 
knowledge o f soeial conventions that do not get interjected voluntarily on an individual 
basis. Further, Adam seemed to take pride in his knowledge o f the soeial conventions 
w ithin the classroom, and this feeling o f empowerment in a peer setting began a wave­
like proeess, in whieh his knowledge was more explicit and linked to his prior 
knowledge. For example, there were distinct differences in the way that he thinks about 
soeial conventions as opposed to moral judgment in the classroom. For example, he 
understood the instability o f soeial conventions as being more situational and eontext- 
speeifie (Nueci, 1982); “ Sometimes we have to be quiet, that’s the rule but sometimes we 
don’t have to be quiet beeause i t ’s a party or playtime, so then i t ’s okay to not use our 
inside voices.”  On the other hand, he demonstrated the stability o f other rules that exist 
because o f safety or fairness (Turiel, 1983); “ Hey, don’t touch her; I w ill tell Mr. I. You 
know we shouldn’ t touch our friends like that;”  “ Why not?”  “ Because it is never 
allowed unless we ask to give somebody a hug because it could bother the person and 
they don’t like it or i f  we hit too hard then we could hurt them and they would feel bad 
and cry. Once I hit Kyle on the playground and he fell down and bleeded, he cried and I 
got into trouble. So, I never touch people, they don’t like it.”
The themes identified in this study suggest that young children do have a strong sense 
o f communal knowledge, but at the same time, the themes would strongly contrast the 
beliefs o f Chandler et al. (2002) that young children are ineapable o f having epistemie 
isolation or that the criteria for their knowledge cannot be viewed or understood in 
advance or cannot be viewed in from multiple perspeetives. Young children demonstrate
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various facets o f a pretend nature that speaks to Chandler et al.’ s (2002) epistemie 
loneliness, and they do demonstrate multiple ways o f knowing what they know and how 
they know it based on the content and context o f the environment. Perhaps the biggest 
argument that may not be demonstrated by the investigations o f this study is the 
children’s ability to know the criteria for their knowledge in advance; however, this study 
should raise some doubt about the accuracy o f such thinking, primarily because the 
children do appear to demonstrate criteria for their knowledge by use o f justifications o f 
knowledge and retreating to a way o f pretend knowing in which they practice their 
criteria in a non-threatening manner, as an epistemie shield o f sorts.
This study focuses on what is in the minds o f preschoolers and does so by observing 
their interactions w ith their peers and listening to their words. Without considering the 
empirical in conjunction with the normative aspects o f their knowledge, they would 
appear epistemologically obtuse. Vygotsky ( 1994) likened this way o f thinking to 
biology and culture; he believed that knowledge starts with external experiences that 
individuals are exposed to w ithin their cultural context. In this study the cultural context 
is the elassroom environment. Kant (1933) believed the same way; knowledge is due to 
experiences but not necessarily derived from an individual’ s experiences. In fact, this 
perspective about knowledge ean be traced to Aristotle ’s theories o f knowledge. 
Aristotle's theory enumerates the possible causes whieh fall into several wide groups, 
amounting to the ways the question why may be answered. Aristotle had his own 
approach to the scientific method in terms o f understanding knowledge; he factored in 
what he called “ the essence”  (Audi, 2001, p.648) o f a person. He thought that there were 
particular qualities about individuals that were also universal. This was in direct contrast
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to his teacher, Plato, who thought that the universal and the particulars were polar 
opposites. This study looks at how preschoolers convey their epistemologies and draws 
some inferences about why preschoolers demonstrate their epistemologies in the way that 
they do.
Systems Approach and Epistemie Ability
The current study also helps explain the Dynamic Systems Framework fo r  Personal 
Epistemolog)’ Development (Winsor, 2005) that was constructed based on p ilo t research 
as discussed previously (See Figure I). It incorporates a system that may impact young 
children’ s epistemologieal development during the in itia l exposure to fonnal learning that 
occurs at preschool age. The framework integrates relationships between the child and 
their peers, parents, and teacher. In addition, it considers the relationships among the 
parent/teacher, the parent/child’ s peers, and the relationship between the teacher and the 
ch ild ’s peers. The framework includes cognitive, social, and environmental 
characteristics. The current study is an attempt to begin looking at the relationship 
between the child and their peers. In addition, there were several themes that emerged 
from  this study that support the presence o f cognitive, social, and emotional 
characteristics that influence preschooler’s epistemological thinking.
The Dynamic Systems Framework for Persona! Epistemolog}’ Development addresses 
the child as the center o f the system. First, the framework considers the cognitive 
processes o f the child as he/she develops a theory o f mind. According to current research 
a child develops a theory o f mind, but there is ongoing debate regarding the early onset o f 
personal epistemological development perhaps being in process prior to theory o f  mind;
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however, more research is needed. The framework also incorporates the child’ s 
language, affeetive dispositions, social behaviors and interactions, and the environment. 
Preschoolers ' Personal Epistemology Connecting with Other Cognitive Constructs
The idea o f children engaging in private speech as a .self-regulating technique (a 
finding in this study) brings up the topic o f children’ s ability to think metacognitively. 
Sclf-rcgulating behavior is a characteristic that is guided by metaeognitive ability (Butler 
&  Winne, 1995; Perry, Phillips &  Hutchinson, 2006; Winnc &  Perry, 2000; Zimmerman,
1990), and includes planning, monitoring, and evaluating personal progress as well as the 
motivation to learn. Winne &  Perry (2000) demonstrated that self-regulated learners are 
cognizant o f their academic strengths and weaknesses, and they have a repertoire o f 
strategies they appropriately apply to tackle day-to-day challenges.
This type o f behavior was identified in the child-participants during this study. For 
example, this was shown in the repetition o f words they were unfamiliar with, repeating 
other ehildren’s words/phrases, converting to pretend knowledge, and using strategies to 
stay on a topic or shift to another topic. Dweck (2000) found that self-regulated learners 
attribute their successes and failure to effort expended on a task or effective use o f 
strategies. Now, this is not to say that these children articulated these types o f 
characteristic; however, their behavior would indicate that their decision-making was 
based on their attention to a topic and their use o f strategies to obtain a position within 
their comfort level. Both o f these behaviors resulted in their success or failure, which 
they are in-tune w ith as observed by their external behavior and what might be inferred 
about their internal awareness through observing their external behavior (i.e., eye contact, 
facial expressions, body language).
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Further, Perry et al. (2006) claimed that self-regulated learners believe that 
opportunities which are challenging or allow them to practice their learning and develop 
an understanding o f the topic w ill afford them success. It could be argued that this study 
helps identify similar characteristics in young children, in that there is a distinction in 
their behavior when they are bored compared to when they are challenged. When they 
are challenged within their zone of proximal development, they are more engaged and 
motivated to be successful. These children wanted to be successful matching a link made 
in the research between se lf regulation and self-efficacy (Pintrich, 2000; Winne & Perry, 
2000).
Knowing more broadly and deeply about the developmental process o f children’s 
epistemology will inevitably contribute to the current literature in the field and perhaps 
provide new and innovative ways to measure personal epistemology. It appears that very 
young children have the propensity to develop epistemologically; however, we may not 
set them up for successfully reaching their potential until decades later.
M ethodologica l Im plications  
One of the problems with measuring adult or even adolescent epistemological beliefs 
is that there often end up being some discrepancies about what they think, what they 
know, and how they behave. For example, teachers w ill often ask their students 
questions about a topic, only to have the students parrot or copy a response that contains 
key words from the text because they think that is what they are expected to say. This 
same phenomenon occurs during epistemological investigations; participants have a 
notion about how they think they should respond or what the researcher wants them to
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say. Even as adults, the instructions or questions may mislead or are misinterpreted by 
the participants.
One o f the benefits o f researching young children is that it can assist in the wording 
o f questions for adolescents and adults in tenus o f how to design specific developmental 
questions that do not misguide the participants. Children are far less inhibited in their 
responses even though they have a sense o f wanting to please the researcher and o f 
correct and incorrect responses. They do not have a greater understanding o f the 
consequences o f their responses to the researcher. In addition, they do not have an 
excessive amount o f knowledge to reference even i f  they do want to give the researchers 
the answer they may be looking for. Having the limited knowledge and experience plus 
the naivety o f the larger significance may just work in the favor o f researchers because 
there is less useless information. Children can either answer the questions or they cannot; 
therefore, some information can be quickly discarded.
This study opens the door for more innovative methods o f measuring personal 
epistemology, primarily because researching young children requires researchers to be 
creative and think outside o f the box. It may just be that controlled experimental studies 
are not completely successful in research w ith young children because o f children’s needs 
for fam iliar situations and building relationships o f trust are not incorporated into many 
controlled experiments. The methods that are used in the cuirent study are discussed in 
this section as well as additional methodological issues and implications.
Focus Groups as a New and Innovative Methodology
Using focus groups is a novel and uncharacteristic methodology for researching 
young children; however, it was used in the current study and proved to be useful and
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effective in tapping into children’ s epistemologies. Focus groups are used more with 
adults in clinical and marketing research and, more recently, have proven to be beneficial 
w ith adolescents’ mental health issues (W orrall &  Marino, 2008), teen birth (Herman, 
2008), and computer game play (Colwell, 2007). Foeus groups are also an effective way 
to address d ifficu lt issues and hard to reach populations (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003). Using 
focus groups in the current study in itia lly  came from the pilot research in that the small 
groups had six to eight participants and mirrored some o f the problems that were present 
in the whole class instruction (i.e., not everyone got a chance to talk, children talked over 
one another, and controlling their active behavior was d ifficu lt); therefore, it was clear 
that the number o f children in a group needed to be less. Three participants could be 
considered a focus group, so the number was reduced to three and the idea o f a central 
focus was integrated. Three participants o f the preschool age in a focus group are 
conducive to accomplishing the goal without having to be concerned about behavioral 
issues.
Perhaps focus groups that are directly linked to classroom instruction and individual 
interviews provide very young children with a scaffold to be able to pinpoint early 
epistemological characteristics and evidence for the early onset o f personal 
epistemological development. Qualitative methodologies such as focus groups can help 
elaborate on the multidimensionality o f the human experience, including personal 
epistemology.
Videotaping
Videotaping is another methodology that was utilized in the current study that was 
beneficial in several ways: (a) It allowed for review o f the data multiple times, (b) it was
394
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
possible to make an individual file fo r each child by copy/pasting the clips for each 
individual together so they could be viewed together, (c) it was possible to choose a brie f 
clip o f a child and show him/her the responses as an anchor to a line o f probing questions 
(in this way the child ’s memory is refreshed about a certain way o f thinking), and (d) the 
children were attentive to the video; it was engaging and fun for them. Another huge 
asset o f videotaping is that the researcher can be observing other activities or other 
children simultaneously, and this leaves time to take field notes and complete 
observational checklists and still have the opportunity later to review activities that may 
have been overlooked in real time.
Use o f  Constant Comparative Analysis as a Methodology’
The constant comparative method is used w ith research designs that incorporate 
multiple data sources (Bogdan &  Biklen, 2003) and is consistent with analyzing case 
study data (Strauss &  Corbin, 1998). This is a complex method o f data analysis and 
requires persistent, consistent, and simultaneous on-going data collection and data 
analysis, so that the researcher can identify preliminary characteristics o f the individual 
child or group.
Using the constant comparative method assists w ith the process o f classifying words 
and behaviors into preliminary categories and subcategories, as well as assists with 
documenting particular strengths and weaknesses o f individuals and groups. The 
constant comparative approach was used to prelim inarily analyze the data. This method 
involves analyzing data as it is collected and using preliminai-y findings to shape future 
interviews. The intent o f this process is to build a conceptual framework that reflects 
participants’ experiences and perceptions regarding the research question. Although there
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were some preexisting ideas about what some o f the participants' experiences might be, 
there was a deliberate attempt to be objective and allow the children to guide the 
direction o f the questions and the discussion in order to avoid using solely those 
preexisting ideas. However, the epistemie matrix cells and the developmental theories o f 
child development continued to be guides for the study as well. Therefore, open coding 
methods (Strauss &  Corbin, 1990) to discover the factors, ideas, and experiences that the 
children perceived to have been important in their lives were a key in the current study 
(Lindsey, Kurtz, Jarvis, W illiams, &  Nackerud, 2000).
The constant comparative method is strict enough to be helpful to the researcher in 
exploring the content and meaning in the data, but it is not saddled with so many strict 
rules to be too rigid. Glaser and Strauss (1967) talk about guidelines rather than about 
fixed and constant rules for doing qualitative research, which indicates that guidelines 
can be used in a flexible and creative way,; as in the current study. Using this approach 
provided a foundation to explore the words and actions o f young children and was found 
to be a useful tool to identify areas o f the investigation that may have otherwise been 
overlooked. W ith all o f the complexities o f researching young children and the 
exploratory nature o f young children’s personal epistemologies, researching young 
children needs to be thorough and rise to the expectations o f quality research 
methodologies in the most scientific manner possible.
Case Study Research in Personal Epistemology’
Case study research is one method that can be helpful in allowing us to understand 
the complex issue o f personal epistemology and add strength to what we already know. 
Case studies provide elaborate detail and contextual analysis but only o f a lim ited number
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o f individual, events, or conditions. A  case study does not lend itself well to 
generalizations or predictions but is quite useful in theory building (Classer &  Strauss, 
196TX
Personal epistemology research has historically engaged in interviews or used 
quantitative methods. More and more researchers in the field are seeing the advantages 
that qualitative and mixed-methodologies research can make in the field. These 
methodologies may help answer many o f the more challenging questions which plague 
the field (Hofer, 2000, Kuhn &  Weinstock, 2003; Schraw &  Olafson, 2003) regarding the 
how and why o f individual’ s beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Using case studies 
in personal epistemology and with children can assist in finding new measures that 
capture the questions we still need to answer and identify areas o f children’s personal 
epistemology that can be the most productive for future research.
Longitudinal Research in Personal Epistemology Research
The possibility o f informative research with very young children allows for more 
longitudinal research in the field o f personal epistemology. Starting at such a young age 
can provide a broader perspective on lifespan development and personal epistemology 
trajectories. Many researchers in the fie ld o f personal epistemology recommend the field 
engage in more longitudinal work, but up to this point, longitudinal studies are still very 
rare (Hofer, 2000, Hofer &  Pintrich, 1997; King &  Kitchener, 1986; Perry, 1970; Schraw, 
2001X
Educational Implications 
The themes found in the cun ent study indicate that preschool children have the ability 
to move between subjective (i.e. more interpretive) and objective (i.e. more factual)
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epistemological frames o f reference, and it appears to be somewhat domain and context- 
specific. This finding can affect the overall way in which teaching and learning is 
viewed. The educational significance o f this study and how researching children’s 
personal epistemologies can have an important role in improving education for all 
children w ill be discussed in this section. Knowing more about children’s 
epistemological onset and development could have a significant impact on the fo llow ing: 
(a) early childhood educational curriculum, (b) classroom instructional techniques, (c) 
teacher education programs, and (d) how parents prepare their children to enter 
preschool.
Early Childhood Education Curriculum
The more valid and reliable our research becomes the more like ly administrators and 
government policy makers o f early childhood curriculums w ill be able to consider and 
implement the value o f personal epistemological development. Gaining more knowledge 
in children’s personal epistemologies stands to impact early childhood curriculums but 
also can guide the current effort to implement preschool standards across the U.S (Martin 
&  Loomis, 2007). The National Association for the Education o f Young Children 
(NAEYC) oversees that national, state, and local education facilities fo llow  strict 
guidelines in order to obtain funding for their programs. The problem is that each state 
has different laws regarding early childhood education. For instance, kindergarten is not 
mandatory in every state; only 41 states require that local school districts offer half-day 
kindergarten, and nine states require the districts to offer full-day. More alarming than 
that is that only 14 states in the US require children to have a kindergarten experience 
prior to entering first grade; two o f those require a full-day o f kindergarten (NAEYC,
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2007). Further still, in 2006, only 43% o f all three-year-olds attended a preschool 
program, and in the same year only 59% o f all four-year-olds attended preschool.
This should alarm us in that far too many children enter school unprepared. When 
they begin unprepared, children begin behind and continue to fall further and further 
behind. The government, educators, and parents should be informed about what it takes 
to enter school ready to succeed. Knowing about very young children’s epistemie 
development can contribute to other cognitive domain-specific tasks such as improving 
school perfonnance, raising math and language abilities, sharpening thinking and 
attention skills, reducing special education placement, and lowering the sehool drop-out 
rate. More broadly, the more successfully we educate individuals, the less crime, 
poverty, mental health issues, dependency addiction, and so on we may see.
It is also possible to add to the list the social and emotional benefits o f early 
childhood education. For example, it improves and strengthens peer interaction, 
decreases problem behavior, encourages more exploratory behavior, and helps 
adjustment to the demands o f formal schooling. Other long-term benefits include savings 
in tax dollars, increasing lifelong eaming potential, achieving better academic outcomes, 
and lowering the rates o f teen pregnancy and incarceration (Galleghar, 2003).
Classroom Instructional Techniques
Perhaps i f  there was less o f a focus on behavioral factors in early childhood teaching 
and learning we could more evenly weigh the social, affective, and epistemological 
factors in preschool learning. It appears that very young children have the propensity to 
develop epistemologically, but we may not set them up for successfully reaching their 
potential.
399
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
How a teacher is trained to teaeh any grade level is important but especially important 
in terms o f early childhood development. A  teacher’s teaching philosophy, teaching 
technique, communication skills, motivation, and even their epistemological beliefs 
(Schraw &  Olafson, 2002) are paramount in the teaching and learning o f preschool 
children. As has been indicated, a pilot study was conducted using a similar 
methodology as the current study. The teacher in the pilot was a 22-year veteran o f 
elementary education, four years o f which were w ith preschoolers. It cannot be known 
for certain i f  her age, race, sex, experience, or education contributed to her phenomenal 
abilities and effectiveness with her students and their parents, but she was very 
knowledgeable about childhood development theory and practice. She regularly and 
consistently applied critical thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making tasks in her 
themes o f the week. She was consistent in addressing the needs o f the students in every 
capacity. She engaged them in question-and-answer interactions, allowed and 
encouraged the children to share their knowledge and experiences, and listened to what 
the children had to say. She positively influenced her students’ personal epistemology; it 
was truly an incredible experience to be in her classroom.
The current study, on the other hand, was conducted with a teacher who was young, 
immature, and inexperienced. In faet he was still in the process o f obtaining his 
Baccalaureate degree. It was his first year o f running his own classroom, and prior to that 
he had been a student aide in the same classroom. He was quite hyperactive and 
egocentric himself. Seldom did he listen to what the children had to say; he quickly 
dismissed their comments in exchange for keeping order in his classroom. For example, 
he responded to student comments with, “ Oh well that’ s very interesting, now go wash
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your hands.”  He also implemented a behavioral technique during whole-class instruction 
where the children could not ask questions or make a comment until after the story was 
read, so he had them remain silent. I f  they agreed with something or had a similar 
experience as that in the story, the children were directed to tap their noses. He was 
pleasant and certainly polite and seemed to try very hard; however, it was d ifficu lt to see 
the rationale behind many o f the activities in terms o f aligning the theme o f the week 
with group or individual activities. I f  he was applying cognitive developmental theories 
to the classroom, they were d ifficu lt to identify. He rarely took the opportunity to answer 
the children’s questions or explain the importance o f a topic or activity, and this could 
have very well affected the students’ personal epistemologies.
Preschool teachers should use instructional techniques (i.e., discovery learning, block 
and dramatic play, music and moving activities) that are based on educationally sound 
research and correspond to the multiple dimensions o f learning. Very young children are 
capable o f a plethora o f cognitive, emotional, social, and physical activities, and 
preschool instructional techniques should expose children to all o f the modalities o f 
learning so that children can discover what they are good at and where their interests fall. 
Not all children are going to be good at every task, but they need to experience it. 
Additionally teachers should be aware o f each child ’s zone o f proximal development; this 
way the teacher w ill know each student’s strengths and weaknesses. This w ill allow the 
teacher to make quality and informed decisions about pairing students for projects and 
play and have realistic expectations for each individual child.
Most importantly, the preschool teacher should have a teaching philosophy rather 
than a play philosophy. Teachers should choose activities that incorporate novel
401
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
situations that children are fam iliar w ith and can relate to. They should be explaining to 
the children the importance o f topics and activities that they can relate to and understand. 
Teaching and learning techniques in the preschool classroom should challenge the 
children to think independently and collectively in solving problems, making decisions, 
and thinking critically. Above all the teacher needs to engage in active relationship 
building between themselves and each child and promote that relationship building 
among the peers.
Perhaps the lack o f some combination o f these techniques speaks to possible 
contributing factors that limited the children in the current study in terms o f sources o f 
knowledge. It was expected that the children in this study would have demonstrated their 
knowledge about external sources similar to those children in the pilot. This did not 
occur, and this could relate to the philosophies and techniques o f the teacher. I f  teachers 
are aware o f  their beliefs about knowledge and knowing and how that relates to learning 
with preschool children, perhaps children w ill be to understand their own beliefs more 
intentionally. For this to occur, teachers would need to explicitly cover themes from an 
epistemological perspective in the way tliey ask questions, answer questions, design their 
lesson plans, and generally approach teaching and learning.
Pre-service Teacher Education Programs
In order to accommodate more cognitively sophisticated children, we would need to 
make considerable adjustments to the education o f pre-service teachers. Children’s 
personal epistemology is important because it provides valuable insights into what 
ehildren know and how they learn. The more understanding we have about children’s 
personal epistemology the better we w ill be able to prepare pre-service teachers to enter
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the classroom, no matter what level they are teaehing. In addition, better prepared 
teachers w ill have more solid developmental and cognitive backgrounds and w ill be more 
effective and efficient in the classroom. How individuals develop personal 
epistemologies and the unique relationship they have to learning may assist teacher 
instruction to fo llow  more closely to theories o f learning, hence, bridging the gap 
between theoiy and practice.
Teachers need to have an understanding o f the importance o f child epistemological 
development, and this may help teachers bring more real-world instruction and 
assessment into alignment (Schraw &  Olafson, 2002). As pointed out earlier, 
evaluativism is a level o f personal epistemology that is not recognizable until later 
adulthood and is thought to incorporate higher levels o f cognition (i.e. metacognition) 
such as critical thinking, problem-solving, reasoning, and logic (Kuhn, ct al, 2002). I f  we 
can identify how to cultivate this more sophisticated way o f thinking and identify links to 
epistemological development in early childhood, the results could lead to better 
understanding o f the processes involved in life-long learning. Understanding how very 
young children can produce evaluativistic thinking as seen in this study is one small step 
in this process.
Parental Education about Preschoolers ' Preparat ion fo r  School and Learning
Currently many states in the US do not have educational standards for preschool 
children, and in some cases families do not even send their children to kindergarten as it 
is still a choice in many locations. There is a direct relationship between parents’ views 
about education and learning and how they value education (Laosa, 1978). W hile we
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train pre-scrvice teachers, parents also need to be educated about the effect o f early 
childhood experiences on later cognitive and emotional abilities.
This is a d ifficu lt area o f educational significance to disentangle considering the 
broad multiculturalism in today’s society. Some culturally shaped early learning 
opportunities have been found to be more conducive than others to preparing children for 
success in schools, which are typically not designed with diverse configurations o f 
students in mind. One o f the challenges that this poses to early childhood educators, in 
particular, involves striking a balance between demonstrating respect for cultural 
differences and preparing children to participate successfully in formal school settings 
(Prince and Lawrence, 1993). A starting point for addressing this dilemma involves 
understanding how children's cultural backgrounds affect the skills, knowledge, and 
expectations that they bring to school.
Culture plays a complex role in shaping children's earliest learning opportunities and 
experiences in the home. Parents’ beliefs about when and how children learn school- 
related skills, their daily interactions w ith their children, and the social rules that guide 
these interactions combine in intricate ways to create what Luis M oll has termed “ funds 
o f knowledge”  that are based in culture (M oll, Amanti, Neff, &  Gonzalez, 1992). 
However, efforts to specify the mechanisms or dimensions o f culture that carry its role in 
learning are in their infancy. There is a need to advance and include cultural beliefs with 
beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Culture is a complex and multidimensional entity 
o f human development, generally, and epistemological development, specifically.
Culture is described by the Board o f Children and Families as encompassing economic.
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ethnie, racial, social, structural, and other dimensions that constitute a constellation of 
influences on children's early learning opportunities (NAEYC, 2007).
It is critical when examining the research evidence to take careful note of the 
investigator’s definition of culture and its implications for the results from any particular 
study as it has multiple interpretations. A persistent problem in much o f this research is 
drawing inferences about non-cconomic dimensions o f culture when, in fact, social class 
may be the more influential variable (Laosa, 1978). Arc differences that are attributed to 
children's ethnic backgrounds or immigrant status, for example, more accurately ascribed 
to the educational backgrounds o f their parents?
Parents are most often motivated in their ambitions for the success o f their children 
but do not have the insights to help them along the way. It is common for parents to 
become less and less engaged in their children’s education as they progress. There are 
many contributing factors to this, but the largest contributing factor that parents w ill 
report, with the exception o f time, is that they do not understand the material their 
children are learning followed by an attitude that they do not understand why the material 
has to be taught because it has no earthly significance to anything useful in the child’s life 
(von Wyl, Perren, Simoni, & Bugin, 2008).
Parents are an important part o f the developing epistemologies of young children and 
an integral part o f the Dynamic Systems Framework fo r  Personal Epistemolog)’ 
Development (See Figure 1) systems. The current study focused on the child’s 
interactions with his/her peers. The pilot study that was conducted included the parent- 
child relationship and the parent-teacher relationship. Some o f the findings should 
inform educators that parents have an important role in child development and epistemie
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development and require some training to inform and empower parents so that they can 
more adequately prepare their young children for an education and see their role in their 
child’s education for the full term.
Children’s personal epistemologies research can foster parent’s interpretation o f early 
childhood developmental milestones and transition perceptions away from traditional 
developmental limitations. Providing parents with a clearer vision o f children’s cognitive 
abilities may help parents better prepare their children to enter structured classroom 
environments. Perhaps i f  there was less focus on behavior factors in early childhood 
teaching and learning, we would be more evenly weighting social, affective, and 
epistemological factors, as opposed to our finding of predominantly social and affective 
levels.
Part 4 Future Research
Researching young children’s personal epistemologies is an area that needs a 
considerable amount of attention. Knowing about the early onset o f epistemological 
thinking w ill advance research in early childhood development as well as research into 
adolescence and adulthood (Chandler &  Carpendale, 1998; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). 
Gopnik, Meltzoff &  Kuhl, (1999) found that children younger than two-years-old can use 
verbal language, watch other individual’ s reactions to an object and make their own 
preference judgment, and show empathy and compassion for others. Therefore it is 
proposed here that future research in young children’s personal epistemology continue to 
investigate children individually and their interactions with others. The Dynamic Systems 
Framework fo r Personal Epistemology Development (See Figure 1) guides this section of
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the discussion; suggestions for future research which are closest to children’s personal 
epistemology w ill be discussed first, followed by some broader issues related to child 
development in general. Personal epistemology in preschool children is quite exploratory 
at this point. Future research should include continuing to identify developmental levels 
and dimensions o f knowledge. Many o f the findings of the current study build on areas 
that support future research recommendations from scholars in the field: insight change 
(Burr & Hofer, 2002), epistemie doubt (Bendixen, 2002; Boyce & Chandler, 1992), and 
issues of domain-dependence (Hofer, 2000; Paulsen &  Wells, 1998; Schommer & 
Walker, 1995).
Systems Fram ew ork
Using a systems approach should be considered in future research as this may be an 
efficient and effective way to tap into a complex construct with a younger population. 
Schommer-Aikins (2004) also promotes a systems approach although hers centers on the 
individual’s personal epistemology, and the approach is more domain-specific. In her 
view, one individual’s personal epistemology would be investigated by a professional or 
scholar from each domain (i.e., math, science, English etc.) then conclusions could be 
compared for the same individual across multiple domains. The current study was 
preempted by a pilot study to help make decisions, and one o f the outcomes of the pilot 
study was a plan for future research in children’s epistemology, called the. Dynam ic  
Systems Fram ew ork f o r  Personal Epistem ology Development (Winsor, 2005) (See Figure 
]). It is a compilation o f important issues and individuals that may impact children’s 
personal epistemology development and incorporates other systems approaches 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1975; Mintichin, 1974).
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The Dynamic Systems Framework fo r  Personal Epistemological Development 
(Winsor, 2005) (DSFPED) is a comprehensive perspective on the influenees o f young 
ehildren’s personal epistemology. The child continues to be the focus o f the system; it 
centers on relationships that impaet a ehild’s thinking about knowledge and knowing, 
such as the relationship between peers as reflected in the current study, but it also 
includes the relationships that exist between the child and his/her parent(s) and the 
relationship between the child and their teacher. In addition, the dynamic systems 
framework integrates the intrinsic and extrinsic facets o f the child ’s development, in 
terms o f cognitive, soeial, and emotional eharaeteristies. Preschool ehildren are at a 
cognitive milestone in tenus o f the theory o f mind (TOM) development and with the 
recent connections between theory o f mind and epistemie development in early 
childhood; TOM is also a cognitive component o f the DSFPED.
Current research is just beginning to identify connections between theory o f mind 
development and epistemologieal thinking (Bartseh, 2002; Burr &  Hofer, 2002; Kuhn, 
Cheney, &  Weinstock, 2000; Mansfield &  Clinehy, 2002). Further, researchers have 
identified a stage o f epistemologieal development prior to an absolutist (dualistie) phase 
o f development (Burr &  Hofer, 2002; Chandler &  Carpendale, 1998; Kuhn &  Weinstock, 
2002), and future research needs to progress in a similar direction. However, future 
research in children’s personal epistemology requires more creative methodologies as a 
means o f investigating their cognitive abilities; traditional survey measures used for adult 
epistemologieal inquiry are inadequate due to ehildren’s developmental limitations sueh 
as reading and writing abilities. For example. Burr and Hofer (2002) administered 
measures for both constructs (i.e. theory o f mind and personal epistemology) using
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puppets. For the epistemological task, the puppets were used to engage the child using 
their justifications for knowing to detennine dualistie or pre-dualistic levels. They 
adapted the measure from Gopnik and Graf (1988) and O’Neill and Gopnik (1991), who 
found that ehildren had difficulty identifying the other’s source o f knowledge and tended 
to favor visual over tactile sources of their own source o f knowledge. Therefore, the 
epistemological task included each child completing two seeing tasks and two feeling 
tasks. Further, Burr and Hofer (2002) related their finding on the epistemological task to 
a theory o f mind task which was adapted from Lalonde and Chandler (1995). Burr and 
Hofer (2002) used a misplaced object task and an unexpected contents task, and again, 
the puppet was used to engage the child in the storyline. Then to better understand the 
connections that might exist between theory of mind and epistemological beliefs, they 
repeated a set o f false-belief tasks and followed-up with epistemie questions that targeted 
the child’s source of knowledge and justifications for knowing.
In the current study the props used to probe children’s epistemologies were objects 
that were familiar to them and were already present in the classroom (i.e., the books read 
in whole class instruction, puzzles, sequence cards, items from the dramatic play area, 
etc.) and the line o f questioning came from the theme-of-the-week topic (i.e., monsters, 
winter, construction, family). These were the topics that they were concentrating on in 
the classroom for the week and, therefore, were familiar to all o f the children. Then 
follow-up questioning was constructed based on the children’s own words and the words 
of others from the whole class instruction, center activities, and focus groups. More 
research of this developmentally appropriate caliber needs to continue with preschoolers.
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In comparing Burr &  Hofer (2002) to the current study, each has a different 
methodology; however, there are some similar findings. This supports a need for future 
research to include both structured, controlled and quantitative designs as well as semi­
structured qualitative designs situated in an authentic environment. There needs to be 
continued foeus on the subjective and objective views as they demonstrate their ability to 
understand and shift between the two with ease and confidence.
Investigating the d ifficu lty and/or absence o f ehildren’s source o f knowledge needs to 
be addressed. For example, the question o f why preschool children have d ifficu lty 
responding explicitly to source o f knowledge questions should be researched. More 
information is needed based in this area based on the finding from this study and Burr &  
Hofer (2002). Perhaps a mixed-methods approach to this question could be beneficial. 
For example, fo llow ing the story in the whole class instruction, the teacher could ask 
source o f knowledge questions (e.g., how do you know that Max didn’ t really go to the 
forest to see the w ild things?). Using the theme o f the week, a vignette could be 
designed, and the children could be asked source o f knowledge questions; however, the 
vignette would need to be a novel scenario that was meaningful to the children and 
developmentally appropriate. A follow-up individual interview could be done in which 
children would be asked probing source o f knowledge questions about their responses in 
the whole class instruction and the vignette. In this way the content would be familiar, 
the contexts would be different, and the questions would be more structured toward the 
source o f knowledge. The ehildren’s responses to the whole class instruction and the 
vignette could be analyzed empirically, and the content o f the probing questions could be 
a qualitative investigation.
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Knowing more about young children’s source o f knowledge, both internal or external, 
could provide more insights into internal sources such as private speech, pretense, 
imagination. This would address how it is that, even though much o f children’s cognitive 
development is taking place internally and with limited language development at that age, 
much o f what and how they know seems implicit to an outsider but not so im plic it to 
their peers. Source o f knowledge is an important dimension o f the process o f knowing; 
researching children’s sources o f knowledge can inform us about developmental patterns 
and patterns regarding the dimensions o f knowledge. This is an area that requires more 
research in all each levels.
The use o f focus groups and videotaping are detailed in the methodological 
implications section o f this chapter. However, observation was another technique used in 
the current study that was effective in tapping into children’ s personal epistcmologies. 
During whole-class instruction the class was obseiwed, checklists were completed, and 
initia l ideas for follow-up questions were generated while the activity was being 
videotaped. Bogdan &  Biklen (2003) recommend observation and field notes because 
the researcher has the ideas and interactions fresh in their mind. Observational 
techniques are often used in classroom teaching. Brophy (2006) found that there were 
many contradictions between teacher self-reports and what was observed. He found 
several teacher misconceptions and distortions, as well as things that teachers did not 
report, such as how underappreciated they were by their students. Observation can be a 
useful methodological tool for identifying what children do not explicitly report. Schraw 
&  Olafson (2002) recommend looking at teacher and pre-service teachers’ worldviews.
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In the DSFPED focus on relationships, this is an area that would benefit from more 
qualitative research, such as phénoménologies or ethnographies (VanMaanen, 1994).
The Dynamic Systems Framework fo r  Personal Epistemological Development 
(Winsor, 2005) extrapolates the social dynamic o f the individual and accounts for the 
importance and need for future research to investigate not only the child’s relationships 
but also the relationships o f those individuals that directly impact the knowledge and 
understanding o f young children. To clearly and effectively see the child’s interactions 
with others, it is necessary to explore multiple relationships including the relationship 
between the parent and the teacher; the parent and the ch ild ’s peers; and the teacher and 
the child ’s peers. This becomes quite a complex task, but interactions may be similar 
among individuals.
Research should be conducted in the children’s authentic learning environment. 
Researching preschooler’s personal epistcmologies in their classroom environment can 
be effective and efficient, particularly in these early exploratory studies. Observing or 
interacting w ith children in the environment that they know, feel comfortable in, and with 
all o f the objects that they know and love at their fingertips places them in an 
environment that they w ill function their best. It also gave the researcher plenty o f 
opportunities to see more natural interactions and perhaps identify unexpected or 
unanticipated thinking or behaving. It is more time efficient in that there is no need to 
lug extensive amounts o f materials around in the hopes that one w ill assist you toward 
your goal. Having no set up time or controlled environment also takes away from having 
to bond with an individual child every time the researcher attempts to explore a measure 
or activity. There is always that icebreaker-time, and preschool children have such short
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attention spans. It is much easier for a researcher to blend into the classroom, and the 
children w ill automatically engage the researcher when they feel at ease.
As was stated, affect is another construct that is included in the dynamic system 
approach and is also in its infancy in terms o f how it is linked to personal epistemology 
and future research could address this (Bendixen &  Rule, 2004). One’s affective nature 
is particularly poignant in researching young children’s epistemologies because it is used 
in how they choose to communicate. Their emotions, interests, needs, motivations, and 
attitudes get conveyed through their words and their actions and strongly impact their 
past, present, and future knowledge and understanding. So, what is the epistemic role o f 
affective dispositions? It is w idely agreed upon that being a good moral individual is a 
result o f having sound moral judgment and reasoning ability (Kohlberg, 1984; Kuhn, 
1991). Moral judgment requires being emotionally attuned to the world (G illigan, 1982; 
Kohlberg, 1984), and moral decision-making is related to epistemic beliefs (Bendixen, 
Schraw, &  Dunkle, 1998; King &  Kitchener, 1994). The current study uncovered 
consistent affective characteristics w ithin individual cases and across individuals that 
appeared to assist the children in adapting their epistemological position relating to the 
moral knowledge and understanding, both in contexts- and content-specific. For 
example, when a child had knowledge or experiences similar to a peer or a storyline, they 
were considerable more interested, engaged, brighter, more aware o f their successful 
account o f linking and transferring information; they were more w illing  to participate and 
did so with ease, animation, and laughter.
Current research strongly supports an integrated model for personal epistemology 
(Bendixen &  Rule, 2004), and this is also reflected in the dynamic systems framework.
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Affect in the DSFPED is reflected as the child ’s dispositions (motivation, interests, 
emotions) and is represented w ith a broken line to indicate the affective nature o f the 
child is expected to change based on the nature o f the interaction. In addition their affect 
is guided by cognitive and social occurrences.
Future research needs to focus on how the environment impacts what the children 
know and how they know. This type o f social perspective o f knowledge is currently 
accepted in the fields o f social psychology and sociology; and termed “ social 
epistemology”  (Fuller, 2002, p. 36). The primary difference being that social 
epistemology involves the social network o f the individual, but interestingly, social 
epistemologists have the same d ifficu lty  coming to a consensus about the intricacies o f 
knowledge, just as the personal epistemologists have boundary concerns (i.e., do beliefs 
about learning predict beliefs about knowledge?). They are two separate domains, but 
perhaps given the complexities (language, conscious awareness) o f tapping into 
children’s personal epistemologies, it may be necessary to get to the root o f personal 
epistemologies through investigations o f social networks. This is linked to Vygotsky 
(1987) in which children develop from the outside in (i.e., interrpsychologically). It is 
also consistent with Bronfenbrenner (1975) in that ecological systems intertwine 
externally and become components o f the individual.
Language.
The complex construct o f language in terms o f childhood epistemic development is 
critical. Language is a complex concept that has several areas that can be investigated; 
however, this study utilizes language as a single internal factor because it is thought to be 
a factor. This study is prim arily concerned with the function o f language; children use
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the same system for representing (i.e. verbal thought) and communicating (i.e. verbal 
diseourse). Future research should focus more on the preschooler’s language 
development more closely and be concerned more with pragmatic and semantic issues. It 
is in this way that language has been enormously significant in theory o f mind 
(Astington, 1994) and pretend play research (Gopnik &  Meltoff, 1989).
Language is a prominent issue in theory o f mind development and a controversial one 
at that (Astington &  Baird, 2005; Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &  Firth, 1985; Chandler, 1992; 
W immer &  Pemer, 1983). Astington &  Baird (2005) investigate possible explanations 
for how children acquire their understanding for theory o f mind. Likewise, this stands to 
be an important component for tapping into and understanding children’s epistemic 
development and could also prove to provide significant information in adolescent and 
adult epistemic thinking as well. Studying this area in preschoolers is an ideal starting 
point because they are transitioning from nonverbal to verbal beings and they are 
experimenting w ith language and developing linguistic abilities. In the current study there 
were epistemic patterns that impacted the way the children communicated. Their 
communication patterns ranged from strictly nonverbal interactions to a combination o f 
verbal and nonverbal to completely verbal. The current study did not look at linguistic 
patterns specifically, but based on the data transcripts, it is reasonable to think this is an 
area that requires a vast amount o f research that might contribute enormously to the 
research in child development and personal epistemology.
The current study indicates that other cognitive constructs may be developing during 
this critical period o f development that have links to personal epistemology and these 
need to be explored as well. For example, when asking children epistemologically
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challenging questions, they begin to present metacognitive characteristics in their 
behaviors that resemble naïve or perhaps metacognitive infancy. Examples include 
linking past and present knowledge and personal experiences to new information, making 
associations with reoccurring sources (i.e., parents, peers, books), self-regulated 
behaviors (i.e., practicing responses in self-talk, repeating others or the story, making-up 
scenarios when they do not know), self-efficacy, and motivation. Future research to 
investigate the cognitive constructs that may coincide with epistemic development should 
include interactions between the child another component o f the DSFPED and include 
more systematic and structured cognitive task. A  mixed-methods approach could be 
infonnative, but the qualitative component is critical for getting into the child ’s world and 
better understanding the cognitive processes and how they work together. Cognitive 
approaches could be complemented by also looking and language, affect, or social factors 
as well.
Longitudinal Research 
Longitudinal studies are deficient in personal epistemology research. Beginning 
longitudinal research with preschoolers would be an asset to development and provide 
infonnation about epistemological development over the lifespan (Hofer &  Pintrich, 
1998). There is plenty that remains unknown about the trajectory o f epistemological 
development that needs to be unpacked, and conducting longitudinal research can 
contribute to gaps in the literature. An ideal way to begin a longitudinal study to 
investigate the personal epistemologies o f preschool children would be to use the 
DSFPED and begin with 30 children and their families and fo llow  them through their 
highest academic accomplishment.
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There are a tremendous number o f factors to consider when researching young 
children, particularly in an authentic environment where many o f the factors cannot be 
controlled. For example, it becomes complex when epistemic questioning is based on the 
words and actions o f the children themselves and the teacher’s teaching and learning 
philosophies. However, the methodology o f this study could be replicated. This could be 
viewed as important starting point for research in children’s epistemic development 
because as mentioned in the limitations section, “ dependability,”  “ trustworthiness,”  
“ credibility,”  “ transferability,”  and “ confirmability”  o f research provide evidence for 
reliability and validity which is needed to advance our knowledge in this area (Bogdan &  
B iklin , 2003, p. 81).
More research with this age specific group o f children w ill help identify which 
characteristics and themes, like those found in the current study, transfer to children in 
similar and different types o f learning environments. For example, important differences 
and similarities may be found in different teaching and learning philosophies, (i.e., 
Reggio-Emilia, Montessori); in different cultural backgrounds (Chen, 2000; Koss &  
Chioino &  Vargas, 1999); w ith different socioeconomic backgrounds and language 
ability (Clegg &  Ginsborg, 2006); or with learning and physical disadvantages such as 
autism (Gelfand &  Barron, 2005), attention-deficit (Wender, 2001), or physical illness 
(Ablin, 1997).
Final thoughts
One final thought about preschooler’ s personal epistemologies has to do with a 
response that was received from a child-participant in the current study. The children
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were extremely curious and inquisitive about why the researcher was in their classroom, 
as they are w ith any newcomer to the classroom. (It really is their domain). They had a 
number o f questions, and as any doctoral student who really believes that young children 
have capabilities beyond what is known would say I explained, “ I want to know what you 
know about knowledge and other things that are important to you.”  Apparently this stuck 
with one o f the children and on the second day o f the second week, 1 asked, “ What do 
you think you know the most about?”  The response went like this, “ Wow what I know 
the most about, well, 1 know about lots o f things but 1 couldn’ t tell you about all o f them 
that I know but why are you asking me. How come you don’t know? I know about me 
but why do you want to know? (40 second pause) What I know about, know about know 
about know about, that is so silly, you’re silly, how do you know what you know about 
know?”  1 thought it was a great question from a preschooler.
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background 
knowledge and 
classroom learning 
{0-2 }
0  ADAM RESULT #3 
Nature of Knowledge 
is more developed 
individually, whereas 
the Nature and 
Process of Knowing 
is represented at a 
more integrated 
level. {0-2}
Q  ADAM RESULT #4: 
Source of 
Knowledge is clearly 
shifts from internal 
to external in 
nature. {0-2}
ure of
wiedge {0-23} "
Nature and Procès 
of Knowing {0-21}
Accepts what is 
understood and 
articulates 
justification. {0-2}
Q  Stay close to the 
classroom topic. 
{0-3} ^
Q  Certain {0-9)J
Affectively and 
behavioraily more 
staWe and positive 
when knowledge is 
certain. However, 
when knowledge is 
unscertain he asks 
questions, when 
there is 
understanding he 
maintains his 
positive nature 
Otherwise his 
knowledge becomes 
more fragmented 
and his disposition 
becomes more 
negative and 
unstable. {0-1}
y  Simple knowledge is 
more affective leads 
to questions and 
more internal 
curoisity {0-2}
Q  Usually integrates 
personal experience 
or family, {0-2}
Q  No sign of external I 
failure but signs of 
internal conflict i.e., 
poor eye contact 
and very quiet, not 
so animated, {0-2}
Combination of 
sources is how he 
makes decisions 
about his behavior 
and knowledge, 
{0-5}
^TustikatiŒ^Ml^ *isa_—isa
JJExternal sources of 
knowledge typically 
get interpreted 
internally and if not 
disengagement is 
the result, {0-3!
Q  When knowledge is 
already linked and 
more certain more 
animated with 
justifcationsand 
more confident 
{0-2 }
No, My sister said 
no fighting; that's 
bad," {0-4}
"ometiraes when 
I'm sick I have to go 
to the doctor and I 
get a shot right here 
(points to arm) then 
I got hurt," {0-6}
Because it's only for 
kids, {0-4}
we have to get 
sweaters so that we 
can go outside, 
that's what my 
mommy says,'{0-4} y  Well yeah but 
tornados goes round 
and round so I can't 
ever go on there 
because I don't like 
around and around 
{0-3}
Q  "Urn, I didnt cry, |
Only my grandpa 
cried because they 
worried about him 
Then they said 
maybe Coco can 
stay with you 
{0 -6 }
Because I needed 
io take the Karate 
{0-3}{J "Because I think it's j 
disgusting," {0-4} I
Q T  think so they can 
go to sleep and 
have energy to fish 
but maybe not,' 
{0-3}
Q  "It might me 
megatron who killed 
Blackout, I will ask 
Elvis, he know s 
more about- that 
than me," {0-3}
^  "All of them are the
same but they look
different, like me
My mommy is white----------------* lilifi you and my
daddy is really black.
I'm just brown,"
{0-2}
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Q  RESULT All 
Primarily AbsoluLisl 
view of knowledge 
across all four 
dimensions of 
knowledge, 
Requires probing 
and ledirection. 
{0 -2}
EPI5TEMIC
PROF LE: AMY
52 RESULT #2:
As her knowledge 
and thinking
isa/ isa\
becomes more
complex she has less
independent
thinking &
demonstrates more
animated behaviors.
More disruptive
and less engaged.
{0-2}
y  Nature of
Knowledge {0-18}' ^
Certain {0-8}Simple {0-18}
Q  Regularly combines 
verbal + nonverbal 
whether certain or 
uncertain, {0-1}
Q  Brief objective 
phrases about the 
story, {0-1}
0  Mainly 
demonstrated 
nonverbally by 
following classroom 
rules and 
procedures, {0-1}
52 Does not deal wel 
with uncertainty 
behavioraily, {0-1}
0  Responds better in 
group activities 
because she is 
reliant on peers, 
{0 -1}
(2 Mainly linked to 
classroom rules or 
family activities 
{0-1}
"You could make 
either one it all 
depends what kind 
of stuff you have to 
make it," (gestures) 
{0-4}
Shhhhh, you need 
to be quiet not it is 
time to tsten to the 
story," {0-4}
ABSOLUTIST {0-7}
52 "In that story 
(pointing) Max 
misses fis mommy 
I rciiss my mommy 
too but I know she 
comes to get me,' 
{0-3}
52 "Orly I know what 
this is. I'm drawing 
it fcr my daddy to 
show him what book 
we read," (pointing 
andfaciai gestures) 
{0-4}
52MULTlPLIST{0-7}j
52 No evaluativistic 
statements. Does 
not even repeat 
peers evaluativistic 
statements but 
becomes silly, 
animated, and 
disruptive. It 
appears often as a 
coping mechanism 
for a lack of 
understanding or 
lack of background 
knowledge, {0-I|
52EVALUATIVI5T {0-6} j
52 Extremely focused 
on self (egocentric) 
but dependent on 
others, {0-1}
52 Never really can 
articulate her source 
of knowledge it is 
more inferred in her 
statements or 
behaviors, {0-1}
52 Internal source of 
knowledge is based 
more on affect than 
experience, {0-1}
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EPI5TEMIC
PROF LE; AMY
Q  RESULT #2:
As her knowledge 
and thinking 
becomes more 
complex she has less 
independent 
thinking & 
demonstrates more 
animated behaviors. 
More disruptive 
and less engaged. 
{0-2}
52 RESULT «:
Strongly influenced 
by peers, often 
requires peer 
interaction to 
respond. Source 
linked to book and 
family, Her personal 
experience 
responses are rarely 
coherent, {0-2}
52 RESULT #4; 
Associations are to 
the book or follows a 
peer response,
Very animated, 
disruptive, and 
incoherent, {0-2}
52 Certain {0-8}
52 Regularly combines 
verbal + nonverbal 
whether certain or 
uncertain, {0-1}
52 Extremely focused 
o n  s e l f (egocentric) 
tut dependent on 
others. {0-1}
52 Does not deal well I 
with uncertainty ! 
behavioraily, {0-1} j
52 Responds better ini 
group activities 
because she is 
reliant o 
{0 - 1}
52 Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0-16}
Source {0-24} 52 Tustification {0-13}
52 Never really can 
articulate her source 
of knowledge it is 
more inferred in her 
statements or 
behaviors, {0-1}
1 peers.
I Internal source of 
knowledge is based 
more on affect than 
experience, {0-1}
"You could make 
' either one it all 
depends what kind 
of stuff you have to 
make it," (gestures) 
{0-4}
I "Only I know what 
this is. I'm drawhg 
it for my daddy to 
show him what book 
we read," (pointing 
and facial gestures) 
{0-4}
52 "He w a n ts  to  go  
ho m e b e c a u s e  h e  
m isses his m am m a. 
That IS v e r y  sa d  an d  j  
is sa d ,"  {0-4}
52 tf you could build a 
snowman what 
would it look like?
Like a reindeer and a 
snowman because if 
I would do that I 
would make a big 
snowman and a little 
reindeei. I would 
give it eyes, and 
nose, and forehead, 
and hair. An I 
woulod put pins in 
it's hail so it would 
look pretty," {0-3}
52 How do you know
that plants and
trees grow outside?
"They grow outside
--------- - ----* because they grow
outside the carpet
outside, they need
dirt and water to
grow." {0-5} |
52 "The forest really
did grow in fdax's
room but that won't
happen in my room
because 1 have' » bunkbeds and I am
on top because I'm
the biggest between
me and my sister."
{0-2}
52 Limited background I 
knowledge. Socially g 
knows the process 
but cannot follow 
through,{0-1}
52 Justifications are j 
linked to book or I 
peers, {0-1} I
52 She starts to offer 
evidence for 
knowledge but 
quickly diesengages, 
{0 -1}
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isa
isa
Q  Carl Result #2; 
Complex and 
Uncertainty occurs 
due to teacher or 
peer interaction. 
Certainty evolves 
from internal or 
family ideas, 
Primarily observed 
within group 
settings. (0-2}
(J Carl Result#!; 
Fluctuates between 
flbsobutist and 
Hultiplist view of 
knowledge. Begins 
with Simple and 
Certain responses 
but when probed 
can have more 
Complex and 
Uncertain
perspectives, {0-2}
Q  ABSOLUTIST {0-5}
W  Simplicity {0-5}
jo  Verbal -F Nonverbal 
responses, {0-1}
isaQ  Initially single word 
responses. 
Requires probing. 
{0 -1}
Q  Responses in 
relationship to the 
book, classroom 
rules, and personal 
experience. {0-1}
0  "That was a monkey 
in Dora the 
Explorer." 
Associates the 
characters from the 
story to pop culture 
toys. {0-5}
Nature of 
Knowledge {0-14} M
Q  Certainty {0-11}
QMULTIPLIST {0-5} I .
Yes, I like the hot 
weather and I like to 
get hot and it is hot 
in the summer here.”
m
QEVALUATIVI5T{CF^ .
JJ Asking teacher r 
peer questions. 
{0 -1}
QMultiplistic certainty 
is mainly internal 
(imagination) or 
personal
experiences, {0-1}
Quick and confident 
with brief responses. 
Generated from 
classroom rules or 
the story. {0-1}
5 Follows classrol 
rules. {0-1}
Q  Follows peetfl
Q  "Weil they said I 
had a nightmare but 
I am not sure. It 
was funny and I had 
to wake-up while I 
was sleeping." {0-5}
J "I have been on a 
plane but 1 have not 
been on a 
helicopter, I think 
they ate different." 
{0-5}
^  "when we were 
outside and it was 
hotwe watered the 
tomato plants but 
they still died 
because the sun is 
too hot for them to 
bake." {0-4}
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IÛEPI5TEMIC 
PROFILE; CARL
isult #2; 
îxand
ainty occurs 
teacher or 
teracticn, 
ity evolves 
iternal or 
ideas.
ly observed 
group 
IS. {0-2}
. X 0  Carl Result #3; 
Combines verbal 
with nonverbal. 
Makes associations 
primarily to personal 
e/perience, pretend 
and family. {0-2}
j Carl Result #4; 
lustifications 
revolve around the 
book or theme and 
personal experience j 
and elaboration to 
pretend world. {0-2} I
jo  Asking teacher or I 
peer questions. IM I
IQ Quick and confident 
with brief responses. 
Generated from 
classroom rules or 
the story. {0-1}
Q foIIows classroom] 
rules. {0-1} I
I Follows peers. {0-1}
QRespects and 
follows authority. 
{0 -1}
Q  Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0-12}
Q  Source {0-16}] Q  Justification {0-11} ]
Q  Multiplistic certainty 
' is mainly internal 
(imagination) or 
personal
experiences. {0-1}J
Q  "We all have to 
listen and do what 
Mr, I says to do.
He is the teacher 
and he will tell our 
parents if we don't. 
{0-4}
Q "I was hiking in the 
woods like them 
(pointing) with my 
mommy and daddy 
and they showed me 
how to use the stick 
to help me walk up 
the big hill." {0-4}
a sun is
I them to }
Q  Mainly off topic, 
relates to pretend 
world. {0-1}
Q  links his personal 
experience to 
knowledge from the 
book or theme. {0-1}
Q  "No, bears need 
their boots back 
because it isn't right 
to take somebody's 
boots. That's why 
they should say 
please or they need 
to give them back or 
you take them 
away." {0-5}
Q  "I was walking up a 
mountain with my 
mommy and I got 
tired because the hill I 
was Nghandmy legs] 
are short “{0-5}
Q"1 know how the
baby bears feels
because I was a
\ baby bear (pointing
X to the picture) like
this one little baby
bear and someone
took my boots," "I
would take them
away from them but
! would say please
and they should get
in big trouble
because it is not nice
to take other bears
things, "If someone
took Hannah's
bout...." {0 3}-
Q^ '^They weren't 
friends at the end 
because she took 
her boots but then 
they were waving so 
I think that moans 
they ended up 
friends." {0-2}
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QQGIRE5ULT#1: 
Knowledge is 
represented in all 3 
developmental levels 
and across alt 4 
dimensions of 
knowledge. 
Overwhelmingly 
MulUplistic view of 
knowledge. {0 2}
EMSTEMIC
PROPILE: GIGI 
{04}
\  /isa
} GIGI RESULT #2: 
Knowledge Is simple 
and uncertain.
When limited prior 
knowledge Is a 
factor she resorts 
to a repetiore of 
animated behaviors. 
{0 -2}
QG1G1RESU.T #3; 
Source of 
Knowledge shifts 
from internal to 
external,
Independent thinker 
and contemplates 
responses seriously. 
Difficulty making 
decisions based on 
source, {0-2} \
iQ Nature of
Knowledge {0-20} I ^
Q  Short responses but 
tan elabot'Ste when 
probed. {O-lf
Q  More absolutist 
regarding peers and 
classroom rules.
QMsotun^^,
QHUlTIPLlSTjO^.
0  "No, you can only
wear your bathing
suit when you go
------------ ► swimming and you
don't go swimming in
the winter time,"
{04}
[ EVALUAIWI5T
Q “Iam not your
friend. Little bear
------------ ► has one friend and!
am friends withR,"
{0-3}
{J'Tf you go away
from your mommy
and daddy,
stranoers can come
and get you, But
sometime 1 get
scared because I 
think I dont want to 
be taken away from 
my mommy and 
daddy. They make 
me safe." {0-2}
’ isa
I Source jo-27} I
p  Associations 
primarily With the  
book and linked to 
personal
experiences.' {04}
JJ Uses imagination j 
and pretend. {0-1} isa/
Q  when she doesn't 
know she will say “l| 
don't know" or say f 
"That's sily" 
accompanied by 
facial and body 
gestures. {0-1}
} Begins with internal 
source and links it to 
the book. Uses 
many nonverbal 
cues with her 
words, {0-1}
({"They are hiding
from their mom and
they are hiding in
the snow."
(pointing) {0-3}
(J “I wear a hat and I 
mittens when it Is 
winter so I stay 
warm and I don't get 
sick. If I get sick 
then 1 don't want to 
take medicine, 
YUCKI"{0-4}
Q  "No Silly, flowers
and trees can't
grow inside because
they need to grow
, ► big and tall like me.
See, I am big and
tail." (compares
hetself to a peer)
(gestures) {0 3}
Q  "In the story, his 
mom said,'go to 
sleep Max.' Uses 
many facial and 
body gestures. 
{04}
Q"I have two dogs 
and I think they are 
nicer than those 
dogs (pointing). I 
have Land I 
love them and they 
love me back." {0-4}
{ j  "Ma>'h,ad J boat 
o u tille  Ins vv)nij-)w 
iiilii-.urmijiridtiunj liewcinied^ iotw? 
iMfjeiiii(), lift 
w.mrcd i(
It».- w,lilted til to
see I IIS frRiriih, The 
Wf’s,“{U-3}
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&E5ULT#1: 
(edge is 
►anted in all 3 
fcpmental levels 
[cross all 4 
jsions of 
[edge. RheblTigly 
llistic view of 
ledge. {0-2}
QEPI5TEM1C
PROFILE: GIGI
\ca
0  Natuie of
Knowledge {0-20} j
{QGI RESULT #2: 
Knowledge Is simple 
and uncertain. 
When limited prior 
knowledge is a 
factor she resorts 
to 0 repetiore of 
animated behaviors, {02}
{ GIGI RESULT #3: 
Source of 
Knowledge shifts 
from internal to 
external,
independent thinker 
and contemplates 
responses seriously. 
Difficulty making 
decisions based on 
source. {0-2}
Q gIGI result #4: 
Justifications are 
integrated with 
simple and certain 
knowledge. 
Associations to the 
book, classroom 
rules, family, and 
personal
experiences. {0 2}
\
/
0  Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0-18}
?Souice{U-27}|
CJ Associations 
primarily with the 
book and linked to 
personal
experiences." {0-l}l
0  Uses imaçnation I 
and pretend, {0-l}|
/
/
Q  When she doesn't 
know she will say “1 
don't know" or say 
"That's*" 
accompanied by 
facial and body 
gestures. {04}
Q  Begins with internal 
source and links it to 
the book, Uses 
rr,any nonverbal 
cues with her 
words. {0*1}
Q  "I wear a hat and 
mittens when it is 
writer so I stay 
warm and I don't get 
sick. If I get sick 
then I don't want to 
take medicine, 
YUCK!"{0-4}
d'No silly, flowers
and trees can't
grow inside because
they need to grow
big and taSIike me.
See, I am big and
tall." (compares
herself to a peer)
(gestures) {0-3}
Q  "I have two dogs 
and I think they are 
nicer than those 
dogs (pointing). I 
haveB&Landl 
love them and they 
love me back." {0-4}
|0  Justification {0-21} j 
IL V-
Q  "They are hiding 
from their mom and 
they are hiding in 
the snow." 
(pointing) {0-3}
0  "In the story, his 
mom said, ‘go to 
sleep Max.' Uses 
many facial and 
body gestures, 
{0-4}
isa---------- k
Q  “Sometime you 
have to wear your 
coat because it is 
cold, like in the 
winter it is cold," 
{0-3}
Q  "I like to sing the 
hello song because I 
know all of the krds 
names, you have to 
watch me do it 
sometime I want you 
do see bow I know 
al the names," {0-3}
Q  “Max had a boat Q  "I'm making a
outside his window monster to look like
in his imagination. the WT's and I'm
he wanted it so he going to name it J
made it up, He isa--------- ^ like my sister and it
wanted it because Is going to be so
he wanted to go to scary but youwon't
see Ns friends. The even know it IS
WT's,“{0-3} scary." {0-2}
Typically related toi 
tf^ e book or I 
classroom rules andl 
procedures, {0-1} I
{jwhen referring toj 
family it is in an I 
abscdutist view. I
{0-1} I
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EPISTEHIC S 
PROFILE; JEREMY j 
{0-4}
mgle word 
responses even 
when probed, {0-1}
^  Mainly when 
knowledge pertain: 
to the book or 
theme, {0-1}
JEREMY RESULT 
#l;{0-2} JEREMY RESULT #2: {0-2} JEREMY RESULT #3; {0-2}
Nature of
Knowledge {0-16}®
^Simplicity {0-8}
are
repetitive. {0-1}
Verbal +  Nonverbal 
{0-16}
rMULT]PLI5T{0-6}l
^  "Look (pointing) |
that momma bear is I
hugging the baby I---------- ^ bear. I like hugs, 1
my daddy gives me I
hugs too." {0-3} p
isa
[EVALUATIVIST{0-5}J .isa.
.isa.
Involves classroom 
rules or personal 
experiences related 
to the story. {0-1}
Internal soirees are I 
linked to emotional I 
dispostition.{0-l} I
are most typical. 
{0-1}
characters to self'l 
{0-1}
"Yes" "No" ' 
Things" {0-4}ABSOLUTIST {0-6}
; "We have to get 
ready for the story 
first and to get 
ready for the story 
you sit like this." 
{0-4}
.isa.
isa
[ "I am afraid of 
monsters but he 
would have ttiem as 
friends, not me. 
{0-5}
t
isa
f "When you don't 
follow the right way, 
you get lost. Once! 
got lost and it no 
fun." {0-3}
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EPISTEMIC 
PROFILE; JEREMY 
{0-4}
JEREMY RESULT 
#3; {0-2}
JEREMY RESULT 
#4; {0-2}
Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0-14}
Source {0-20}
y  Responses are 
repetitive, {0-1}
Internal sources are 
linked to emotional 
dispostition. {0-1}
Because."{0-1}
■f Nonverbal
Parents and peers 
are most typical 
{0 -1}
respond using 
evidence from 
classroom content or 
personal 
experiences. {0-1}
Involves classroom 
rules or personal 
experiences related 
to the story. {0-1}
Compares
characters to self
Those bears will 
get in trouble 
because they ran 
from the momma 
bear and she will be 
mad and them bears 
will be in big trouble. 
{0-3}
Some of them are 
purple and some are 
green but some are 
black (pointing)
Look can you see? 
They are like 
Transformers," {0-4}
I like the Wild 
Things but I am 
afraid of monster 
so I would run real 
fast, My mommy 
says there is no 
monsters." {0-4}
^  "1 had it first so he
can't h-ave it
because I'm still
... 1 ► needing it to color
Blackout so it looks
how I want it, life on
the TV."{0-2}
I
isa
fan't
(jtway, 
TOnce I
 ^"No, he looks like 
Blackout just like in 
the TV. Adam has 
one and I looked at 
it." {0-2}
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RESULT 1: 
Fluctuates between 
Absolutist and 
Multiplist views of 
knowledge. (0-2)
EPI5TEMIC 
PROFILE; TRLJOY 
(0-4)
0  RESULT 2 
Certainty of 
knowledge is the 
strongest 
represented.
Strong associations 
with personal 
experiences, 
parents, or 
imagination, (0-2)
0  Very limited 
interaction with 
others. Most 
knowledge comes 
from within or family. 
Combines verbal 
and nonverbal 
expressions to help 
convey meaning. 
(0-1)
Q  Expresses her 
knowledge in terms 
of rules or close to 
the storyline, (0-1)
Q  Nature of 
Knowledge (0-11)
S^inple(W4^
? ABSOLUTISTM]|-
^  "Now that's two 
snails, they move 
slow. And ladybugs 
they ttiove really 
slow too but not our 
class, we move fast 
but we are not real 
ladybugs. We/they 
go just a little bit 
slow, like this 
(gesture).' (0-4)
Q  "I learned that 
everybody don't hit 
each other and keep 
my body safe. My 
knowledge is I think 
in my head." (0-3)
(J Frequent use of "I 
can't be sure." 
"Sometimes' "You 
never know." "I 
don't know but my 
mommy does." (0-1)
"You get punished if 
your bad, 
Sometimes you can 
get punished even 
when you don't 
know." (0-4)
' I
isa
Q  "I am making a 
princess going to a 
big party. Like when 
I pretend I am a 
real princess and I 
dress-up. That's 
when 1 put on a 
pretend dress but it 
is a real dress and I 
pretend it is 
beautiful (gestures), 
"(0-4)
Q  Consistently 
provides a relevant 
response and make 
a connection to her 
experience or 
pretend world but 
typically
acknowledjes that 
there may be other 
options.-(0-1)
Q  References
classroom topic or
story. (0-1)
U  Links knowledge to 
family. (O-I)
Q  fdakes associations 
to personal 
experiences and 
internal affective 
dispositions. (0-1)
Q  Does not seem to 
be impacted by 
peer verbal or 
nonverbal behaviors 
as a means to 
respond.(0-1)
QEVALUATm5T(0-3)j.
Q  "Sometimes the 
bears should be in 
trouille for not 
listening to the mom 
but sometimes it is 
different.
Sometimes I have to 
listen to my mommy 
and sometimes I 
have to my dad's 
way because I don't 
want to get in 
trouble but it is 
different ' (0-3)
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Q  EPISTEHIC I 
PROFILE: TRUDY ! 
(04}
T2
of
. is tfie
St
nted,
associations
tsonai 
lences, 
ts,or 
ation. (0 2}
RESULT 3: Makes 
associations from 
tier internal pretend 
world to ttie real 
world, Family is ttie 
only external source 
of knowledge 
referenced. (0-2}
} RESULT 4; 
.lustificatbns are 
limited to Absolutist 
and Multiplistic views 
and occur only wtien 
probed. (0-2}
} Nature and Process I 
of Knowing (0-10} I
fled if
pucan
even
n't
ga
a to a 
ewfien 
na 
d l  
Jiat's 
na
s but it 
5 and I
Frequent use of "I 
can't be sure." 
"Sometimes" "You 
never know." "I 
don't know but my 
mommy does," (0-1}
References 
classroom topic or 
story, (0-t}
Q  Consistently 
provides a relevant I 
response and make j  
a connection to her | 
experience or 
pretend world but 
typically
acknowledges that I 
there may be other | 
options. (0-1}
f j  Links knowledge to 
family. (0-1}
0  Makes associations 
to personal 
experiences and 
internal affective 
dispositions. (0-1}
Does not seem to 
be impacted by 
peer verbal or 
nonverbal behaviors 
as a means to 
respond.{0-1}
J "My mommy knows 
how to dress In the 
winter, she makes 
me wear a coat and 
hat and mittens so I 
keep warm and 
safe." (0-4)
"I know everything 
that's about 
penguins. I 
watched penguins 
at the zoo, so I 
know they live in the 
cold like bears do 
too." (0-4)
U "Those monsters in 
that book (pointing) 
are scary liecause 
they are scary and
ugly. They are 
growling their teeth 
and they have big 
bugging eyes." (0-4)
!
isa
{J "I like to dress-up 
like a princess 
because my mommy 
and daddy ttiink Tm 
so pretty and then 1 
feel pretty and 
beautiful, (0-3)
\
Q  Serious in her 
responses and 
appears to 
contemplate, 
Strong association 
to pretend world, 
personal
experiences, and 
family. (0-1)
iJJ Typically uses 
certain/uncertain 
knowledge to justify 
her knowledge. 
Strong link to the 
classroom, personal 
experiences, and 
pretend ideas, (0-1)
\ "I was afraid of the monsters in the WT's 
because once 1 
watched a scary 
movie and it gave 
me really bad 
dreams and I 
couldn't sleep good, 
so, I slept with my 
mommy and daddy.
1 don't like those 
bad dreams." (0-2)
is the 
(be in 
t
emom 
mes it is
11 have to 
y mommy 
mes I
d's
|se I don't | 
bin
"1 think the mom 
should be different 
because if he's so 
bad and it hurts her 
ears then she could 
have walked him 
right up to his room. 
That's what my 
mommy would do to 
me." (0-2)
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ADAM RESULT #1: 
Knowledge is 
represented in all 3 
developmental levels 
and across all 4 
dimensions of 
knowledge, 
Overwhelmingly 
I'lultiplistic view of 
knowledge, (0-1}
EPISTEHIC
PROFILE: ADAM
^  Nature and process 
of knowing are 
complex and 
connected, {0-1}
} The more 
integrated or 
complex his 
knowledge Is the 
more he combines 
verbal and 
nonverbal 
descriptions. {0-2}
Nature of
Knowledge {0-23}* 4
Simple {0-23}~[ Q  Certain {0-9}
ADAM RESULT #2: 
Simple and Certain 
Knowledge have a 
strong relationship 
with his personal 
experiences with 
family and peers. 
Integration of 
background 
knowledge and 
classroom learning. 
{0-2}
\
Q  ADAM RESULT #3] 
Nature of Knowlef 
is more developed 
individually, wher| 
the Nature and 
Process of KnowiiJ 
is represented at I  
more integrated 
level. {0-2}
; Accepts what Is 
understood and 
articulates 
justification, {0-2}
0  Affectively and 
behavioraily more 
stable and positive 
when knowledge is 
certain. However, 
when knowledge is 
unscertain he asks 
questions, when 
there is
understanding he 
maintains his 
positive nature. 
Otherwise his 
knowledge becomes 
more fragmented 
and his disposition 
becomes more 
negative and 
unstable. {0-1}
ptay close toS 
classroom top| 
{0-3}
0  Simple knowledge is 
more affective leads 
to questions and 
more internal 
curoisity {0-2}
Q  No sign of external | 
failure but signs of 
Internal conflict i.e.,| 
poor eye contact 
and very quiet, not 1 
so animated, {0 2} [
J External sources o 
knowledge typicalljj 
get interpreted 
internally and if noj 
disengagement is j 
the result. {0-3}
J "But angels live In I 
Heaven, and God, 
and bugs too, and 
bugs too." {0-4}
A bsolutist {o-9}|
0  "Now that's two 
snails. They move 
really slow, And 
lady bugs; tliey 
move really slow 
too, They just go a 
little bit slow, like 
this (indicating with 
gesture)." {0-4}
T
} "Sometimes when 
I’m sick I have to go 
to the doctor and I 
get a shot right here 
(points to arm) then 
I got hurt," {0-6}
QMULTIPtl5T{0^.
0  "1 learn that
everybody dont hit
each other and keep
> their bodies safe
because I yrant to
have friends." {0-5}
4
I
"Because I think it's 
disgusting." {0-4}
Q"Wehavetj 
sweaters so| 
can go out si 
that's what'ij 
mommy sayr
0  "Urn, I didi)l 
Only my gr)| 
cried bee* 
worried a 
Tfien they J 
m.iybe Cxi 
stay with yg 
{0 6)
EVALUATIVlST {0-7}
"Somebody would
steal it and bring
---- :------ ► them home, and
never come back."
{0-3}
Q  “T thini'. so they canj 
go to sleep aniJ 
have energy to fish I  
but maybe not."
"^11 mil jilting 
iiipgfilKjriv*
hlcxW- 
tivis, he hnji 
more about ij 
than me."
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QEPI5TEHIC
PROF LE; ADAM
ADAM RESULT #2: 
Simple and Certain 
Knowledge have a 
strong relationship 
with his personal 
experiences with 
family and peers. 
Integration of 
background 
knowledge and 
classroom learning, 
(0-2)
[ADAM RESULT #3; 
Nature of Knowledge 
is more developed 
individually, whereas 
the Nature and 
Process of Knowing 
Is represented at a 
more integrated 
level. {0-2}
QADAMRESUtT #4:
Source of
Knowledge is dearly 
shifts from internal 
to external in 
nature. {0-2}
Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0-21}
^Accepts what is 
understood and 
articulates 
justification, {0-2} I
Q  Certain {0-9}
Affectively and 
behaviorally more 
stable and positive 
when knowledge is 
certain. However, 
when knowledge is 
unscertain he asks 
questions, when 
there is
understanding he 
maintains his 
positive nature. 
Otherwise his 
knowledge becomes 
more fragmented 
and his disposition 
becomes more 
negative and 
unstable, {0-1}
Q  Simple knowledge is 
more affective leads 
to questions and 
more internal 
curoisity {0-2}
Stay close to the 
classroom topic, 
(0-3)
j Usually integrates 
personal experience 
or family. {0-2}
t
No sign of external 
failure but signs of 
internal conflict i.e., 
poor eye contact 
and very quiet, not 
so animated, {0-2}
isa \  isa
1
Q  Combination of 
sources is how he 
makes decisions 
about bis behavior 
and knowledge. 
{0-5}
isa Source {0-26} 1 ka , Q  Justification {0-21} ||+isa_
y t  1
I "Sometimes when 
I I'm sick I have to go 
to the doctor and I 
get a shot right here 
(points to arm) then 
I got hurt." {0-6}
I External sources of I 
knowledge typically! 
get interpreted 
internally and if not; 
disengagement is 
the result. {0-3}
Q  "No. My sister said 
no fighting; that's 
bad." {0-4}
\ 0  When knowledge is 
already linked and 
more certain more 
animated with 
justifcations and 
more confident. 
{ 0-2}
1 done know. {0-4}
Because I think it's 
disgusting,” {0-4}
11 think so they can 
go to sleep and 
have energy to fish 
but maybe not." 
{0-3}
Q  "We have to get 
sweaters so that we 
can go outside, 
that's what my 
mommy says,"{0-4}
"Urn, I didnT cry, || 
Only my grandpa 
cried because they 
worried about him. 
Then they said 
maybe Coco can 
stay with you,"
{0 - 6 }
J|"Itiriightme 
megatron who killed 
Blackrut, I will ask 
Elvis, he knows 
more about that 
than me," (0-3}
4V Q  Because it's only for S 
kids, {0-4} 5
t
isa
1
D Well yeah but 
tornados goes round 
and round so 1 can't 
ever go on there 
because I don't like 
around and around. 
{0-3} .
A
isa
1
Q  Because I needed 
to take the Karate, 
{0-3}
isa
1
"All of them are the 
same but they look 
different, like me.
My mommy is white 
like you and my 
daddy is really black. 
I'm just brown." 
{0-2}
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J RESULT #1: 
Primarily Absolutist 
view of knowledge 
across all four 
dimensions of 
knowledge, 
Requires probing 
and redirection, 
(0 -2 )
EPI5TEM1C 
PROFILE: AMY 
(0-4)
------------------L
Q  RESULT #2:
As her knowledge 
and thinWng
isa/ isa\
becomes more
complex she has less
independent
thinking 8,
demonstrates more
animated behaviors.
More disruptive
and less engaged.
(0-2)
O'
Q  Brief objective 
phrases about the 
story, (O-I)
Nature of
Knowledge(0-I8}' ^
Simple {O-iej-J Certain (0-8)
Q  Extremely focused 
on self (egocentric) 
but dependent on 
others. (0-1)
Regularly combines 
verbal -f nonverbal 
whether certain or 
uncertain, (O-I)
JJ Mainly 
demonstrated 
nonverbally by 
following classroom 
rules and 
procedures, (0-1)
0  Never really can 
articulate her source 
of knowledge it is 
more Inferred in her 
statements or 
behaviors, (0-1)
Q  Does not deal wel 
with uncertainty 
behaviorally. (0-1)
Q  Responds better 
group activities 
because she is 
reliant on peers 
(0-1)
0  Mainly linked to 
classroom rules or 
family activities. 
(0 -1)
Internal source of 
knowledge is based 
more on affect than 
experience. (0-1)
y  "You could make 
either one it all 
depends what kind 
of stuff you have to 
make it," (gestures) 
(0-4)
y  "Shhhhh, you need 
to be quiet not it is 
time to listen to the 
story," (0-4)
y  ABSOLUTIST (0-7) I
y  "In that story 
(pointing) Max 
misses his mommy 
I miss my mommy 
too but 1 know she 
comes to get me 
(0-3)
y  "Only I know what 
this is, Tm drawing 
it for my daddy to 
show him what book 
we read." (pointing 
and facial gestures) 
(0-4)
yMULTlPllST(0-7}[
Q  No evâlualivistic 
statements, Does 
not even repeat 
peers evaluativistic 
statements but 
becomes silly, 
animated, and 
disruptive. It 
appears often as 
coping mechanism 
for a lack of 
understanding or 
lack of background 
knowledge,
|yEVALUATlVlST (0-6) |
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yEPISTEHIC 
PROFILE: AML 
(04)
y  RESULT #2;
As her knowledge 
and thinking 
becomes more 
complex she has less 
independent 
thinking & 
demonstrates more 
animated behaviors. 
More disruptive 
and less engaged.
M
y  RESULT #3 
Strongly influenced 
by peers, often 
requires peer 
interaction to 
respond. Source 
linked to book and 
family. Her personal 
experience 
responses are rarely 
coherent. (8-2)
y  RESULT #4: 
Associations are to 
the book or follows aj 
peer response.
Very animated, 
disruptive, anti 
incoherent. (0-2)
Tisa^ y  Regularly combines 
verbal + nonverbal 
whether certain or 
uncertain. (0-1) 
n  ' '
y  Does not deal wel I 
with uncertainty j 
behaviorally. (0-1) I
y  Extremely focused 
on self (egocentric) 
but dependent on 
others. (0-1)
y  Responds better in 
group activities 
because she is 
reliant on peers. 
(0 -1)
y  Never really can 
articulate her source 
of knowledge it is 
more inferred in her 
statements or 
behaviors. (0-1)
Nature and Process 
of Knowing (0-16)
Justification (0-18)
} Internal source of 
knowledge is based 
more on affect than 
experience. (0-1)
j  could make 
|r one it all 
fids what kind 
kff you have to 
tit,“(gestures)
y  "He wants to go ^  
home because he 
misses his mamma. 
That is very sad and 
is sad." (0-4)
f I know what 
I'm drawing 
1 my daddy to 
p him what book 
"(pointing 
facial gestures)
y  If you could build a 
snowman what 
would it look like? 
tike a reindeer and a 
snowman because if 
1 would do that ! 
would make a big 
snowman and a little 
reindeer. 1 would 
give it eyes, and 
nose, and forehead, 
and hair. Anl 
woulod put pins in 
it's hair so it would 
look pretty." (0-3)
^  How do you know 
that plants and 
trees grow outside? 
"They grow outside 
because they grow 
outside the carpet 
outside, they need 
dirt and water to 
grow,"(0-S)
1
isa
y  "The forest really j 
did grow in Max's 
room but that won't 
happen in my room 
because 1 have 
bunkbeds and 1 am 
on top because I'm 
the biggest between 
me and my sister," 
(0-2)
y  Limited bacliground 
knowledge. Socially 
knows fie process 
but cannot follow 
through. (0-1)
y  Justifications are I 
linked to book or |  
peers. (0-1) I
y  She starts to offer 
evidence for 
knowledge but 
quickly diesengages. 
(0-1)
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Q  Carl Result#!; 
Fluctuates between 
Absolcutist and 
Multiplist view of 
knowledge, Begins 
with Sinple and 
Ceitain responses 
but when probed 
can have more 
Complex and 
Uncertain
perspectives. (0-2}
EPI5TEMIC 
PROFILE: CARL 
{0-4}
Nature of
Knowledge {0-14}* *
Q  Carl Result #2; 
Complex and 
Uncertainty occurs 
due to teacher or 
peer interaction. 
Certainty evolves 
from internal or 
family ideas. 
Primarily observed 
within group 
settings. (0-2}
Qamplicity{C^
JJ Verbal -F Nonverbal 
responses, {01}
{J Initially single word 
responses. 
Requires probing. 
{0 -1}
Q  Responses in 
relationship to the 
book, classroom 
rules, and personal 
experience. {0-1}
Q  ABSOLUTIST {0-5} I .
^  "That was a monkey 
in Dora the 
Explorer," 
Associates the 
characters from the 
story to pop culture 
toys, {0-5}
QCertantHOC^
Q  "Well they said I 
had a nightmare but 
I am not sure. It 
was funny and 1 had 
to wake-up while I 
was sleeping," {0-5}
isa
isa
Q  Asking teacher c 
peer questions. 
{0 -1}
^  Multiplistic certainty 
is mainly internal 
(imagination) or 
personal
experiences. {0-1}
Q  Quick and confident 
with brief responses. 
Generated from 
classroom rules or 
the story. {0-1}
J Follows classror 
rules. {01}
Q  Follows peers,1
0  MULTIPLIST ( 0 ^ .
^  Yes, I like the hot 
weather and I like to 
get hot and it Is hot 
in the summer here." 
{0-3}
OEVALUATIVIST (0-4} | .
Q  "1 have been on a
plane but I have not
been on a-------------- p. helicopter, I think
they are different."
(0-5} ■
Q  "When we were 
outside and it was 
hot we watered the 
tomato plants but 
they stii died 
because the sun is 
too hot for them to 
bake." {0-4}
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JJEPISTEMIC 
PROFILE: CARL 
#4}
isult #2:
!x and 
ainty occurs
tteacher or ter action, ity evolves 
iternal or 
ideas, 
ly observed 
group
IS. (0-3
Q  Carl Result #3: 
Combines verbal 
with nonverbal. 
Makes associations 
primarily to personal 
experience, pretend 
and family. (0-2(
Carl Result #4; 
Justifications 
revolve around the 
book or theme and 
personal experience 
and elaboration to 
pretend world. (0-2)-
Mature and Process 
of Knowing (0-12(
Q  Source (0-16}
Q  Asking teacher or 
peer questions. 
(0 -1}
Q  Quick and confident 
with brief responses. | 
Generated from 
classroom rules or 
the story. (0-1}
V
isa
isa
Follows peers. (0-1}
^  Follows classroom 
rules. (0-1}
^^ tficatioMOO^
0  Respects and 
follows authority. 
(0-1)
"153 V 
'isa
. Q  Mainly off topic, 
relates to pretend 
world. (0-1}
Links his personal 
experience to 
knowledge from the 
book or theme, (0-1} j
Multiplistic certainty 
is mainly internal 
(imagination) or 
personal
experiences. (0-1}
I
ebut
It
I had
ilel
(0-5}
Q  "We all have to 
listen and do what 
Mr. I says to do.
He is the teacher 
and he will tell our 
parents if we don't.' 
(0-4}
0 "No, bears need 
their boots back 
because It isn't right 
to take somebody's 
boots. That's why 
they should say 
please or they need 
to give them back or 
you take them 
away." (0-5} \
t \
in a 
venot
link
■ent."
{ "I was hiking in the 
woods like them 
(pointing) with my 
mommy and daddy 
and they showed me 
how to use the stick 
to help me walk up 
the big hill." (0-4}
Q  "I was walking up a
mountain with my
moirimy and I got
tired because the hill
was high and my legs
are short." (0-5}
"I know how the 
baby bears feels 
because I was a 
baby bear (pointing 
to the picture) like 
tills one little baby 
bear and someone 
took my boots." “I 
would take them 
away from them but 
1 would say please 
and tliey should get 
in big trouble 
because it is not rice 
to take other bears 
things, "If someone I 
took Hannah's 
boot " (U 3}"
ye 
was 
ed the 
shut
sun is 
lemto
^  "They weren't 
friends at the end 
because she took 
her boots but then 
they were waving so 
I think that means 
they ended up 
friends." (0-2}
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tjGlGl RESULT#!: 
Knowledge is 
repfesenledhall3 
developmental levels 
and across all 4 
dimensions of 
knowledge. 
OverwheWngly 
Multiplistic view of 
knowledge. {0-2f
{JEPI5TEM1C 
PROFILE: GIGI
(04}
\  /isa r
0  GIG! RESULT #2: 
Knowledge is simple 
and uncertain, 
When limited prior 
knowledge is a 
factor she resorts 
tea repetioieof 
animated behaviors, 
(0-2}
0  GIG! RESULT #3: 
Source of 
Knowledge shifts 
from internal to 
external.
IndependenUhinker 
and conlerrplates 
responses seriously, 
Difficulty making 
decisions based on 
source. {0-2} \
Q  Nature of 
Knowledge (0-20) I
y  \
0  Short responses but — 
can elaborate when 
probed. (O-I}
fjMore absolutist 
regarding peers and 
classroomrules. 
(0-1}
I^ Simplicrty {0-ll}j
CJ ABSOLUTIST (0-8}
Q  MULTIPLIST
Q 'I am not your
friend. Little bear
------------ ► has one friend and 1
am friends withR."
{0-3}
Q;evaluativisi{o-7}[.
Q  "If you go away
from you mommy
and daddy,
strangers can come
and get you. But
sometime I get
scared because I 
think I don't want to 
be taken away'from 
my mommy and 
daddy. They make 
me safe," (0-2}
{J Certainty {0-17} Source {0-27(1
0  Associations 
primarily with the 
book and linked to 
personal
experiences." (0-1} I
Q  Uses imagination I 
and pretend, (0-1}
y *  y
isa
/
Q When she doesn't 
know shew® say "I 
dont know" or say 
"That's s^y" 
accompanied by 
facial and body 
gestures. (0-1}
Q  Begins with internal 
source and knks it to 
the book. Uses 
many nonverbal 
cues with her 
words. (0-1}
Q  "1 wear a hat and 
mittens when it is 
winter so I stay 
warm and I don't get
sick. If I get sick 
then I don't want to 
take medicine, 
yUCKi" (0-4}
Qf "No silly, flowers I
and trees can't
grow inside because
they need to grow
------------ k big and tail lib me.
See, I am big and
tall." (cofTipares
herself toa peer)
(gestures) (0-3} |
0"No, you can only
wear your bathing 0  "They are hiding Q"In the story, his |
suit when you go from their mom and mom said, 'go to
swimming and you ---------- -isa----------- ». they are hiding in sleep Max.' Uses
don't go swWng in the sncHv."
... isa------------------------- many facial and
the winter time." (pointing) (0-3} body gestures.
(04} (0-4}
JJ "I have two dogs 
and I think they are 
nicer than those 
dogs (pointing). I 
have 6 8rL and I 
love them and they 
love me back." (04}
”H‘i' hôil àlMiîit
oitside hi', window
ii'iltrsioij'jn litMi,
li'jw»r.lodrt soIk.* 
iindf it uj ), He 
w,r,i f*d it because 
he wanted to go to 
sec his friends, The 
m :  (0-3}
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isa
 /
^  GIG! RESULT #2: 
Knowledge is simple 
and uncertain.
When limited prior 
knowledge is a 
factor she resorts 
toarepetiore of 
animated behaviors. 
{ 0 -2 }
QEPI5TEMIC 
PRCflLE: GIGI 
(04}
Q  GIGI RESULT #3; 
Source of 
Knowledge shifts 
from internal to 
external,
Independent thinlrer 
and contemplates 
responses seriously. 
Difficulty making 
decisions based on 
source. (0-2} \
Q  GIGI result M: 
Justifications are 
integrated with 
simple and certain 
knowledge. 
Associations to the 
book, classroom 
rules, family, and 
personal
experiences. {0-2}
Iture of I 
lowledge {0-20} I
\
Q  Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0*18}
Iba.
[Source (0-27} I
Q  Associations 
primarily with the 
book and knked to 
personal
experiences," {0-1}
j j  Uses pagination 
and pretend. (0-1}
/
/
Q  Wtien she doesn't 
know she will say "I 
dont know" or say 
"That's silly" 
accompanied by 
facial and body 
gestures. (0-1}
Q  Begins with internal 
source and links ^  to 
the book. Uses 
many nonverbal 
cues with her 
words. (0-1}
Q  "They are hiding
from their mom and
■ - ■ — ► they are hiding in
the snow."
(pointing) {0-3}
Q  "I wear a hat and 
mittens when it Is 
winter so I stay 
warm and I don't get 
sick, If I get sick 
then 1 don't want to 
take medicine, 
YUCKI" (0-4}
JJ "In the story, his 
mom said, 'go to 
sleep Max.' Uses 
many facial and 
body gestures, 
(0-4}
Q 'l have two dogs 
and I think they are 
nicei than those 
dogs (point'ng). I 
haveB&l. and I 
love them and they 
love me back." (0-4}
{J "Sometime you 
have to wear your 
coat because it is 
cold, like in the 
winter it is cold," 
{0-3}
0  "1 like to sing the 
helo song because I 
know all of tfte kids 
names, you have to 
watch me do it 
sometime I want you 
do see how I know 
all the names." {0-3} 1
Q "No siHy, flowers 1 
and trees can't 1 
grow inside becausel 
they need to grow 1
hig AnrltAlUiU= me. I ,<a ,
Q  "Max had a boat 
outside his window 
in tiis imagination, 
lie wanted it so he 
made it up. He 
wanted it becauseSee, I am big and I
tall." (compares 1 he wanted to go to
herself to a peer) | see his friends, The
(gestures) (0-3} | WT's." (0-3}
Q "I'm making a 
monster to looklik.e[ 
the WT's and I'm 
going to name it J 
like my sister and Æ | 
IS going to be so 
scary but youwontj 
even know it is 
fcary."(0-2}
Q  Typically related to 
the book or 
classroom rules and 
procedures. {0-1}
Qwhen referring toi 
family it is in an J 
absolutist view, 
(0-1}
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EPISTEMIC 
PROFILE; JEREMY[ 
{04}
Single word
responses even
when probed. {0-1}
/
Ü  Mainly when
knowledge pertains
to the book or
theme. {0-1}
isa^
JEREMY RESULT 
fl: {0-2} JEREMY RESULT #2 : {0-2} JEREMY RESULT #3:{0-2}
Nature of
Knowledge {0-16}* '*
: ABSOLUTIST{0-6}) . .isa.
f "Yes" "No" "Wild 
Tfiings" {0-4}
isa
Î MULTIPLIST
[ "Look (pointing) 
that momma bear is 
hugging the baby 
bear. I lik hugs, 
my daddy gives me 
hugs too,"{0-3}
isa
lEVALUATIVIST {0-5} .isa.
^  Certainty {0-15}|
are
repetitive. {0-1}
Verbal -F Nonverbal 
{0-16}
isa
J Involves classroom 
rules or personal 
expeiiences related 
to tfie story. {0-1}
Internal sources are I 
linked to emotional I 
dispostition. {0-1} I
f Parents and peers 
are most typical. 
{0 -1}
characters to sq 
{0-1}
0  "We have to get 
ready For the story 
First and to get
ready for the story 
you sit like this." 
{0-4}
1
isa
-isa------------------ ^
^  "I am afraid of 
monsters but he 
would have them as 
friends, not me. 
{0-5}
t
isa
1
^  "when you don't
follow the right way,
----------------------- > you get lost, Once I
got lost and it no
fun." {0-3} 1
.isa.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
EPISTEMIC 
PR' i^ ILE: JEREMY 
{0-4}
\
JEREMY RESULT 
#3; {0-2}
JEREMY RESULT 
#4: {0-2}
Nature and Process 
of Knowing {0-14}
Source {0-20}
are
repetitive. {0-1}
Internal sources are 
linked to emotional 
dispostition. {0-1}
Because, {0-1}
Verbal + Nonverbal 
{0-16} y  Parents and peers 
are most typical. 
{0-1}
respond using 
evidence from 
classroom content or 
personal 
experiences. {0-1}
Involves classroom 
rules or personal 
experiences related 
to the story. {0-1} characters to self 
{0 -1}
Those bears i 
get in trouble 
because they ran 
from the momma 
bear and she will be 
mad and them bears 
will be in big trouble." 
{0-3}
Some of them are 
purple and some are 
green but some are 
black (pointing)
Look can you see? 
They are like 
Transformers." {0-4}
oget 
he story 
get 
he story 
this,
lilce the Wild 
Things but I am 
afraid of monsters 
0 1 would run rea 
fast. My mommy 
says there is no 
monsters." {0-4}
of
ut he 
3 them as 
tme.
dont 
Ight way, 
t. Once I 
it no
^  "I had it first so he
can't have it
because I'm still
needing it to color
Blackout so it looks
how I want it, like on
the TV," {0-2}
"No, he looks like 
Blackout just like in 
The TV. Adam has 
one and I looked at 
it." {0-2}
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OPESULM: ' 1
Fluctuates between 
Absolutist and 
Wtipkt views o f  
knowledge. tO-2(
EP5TERIC
PROFILE: TRUDY
JJ RESULT 2: 
Certainty of 
knowledge is ttie 
strongest 
represented. 
Strong associations 
with personal 
experiences, 
parents, or 
imagination. {0-2)
0  Very limited 
interaction with 
others, Most 
knowledge comes 
from within or family. 
Combines verbal 
and nonverbal 
expressions to help 
convey meaning, 
{0- 1}
Q  Expresses her 
knowledge in terms 
of rules or close to 
the storyline, {0-1}
Nature of 
Knowledge {0-11}
^Certainty {0-7} [
QÂësôSrërMj — -
 ^"Now that's two 
snails, they move 
slow. And ladybugs 
they move really 
slow too but not our 
class, we move fast 
tut we are not real 
ladybugs, We|they 
go just a little bit 
slow, like this 
(gesture)." {0-4}
^  "You get punished if 
your bad. 
Sometimes you can 
get punished even 
when you don't 
know," {0-4}
T
J MULTIPLIST {0-4}l_Isa.
 ^"I learned that 
everybody don't hit 
each other and keep 
ray body safe. My 
knowledge is I think 
in my head." {0-3}
 ^"1 am making a 
princess going to a 
big party, Like when 
I pretend I am a 
real princess and I 
dress-up. That's 
when I put on a 
pretend dress but it 
is a real dress and 1 
pretend it is 
beautiful (gestures). 
"{0-4}
4
isa
I
UEVALUATIVIST{0-3}|
0  'Sometimes the 
bears should be in 
trouble for not 
listening to the mom 
but sometimes it is 
different.
Sometimes I have to 
listen to my triomtfiy 
and sometimes I 
have to my dad's 
way because I don't 
want to get in 
trouble but it is 
different." {0-3}
Q  Frequent use of "I 
can't be sure." 
"Sometimes" "You 
never know." "I 
don't know but my 
mommy does ."{0-1}
JJ References
classroom topic or
story. {0-1}
0  Links kno'wledge to 
family. {0-1}
Consistently 
provides a relayant 
respon'.ean'jmake 
a connection to her 
experience or 
pretend world but 
typically
acknowledges that 
there may be other 
options. {0-1}
Q Makes associations j 
to personal 
experiences and 
internal affective 
dispositions. {0-1} I
Does not seem to 
be impacted by 
peer verbal or 
nonverbal behaviors 
as a means to 
respond.{0-1}
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Delations 
nal
E^PISTEMIC 
PROFILE; TRUDY 
{0-4}
Q  RESULT 3; Makes 
assodattons from 
her internal pretend 
world to the real 
world. Family is tfie 
only external source 
of knowledge 
referenced. {0-2}
RESULT 4 
Justifications are 
limited to Absolutist 
and fdultiplistic views 
and occur only when 
probed,{0-2}
f Nature and Process I 
of Knowing {0-10} I
Q  Frequent use of "I 
can't be sure," 
"Sometimes" "You 
never know." "I 
don't know but my 
mommy does." {0-1}
Q  Consistently 
provides a relevant 
response and make 
a connection to her 
experience or 
pretend world but 
typically
acknowledges that 
there may be other 
options, {0-1}
References 
classroom topic or 
story, {0-1}
1 /Q  Links knowledge to family. {0-1}
J Makes associations 
to personal 
experiences and 
internal affective 
dispositions. {0-1}
0  Does not seem to 
be impacted by 
peer verbal or 
nonverbal behaviors 
as a means to
jyhen
dl
"I know everything 
that's about 
penguins, I 
watched penguins 
at the zoo, so 1 
know they live in the 
cold like bears do 
too." {0-4}
3 mom 
;itis
"I think the mom 
should be different 
because if tie's so 
bad and it hurts her 
ears then she could 
have walked him 
right up to his room. 
That's what my 
mommy would do to 
me. "{0-2}
Justification {0-8} I ^Serious in her 
responses and 
appears to 
contemplate. 
Strong association 
to pretend world, 
personal
experiences, and 
family, {0-1}
Typically uses 
certain/uncertain 
knowledge to justify 
her knowledge. 
Strong Ink to the 
classroom, personal 
experiences, and 
pretend ideas. {0-1}
"My mommy knows 
how to dress in the 
winter, she makes 
me wear a coat and 
hat and mittens so I 
keep warm and 
safe." {0 4}
0  "Those monsters in 
that book (pointing) 
are scary because 
they are scary and 
ugly. They are 
growling their teeth 
and they have big 
bugging eyes." {0-4}
1 \
\
0  "I like to dress-up
like a princess
because my mommy
and daddy tNnk Tm
so pretty and then 1
feel pretty and
beautiful. {0-3}
Q  "I was afraid of the 
monsters in the WT's 
because once I 
watched a scary 
movie and it gave 
me really bad 
dreams and I 
couldn't sleep good. 
So, I slept with my 
mommy and daddy.
I dont like those 
bad dreams." |0-2}
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